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Introduction 
The rate of growth of world trade continues to outpace 
that of economic growth by a significant margin, implying 
growing economic interdependence. Consequently, trade 
performance and trade policy play an increasingly important 
role in determining economic growth and welfare. As the 
European Community is the leading world trader of both 
merchandise and commercial services and accounts for a 
major part of international flows of foreign direct invest-
ment, its economic influence as a world trade partner is 
considerable. The Community is aware of this and assumes 
special responsibilities vis-a-vis third countries. In Europe, 
the Community is actively encouraging and promoting the 
transformation of the former centrally planned economies 
to market-based systems. In a broader context, the Com-
munity is helping less developed economies through trade 
and development policies. 
As a reflection of these considerations, the first part of this 
report is concerned with trade, integration and growth. It 
starts with a synopsis of Community trade in the 1980s. 
Thereafter, the issue of regional integration and trade is 
analysed, with particular emphasis on the new relationship 
of the EC with Central and Eastern Europe, and regional 
integration efforts among developing countries. The first 
part of this report closes with a description of the preferential 
regimes covering EC imports from developing countries.and 
of their variable trade and growth performance during the 
1980s. 
With respect to trade policy, recent years were marked by 
the ongoing GA TT Uruguay Round negotiations, in which 
the Community is a principal actor. As these talks remain 
to be successfully concluded, this report does not address 
the challenges and aspirations for a successful final result. 
Nevertheless, it was felt useful to provide analyses on new 
trade issues which are likely to increase in importance over 
the corning years and which have already been the subject 
of intense negotiations in the Uruguay Round. Conse-
quently, the second part of this report contains expert contri-
butions on trade and foreign direct investment, services, and 
trade-related intellectual property rights. 
In the remainder of this introduction, a short survey of the 
main contents of this report is provided. 
Part One on trade, integration and growth begins with a 
chapter which reviews the evolution of Community trade in 
the 1980s and notes that the EC continues to show a higher 
degree of trade openness than either the US or Japan. For 
merchandise trade, the Community has benefited from a 
favourable evolution in the terms of trade which has substan-
tially enhanced real income. Throughout the 1980s, the geo-
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graphic composition of Community trade has changed sub-
stantially. The increase in the share of developed countries 
(up from 48% in 1980 to 60% in 1990) came almost entirely 
at the expense of OPEC countries. Trade with Central and 
East European countries, although having increased in re-
cent years, none the less still accounts for a relatively small 
portion of EC external trade (7% in 1990). For non-OPEC 
developing countries, the trends are very divergent: the de-
clining share of EC imports corning from heavily indebted 
countries in Latin America and Africa contrasts with the 
four Asian newly industrializing economies whose import 
share has grown by a factor of three in the 1980s. 
The market value share of Community exports in world 
trade has remained constant as a result of the compensating 
effects of an upward movement in relative export prices and 
a fall in market share in volume terms. A deterioration of 
EC price competitiveness throughout most of the 1980s 
appears to be only partially responsible for the slow export 
growth in volume terms (1, I% p.a. for the decade as a whole 
and 0,6% p.a. since 1986). 
EFT A countries and the US are still the biggest export 
markets for the Community (45% in 1990). South Korea, 
Taiwan, Japan, Turkey, Singapore, Hong Kong, Israel, 
China and the US, in decreasing order, are the markets 
where EC exports, in value terms, have expanded the most. 
Manufactures represent more than 90% of total Community 
merchandise exports, more than half of which were ac-
counted for by equipment goods. 
The relative fall in primary product prices (particularly oil) 
has Jed to a substantial reduction in the share of such 
commodities in total Community imports. This, as well as 
other factors, resulted in an increased share for manufactures 
in total imports. Penetration of the EC market by foreign 
products has risen in most manufacturing sectors, in particu-
lar textiles and clothing, footwear and leather goods, motor 
vehicles and transport equipment, and non-metallic min-
erals. Over the last decade, Turkey, China, Taiwan, the 
former Yugoslavia, Japan, Thailand, South Korea, Pakistan 
and Austria, in this order, have experienced the biggest 
increases of their exports (in value terms) to the Community 
market. Between 1986 and 1990, the volume of EC imports 
rose 40,3%, much faster than EC exports. This suggests that 
foreign producers have been able to take advantage of the 
opportunities created by the completion of the 1992 single 
market programme. 
For high-tech products, the Community has moved from an 
ECU 5 billion surplus in 1982 to an ECU 23 billion deficit 
in 1990 (a fall in the export/import ratio from I, 1 to 0,8). 
The limited expansion of EC exports of high-tech products 
1 
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is reflected on major export markets, where EC products 
have progressively lost market shares largely to the advan-
tage of products from Japan and the newly industrializing 
economies. 
Chapter II of Part One deals with regional integration and 
trade, and is subdivided into three sections. It begins with 
an overview section of regional integration experiences in 
Europe (EC, EFT A and CMEA), placing particular empha-
sis on the evolution of the European Community. It con-
cludes that EC integration has been successful, in that it has 
had a significant impact on intra-EC trade, although this 
may in part be explained by other factors and by the various 
extensions of EC membership. At the same time, EC inte-
gration has benefited world trade through its generally lib-
eral external trade policy. The success of European inte-
gration has been followed by greater regional integration 
efforts elsewhere, e.g. the Europe Agreements (between the 
Community, CSFR, 1 Hungary and Poland) and Nafta (be-
tween Canada, Mexico and the US). 
The subsequent section examines the new trade relationship 
between the EC and Central and East European countries 
(CEECs). Since 1989, the importance of EC markets for the 
CEECs has shot up dramatically as the previous CMEA 
trade regime collapsed: however, for the Community, these 
countries remain relatively minor partners. Whereas this 
geographical trade pattern of CEECs' exports is much closer 
to the 'normal' pattern than in the past (i.e. pre-1989), there 
may be some 'overshooting' given the current political and 
macroeconomic disturbances in the former Soviet Union. 
To assist in the transformation process, the Community has 
substantially improved the terms of access to EC markets, 
culminating in the signing of Association Agreements with 
CSFR, Hungary and Poland which aim to establish a free 
trade area. The Community has been prepared to act boldly 
by agreeing to include in the Agreements a degree of lib-
eralization in sensitive sectors (textiles, iron and steel and 
agriculture), despite strong internal pressure. For textiles, 
there is an explicit link in the Agreements with progress 
in the Uruguay Round negotiations, thereby ensuring that 
liberalization will not be done at the expense of other trade 
partners. In addition, the Community is contributing to the 
transformation process through its own assistance pro-
grammes and the coordination of G-24 actions, including 
medium-term assistance to help macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion. 
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Prior to 31 December 1992, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic 
formed the CSFR. As most of the analysis in this text refers to the pre-
1993 period, the appellation CSFR is used. 
The last section of Chapter II examines regional integration 
efforts among developing countries. The Community both 
advocates and supports such initiatives for political and 
economic reasons. A review of the costs and benefits for 
developing countries to engage in regional integration is 
undertaken and consideration is given to whether developing 
countries can draw useful insights from the integration ex-
periences of the Community. Regional integration efforts 
among developing countries are reviewed, including Merco-
sur, Asean, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab 
Maghreb Union. Previous integration efforts among de-
veloping countries have failed for many reasons, but es-
pecially because of limited political commitment, low levels 
of economic growth, the pursuit of infant industry policies, 
and the weakness of regional institutions. More recent inte-
gration efforts have sought to redress these weaknesses. 
A key condition for successful regional integration is the 
maintenance of an open trade regime with the rest of the 
world. 
Part One closes with Chapter III on the trade and growth 
performance of developing countries in the 1980s. The first 
section provides an overview of the Community's preferen-
tial trading relations. The Community has extended through 
a number of instruments preferential, non-reciprocal trade 
benefits to various groups of developing countries, e.g. ACP 
countries and the overseas territories of the Member States, 
Mediterranean countries and certain Asian and Latin Amer-
ican countries. In addition, preferential and reciprocal trade 
agreements have been concluded with the EFT A countries, 
Central and East European countries, Turkey, Israel, Malta, 
Cyprus and San Marino. New arrangements are being pre-
pared with EFT A countries, some Mediterranean countries, 
and with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
Traditionally, preference has concentrated on preferential 
tariff treatment. However, with the declining importance of 
tariffs, other factors are increasingly determining the benefits 
gained from preferential trade relations: these factors include 
rules of origin, the treatment of non-tariff barriers, tolerance 
and derogation provisions, the extent of product exclusions 
or limitations of trade preferences, and, finally, safeguards 
and dispute settlement arrangements. 
Despite the importance of preferential trading relations for 
the Community, effective trade preferences are only extended 
for a limited share (less than 30%) of EC imports. This 
underlines the importance of the multilateral trade system, 
which has helped to keep the potentially distorting effects 
of preferential trade within reasonable bounds. Trade prefer-
ences can be of assistance to developing countries, but only 
if they implement the necessary supporting policies which 
foster macroeconomic stability and the participation of the 
country concerned in the world economy. It appears that 
countries which experienced rapidly growing exports to the 
Community during the 1980s have been relatively effective 
utilizers of the benefits offered under the Community's gen-
eralised system of preferences. 
The second section of Chapter III surveys the overall econ-
omic performance of developing countries during the 1980s. 
Throughout this period, growth in low and middle-income 
countries slowed down compared with the previous 15 years. 
This slowdown was, however, not uniform across all groups 
of developing countries, with the countries of South and 
East Asia registering impressive rates of growth. Export 
performance during the 1980s has to a large extent been the 
force behind economic growth. Development may be best 
served by an export policy mix that favours export growth 
based on open, undistorted markets and not by policies that 
promote import substitution particularly via protectionist 
measures. Open-market-oriented development is also likely 
to encourage foreign direct investment inflows. This section 
considers the reasons for divergent economic and export 
performance both within and between regional groupings of 
developing countries. Three regional blocs are examined in 
detail: the dynamic Asian economies (Malaysia, Singapore, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Hong Kong), the 
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar), and 
the developing countries of the Mediterranean. 
Part Two on new issues in international trade commences 
with the paper by David Greenaway on foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) in the EC. The Community is both a major 
source of, and host to, FDI. The US is also important, both 
as a host and source, whilst Japan is important as a source· 
but not as a host. EC inward investment is dominated by 
EFT A, the US and Japan; it is located primarily in the 
UK, Spain, the Netherlands and France and concentrated 
principally in banking and finance, food products and chemi-
cals. The key location for outward investment is the US, 
followed by EFT A; the UK, the Netherlands and France 
are the main sources; investment goes mainly into energy, 
chemicals, machinery and transport equipment, and banking 
and finance. Japan is now the key marginal supplier of 
inward investment, with the largest flows going to the UK 
and the Netherlands. 
FDI occurs when firms have proprietary assets like repu-
tation or brand image which they wish to exploit in a 
particular location. Market imperfections of one form or 
another lead firms to invest directly to exploit such assets, 
rather than license their product/technology, or engage in 
trade directly from their home country. FDI promotes inter-
national specialization, thereby promoting static and dy-
namic gains. Concern is sometimes expressed regarding the 
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activities of multinational enterprises, typically focusing on 
the quality and quantity of employment generated, trade 
balance effects and income redistribution through transfer 
pricing. In general these anxieties appear to be exaggerated, 
and the evidence suggests that the EC has benefited from 
inward investment. 
Investment policy may operate through direct investment 
measures, or trade-related investment measures: the former 
are generally incentive measures, the latter disincentive 
measures. It is clear that many of these instruments have 
direct trade effects. The 1992 programme for completing the 
internal market has stimulated a great deal of intra-EC 
investment flows as well as inward investment, in particular 
from Japan. Once the single market measures are im-
plemented in full, the scope for independent policy actions 
on the part of Member States will be further constrained. 
Adjustment pressures in particular sectors may induce Mem-
ber States to take action, such as the use of investment policy 
to attract inward investment to the affected sectors/regions. 
This necessitates rigorous competition policy and attention 
being paid to the issue of policy coordination across Member 
States. 
A range of regional and multilateral arrangements or codes 
have been arrived at, directed largely at setting standards 
rather than influencing behaviour. The inclusion of trade-
related investment measures and subsidies as agenda items 
on the Uruguay Round provides the opportunity for GA TT 
to become more directly involved in specifying multilateral 
disciplines to govern the use of investment measures. Pro-
gress within GA TT cannot be secured by attempting to 
transpose the provisions which apply to merchandise trade 
to investment. However, the principles on which trade disci-
plines are based, most notably national treatment and mu-
tual recognition, should provide the foundation for new 
disciplines for investment measures. GA TT can learn from 
progress made on intra-EC investment. 
In his contribution on services, Patrick Messerlin shows that 
shares of the major world trading countries for trade in 
services are similar to their shares for trade in goods. Evi-
dence suggests an early, yet modest, impact of the internal 
market programme for services on EC trade in services. The 
growth of intra-EC trade in services is faster than the growth 
of extra-EC trade, though the intra-EC share of total EC 
trade remains lower in services than in goods. 
Comparative advantage is valid for services as well as for 
goods, despite the non-storability and intangible nature of 
services. Moreover, a dualistic specialization pattern, with 
developed countries completely specialized in services and 
developing countries completely specialized in goods, is un-
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likely. Trade barriers are not the best solution to the complex 
problems of information or reputation related to the intangi-
bility of services, particularly in the context of 'infant' indus-
tries of services. OECD countries' offers at the Uruguay 
Round tend to cover more sectors than those made by 
developing countries or NIEs, and the breakdown of the 
initial offers by sector presents a wide range of liberalization 
options. Trade liberalization would benefit from the im-
plementation of a multilateral trade policy review of the 
major policy instruments used by the countries for restricting 
their trade in services. Such a review mechanism could rely 
on a taxonomy based on quantitative measures, price instru-
ments and on measures aimed at creating a competitive 
environment. 
There is a fundamental difference between the liberalization 
approaches of the internal market programme for services 
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
The goal of the single market requires the liberalization of 
both cross-border-based and establishment-based trade in 
services, leading to mutual recognition and minimal harmon-
ization. By contrast, GA TS defines four 'modes of supply' 
(cross-border trade, movement of service consumers, move-
ment of service producers, and establishment of service pro-
viders in the foreign markets), leaving open the possibility 
to liberalize only certain modes of supply. In particular, 
liberalization limited to establishment-based trade may lead 
to small gains. 
Trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) are treated 
in the paper by Keith Maskus. Trade in intellectual property 
has increased rapidly in recent years, both through its em-
bodiment in goods and through flows of foreign direct 
investment and licences for the use of technologies and 
trade names. This growth reflects, in part, the increasing 
globalization of business competition as firms employ soph-
isticated forms of international activity to exploit the econ-
omic value inherent in their innovative and creative work. 
Government measures to protect intellectual property rights 
such as patents, trade marks, copyrights, and related devices 
take on greater importance as part of the background rules 
governing international trade and investment. 
In general terms, the EC has two broad interests in the 
intellectual property area. First, it is important to establish 
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greater harmonization of national policies among the Mem-
ber States in order to rationalize incentives for engaging in 
innovative activity and product marketing. Second, con-
tinued efforts need to be made through GA TT and other 
multilateral organizations to achieve stronger protection for 
intellectual property outside the EC, particularly in de-
veloping countries. 
Stronger levels of intellectual property protection carry cer-
tain costs as well as benefits. The essential reason for this 
trade-off is that, on the one hand, such protection attempts 
to overcome the dynamic economic problem that infringe-
ment limits the returns on innovation, resulting in an under-
investment in new technology and product development. 
On the other hand, however, protection worsens the static 
economic problem that new information should be provided 
to users at marginal cost, which is likely to be too low 
to compensate innovators fully. Thus, intellectual property 
protection is inherently a crude solution to problems of a 
'second-best' nature and changes in policy could, in prin-
ciple, raise or lower welfare. Consequently, each policy pack-
age needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
In this context, technologically advanced countries with 
high-income consumers that have a strong preference for 
great product variety and quality achieve significant dynamic 
benefits from intellectual property protection. However, 
even in countries that should gain overall, there is a risk that 
stronger intellectual property protection could result in high 
costs for consumers and input users and limited competition 
and technology diffusion. That is why there is a need for an 
effective competition policy to offset potential abuses of 
stronger intellectual property rights. 
Two annexes at the end of the report contain background 
material. The first gives a concise overview of Community 
trade policy, in particular the legal basis, decision-making 
procedures and the implications of the Treaty on European 
Union, as well as a detailed presentation of the EC's main 
trade policy instruments available and specific sectoral ar-
rangements. A second annex provides statistical information 
on the trade position of the European Community and main 
trading partners. 
Part One 
Trade, integration 
and growth 
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I - Community trade in the 1980s 
Summary 
The Community is the leading world trader both in merchan-
dise and commercial services. It also accounts for a major 
part of the world flows of foreign direct investment. As 
far as merchandise trade is concerned, over the 1980s the 
Community benefited from a favourable evolution in terms 
of trade which has substantially enhanced its real income. 
Although the upward movement in the Community's relative 
export prices has been accompanied by a decline in overall 
export market share in volume terms, taking these two 
movements together the Community has broadly maintained 
its market share in value terms. 
The relative fall in primary product (and particularly oil) 
prices has led to a substantial reduction in the share of such 
commodities in total Community imports. As a consequence 
of this and other factors (such as the export-oriented devel-
opment of certain Asian countries) an increasing proportion 
of Community imports is accounted for by manufactured 
goods coming from other developing countries, and from 
the newly industrializing economies (NIEs). The Community 
has thus become a more important participant in world 
trade in manufactures: 
In 1990, developed countries accounted for some 60% of 
EC trade, compared to 48% in 1980. This increase has 
occurred almost entirely at the expense of OPEC countries, 
whose relative share was down to 9,7% of Community 
imports in 1990, compared to 27,2% a decade earlier (the 
share of EC exports to OPEC countries declined from 18, I% 
to 8,4%). Over the 1980s, EFTA countries and the United · 
States of America together accounted for the largest and 
increasing share both of EC exports (45% in 1990) and 
imports (42%). Japan has become a major supplier of the 
Community market (10% in 1990), but is a relatively less 
important export market (5%). Trade with Central and East 
European countries continues to represent a relatively small 
portion of EC external trade (7% in 1990). 
Over the last decade, Turkey, China, Taiwan, the former 
Yugoslavia, Japan, Thailand, South Korea, Pakistan and 
Austria, in this order, have made the biggest inroads (in 
value terms) into the Community market. During the same 
period, the volume of Community imports increased at an 
average annual rate of3,2%. Since the mid-1980s, when the 
'1992 programme' was launched, imports from the rest of 
the world have become the most dynamic component of 
Community trade: between 1986 and 1991, the volume of 
EC imports rose by 40,3%. At the global level, and even 
more so in the area of manufactures, the volume of EC 
imports from third countries has increased more rapidly 
than intra-EC trade, suggesting that foreign producers have 
been able to take advantage of the opportunities created by 
the completion of the internal market. 
South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Turkey, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Israel, China and the United States of America, in 
decreasing order, are the markets where EC exports, in value 
terms, have expanded more rapidly during the 1980s. EC 
exports to these countries have increased at a rate two to 
five times as fast as the average for total Community exports. 
However, the volume of Community exports increased at a 
rather slow pace during the 1980s (I, I% per year on aver-
age), and has slowed down even further (0,6%) since 1986. 
EC price competitiveness, which has deteriorated during 
most of the 1980s, appears to be only partially responsible 
for the slow export growth in volume terms. 
At the end of the 1980s, the Community economy, whose 
GDP is comparable to that of the USA and about twice 
Japan's, showed a higher degree of trade openness than 
either of these countries. 
In terms of product composition, the EC import pattern 
has progressively moved away from commodities and raw 
materials towards processed manufactures, in particular 
equipment goods. Manufactures have driven the sustained 
growth of Community imports during the second half of 
the decade. The penetration of the EC market by foreign 
products has risen for most manufacturing sectors, in par-
ticular textiles and clothing, footwear and leather goods, 
motor vehicles and transport equipment, and non-metallic 
minerals. 
During the 1980s, EC imports of high-tech products have 
been growing at an average annual rate double that of the 
corresponding EC exports. The effect has been a progressive 
worsening of the EC trade balance for high-tech products, 
which has moved from an ECU 5 billion surplus in 1982 to 
an ECU 23 billion deficit in 1990. At the same time, the 
export/import ratio has moved from I, I to 0,8, pointing to a 
weakening of the EC competitive position and an increasing 
dependence on foreign suppliers. The USA remains the 
Community's main supplier of high-tech products, but its 
position, as well as that of the EFT A countries, has been 
substantially eroded by rising EC imports from Japan and 
the newly industrializing economies. 
Manufactures account for more than 90% of total Com-
munity merchandise exports. In 1990, more than half of 
total EC exports of manufactures were accounted for by 
equipment goods. Industrial machinery and chemicals were 
the two largest exporting sectors of the EC economy. The 
7 
Part One: Trade, integration and growth 
limited expansion of EC exports of high-tech products has 
been concentrated on the markets of other developed 
countries, in particular the USA. The modest performance 
of EC exports of high-tech products is reflected on the major 
export markets, where EC products have progressively lost 
market shares largely to the advantage of products from 
Japan and the newly industrializing economies. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief description 
of the main characteristics of Community trade during the 
last decade. The chapter is organized as follows. Section I 
presents the Community's economy and trade in a world 
context. Sections 2 and 3 examine the development of Com-
munity imports and exports, respectively, with particular 
attention to the terms of trade and export price competi-
tiveness. Section 4 compares the Community's degree of 
trade openness with other major trade partners. Finally, 
Section 5 concentrates on Community trade in high-tech-
nology products. 
1. The place of the Community 
in the world economy 
Although the EC economy accounts for more than one-
quarter of world GDP and trade among its Member States 
plays an important role, its international dimension has 
been substantially enhanced by growing global economic 
interdependence. 
A few figures may help to set the orders of magnitude of 
the Community's involvement in world trade. EC exports 
to and imports of goods from third countries reached ECU 
420 and 463 billion respectively in 1990, representing 8,9% 
and 9,8% of Community GDP. In the same year, Com-
munity merchandise trade accounted for 20,7% of world 
trade, 1 compared to 16,8% for the United States and 9,7% 
for Japan. The importance of the Community as the leading 
world trader is not only limited to merchandise trade: in 
1990, the Community accounted for 27,1 % of world trade in 
commercial services, ahead of the United States of America 
(16,1%) and Japan (10,2%). Another important element 
which increasingly adds to the external economic dimension 
of the Community is foreign direct investment. Over the 
period 1985-89, the Community accounted for 37% and 
19% of world total outward and inward flows of foreign 
direct investment, respectively. While Part Two of this issue 
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in the value of both Community and total world trade, the share of the 
EC rises to 39,3%. 
deals specifically with trade in services and foreign direct 
investment, this part will concentrate on the Community's 
trade in goods. 
In the early 1980s, Community trade and economic activity 
were negatively affected by the stagnation of world trade, 
which bottomed out in 1983 (- 3% in volume terms). Since 
the mid- l 980s, the external environment has substantially 
improved, with the volume of world trade growing at an 
annual average rate of 6% between 1985 and 1990. Economic 
growth in North America, the dynamic Asian economies 
and EFT A countries more than offset the adverse impact 
on EC exports of poor economic performances in heavily-
indebted countries of Latin America and Africa, and in 
the Middle East. However, around 1990 a long period of 
sustained economic growth in the industrialized countries 
came to an end. World trade and output slowed down in 
1990 and 1991 as a result of several factors: the temporary 
rise in oil prices caused by the Gulf War, the weakening of 
economic activity first in North America and then in Western 
Europe and Japan, and the deep economic recession in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
2. Community imports 
2.1. Geographical structure of 
Community imports 
A large share of the Community's merchandise trade is 
accounted for by developed countries, both as an export 
market and a source of import supply (see Table 822). 
On the import side, the share of developed countries in 
Community imports has been greatly affected by major 
shocks in the relative price of raw materials and in particular 
fuels. The large price rises of primary commodities during 
the 1970s led to a significant decline of developed countries 
as a source of EC imports. The subsequent price erosion of 
primary commodities, in particular the significant drop in 
oil prices over the 1980s, have pushed up again the share of 
developed countries, which in 1990 accounted for 59,7% of 
total EC imports, up from 46, I% in 1980. 
In 1990, EFTA countries as a whole represented the largest 
import supplier, accounting for 23,5% of total Community 
imports, that is 6,5 percentage points above the correspond-
ing 1980 level. The USA remained the single most important 
trading partner, its share of Community imports fluctuating 
All the numbered tables are in Annex II - Statistical information (see 
page 205). 
around 17 to 18% of total EC imports, with a certain 
acceleration in the late 1980s (see Table 82). Japan's share 
rose sharply, particularly· between 1980 (4,9%) and 1988 
(10,7%). In 1990, Japan was the second largest supplier of 
the Community market after the United States, but it is 
worth noting that its share has been declining since 1988. 
Among the group of developing countries the trends are 
very divergent. The OPEC countries' share of Community 
imports fell dramatically from 27,2% in 1980 to 9,7% in 
1990, as a result of the fall in oil prices over the 1980s; to a 
lesser extent, imports from heavily indebted countries in 
Latin America and Africa have also declined. By contrast, 
the share of the four Asian NIEs1 has grown by a factor of 
almost three since 1980, reaching 5,7% of EC imports in 
1990. Although imports from Central and East European 
countries2 have recently increased, over the 1980s they ac-
counted for a relatively small fraction of EC external trade. 
In 1990, the combined share of Central and Eastern Europe 
in total EC imports was still at a relatively modest 6,8%.3 
In 1990, the former Soviet Union, China and Canada were 
among the 10 leading suppliers of the Community market, 
in addition to the United States, Japan and five EFT A 
countries (see Table 83). Over the last decade, Turkey, China, 
Taiwan, the former Yugoslavia, Japan, Thailand, South 
Korea, Pakistan and Austria, in this order, have made the 
biggest inroads into the Community market. The value of 
Community imports from these countries has increased by 
a factor of three to seven, compared to 1,6 for total extra-
EC imports. By contrast, the largest market share losses 
have been experienced by the oil-exporting countries. 
2.2. Product composition of 
Community imports 
The product composition of Community imports in value 
terms has changed substantially over time. The most remark-
able feature has been the relative shift away from imports 
of foodstuffs and primary products towards manufactures. 
The share of the latter increased to 78% of total EC imports 
in 1990, compared to 54,0% a decade earlier; at the same 
time, the corresponding shares of agricultural and energy 
products declined to 5,9% and 16,0%, respectively, from 
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. 
The definition of Central and East European countries used in the text 
includes eight countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the former 
GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the former USSR. 
To put it in perspective, in 1990 Switzerland alone accounted for 7,4% 
of EC imports. 
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9,3% and 36,7% in 1980 (see Graph 1). A number of 
factors contributed to these developments: the impact of the 
common agricultural policy, the introduction of natural 
resource-saving technologies, relative price changes, as well 
as increasing imports of highly processed goods· from the 
newly industrializing economies. Within manufactures, over 
the 1980s, imports of equipment goods into the Community 
have risen at a rate almost twice that of both intermediate 
and consumer goods, so that in 1990 equipment goods 
accounted for almost half (45,7%) of all EC imports of 
manufactured products (see Graph 2). 
The decline in the relative weight of raw materials and 
agricultural products can also be detected when looking at 
the detailed product breakdown of Community imports. 
Apart from a few sectors generally affected by specific trade 
arrangements (textiles, iron and steel, and non-ferrous met-
als), the share of all other manufactured products has in-
creased substantially between 1980 and 1990 (see Tables 85 
and 86).4 This contrasts sharply with the corresponding drop 
in imports of non-manufactured products such as mineral 
fuels, non-fuel raw materials, and food and tobacco. 
The increasing importance of manufactured products in the 
import structure of the Community is parallelled by similar 
developments in other major developed economies. Over the 
last decade there has been a major expansion in the share 
of manufactures imported into the United States and Japan, 
where the relative importance of energy products shrank by 
about half (see Table 84). None the less, in 1990, Japan's 
level (63,2%) was still significantly lower than in the USA 
(83,3%) and the EC (78,2%). 
2.3. Recent trends in Community 
import volumes 
During the period 1980-91, the volume of Community im-
ports from the rest of the world increased at an average 
annual rate of 3,2%, that is at a somewhat lower pace than 
the 3,7% corresponding to total EC imports including intra-
EC trade (see Table 87). This moderate average growth of 
Community external imports is largely the result of develop-
ments in the first part of the decade. Since the mid-1980s, 
and in conjunction with the launching of the 1992 pro-
gramme, extra-EC imports have become the most dynamic 
component of Community trade: between 1986 and 1991, 
EC imports from the rest of the world rose by 40,3% com-
pared to 30,7% for intra-EC imports. This strengthening of 
See Table 86 in Annex II for the 40 leading products and a comparison 
of sectoral trade growth during the last decade. 
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GRAPH I: Share of agriculture, energy and manufactured goods in EC imports 
Sources: Eurostat, Volimex. 
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EC import growth is further magnified by the comparison 
with the 1980-85 period, when import volumes actually fell 
by3%. . 
With an average annual growth rate of 9,1 % between 1986 
and 1991, manufactures have driven the sustained growth 
of total Community imports during the second half of the 
decade. This compares with a lower 7,5% annual growth 
for intra-EC imports. Hence, at the global level, and even 
more so in the key area of manufactures, exporters from 
third countries appear to have been able to take advantage 
of the opportunities created by the completion of the internal 
market, outperforming their competitors in the EC Member 
States. 
3. Community exports 
3.1. Geographical structure of 
Community exports 
., 
-, 
The geographical pattern of Community exports is to a 
certain extent mirrored by the import developments de-
scribed above. The share of total exports directed to de-
veloped countries has increased substantially during the 
1980s, reaching 59,8% in 1990 from 49,6% a decade earlier 
(see Table 82). In 1990, EFTA markets accounted for more 
than a quarter (26,5%) of Community exports. The United· 
States represented the second largest market with 18,2% of 
Community exports in 1990, compared to only 12,8% in 
1980. The expansion of EC exports on the American market 
has been particularly vigorous in 1984-85, in conjunction 
with the appreciation of the US dollar. The share of EC 
exports to Japan doubled between 1984 and 1990 to 5,4%. 
However, despite the significant growth of Japan as an 
export market, in 1990 Switzerland (9,8%), Austria (6,4%) 
and Sweden (5,7%) each still represented larger outlets for 
Community merchandise exports. 
The share of EC exports to developing countries decreased 
to 33,6% in 1990, from 45,9% in 1980. Over the same period, 
the substantial fall of exports to both OPEC, from 18,1 to 
8,4%, and Latin American countries, from 6,1 to 3,6%, 
more than outweighed the marked increase of EC exports 
to the Asian NIEs, whose share more than doubled to 5,5% 
in 1990 (see Table 82). With 8,1 % of total EC exports in 
1990, the group of fast-growing Asian countries (Asean plus 
NIEs) has become a larger market for Community exporters 
I - Community trade in the 1980s 
than all Central and Eastern Europe, where only 6,7% of 
EC exports were directed. It is, however, worth noting that 
in 1990 the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia still ranked 
among the 10 leading individual markets for Community 
exports (see Table 88). The markets where EC exports have 
expanded more rapidly during the 1980s are mostly those of 
fast growing countries in the Far East. They include, in 
decreasing order, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Turkey, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Israel, China and the United States. 
Exports to these countries have increased at a rate two to 
five times as fast as the average for total Community exports. 
3.2. Product composition of 
Community exports 
Unlike imports, the product composition of Community 
exports has remained relatively stable over time, with manu-
factures accounting for more than 90% of total merchandise 
exports. During the 1980s, a similar export structure can be 
observed for Japan and the United States, although for the 
latter the growth of manufactures has been associated with 
the relative decline as a major exporter of farm products 
(see Table 84). 
The thrust of Community exports of manufactured products 
increasingly consists of equipment goods, which in 1990 
accounted for 51,7% of total EC exports of manufactures. 
The share of consumer goods has increased slightly over the 
1980s (to 26, 7% in 1990), whereas the relative importance 
of intermediate goods has been declining, particularly since 
the mid-1980s (see Graph 3). This export structure is only 
partly reflected in the corresponding export structure of the 
United States and even less in the case of Japan, where the 
share of equipment goods is significantly more pronounced 
(77 ,0% in 1990). On the other hand, EC exports appear to 
rely more heavily on consumer goods than both those trade 
partners. 
Industrial machinery (15,3%) and chemicals (12,3%) are 
the two largest exporting sectors of the EC economy (see 
Table 85). The relative growth of exports at a finer sectoral 
level provides mixed indications as to the pattern of specializ-
ation: sectors where EC exports, in value terms, have in-
creased more rapidly over the last decade include intermedi-
ate goods (like plastics in primary forms, organic chemicals), 
equipment goods (transport equipment, electrical and 
power-generating machinery), as well as consumer goods 
(certain food products, clothing, and beverages) (see 
Table 86). 
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GRAPH 3 : Exports of manufactures: share of intermediate, equipment and consumer goods, 1980-90 
1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990 
• intenncdiate • Equipment ~ Consumer 
S011rc~: Eurostat. 
3.3. Recent trends in Community 
export volumes 
During the last decade, the volume of Community exports 
to the rest of the world increased at a rather slow pace, 
I, I% per year on average. The annual growth rate actually 
declined over the period 1986-91 , when it dwindled to an 
average 0,6% (while imports were growing at 7%). This 
modest performance on the world markets is somewhat 
outweighed by the more rapid expansion of intra-EC exports 
which sustained the export pattern of nearly all Member 
States (see Table 87). The growth of export volumes for 
manufactures has been even more sluggish, with an annual 
average rate of 0,9% over the entire period, and a poor 
0,5% between 1986 and 1991. After a period of stagnation, 
the temporary export recovery in export volumes during the 
years 1988-89 has only marginally improved the relatively 
poor performance of Community exports on world markets, 
as indicated by the poor results in 1990 ( - 0,3 % ) and 1991 
(-0,1%). 
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3.4. Export market shares and price 
corn peti ti veness 
Since 1985 the Community market share of world exports 
has recovered most of the ground lost in the early 1980s, 
and its 1990 level (20,0%) was roughly comparable to that 
of a decade earlier (see Graph 4) . This recovery in value 
terms stems from the combined effect of a decline in the EC 
export volumes and by increasing export prices. Table 1 
compares the export volume market share and the relative 
price competitiveness for the Community, Japan and the 
United States. The market share indicator is defined , on the 
basis of aggregate trade data, as the difference between 
annual export volume growth and the growth of world 
demand. The competitiveness variable measures the differ-
ence between the growth rate of export prices of competitors 
and the growth rate of EC export prices. The two variables 
are expected to be positively correlated, so that an improve-
ment in price competitiveness (e.g. EC export prices increase 
less than its competitors' prices) should boost export volume 
market shares. 
I - Community trade in the 1980s 
GRAPH 4: Share of EC exports in total world exports of goods1 (current prices) 
(%) 
25---------------------------------, 
1 Excluding intra-EC e..pons. 
Sourctt: Eurostat aod GA IT. 
Table 1 
20 
IS 
10 
s 
0 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 198S 
Gains in export volume market shares and price competitiveness 1973-90 
198 1 1982 1983 1984 
1973 
Community 
Gain in market shares 0,2 - 3,0 - 5,7 - 8,8 
Gain in price competitiveness 2,8 - 0,6 - 1,2 2,5 
United States 
Gain in market shares 0,0 - 4,9 - 7,3 - 0,6 
Gain in price competitiveness 1,0 - 6,1 - 7,1 - 4,1 
Japan 
Gain in market shares 3,0 1,3 0,4 - 7,1 
Gain in price competitiveness 2,4 3,4 - 2,4 - 1,8 
Note: 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
(% average annual growth changes) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1990 
1982 
- 0,6 - 7,3 - 3,0 - 4,6 -0,9 -1,7 -4,0 
- 5,3 - 20,9 - 12,4 - 4,9 1,9 - 10,7 - 5,7 
- 8,1 0,2 8,5 6,0 4,6 4,0 0,3 
- 2,1 5,6 6,6 - 0,3 - 0,6 10,5 0,3 
- 3,2 - 8,0 - 1,6 - 0,3 - 2,1 6,0 - 1,6 
- 1,6 - 15,9 - 1,6 - 5,5 2,3 11,1 - 1,3 
Gains in export volume market shares are defined as the di ffe rence between the average annual growth of export volume (for the Community: extra-EC) and weighted world import volume (for 
the Community: extra-EC). A plus (minus) indicates an increase (decrease) in the marke t sha re of the count ry. 
Gains in price competitiveness arc defined as the difference between the average annual growth of double-weighted competitor's export prices (for the Community : extra-EC) and the export price 
(for the Community : ex tra-EC). 
A plus (minus) means tha t export prices of the count ry increase less (more) than export prices of its competitors. 
Sources : Eurostat, Trend, Volimex data bank and Quest model. 
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Over the 1982-90 period there has been a continuous decline 
in the Community's export market shares (in volume terms) 
on the world markets, with a negative differential of some 
3,9% compared to its trade competitors. This contrasts with 
the previous decade when Community producers were able 
to improve their relative position on their export markets. 
The comparison with the United States and Japan also 
confirms the relative decline in the Community's export 
capability. Following a drop in the early 1980s, since 1986 
American export market shares have been recovering stead-
ily, boosted by the US dollar depreciation. In the case of 
Japan, the loss of export market share has been concentrated 
in the years 1984-89 while a considerable improvement has 
taken place in 1990. 
EC price competitiveness has been deteriorating during most 
of the 1980s and,judging from the averages over that period, 
must be seen as the major factor behind the evolution of 
export market shares: the direction and the magnitude of 
the changes in price competitiveness are on average reflected 
more than one-for-one in the corresponding movements in 
the export market shares, although non-price factors may 
have played a role as well. A similar relationship between 
GRAPH 5: Community terms of trade (trade in goods, 1985 = 100) 
180 
160 
export volumes and price competitiveness seems to hold on 
average for the United States and Japan. Thus, for example, 
the recovery of the American export market share since 1986 
can largely be related to the increase in competitiveness 
following the decline in the value of the US dollar. 
3.5. Community terms of trade 
As mentioned above, over the 1980s the relative price of 
primary commodities has dropped significantly compared 
to the manufacture component of EC imports. At the same 
time, the relative price of EC exports has been growing at 
a faster rate compared to its trade partners, also due to 
movements in the nominal exchange rates. Since the mid-
l 980s, this has translated for the Community into a major 
improvement in the terms of trade, which rose by 38, 1 % 
between 1985 and 1990 (see Graph 5). Most of the improve-
ment has concerned the terms of trade with the developing 
countries, in particular with those relying mostly on oil 
and other basic commodities for their exports, whereas the 
improvement has been more contained vis-a-vis the newly 
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industrializing economies in the Far East. 1 As imported 
products became cheaper in terms of exported goods, the 
Community's real income ·has been substantially enhanced. 
4. Trade openness of the Community 
compared to the USA and Japan 
The ratio of trade to gross domestic product provides a 
rough measure of the degree of openness of an economy. 
Trade can be defined as the value of imports, exports or a 
combination of both. Many factors intervene in determining 
the degree of openness, among which the size of the econ-
omy, its location vis-a-vis other trade partners, the degree of 
economic development, historical links, as well as the policies 
undertaken play a relevant role. In the short term, changes 
in the relative price of different categories of products and 
exchange-rate movements also have a significant impact on 
the degree of trade openness. 
The price indexes used to calculate the terms of trade in Graph 5 rely 
on 1985 as the base year. In that year, energy products still accounted 
for almost one third of total EC imports, compared to only 16% in 
l 990. This may tend to overestimate the improvement in the Community 
terms of trade by giving a larger weight to energy products, without 
taking into full account ihe expanding share of imported manufactures. 
I - Community trade in the 1980s 
The share of Community trade of goods and services as a 
percentage of GDP has been rising over the last three decades 
(see Graph 6) . Such a rising path, however, has been subject 
to major fluctuations, largely determined by changes in the 
price of imported food and energy products, and by major 
shifts in the value of the US dollar, in which most commodi-
ties are usually priced. At the end of the 1980s the Com-
munity economy, whose GDP is comparable to that of the 
USA and about twice Japan's, showed a higher degree of 
openness than either of these countries. 
Excluding energy products from the trade values reduces 
measurement problems linked to commodity price volatility. 
The resulting measure of trade openness (see Graph 7) con-
firms the upward trend for the Community, and accentuates 
the increasing role of trade for the American economy. 
By looking separately at the import and export sides, it 
appears that trade patterns have varied significantly. The 
Community and, in particular, the USA have come to rely 
increasingly on imported manufactures (see Graph 8). De-
spite its relatively smaller size compared to the other two 
major trading partners, the Japanese economy has been 
characterized by a downward trend which has actually re-
duced an already low level of import penetration (by the 
GRAPH 6: Trade• in goods and services as a percentage of GDP (current prices) 
(%) 
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GRAPH 7: Merchandise trade1 (excluding energy products) as a percentage of GDP (current prices) 
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GRAPH 8: Share of imports of goods (excluding energy products) as a percentage of GDP 
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GRAPH 9: Share of exports of goods (excluding energy products) as a percentage of GDP 
(%) 
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late-l 980s the Japanese import ratio was still considerably 
lower than for both the Community and the USA). In 
particular during the 1980s, the surge in American imports 
(the imports to GDP ratio peaked in 1988 at 8,3%) contrasts 
with the relative stability for the EC (above 8%) and Japan 's 
actual decline (from 6,7% in 1980 to 6,0% in 1990). Since 
the mid- l 980s, however, there has been a clear inversion in 
the Japanese trend, with a rising share of imports. Over 
the 1980s, import penetration of the Community market 
increased for most manufacturing sectors and, in particular, 
textiles and clothing, footwear and leather goods, motor 
vehicles and transport equipment, and non-metallic minerals 
(see Table 89).1 Chemicals, timber, wooden furniture and 
food products are the only sectors where import penetration 
actually declined during the 1980s; it is apparent that in the 
case of food products, the common agricultural policy has 
played a relevant role in checking the expansion of foreign 
imports. 
The defini tion of import penetration used in Table 89 in Annex II is 
somewhat diffe rent from the one used in the text, as imports are related 
to 'apparent consumption' rather than to GDP. The main difference 
consists in using output plus net imports instead of value added as the 
ratio denominator. This represents a better measure of the share of 
domestic demand met by fo reign products as both numerator and 
denominator include the value of intermediate goods. 
On the export side, differences are less striking (see Graph 9). 
A significant expansion in the export openness of the Com-
munity and especially Japan took place between the early 
1970s and 1985; in the case of the United States, the share 
of exports progressed until 1980 and then declined dramati-
cally in the first half of last decade, in conjunction with the 
US dollar appreciation. Since the mid- l 980s, the shares of 
EC and Japanese exports in GDP have dropped consider-
ably, while the corresponding share for American exports 
rose steadily. 
5. Community trade in high-technology products 
Particular importance is generally attached to trade in 'high-
technology' products, since they tend to be one of the most 
dynamic components in world trade, and are often regarded 
as instrumental in maintaining or improving an economy's 
competitive edge vis-a-vis other trade partners. Although 
price remains an important element of competitiveness, non-
price factors, like the ability to innovate in the presence of 
rapid technological progress, play a major role in determin-
ing the overall level of competitiveness . 
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This section provides a brief overview of Community trade 
in high technology products in relation to other major trade 
partners. The definition of high technology products used 
for this purpose is based upon the classification of each 
industry according to its level of research and development 
intensity (ratio of R&D spending to turnover or output) and 
controlled for national variations. Those products that rely 
heavily on R&D expenditure are considered technology-
intensive (high-tech). l 
By the end of the 1980s, this group of products accounted 
for approximately one-quarter of the value of all developed 
countries' trade in manufactured goods. During the 1980s, 
the corresponding share for the Community remained more 
or less stable, at around one-fifth of total exports of manu-
factures, and it increased only slightly on the import side to 
31,4% of total manufactured imports in 1990, from 30,9% 
a decade earlier (see Table 90). Over the period 1982-90, EC 
exports of high-tech products increased somewhat faster 
(59,5%) than total EC exports (47,8%). The increase in EC 
imports ofhigh-tech products over the same period (137,8%) 
was three times as big as the corresponding growth of total 
EC imports (38,0%). In other words, EC imports of high-
tech products have been growing at an average annual rate 
of 11,4%, double that of the corresponding EC exports 
(6,0%) (see Table 91). The effect has been a progressive 
worsening of the EC trade balance for high-tech products, 
which has moved from an ECU 5 billion surplus in 1982 to 
an ECU 23 billion deficit in 1990. 
Another measure of the Community's trade performance is 
given by the export/import ratio for high-tech products, 
whereby a ratio in excess of unit reflects a trade surplus and 
a ratio of less than unit a trading deficit (see Table 92). The 
decline in the EC ratio from 1,1 in 1982 to 0,8 in 1990, with 
respect to the ensemble of its partners, reflects the shift in 
the trade balance from a surplus to a deficit. Only with the 
USA has the Community position improved over the period; 
EC net exports ofhigh-tech products vis-a-vis all other trade 
partners have deteriorated. The most dramatic deterioration 
in the trading balance of the Community has occurred with 
the group of 'competitive developing countries'.2 In 1990 a 
positive ratio appeared only for EC trade with the EFT A 
The resulting aggregate, constructed by Eurostat, comprise~ 130 indivi-
dual products defined according to the Standard Internauo_nal Trade 
Classification (SITC, Revision 2). For a complet~ expla~at1on of the 
methodology used to construct the data and the hst of high-t~h ~ro-
ducts, see Eurostat (1989), Statistical analysis of extra-EC trade m h1gh-
tech products, in particular pp. 9-13 an~ 107-112.. . 
2 This composite group includes Argentma, Brazil, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Macau, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippine~, Singapore, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and the former Yugoslavia. 
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countries. Hence, all indicators point to a weakening of the 
EC competitive position and an increasing dependence on 
foreign suppliers. 
Most of the above changes in the EC trade position are 
reflected in the geographical distribution of world trade in 
high-tech products, both on the export and the import side. 
Exports. The value of Community exports ofhigh-tech prod-
ucts has risen from ECU 27 billion in 1978 to some ECU 
73 billion in 1990. Table 93 distinguishes four major export 
markets, which in 1990 accounted for almost two-thirds of 
total EC exports of high-tech products. The USA has be-
come the single largest market with 22,7% of total EC 
exports ofhigh-tech products in 1990, overtaking the EFTA 
countries which none the less remain an important market 
for EC exports (21,6%). The share of the Ja~anese ~ark~t 
has grown significantly during the 1980s, but ID 1990 1t still 
represented a rather unimportant market (3,2%) for EC 
producers of hi-tech products, especially when ~ompared 
to the group of competitive developing countnes whose 
combined share was five times as big (16,0%). The rate of 
growth of EC exports of high-tech products ?as genera~ly 
been lower through the period 1986-90 than ID the earlier 
period 1982-86, with the exception of exp?rts directed to the 
group of competitive developing countnes (see Table 9_1). 
Between 1986 and 1990, EC high-tech exports actually ID-
creased at a lower pace (16,7%) than total EC exports 
(22,8%). 
American exports of high-tech products are increasingly 
directed to the markets of the competitive developing 
countries but also to Japan (the latter's share almost doubled 
to 11 % in 1990). Although Western Europe remains a major 
market for American exporters, its relative share has either 
risen marginally, in the case of the Community, or actually 
declined in the case of the EFT A countries. This points to 
a reorie~tation of American exports towards more dynamic 
markets outside Europe. 
The US and the Community markets account for the largest, 
and expanding, share of Japanese exports ofhigh-tech prod-
ucts (with the two markets combined absorbing some 60% 
of the total in 1990), whereas a certain deterioration occurred 
in the relatively less important EFT A market. Between 1986 
and 1990, however, Japanese exports became more oriented 
towards the competitive developing countries at the expense 
of the American market. Not surprisingly, an increasing 
share (52, I% in 1990) of the ETF A countries' exports of 
high-tech products is directed to the Community market. 
Imports. On the import side, the EC market for high-tech 
products has experienced a five-fold rise since 1978, to attain 
ECU 96 billion in 1990. In 1990, over 80% of EC imports 
came from the four suppliers shown in Table 93. The USA 
remained the main Community supplier of high-tech prod-
ucts (35,4% in 1990), but its position has been substantially 
eroded by rising EC imports from Japan (21,6%) and the 
competitive developing countries (15,9%); the latter's share 
has nearly doubled between 1978 and 1990 (see Table 93). 
It is also worth noting that in 1990 over half ( 52, I%) of all 
manufactures imported by the Community from the USA 
were high-tech products. The share of EC imports from the 
EFTA countries (15,2% in 1990) has also declined since 
1978. The annual average growth rate of Community im-
ports of high-tech products was sustained during the second 
part of last decade (at an annual average rate of 11,7%), 
with the USA (10,1%), Japan (9,2%) and the EFTA 
countries (9,2%) clearly outperformed by the competitive 
developing countries (21,0%) (see Table 91). 
The same situation is mirrored in the American market, 
where imports of high-tech products from Japan (whose 
share reached 33,7% in 1990) and, in particular, the group 
of competitive developing countries (34,2%) have displaced 
imports from the Community and EFT A (see Table 93). 
Japan is still relying mostly on the USA (57,1 % in 1990) 
for its imports of high-tech products, but the competitive 
developing countries are gaining considerable ground 
(21,3% in 1990). A clear downward trend can be detected 
for Japanese imports of high-tech products from the Com-
I - Community trade in the 1980s 
munity (from 20,6% in 1978 to 13,2% in 1990) and the 
EFTA countries. Finally, on the EFTA market only the 
share of imports from the Community (52,4% in 1990) has 
declined between 1978 and 1990, largely to the advantage 
of products originating in Japan and the competitive 
developing countries. 
To summarize, the expansion of EC exports of high-tech 
products over the 1980s has been sluggish and mostly con-
centrated on the markets of other developed countries, in 
particular the USA. At the same time, there has been a 
reorientation of American exports towards non-European 
markets, while the growth of Japanese exports has relied 
primarily on the American and EC markets. The already 
high dependence on the EC market of EFT A countries' 
exports has further increased over the last decade. The USA 
remains the main Community's supplier of high-tech prod-
ucts, but its position, as well as that of the EFT A countries, 
has been substantially eroded by rising EC imports from 
Japan and the competitive developing countries. The modest 
performance of EC exports ofhigh-tech products is reflected 
on the import side of its main trade partners, where EC 
products have consistently lost market shares. The rise of 
imports of high-tech products from Japan and the competi-
tive developing countries to the American market has been 
largely at the expense of Community and EFT A products, 
which have also lost considerable ground in the Japanese 
market. The decline of EFT A imports from the EC has been 
more contained, and EC high-tech products still account for 
more than half the EFT A market. 
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II - Regional integration and trade 
A - Regional integration: an introductory note 
1. Introduction 
Regional economic integration in Europe was launched in 
earnest more than 30 years ago. In the late 1950s, three 
(partly rival) regional schemes were established: the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC), with six members 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands); the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), with seven members (Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom -
Iceland and Finland joined later); and the Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA), with eight members (Al-
bania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Po-
land, Romania and the Soviet Union). 
These three schemes, and their relationship with one another, 
have evolved considerably over the years. 
The EEC - which meanwhile became the European Com-
munity (EC) - has both deepened and widened. From a 
mere customs union with six members, it has matured into 
a fully-fledged single market with 12 members (the original 
six plus Greece, Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the 
United Kingdom) increasingly sharing common micro- and 
macroeconomic policies. Three phases of trade liberalization 
within the EC can be distinguished. The first, starting in 
1958, was the elimination of customs duties and quantitative 
restrictions. It was completed in 1968 with the introduction 
of a common external tariff. The second, between 1973 and 
1986, witnessed successive enlargements from six to twelve 
members. The last, ending in 1992, is the completion of the 
internal market for goods, services, capital and labour. 
Concurrently, the relationship of EFTA with the Com-
munity has been sharply transformed. Since 1973, the mem-
bers of EFT A and the Community have constituted an 
umbrella free trade area which has permitted the free circu-
lation of manufactured goods. From 1993, the newly formed 
European Economic Area (EEA) will allow unrestrained 
circulation of manufactured goods, services, capital and 
labour between the EFT A and the Community. And by 
1995, a certain number of present EFTA members could 
join the Community. 
Changes in the CMEA have been even more dramatic. As 
a result of political and institutional transformations in 
Eastern Europe since 1989, the CMEA collapsed. It was 
formally dissolved in 1991. The following year, Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary and Poland signed free trade agreements 
with the Community, and similar arrangements are under 
way for Bulgaria and Romania. 
The network of regional arrangements which has emerged 
around the Community (see Table 2) can be described as a 
European trading bloc. The possibility of similar regional 
arrangements in America (around the United States) and 
Asia (around Japan) raises the spectre of the end ofmultilat-
eralism as the world economy fragments into three conflict-
ing regional trading blocs. This prospect is at the centre of 
much controversy among academic economists and policy-
makers alike. 1 
The remainder of this short paper is divided into two sub-
stantive parts. Section 2 focuses on EC integration and 
examines its impact on trade. Section 3 deals with the issues 
of regionalism versus multilateralism and regional trading 
blocs. Section 4 concludes. 
2. The impact of EC integration on trade2 
The extent of regionalization is commonly measured by the 
share of intra-area trade in total trade, where trade refers to 
exports and/or imports. An increase in the intra-area share 
is taken as verification of the effect of regionalization on 
trade flows. However, as Lloyd (1992) notes, this can only 
be considered as weak evidence since changes in the intra-
area share capture many other effects besides integration. 
The regional structure of total EC-12 merchandise trade for 
the period 1958-90 is reported in Table 3.3 For the moment 
examination will focus entirely on the first column, which 
shows the share of intra-EC trade in total EC trade. As far 
as exports are concerned, the figures confirm the three phases 
of integration presented in the Introduction. The share of 
intra-EC exports increased steadily following the Treaty of 
Rome,jumping from less than 40% in 1958 to nearly 55% in 
1970. It remained roughly constant until 1985 and increased 
again thereafter, scoring over 60% in 1990.4 
The picture is similar on the import side, but here the 
composition of trade has added a strong price component 
to the evolution in the share of intra-EC trade. Whereas 
the Community exports mainly manufactures whose price 
fluctuates little, it imports large quantities of raw materials 
which have undergone large price fluctuations during the 
period under investigation. The share of intra-EC imports 
for all merchandise commodities rose from 35% in 1958 to 
For opposite views, see, for instance, Bhagwati (1992) and Summers 
(1991). 
This section draws heavily on Sapir (1992). 
EC-12 refers to the present 12 EC members. 
A year-by-year examination of the data confirms that 1985 corresponds 
to a structural break in the series. In 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984 the 
intra-EC export share was 53,2, 54,4, 55,0 and 54,6%, respectively. It 
was 57,4, 58,9, 59,8 and 60,2%, respectively, for 1986, 1987, 1988 and 
1989. 
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Table 2 ::I. 0 
::, 
~ 
Network of EC regional agreements ..., 
.., 
I» 
0. 
~ 
Year Benelux Denmark Greece Portugal Spain Austria Czecho- Bulgaria Turkey Malta Cyprus Yugoslavia Maghreb Mashreq Israel ACP a· France Ireland Finland slovakia Romania countries .... 
Germany UK Iceland Hungary 0 
Italy Norway Poland (IQ .., 
Sweden I» 
Switzerland C". 0 
::, 
I» 
::, 
1958 Membership 0. (IQ 
.., 
0 
1961 Association ~ .... 
Agreement ::r 
1963 Association Association 
Agreement Agreement 
(Yaounde) 
1970 FT Association 
Agreement Agreement 
1973 Membership FT FT Association 
Agreement Agreement Agreement 
1975 FT Association 
Agreement Agreement 
(Lome) 
1976 Cooperation 
Agreement 
1977 Cooperation 
Agreement 
1980 Cooperation 
Agreement 
1981 Membership 
1986 Membership Membership 
1992 Europe 
Agreement 
1993 EEA Europe 
Agreement Agreement 
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Table 3 
The regional structure of EC-12 trade, 1958-90 
(Asa percentage of tot~/ EC-12 trade) 
Year Western Europe Eastern and southern neighbours Rest of the world Total 
EC-12 EFTA Total Eastern Mediterranean ACP Total Developing Industrial Total 
Europe countries countries countries 
Exports 
1958 37,2 12,2 49,4 2,7 7,8 6,6 17,l 15,3 18,2 33,5 100,0 
1965 49,6 13,0 62,6 2,9 4,8 4,4 12,1 9,4 15,9 25,3 100,0 
1970 53,4 11,7 65,1 3,4 4,8 3,6 11,8 7,1 16,0 23,1 100,0 
1975 52,4 10,6 63,0 4,9 6,7 3,6 15,2 9,6 12,2 21,8 100,0 
1980 56,l 11,2 67,3 3,5 5,9 3,5 12,9 9,2 10,6 19,8 100,0 
1985 55,2 10,0 65,2 2,8 5,2 2,3 10,3 8,7 15,8 24,5 100,0 
1990 61,2 10,4 71,6 2,3 4,2 1,6 8,1 7,3 13,0 20,3 100,0 
Imports 
1958 35,2 9,3 44,5 2,9 4,5 
1965 44,9 9,0 53,9 3,4 4,7 
1970 50,3 8,7 59,0 3,2 4,7 
1975 49,5 7,9 57,4 3,5 3,8 
1980 49,3 8,6 57,9 3,7 4,2 
1985 53,4 9,4 62,8 3,9 5,1 
1990 59,0 .9,6 68,6 2,7 3,8 
Source: Eurostat. 
nearly 55% in 1973. It plunged below 50% in 1974-76, after 
the first oil-price shock, and again in 1980-81, after the. 
second oil-price shock. There was a significant rise after 
1985. 1 
A more instructive picture of the share of intra-EC imports 
can be obtained by focusing on processed products. This 
was done by Jacquemin and Sapir (1988a), who examined 
EC-10 imports for the period 1963-83.2 They found that the 
share of intra-EC imports for all processed goods behaved 
differently before and after 1973.3 During the first period, 
there was a steady increase in the share from 51 to 61 %. 
There was stagnation thereafter, with an eventual decline to 
around 58%. More recent figures indicate that this trend 
has not been reversed to date. 
Jacquemin and Sapir (1988a) also examined the evolution 
in the share of intra-EC imports for individual Member 
The intra-EC import share was 51,7% in 1984 and 57,9 % in 1986. 
EC-10 excludes Portugal and Spain. 
Processed goods as defined here comprise the products of all the indus-
tries belonging to sectors 2, 3 and 4 of the NACE classification. 
6,8 14,2 19,2 22,1 41,3 100,0 
5,2 13,3 12,7 20,1 32,8 100,0 
4,4 12,3 10,3 18,4 28,7 100,0 
3,8 11,l 16,3 15,2 31,5 100,0 
3,8 11,7 15,6 14,8 30,4 100,0 
3,5 12,5 9,8 14,9 24,7 100,0 
1,8 8,3 8,2 14,9 23,1 100,0 
States and individual industries or sectors (i.e. groups of 
industries). In the former, they observed an interesting con-
vergence phenomenon between old and new members after 
the first enlargement in 1973. This resulted from a decrease 
in the share of intra-EC imports for the old members and 
an increase for the new.4 
They also found important differences across sectors and 
industries. It turned out that the evolution observed at the 
aggregate level after 1973 was the result of three different 
trends: a declining share in engineering products (NACE 
sector 3), stagnation in ore processing and chemicals (NACE 
sector 2), and a rising share in other manufactures and 
processed agriculture (NACE sector 4). More recent figures 
show that these trends have continued, at least until 1991. 
Wide differences of behaviour across sectors and industries 
confirm that import shares are affected by factors other than 
EC integration. These include changes in external trade 
4 A similar phenomenon occurred after the accession of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain. See also Lloyd (1992) who shows clearly the diverging trends 
in the share of intra-area imports for EC-6 and EC-12 after 1973. 
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policy and competitiveness vis-a-vis non-EC members. Thus, 
the continuous decline in the share of intra-EC imports 
for footwear and clothing reflects primarily the changing 
comparative advantage of the Community in labour-inten-
sive products. On the other hand, the steady rise in the intra-
EC share for processed agricultural products is, probably, a 
reflection of the common agricultural policy (CAP). 
As Lloyd (1992) indicates, the only way to disentangle the 
effect of regional integration from other effects on intra-
area trade shares is to regress these shares on a set of relevant 
variables. Such an exercise was conducted by Jacquemin and 
Sapir (1988b) who examined the 1973 and 1983 shares of 
intra-EC imports in four countries (France, Germany, Italy, 
and the United Kingdom) and across about 100 NACE 3-
digit industries. Three findings from their regression analysis 
are particularly relevant in the context of the present paper. 
First, the accession of the United Kingdom to the Com-
munity has significantly increased the share of its imports 
from other Member States between 1973 and 1983. 1 This 
supports the hypothesis that EC integration has had a sub-
stantial impact on trade flows. Second, the presence of non-
border barriers among EC members contributed signifi-
cantly to lowering the share of intra-EC imports for products 
where scale economies matter. Finally, between 1973 and 
1983, the CAP played an important role in boosting the 
share of intra-EC imports in processed agricultural goods. 
In summary, it appears that the share of intra-EC trade has 
significantly increased since 1958. Although the evidence 
suggests a strong effect of EC integration, it also calls for 
two caveats. The first relates to the many other factors which 
have affected EC trade shares over time, including external 
trade policy and competitiveness. The second concerns the 
numerous extensions of EC membership, which have played 
an important part in maintaining the momentum of inte-
gration at the level of EC-12. 
3. Regionalism versus multilateralism 
As trade economists have long known, regionalism and 
multilateralism need not conflict with each other. Provided 
regional integration arrangements adopt a fairly liberal ex-
ternal trade regime, chances are that they benefit world 
trade. In other words, regional trade liberalization ought to 
be judged by its contribution to world-wide trade liberaliza-
tion. 
The United Kingdom joined the European Community in 1973. 
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In the area of manufactured products, where the Community 
has generally adopted a liberal trade policy, EC integration 
has resulted in trade creation and benefited world trade. 
Community participation in successive GA TT rounds has 
been crucial in shaping its external trade regime in manufac-
turing. Its active role in multilateral trade negotiations was 
dictated partly by its own liberal charter and partly by the 
insistence of its trade partners, most notably the United 
States. 
European integration was the main driving force behind the 
Dillon and Kennedy rounds of multilateral trade nego-
tiations which produced substantial tariff reductions. The 
process of EC integration was a catalyst in the reduction of 
Europe's external protection. This view seems to be shared 
by most authors.2 For instance, Hufbauer (1990) states that 
'France and Italy, in particular, would have strongly resisted 
making any trade concessions in the 1960s, and Germany 
would not have made trade concessions in isolation from its 
continental partners.' (p. 5). Regarding France, Messerlin 
(1992) notes that the 'first impact of the Treaty of Rome 
was to impose ... [a] macroeconomic environment [which] 
allowed the progressive opening of the French economy .... 
As a result, the protection granted to the French manufactur-
ing sector vis-a-vis both the Community and the rest of the 
world ... decreased during the 1960s.' (p. 159). 
The simultaneous lowering by the Community of its internal 
and external protection in manufacturing did not end with 
the Kennedy Round in the late 1960s. The first enlargement 
of the Community, in 1973, was followed by multilateral 
tariff cuts on manufactured goods during the Tokyo Round, 
which was completed in 1978. And the third enlargement, 
in 1986, was immediately followed by the launching of the 
still-unfinished Uruguay Round. 
The situation in temperate agriculture has run counter to 
that in manufacturing, with trade diversion instead of trade 
creation. The root of the problem lies with the de facto 
exclusion of temperate agriculture from the GA TT. 
At the end of the day, the evidence strongly suggests that 
the process of EC integration has been beneficial to both the 
Community itself and its trading partners. This favourable 
outcome is, to a large extent, due to the fact that integration 
has led to substantial multilateral trade liberalization, be-
yond what could have materialized without the Community. 
As Lawrence (1991) noted: 'The postwar experience of the 
EC is heartening. Increasing European integration after the 
Treaty of Rome was quite compatible with the lowering of 
For a dissenting view, see Winters (1992). 
Europe's external barriers.' (p. 26). The obvious exception 
is agriculture. 
Some might, however, wonder whether the Community is 
likely to maintain its active support in favour of the multilat-
eral trade system. Those who worry point to two develop-
ments. The first concerns the network of regional agreements 
built around the Community and is described in Table I. 
Half the share of extra-EC trade is accounted for by trade 
with regional partners: EFT A, Eastern Europe and southern 
neighbours (Mediterranean and ACP countries). If one adds 
this to the share of intra-EC trade, one can observe that 
roughly 80% of EC trade is intra-regional (see Table 3). The 
second concern relates to the parallel movement towards 
regionalism in America and Asia. 
The emergence of a tripolar world raises vital questions. In 
the coming years, regionalism can either contribute to or 
be detrimental to the multilateral trading system. The two 
scenarios are possible and correspond to a distinction be-
tween what Jacquemin and Sapir (1991) have described as 
'natural integration' and 'strategic integration'. 
The former situation involves 'natural' trading partners geo-
graphically close to one another, which adopt a liberal trade 
policy vis-a-vis third countries. Strategic integration, on the 
other hand, refers to a situation where member countries 
pursue a common trade policy at the expense of · third 
countries. Obviously, natural integration could lead to stra-
tegic integration. If the three blocs decide to play a non-
II - Regional integration and trade 
cooperative game, natural integration could, indeed, be used 
as a leverage for strategic conduct, with detrimental conse-
quences for all. 
4. Concluding remarks 
The previous sections suggest that EC integration has been 
successful. It has had a significant impact on intra-EC trade. 
At the same time, it has benefited world trade thanks to its 
generally liberal external trade policy. 
The success of EC integration has created dynamics towards 
greater regional integration both in Europe and elsewhere. 
In Europe, one of the most interesting recent developments 
are the European Agreements between the Community on 
the one hand, and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland on 
the other. These agreements, which aim at the establishment 
of a free trade area within 10 years of their entry into force 
(March 1992), are analysed in Chapter 11.B. Elsewhere, there 
are equally important efforts to create regional economic 
schemes. In America, efforts are under way for the establish-
ment of a North-American Free Trade Area (Nafta) between 
the United States, Canada and Mexico. Also, many de-
veloping countries are either launching new plans or reviving 
old schemes for regional integration. Chapter 11.C presents 
a critical review of regional integration among developing 
countries based on the EC experience. 
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B - EC trade with Central and Eastern Europe: a new relationship 
1. Introduction 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe1 are undergo-
ing an unprecedented revolution aimed at the transformation 
of economic policy from central planning to market orien-
tation. One of the crucial elements of this process involves 
the restructuring of Eastern Europe's foreign economic re-
lations. 
Until the change in economic policy, the participation of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (EESU) 
in world trade had a special flavour. The share of EESU in 
world trade had been steadily declining, reaching 8% in 
1988. At the same time, however, the degree of openness 
(measured by the ratio of exports to GNP) of the individual 
East European countries was roughly comparable to that of 
several countries of Western Europe.2 But the main feature 
of this trade was its high degree of concentration within the 
former CMEA zone. In 1988, two-thirds of the exports by 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe remained inside 
the zone. Rather than the result of market forces, trade by 
these countries was, therefore, mainly a reflection of centrally 
planned decisions. 
There is broad agreement that the success of Central and 
Eastern Europe in shifting economic policy towards market 
orientation hinges partly on their ability to become again 
fully-fledged participants in the world trading network. This 
agreement stems from the lessons drawn from the experience 
of the past decades in countries around the world, demon-
strating the virtue of market-oriented trade in fostering econ-
omic growth. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
share a strong desire to avail themselves of long-denied 
opportunities to import Western goods and technology in 
order to improve their economic performance. 
Likewise, it is widely recognized that the successful inte-
gration of Central and East European countries into the 
world economy will depend upon two complementary fac-
tors: their capacity to transform their own economies and 
improved access to foreign markets. 
Throughout the paper, the definition 'Central and Eastern Europe' will 
refer to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. 
Unless specified differently, Yugoslavia is outside the scope of the paper. 
When the Soviet Union is included, the expression 'Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union' (EESU) will be used. 
Estimates of the degree of openness, however, vary substantially across 
sources mainly due to different GNP and intra-CMEA trade estimates. 
For instance, Collins and Rodrik (1991) find a ratio of exports to GNP 
of 19% for Czechoslovakia, 15% for Hungary and 7% for Poland (1988 
figures), while the OECD (1991) reports figures of 35, 33 and 19% (1989 
figures), respectively. 
The economic transformation of the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe raises a number of issues with respect 
to the volume of trade, its geographical pattern, and its 
product composition. Most economists expect important 
changes on all three accounts, but opinions vary on the 
speed at which changes are likely to take place. One area, 
however, where adjustments have occurred with great rap-
idity is the geographical pattern of trade. With the collapse 
of the CMEA, and the crisis in the Soviet Union, the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe have redirected 
their trade flows to Western industrial economies, particu-
larly the EC. 
The issue of access to industrial countries' markets has, 
therefore, become a matter of great acuity. The EC, which 
has become the largest trading partner of most countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (in 1991 it accounted for about 
50% of exports from and imports to Hungary and Poland), 
has not only taken a number of important steps to improve 
the access to its markets, but also reshaped its relations with 
these countries in a fundamental way. The speed and extent 
of the Community's response has been unprecedented, par-
ticularly when taking into account the nature of its decision-
making process. 
Initially, the Community's response focused largely on uni-
lateral, piecemeal trade measures and on assistance. Gradu-
ally, however, the emphasis moved to a more systematic 
redefinition of its relations with the emerging democracies 
in Central and Eastern Europe. As a first step towards the 
eventual full integration of these countries into the Com-
munity, a free trade area is now being established. This 
indicates clearly that, although it continues to provide sub-
stantial financial assistance to Central and East European 
countries (CEECs), the Community views trade as the most 
important channel for supporting their economic transform-
ation. 
Meanwhile, economists in academia and international or-
ganizations have taken to task the industrial countries, es-
pecially the EC, for their trade policies vis-a-vis the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe. Industrial countries are 
often urged to dismantle non-tariff barriers which, according 
to the OECD Secretariat, 'are particularly restrictive in sec-
tors where CEECs have done relatively well' (OECD, 1991, 
p. 18). The sectors concerned are agriculture, textiles and 
clothing, steel and chemicals. 'Of these, the first three are 
widely subject to restrictive sector-specific arrangements 
which largely put them outside the GA TT agreement. The 
fourth has been heavily restricted by the application of anti-
dumping and countervailing duty actions' (OECD, 1991, 
p. 19). 
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The years ahead will witness a greater integration of the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe with their Western 
neighbours. A few key indicators on the size of these 
countries will shed some light on the magnitude of the impact 
of such integration. In terms of population, the CEECs 
(96 million inhabitants in 1989) are nearly three times as 
large as the EFTA group (34 million), but somewhat smaller 
than the EC's southern neighbours (Turkey and the· three 
Maghreb countries, with a population of 110 million). The 
picture concerning the relative size of GDP is more compli-
cated. Depending upon the source, the ratio of CEECs' GDP 
to that of the EFT A ranges between one-third and one. 
Using World Bank estimates, the GDP of Central and East-
ern Europe stood, in 1989, at about USO 200 billion, roughly 
equivalent to the Netherlands' GDP. This compares with 
USO 670 billion for the EFTA, and about USO 140 billion 
for Turkey and the Maghreb combined. 
The uncertainty surrounding the GDP figures also affects 
the estimates of per capita income. According to the World 
Bank, the per capita GDP of Central and Eastern Europe 
amounted to about USO 2 OOO in 1989. This was less than 
one-tenth the income per head of EFT A, but more than 
50% that of Turkey and the Maghreb combined. However, 
other socioeconomic indicators, such as those relative to 
health and education, suggested that CEECs were closer to 
the EFTA countries than to Turkey and the Maghreb. Turn-
ing to external trade, Central and Eastern Europe had, in 
1989, merchandise exports of about USO 50 billion, i.e. 
somewhat less than Spain (USO 66 billion). Although 
CEECs' exports were nearly double those of Turkey and the 
Maghreb combined, they amounted to less than one-third 
those of EFT A. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the issues 
associated with the integration of the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe in the world economy, in particular 
with respect to EC commercial policy. The main argument 
can be summarized as follows. Section 2 looks at the volume 
of trade ofCEECs, its product composition and its direction. 
It confirms that the EC has become, and will remain, the 
main partner of Central and Eastern Europe. Section 3 
shows how the Community's commercial policy has been 
adapted to allow better access to exports from Central and 
Eastern Europe. Section 4 examines the consequences of EC 
trade liberalization for exports from Central and Eastern 
Europe and competing third countries. It addresses the criti-
cisms of EC commercial policy summarized above. More-
over, it attempts to gauge the relative importance of supply 
factors in Central and Eastern Europe and access conditions 
in the EC market in shaping trade flows between CEECs 
and the EC. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Volume, composition and direction of trade 
There is much speculation in economics literature about the 
potential consequences of the economic transformation in 
Central and Eastern Europe for international trade. I Most 
of the literature focuses on the medium term, at the end of 
Central and Eastern Europe's transition to a market econ-
omy. This paper concentrates, instead, on the transition 
phase. 
2.1. Direction of trade 
The recent collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA) and the recession in Central and Eastern 
Europe have led to a dramatic change in the geographical 
composition of exports from Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union (EESU). Instead of being directed 
eastwards to their former CMEA partners, exports from 
EESU are now increasingly shipped westwards, particularly 
to the EC. 
The actual geographical composition of 
exports from EESU 
Table 4 indicates a number of interesting features about the 
geographical pattern of exports from EESU as it stood in 
1989: 
(i) On average, 75% of exports from the countries of 
EESU were shipped to Europe (which is defined here as 
comprising the EC, EFT A, and EESU). This proportion 
was, in fact, no different from that observed for the 
countries of either the EC or EFT A. 2 This proportion 
varied relatively little among the individual EESU 
countries (the only outlier was Romania with a ratio of 
only 58%). 
(ii) On average, the share of exports from EESU shipped 
to other EESU countries was larger than the share going 
to the EC. This was also true of all the individual EESU 
countries. Exports to the Soviet Union ranged between 
25% of Poland's exports and 58% for Bulgaria (see 
also Graph 10). 
(iii) Within EESU the main market for exports from the 
EESU countries was, by far, that of the Soviet Union. 
See, for instance, CEPR (1990), Collins and Rodrik (1991), and Hamil-
ton and Winters (1991 ). 
In 1989, the share of EC and EFTA goods shipped to Europe was 73 
and 76%, respectively. 
Table 4 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: geographical composition of exports, 1989 
Partner Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland 
EC 8 16 24 31 
EITA 5 9 10 
EESU 75 59 42 39 
Eastern Europe (17) (16) (14) (14) 
Soviet Union (58) (43) (28) (25) 
Europe - Total 84 80 75 80 
World 100 100 100 100 
Source: Collins and Rodrick ( 1991 ). 
GRAPH 10: East European counbies and the USSR: distribution of exports in 1988 
(%) 
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(% of exports to the world) 
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This corresponds to the fact that the Soviet Union 
accounted for about two-thirds of EESU's combined 
GNP. 
Drastic changes in the geographical pattern of Central and 
Eastern Europe's exports have taken place in 1990 and 1991: 
(i) The importance of the EC market, which had already 
increased for some countries in 1988/89, shot up drasti-
cally in 1990. Table 6 shows that the EC accounted for 
more than 30% of exports for each country of Central 
and Eastern Europe. This proportion was, none the less, 
still substantially lower than that of other neighbours of 
the Community. 
(ii) In 1991, the importance of the EC market again in-
creased for Central and East European exporters, reach-
ing about 50% for Hungary and Poland. 
(iii) Table 5 traces, in greater details, the rapid transform-
ation of the geographical pattern of Poland's exports. 
During the first three quarters of 1990, the share of 
Poland's exports going to EESU was down 15 to 16 
points compared to the annual figure for 1989. At the 
same time the share absorbed by the EC was up 12 to 
14 points. As a result, the EC became the single largest 
market for Poland's exports. During the last quarter of 
1990 and the first quarter of 1991 these shares changed 
again: EESU was down a further 10 points and the EC 
was up an additional 10 points. These figures have 
remained roughly constant throughout the second and 
third quarters of 1991. 
Table S 
Poland: geographical composition of exports, 1989 
Partner Actual 
EC 
EFTA 
EESU 
Eastern Europe 
Soviet Union 
Europe - Total 
World 
1989 
(I) 
31 
,; io 
.)~39 
·, ··(14) 
(25) 
80 
100 
QI 
(2) 
43 
24 
100 
Q2 
(3) 
43 
25 
100 
1990 
Finally, note should be made of Graphs 11 and 12 which 
show that the EC is, within the OECD countries, by far the 
largest trading partner of Central and Eastern Europe. This 
was already the case in the past, but its relative importance 
has further increased since 1989. 
The 'normal' geographical composition of 
exports from CEECs 
A number of studies have attempted to compute the 'normal' 
geographical pattern of trade of Central and Eastern Europe, 
i.e. the pattern that would prevail if Central and Eastern 
Europe were a market economy fully integrated into the 
world system. These studies generally use a 'gravity model' 
which relates bilateral trade flows to variables such as GNP, 
population, distance, and trading arrangements. These mod-
els show that the existence of the CMEA system drastically 
increased intra-CMEA flows at the expense of trade with 
Western countries, particularly the EC. 1 The breakdown of 
the CMEA should, therefore, result in a redirection of ex-
ports towards the EC. In the same spirit, Andre Sapir has 
attempted to estimate the 'normal' geographical allocation 
of Poland's exports using the following two-step procedure. 2 
See Havrylyshyn and Pritchett ( 1991 ), Collins and Rodrik ( 1991 ), and 
Hamilton and Winters (1991). 
Andre Sapir, 'The geographical composition of exports from Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union', internal document, EC Commission, 6 
August 1991. 
Q3 
(4) 
45 
24 
100 
Q4 
(5) 
55 
15 
100 
1991 
QI 
(6) 
54 
15 
100 
(% of exports to the world) 
Pffllic:ted 
Sapir C&R 
{7) (8) 
51 51 
5 10 
24 23 
(7) (9) 
(17) (14) 
80 85 
100 100 
Sources: columns (I) and (8): Collins and Rodrick (1991); columns (2) to (6): Polish statistics; column (7): own estimates. 
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Table 6 
Share of total exports to the EC, selected countries, 1984-91 
(%) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Bulgaria 21,6 17,1 20,1 20,7 17,7 18,7 28,8 37,8 
Czechoslovakia 22,8 22,8 23,4 24,4 24,2 25,7 32,0 n.a. 
Hungary 16,4 16,0 17,3 19,8 22,5 24,7 33,5 39,7 
Poland 23,4 22,6 21,3 25,8 30,3 30,9 35,6 45,0 
Romania 26,0 24,1 22,6 25,9 24,0 25,2 31,4 34,2 
USSR 40,5 33,6 27,8 29,1 27,9 29,7 38,7 43,0 
Austria 55,2 56,1 60,2 63,6 63,8 64,9 64,8 65,8 
Finland 38,9 37,1 38,3 42,1 44,2 43,9 46,7 51,2 
Greece 54,9 54,3 63,7 66,9 64,4 64,7 64,l 63,7 
Portugal 61,9 62,7 68,3 71,8 72,0 72,0 n.a. n.a. 
Spain 51,6 52,l 60,3 63,8 65,7 66,4 72,9 72,1 
Turkey 39,0 40,3 43,7 47,8 43,7 46,7 53,3 51,4 
Source: JMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 1991. 
GRAPH 11 : Trade of Central and Eastern Europe with developed countries (DCs): imports of Central and Eastern Europe 
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GRAPH 12: Trade of Central and Eastern Europe with developed countries (DCs): exports of Central and Eastern Europe 
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First, based on the previous discussion, the 'normal' share 
of Poland's exports shipped to Europe is estimated at 80% 
(which is also the share recorded in 1989). Second, the 
'normal' allocation of Poland's exports among the three 
European markets (EC, EFT A and EESU) is assumed to 
follow the relative importance of each market (excluding 
Poland) in Europe's GNP. The results of this procedure are 
reported in Table 5, column (7). The following geographical 
composition of Poland's exports is predicted: 51 % to the 
EC, 5% to the EFTA, 24% to EESU (including 17% to the 
Soviet Union), and the remaining 20% to the rest of the 
world. These figures are extremely similar to those estimated 
by Collins and Rodrik (1991). Note also that a proportion 
of 50% of total exports going to the EC is not particularly 
large for EC neighbours (see Table 6). 
Two messages emerge from the comparison between actual 
and predicted trade flows for Central and Eastern Europe: 
(i) the current (1991) geographical trade pattern of CEECs' 
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exports is much closer to the 'normal' pattern than the 
past (1 ?89) one; 
14,1% 
OthcrDCs 
8,4% 
January-June 1991 
EC 
(ii) there may, however, exist an over-shooting: the share of 
EESU may have become too small due to the current 
political and macroeconomic disturbances in the Soviet 
Union; it does not imply, however, that the EC share 
has necessarily become too large compared to the me-
dium-term equilibrium. 
The Community has become and will remain the main pole 
of attraction for exports from Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union. This is a fact which cannot be eluded 
and upon which the Community has acted by improving the 
access of its market. In addition, however, there is room for 
macroeconomic actions which may help restore trade flows 
among the former CMEA countries. 
2.2. Volume of trade 
The issue of the geographical composition of exports from 
Central and Eastern Europe cannot be entirely separated 
from the problem of the volume of trade. 
The economic transformation in the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe can be expected to increase the volume 
of their exports to the EC for two reasons. The first is the 
redirection of exports away from the CMEA, which is 
already on its way. The second is the medium-term effect of 
economic transformation on trade openness and output. 
As far as the first factor is concerned, Brada (1991) has 
calculated that the elimination of the trade-diverting effect 
of the CMEA could free about 50% of Central and Eastern 
Europe's exports. The obvious question that arises is whether 
the goods diverted from the CMEA could find a market 
elsewhere. Some elements of answer will have to await the 
next section, which deals with the product composition of 
trade. 
The second factor is even more uncertain. Estimates of the 
effect of economic reform on trade openness in Central and 
Eastern Europe vary a great deal between analysts. To a 
large extent, differences in predicted values are accounted 
for by differences in the current values (see footnote 2 on p. 
27). None the less, most economists anticipate an increase 
in total exports as a result of simulations using a 'gravity 
model'. Based on 1985 trade flows, Hamilton and Winters 
(1991) anticipate CEECs' exports to increase by 50%, as-
suming production constant. A similar increase is predicted 
by Collins and Rodrik on the basis of 1988 trade flows, 
again assuming production remains constant. If production 
is allowed to increase, as can be expected in the medium 
term, exports should rise even further. Most of these ad-
ditional exports can be expected to flow towards the EC 
market. 
2.3. Product composition of trade 
The two previous issues, the geographical composition of 
trade and the volume of trade, are connected not only with 
each other, but also with the product composition of trade. 
The types of goods exported by the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe to former CMEA partners differ signifi-
cantly from the kinds of goods exported to the rest of the 
world, including the EC. First of all, the product categories 
diverge strongly. For instance, machinery and transport 
equipment accounted, in 1988, for 60% of Czechoslovak 
exports to CMEA countries, but only for 20% of exports to 
other countries (they accounted for 14% of exports to the 
EC). Secondly, even within the same product category, the 
quality of products is likely to differ according to their 
destination, the exports to CMEA countries having a lower 
quality than exports to the EC. 
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The implication of these differences is that Central and 
Eastern Europe may not be able to ship to the West many 
of the goods freed up by a decline in intra-CMEA trade, at 
least not in the short term. On the other hand, a large 
proportion of the goods presently exported by the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe to the West are regarded 
there as sensitive products. 
Consequently, in order to match the decline in exports to 
the former CMEA, the expected increase in exports from 
Central and Eastern Europe to the West can only be met in 
either (or a combination) of the following two ways: 
(i) CEECs succeed rapidly in converting part of their pro-
duction capacity formerly used to export to the East; 
(ii) CEECs succeed in increasing their exports of sensitive 
products to the West. 
The following two sections discuss how changes in EC com-
mercial policy have contributed toward the restructuring of 
Central and Eastern Europe's exports. 
3. EC trade regimes towards Central and 
Eastern Europe 
3.1. Trade regime before the Trade and 
Cooperation Agreements 
Until the late 1980s, the EC rules on State-trading countries 
placed Central and East European countries at the bottom 
of the EC's hierarchy of trade preferences. Only Romania 
(and Yugoslavia) benefited from the EC's generalized system 
of preferences (GSP), while exports from the CEECs gener-
ally faced significant trade obstacles, often in the form of 
quantitative restrictions (QRs), set at EC and/or national 
level. 
3.2. The Trade and Cooperation Agreements 
Since 1989, however, the Community has been engaged in 
promoting the process of political and economic reforms in 
the CEECs. To supplement the network of agreements with 
these countries, actions were taken to ensure that Trade 
and Cooperation Agreements were concluded with those 
countries not yet covered by such agreements, while at the 
same time redefining their objectives and content. 
A number of import quotas were removed by the EC Mem-
ber States already in 1990, as part of Community's trade 
concessions. Originally, EC-wide quantitative restrictions 
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were to be gradually phased out in the case of Hungary and 
Poland. Subsequently, the extension of Operation Phare to 
other countries resulted in the elimination or suspension of 
QRs vis-a-vis Central and Eastern Europe. QRs specifically 
aimed at these countries and operated nationally by Member 
States were eliminated, whereas non-specific QRs (covering 
glass, shoes, toys, leather, some machinery, some non-MF A 
products and some non-ECSC steel products) were sus-
pended until the end of 1991. The generalized system of 
preferences was granted to all five Central and East Euro-
pean countries. 
The Trade and Cooperation Agreements envisaged specific 
provisions for certain sensitive sectors, which accounted for 
a substantial part of CEECs' exports (see Table 7). For 
textiles, the CSFR, Hungary and Poland accepted an interim 
(not-renewable) arrangement aimed at replacing for a year 
the existing bilateral arrangements, in view of putting the 
three countries on a par with other MF A participants. I For 
Table 7 
Commodity composition of exports to the EC from Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 1988-90 
A-Poland 
1988 1989 
Food and agricultural products 20,0 23,2 
Textiles and clothing 10,6 10,3 
Iron and steel 6,8 8,9 
Total of the three groups 37,4 42,4 
Other products 62,6 57,6 
B - Czechoslovakia 
1988 1989 
Food and agricultural products 7,0 8,6 
Textiles and clothing 10,9 9,9 
Iron and steel 14,0 14,7 
Total of the three groups 32,0 33,1 
Other products 68,0 66,9 
C-Hungary 
1988 1989 
Food and agricultural products 28,5 29,3 
Textiles and clothing 15,8 14,7 
Iron and steel 7,5 7,2 
Total of the three groups 51,8 51,3 
Other products 48,2 48,7 
Source: Eurostat (Comext). 
(% of total) 
1990 
21,0 
11,2 
8,9 
41,l 
58,9 
1990 
7,6 
10,7 
15,2 
33,5 
66,5 
1990 
23,8 
15,5 
8,3 
47,5 
52,5 
The CSFR, Hungary, Poland and Romania are participants in the 
Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) governing trade in textiles and clothing. 
Their combined share was less than 11 % of EC imports of textiles and 
clothing from MFA-restrained countries. In 1990, textiles and clothing 
accounted for 11,2% of Polish, 10,7% of Czech and 15,5% of Hungarian 
exports to the Community. 
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1990 and 1991 the agreements provided for quota increases 
of+ 13% for Hungary and+ 23% for Poland, while residual 
quantitative restrictions by Member States on non-MFA 
textiles imports from both countries were eliminated in Nov-
ember 1989. 
In the case of agriculture, EC trade concessions were more 
limited. At the end of the last decade, exports of agricultural 
products accounted for about one quarter of Hungarian and 
Polish exports and some 8% of exports from the CSFR. 
EC import duties for iron and steel (ECSC products) were 
already low. Simple average EC tariffs are 3,5% for un-
worked products, 5,6% for semi-manufactures and 5,4% for 
manufactures. In 1990, imports from Central and Eastern 
Europe accounted for some 18% of total extra-EC imports 
of ECSC products. Trade with those countries has been 
subject to a series of annual arrangements taking the form 
of voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs), covering also the 
five Member States' autonomous quotas. Such VRAs in 
1990 covered some 87% of sectoral Community imports 
from Central and Eastern Europe. 
In 1991, VRAs were agreed for the last year, in view of 
the commitments within the framework of the steel trade 
liberalization arising from the Community's relations with 
the USA and the expected Multilateral Steel Arrangement 
(MSA). 
For Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Protocol of 
the Cooperation Agreements concerning ECSC products 
entered into force on l December 1991, l January 1992 and 
l April 1992 respectively.2 Consequently, from the outset of 
1992 trade in ECSC products was completely liberalized for 
Poland and Hungary and for Czechoslovakia as from l 
April 1992. 
3.3. The Association Agreements {Table 13) 
Negotiations for the Association Agreements with the 
CSFR, Hungary and Poland started in December 1990 and 
were signed on 16 December 1991. The Agreements, which 
also contain sections on political dialogue and institutional 
provisions, aim at the establishment of a free trade area and 
freedom of movement, as well as at economic and financial 
cooperation, in view of ever-closer relations with the 
countries concerned. The free trade area is to be established 
at the end of a transitional period, of a maximum duration 
of 10 years, divided into two successive stages of five years 
The main commercial effect of these protocols was the suppression of 
national contingents for five Member States: Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
each, starting from the entry into force of the Agreements 
(March 1992). Pending the ratification of the Agreements 
by the national parliaments, interim agreements are currently 
in place to implement the provisions of the European Agree-
ments on trade and trade-related matters. 1 Negotiations in 
view of Association Agreements with Bulgaria and Romania 
started in mid-May 1992. The trade component of these 
Agreements is virtually the same as in the case of the CSFR, 
Hungary and Poland. 
On the Community side, the Association Agreements con-
solidate all the previous unilateral trade concessions, while 
laying the ground for the complete removal of all trade 
obstacles by the end of the transitional period. The trade 
provisions involve the immediate removal of all quotas, 
while import tariffs will be progressively eliminated over a 
period ranging between two and five years. The Central 
European countries will reciprocate more slowly by phasing 
out tariffs and quotas over a period of four to nine years. 
As in the previous Trade and Cooperation Agreements, the 
Association Agreements also contain specific provisions for 
certain sensitive sectors. 
Textiles. The Agreements (Protocol No 1) provide for the 
progressive elimination of import duties over six years from 
the date of entry into force of the Agreements. Existing 
quantitative restrictions are to be eliminated within a period 
not shorter than five years (but no longer than half the 
period agreed in the Uruguay Round for the phasing out of 
the MFA) as from 1 January 1993. Modalities for tariff 
reduction and phasing out of the QRs are to be negotiated 
bilaterally. The Agreements contain safeguard provisions in 
case of market disruption (related to specific EC regions. 
and products), and stipulate that at the end of the 10-year 
transitional period sectoral trade between these countries 
and the EC will no longer be subject to special treatment. 
Iron and steel (ECSC products). The VRAs system expired 
at the end of 1991, not having been renegotiated for 1992. 
The entry into force of the Association Agreements in March 
1992 removed the residual national quotas.2 
Agriculture. In addition to the consolidation of and some 
improvements to previous concessions (GSP and elim-
ination/suspension of QRs), there will be reciprocal con-
cessions for specific products of particular export interest 
for Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. 
Council Decision of 25 February 1992, OJ L 115/1, 30.4.1992. 
The elimination of national quotas had been anticipated for Poland and 
Hungary by the entry into force of the ECSC Protocols of the Cooper-
ation Agreements (I December 1991 and 1 January 1992). For Czechos-
lovakia the Protocol of the Cooperation Agreement virtually did not 
have any effect as it entered into force on 1 April 1992, that is after the 
entry into force of the Association Agreements. 
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In 1991 about 50% of all exports from the CSFR, Hungary 
and Poland entered the EC market free of any import duty 
or quantitative restriction. The proportion of imports that 
entered duty-free (under either the MFN or GSP regime) 
was respectively 57% for Poland, 47% for Hungary and 
46% for the CSFR. 
Other major provisions 
In 1991, anti-dumping measures were in force against the 
CSFR, Hungary and Poland. They were largely concentrated 
in chemical products, and were mostly in the form of under-
takings. 3 Such undertakings were originally agreed with cen-
tral entities. The application of existing anti-dumping 
measures, however, has become more problematic with the 
introduction of market economy principles in those 
countries, since the new economic agents are not bound by 
previous undertakings. 
The Association Agreements provide for anti-dumping rules 
in accordance with existing domestic legislation and the 
GA TT Anti-dumping Code. The procedure requires that the 
Association Council be informed of a dumping case as 
soon as the authorities of the importing party initiate an 
investigation. Anti-dumping duties may be adopted when 
dumping continues or no satisfactory solution is reached 
(e.g. an undertaking) within 30 days after the matter has 
been referred to the Council. In addition, provisional 
measures may be taken where exceptional circumstances 
require immediate action. Uncertainty prevails, however, as 
to the legal basis for computing normal values in assessing 
dumping margins. In the past, specific rules were adopted 
vis-a-vis State-trading countries; under these rules normal 
values were calculated on the basis of cost structures in 
relevant third countries. In the future, when transformation 
towards market economies will be completed, general rules 
(i.e. those applying in the case of market economies) will be 
used. During the transition period, special legislation may 
be necessary. 
Furthermore, the Agreements foresee the application of 
Community provisions in the area of competition policy, in 
particular State aids. In 1992 the implementing rules were, 
however, not yet in place. They must be adopted within 
three years from the entry into force of the Agreements. 
The products subject to anti-dumping measures are the following: silicon 
carbide (Poland), sodium carbonate (Poland), methenamine (Poland and 
CSFR), artificial corundum (Poland, CSFR and Hungary), potassium 
permanganate (CSFR), urea (CSFR and Hungary), and copper sulphate 
(Poland, CSFR and Hungary). The impending expiry for the last prod-
uct has already been published. At present investigations have been 
initiated for silicon carbide (Article 15 review) and seamless steel tubes 
(new investigation affecting all three countries). 
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With regard to State aids, during the first five years (which 
may be extended by an additional five-year period), Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary and Poland will be treated as the least 
developed areas within the Community. This implies that 
they may grant aid for investments for up to 75% of their 
value and, under certain conditions, also temporary op-
erating aids without breaching the Agreements. If the Com-
munity considered a trade-related measure as appropriate, 
it would first have to report it to the Association Council 
for consultation, and in any event such a measure would 
have to be in conformity with the procedures and under the 
conditions laid down by the GA TT. 
The Agreements provide for the possibility of safeguard 
measures in case of serious injury to Community producers, 
or serious sectoral difficulties leading to a significant deterio-
ration in the economic activity of a Community region. No 
specific mention is made of the type of appropriate measures, 
which are normally taken after mutual consultation. 
The actual impact of the Agreement provisions aimed at 
countering potential negative effects of import surges and 
State aids remains to be seen, and will crucially depend on 
the way they are implemented. 
One of the Protocols of the Association Agreements lays 
down the arrangements applicable in terms of rules of origin. 
To benefit from the trade preferential treatment stemming 
from the Agreements, goods exported to the Community 
must have been fully produced or undergone sufficient work-
ing or processing in one of the three CEECs. The Agreements 
also allow for cumulation: those products that have not 
undergone sufficient working or processing in one of the 
three countries, but previously originated from either the 
Community or one of the other two countries, also qualify 
for preferential treatment. 1 Broadly speaking, in this area 
the three CEECs enjoy a treatment similar to that of the 
EFT A countries before the creation of the EEA. 
3.4. Compatibility with GATT of Association 
Agreements: bilateral versus multilateral 
As recent developments show, the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe cannot look to intra-regional trade to 
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As a general rule, non-originating materials are considered to be suf-
ficiently worked or processed when the product obtained is classified in 
a heading ( of the Harmonized System) which is different from that in 
which all the non-originating materials used in its manufacture are 
classified. In addition, the Protocol concerning rules of origin contains 
a list of products for which specific conditions (e.g. a percentage rule) 
must be fulfilled to obtain the originating status. 
cushion the process of integration of their production struc-
tures into the world economy. Even smaller regional inte-
gration schemes in Central and Eastern Europe, perhaps 
more acceptable at the political level, would hardly give the 
needed boost to their restructuring economies. By the same 
token, larger trade concessions with developing countries 
would fall short of making a major impact. And certainly 
the last thing these restructuring economies need is the 
replacement of their old centrally-planned price structures 
with a new one relying on inward-looking policies based on 
import substitution. This makes a durable acceleration of 
expansion of trade with the rest of the world, and in particu-
lar with their closer continental markets, yet more pressing. 
Most CEECs have regularized their position in international 
organizations. All are, or are in the process of becoming, 
members of the IMF and the World Bank. With the excep-
tion of Albania, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, all are 
Contracting Parties to the GATT.2 
The creation of a free trade area, as envisaged in the Associ-
ation Agreements, is fully compatible with the multilateral 
trading system as long as it complies with the two main 
conditions set in Article XXIV of the GA TT. The GA TT 
allows the formation of free trade areas or customs unions 
which, without raising trade barriers against third countries, 
provide its members with preferential treatment, as in the 
case of the Community itself or the US-Canada FT A. The 
presumption behind the acceptance of these forms of agree-
ment has been that their trade-creating effects are larger 
than their trade-diverting ones. In addition, GA TT Article 
XXIV requires that preferential agreements cover 'substan-
tially all trade', which has generally been interpreted as 
meaning about 80% of merchandise trade, rather than being 
limited to a small number of sectors. 
As far as the Community is concerned, it already has one 
of the lowest (bound) tariff structures. In some sectors, 
however, the level of protection is relatively higher, due to 
the presence of non-tariff measures. It is in these sectors 
(textiles and clothing, agriculture, ECSC products) that the 
risk of trade diversion may become real. In the case of 
textiles and clothing, however, the explicit link made by the 
Agreements with the Uruguay Round reduces the likelihood 
of such an outcome. 
On the other hand, countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
also have a low level of external protection, having elimin-
ated most of the non~tariff barriers of central planning, and 
The CSFR and Yugoslavia acceded to GATT as market economies; 
Hungary, Poland and Romania under special provisions; Bulgaria, an 
observer to GATT since 1967, applied to accede to GATT in 1986. 
Hungary and Poland are in the process of renegotiating their Protocols 
of Accession. 
having long had relatively low tariffs. 1 The sustainability of 
such an open trade regime during the difficult phase of 
transformation of their economies may, however, be ques-
tioned. 
4. Impact of EC trade liberalization on 
Central and Eastern Europe 
4.1. Supply response in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
In view of closer trade relations with the Community, 
CEECs will have to face not only an adaptation to the EC 
requirements, but also, and more importantly, the building 
up of a market-based economy to be integrated into the 
world economy. The disappearance of the CMEA system 
(formally in April 1991, but much earlier in practice) trans-
lated into the vanishing of well-established pricing formulas 
and clearing facilities associated with the traditional CMEA 
transferable rouble trade and payment arrangements. 
Although the CEECs have proved rather successful in re-
orientating their trade towards more promising markets in 
Western Europe, the economic situation in Central and 
Eastern Europe continues to deteriorate, with the sharp 
reductions in output and domestic demand observed in 1989/ 
90 expected to continue, or at best stabilize, in 1992/93.2 
The breakdown of trade links within the CMEA block has 
not only led to the loss of previously secured market outlets· 
but, given the rigid division of labour among former CMEA 
countries, also to potential supply bottlenecks which can 
hinder the development of domestic production. Though 
reforming countries can now supply their economies in the 
more efficient world markets, such a possibility is also limited 
by the availability of hard currency. Considerable drops in 
investment are delaying the capacity of CEECs' economies 
to react swiftly to market signals. The uncertainties sur-
rounding the issue of private ownership means that there 
is little incentive for would-be private investors to take 
investment decisions in substitution of the previously cen-
trally-planned ones. Several observers have stressed (see Van 
In 1990/91, the CSFR and Poland implemented trade reforms which 
reduced tariffs by at least 40 percentage points, and eliminated almost 
all peaks from their tariff schedules, while at the same time abolishing 
all quantitative restrictions on imports other than those based on health 
and public safety. A long-standing member of GATT like Czechoslo-
vakia now has a low 'bound' tariff average of 4 to 5%. 
See OECD, 'Integrating Central and East European countries in the 
international economy', WP3(91)5, p. 4. 
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Brabant, 1991) the enormous difficulties in moving from the 
legacy of 40 years of central planning to a fully-fledged 
market economy: lack of familiarity with how markets actu-
ally operate; the absence of a broad middle class that could 
take over management from political or administrative de-
cision-makers; the weakness of a managerial and entreprene-
urial culture; expectations of individuals as to the preser-
vation of most of the benefits granted under communism; 
the absence of institutions, legal bases and the financial 
infrastructure necessary for a market economy. Progress in 
these areas varies considerably among the countries of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, and is far from proceeding swiftly 
as it meets significant internal resistance. 
The transformation process in CEECs will require substan-
tial capital equipment, which developed countries, especially 
those in Europe, will be most likely to supply. CEECs' 
relatively cheap (see Table 8) and supposedly well-trained 
labour resources are also likely to attract investment from 
developed countries. In the longer term, if such a process 
succeeds, it would lead to relatively quick changes in wage 
and income levels in CEECs, pushing their specialization 
pattern towards skill-intensive, higher-cost goods. 
Table 8 
Hourly earnings in manufacturing 
USA 
Germany 
France 
Japan 
Spain 
Portugal 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Singapore 
Mexico 
Poland 
(1990 USA= JOO) 
100 
138 
98 
82 
72 
20 
24 
24 
19 
12 
6 
Source: Blanchard, Dornbusch et al. Reform in Eastern Europe, MIT Press, 1991. 
The ability to increase exports in the face of large import-
intensive investment requirements is crucial if external via-
bility is not to be undermined by unsustainable levels of 
external debt. The export base of CEECs, for the time being, 
is likely to be rather limited and concentrated on existing 
productions, largely those in so-called 'sensitive' sectors. 
Their potential export capacity for the near future is unlikely 
to increase massively, and will probably rely mainly on 
comparatively cheap labour. Outward-oriented policies 
would be more likely to be adopted as a guide to their 
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transformation process into a market economy by a buoyant 
external environment. While the old trading relationships 
have dissolved faster than anticipated, integration into the 
world trading system remains time-consuming. The 'early 
harvest' that followed removal of disincentive to market-
orientated trade, particularly in those sectors where CEECs 
already had a significant production capacity in place, is 
probably tapering off. Further export growth, consequently, 
must rely on restructuring of production, including the 
ability to respond flexibly to emerging and changing demand 
stimuli. 
The policy implication for their major trade partners, as 
acknowledged by all OECD members, is that 'open access 
to their markets is the single most important contribution 
that OECD countries can make to improving prospects for 
transition in the region'.i 
Even when assuming that the external conditions were fully 
met, evidence on the actual pace of reform in CEECs arouses 
a certain apprehension as to the actual progress made thus 
far. Thus, for example, difficulties in the implementation of 
institutional changes, great divisiveness and political stale-
mate appear to inhibit the amplitude of the transformation 
process in Poland. Likewise, the significant progress made 
in terms of economic reform and macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion in Czechoslovakia is increasingly overshadowed by un-
certainties related to the future of the federation. There are, 
however, some signs that a certain degree of supply response 
is taking place. 
4.2. Supply response: the impact of the GSP 
Since January 1990, exports from Poland and Hungary to 
the Community are covered by the generalized system of 
Conclusions ofOECD WPI autumn discussion on 'Transition issues in 
Central and Eastern Europe', 3 and 4 October 1991 (ESD/CPE(91)14, 
p. 4). 
Table 9 
EC imports from Poland and Hungary, 1990-91 
Total 
Dutiable 
GSP-eligible 
GSP-granted 
38 
MillionECU 
1990 
5 156 
4047 
2 971 
I 377 
% 
JOO 
73 
34 
Poland 
MillionECU 
1991 
6 212 
,4 858 
3 901 
2 280 
preferences (GSP), which provides duty-free access for 
manufactured goods and reduced tariffs for agricultural 
goods. This section attempts a first evaluation of the impact 
of the GSP on exports from Poland and Hungary. The 
purpose is to gauge the supply response of these countries 
to improved EC market access. 
Table 9 below gives the basic information on EC imports 
from Poland and Hungary in 1990 and 1991, by tariff regime. 
The most striking feature is that only 35% of dutiable 
imports from Poland and Hungary (i.e. imports of products 
for which the common external tariff is not nil) actually 
benefited from the GSP in 1990. Tables 10 and 11 provide 
additional information on EC imports of GSP-eligible prod-
ucts from Poland and Hungary. Several elements are worth 
noting: 
(i) Sensitive products, including agriculture and textiles 
(but excluding ECSC products), account for about half 
of these countries' exports of GSP-eligible products. 
(ii) The rate of utilization of the GSP differs substantially 
between sensitive and non-sensitive products. It is more 
than 50% for the latter, but barely 35% for the former 
(for textile products the rate is only 10%). This differ-
ence is accounted for by the GSP regime. Sensitive 
products (including most textile and agricultural items) 
are granted duty-free access (or reduced duties for agri-
cultural products) up to a certain limit. No such limit 
applies to non-sensitive products. 
(iii) The fact that even for non-sensitive products the rate 
of utilization is relatively low is largely due to the 
(probably temporary) inability of Poland and Hungary 
to meet the EC's rules of origin. 
The picture that emerges from the previous account is that 
the GSP has improved the access of Poland and Hungary 
to the EC market, but only to a limited degree due to 
limitations in the functioning of the system. 
% 
100 
80 
47 
Million ECU 
1990 
2 934 
2 601 
2 069 
903 
% 
100 
80 
35 
Hungary 
MillionECU % 
1991 
3 624 
3 220 100 
2 667 83 
1 325 41 
Table 10 
EC imports of GSP-eligible products from Poland, 1990 
Product category GSP imports Utiliz.ation 
(millionECU) (%) 
Eligible Granted 
Grand total 2 971 I 337 46 
Sensitive products, except 
agriculture and textiles 553 239 43 
Sensitive industrial products, 
petroleum products only 72 12 16 
Sensitive industrial products, 
except petroleum products 480 227 47 
Sensitive ECSC products 0 0 
Non-sensitive products, except 
agriculture and textiles I 438 845 58 
Non-sensitive industrial 
products, petroleum products 
only 12 10 77 
Non-sensitive industrial 
products, except petroleum 
products 1425 835 58 
Non-sensitive ECSC products 0 0 
Textile products 588 63 10 
MF A products 555 53 9 
Non-MFA products 33 10 31 
Agricultural products, with 
limitations 0 0 
Agricultural products 389 228 58 
Agricultural products, under 
CAP 56 30 53 
Agricultural products, without 
limitations 332 198 59 
Figures for 1991 show significant improvements in the access 
obtained by the CEECs under the GSP. The share of dutiable 
imports actually benefiting from the GSP has increased to 
47% from 34% in 1990 for Poland, and to 41% from 35% 
for Hungary. This suggests that these countries have been 
able to exploit relatively rapidly the opportunities offered 
by the system. In the case of the CSFR, which only became 
eligible for GSP treatment in January 1991, and hence had 
less time to learn the functioning of the system, a lower (yet 
significant) 38% of exports actually entered the EC market 
duty-free under the GSP system. In addition, it should be 
stressed that by far the most dynamic component of Polish 
and Hungarian exports to the EC are those products which 
have actually received GSP treatment. For instance, for 
Poland, GSP-granted exports have grown by 66% between 
1990 and 1991, while total exports have 'only' risen by 20%. 
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Table 11 
EC imports of GSP-eligible products from Hungary, 1990 
Product category GSPimports Utilii.ation 
(million ECU) (%) 
Eligible Granted 
Grand total 2 069 903 43 
Sensitive products, except 
agriculture and textiles 402 204 50 
Sensitive industrial products, 
petroleum products only 62 58 93 
Sensitive industrial products, 
except petroleum products 357 145 40 
Sensitive ECSC products 0 0 
Non-sensitive products, except 
agriculture and textiles 937 507 54 
Non-sensitive industrial 
products, petroleum products 
only 18 12 • 64 
Non-sensitive industrial 
products, except petroleum 
products 918 494 53 
Non-sensitive ECSC products 0 0 
Textile products 452 49 11 
MF A products 428 43 10 
Non-MFA products 23 6 28 
Agricultural products, with 
limitations 3 0 
Agricultural products 273 142 52 
Agricultural products, under 
CAP 73 39 53 
Agricultural products, without 
limitations 199 102 51 
The next question concerns the supply response of Poland 
and Hungary to the improved access to the EC market. In 
order to examine this issue, the top 10 products (defined in 
value terms at the GSP tariff line) which have actually 
benefited from the GSP in 1990 have been selected. These 
10 products represent 32% of the total GSP-granted imports 
from Poland and 26% of the equivalent imports from Hun-
gary. Total imports of these products from Poland and 
Hungary (i.e. regardless of their GSP treatment) have been 
examined for the period 1988-90 and compared with total 
imports of all products from these two countries. 
In 1990, the grand total of EC imports from Poland was 
34% greater than in 1989 and 53% larger than in 1988. 
Seven of the top 10 GSP products recorded faster growth 
than the grand total. Some of these products recorded re-
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markable growth, in particular certain iron and steel prod-
ucts ( + 107% in 1990 compared to 1989) and wooden boxes 
( + 457% ). On the other end of the spectrum, the product 
with the lowest growth (a decline in 1990 compared to both 
1989 and 1988) among the top 10 was the automobile, a 
sensitive product subject to a tariff quota only partially filled 
in 1990. Imports from Hungary have increased less rapidly 
than imports from Poland. In 1990, the grand total was only 
13% greater than in 1989 and 36% larger than in 1988. Six 
of the top 10 GSP products had faster growth than the grand 
total, some of them with remarkable growth, especially saus-
ages ( + 75% in 1990 compared to 1989). 
It would seem, therefore, that Poland and, to a lesser extent, 
Hungary have both been able to take advantage of the new 
opportunities provided by the GSP. This suggests that their 
supply response may not be as low as anticipated. This is 
also confirmed by the 1991 export growth figures for 1991 
reported above. 
On the other hand, evidence from the iron and steel sector 
(whose products are outside the GSP system) suggests that 
the potential for a sustained export surge from these 
countries is probably limited. 1 Certain industry analysts are 
indeed of the opinion that large parts of production in this 
sector are either uncompetitive and/or of insufficient quality 
standards to make sustained inroads into the EC market. 
4.3. Some longer-term aspects of economic 
reform in CEECs 
Most of the above discussion has concentrated on the short-
term aspects of the economic reform process in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The question remains open as to the longer-
term aspects of economic transformation. In this regard, 
different scenarios can be envisaged. One of the most opti-
mistic, though not necessarily one of the most likely, would 
entail a rapid export-led economic take-off as in the case of 
the newly industrializing countries in South-East Asia. Their 
overall experiences, as well as that of individual developing 
countries, point to both a high degree of concentration of 
specific destinations for, and of concentration of specific 
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Out of five Central and East European countries, only Poland appears 
to have been somewhat constrained by EC quantitative restrictions in 
this sector (with a 98% degree of quota utilization), while for the CSFR 
(84%}, Hungary (72%), Bulgaria (59%) and Romania (41 %) limited 
access to the EC market does not seem to have been the main obstacle 
to export expansion. Figures for the first six months of 1991 show that 
only Poland has been able to take full advantage of the quota increases 
(with a 106% degree of quota utilization) while the performance of the 
remaining countries lags even behind those for the corresponding period 
of 1990. 
products in the total exports of individual developing 
countries. 2 
In addition to the access to large export markets, substantial 
changes in product composition of their exports have been 
another key feature of the success stories among the dynamic 
Asian economies. These changes have been determined, to 
a large extent, by shifts of production towards new product 
areas where demand in the developed economies was increas-
ing fastest. Indeed, most of the success of these economies 
has stemmed from the flexibility in adjusting their structure 
of production as well as their marketing strategies to chang-
ing conditions. 
In the case of a successful long-term scenario, Central and 
East European countries are likely to face internal as well 
as external frictions. While liberalization brings along overall 
net benefits, these are the result of efficiency gains and 
adjustment costs that tend to be unevenly distributed. Ad-
justment costs can be regarded as the necessary condition 
for fostering change in a dynamic economy, since they make 
possible the reallocation of resources across industries. This 
latter process implies that adjustment costs tend to be sector 
and/or region specific. Resistance to restructuring is likely 
to be stronger the more concentrated the effects of trade 
liberalization and the slower the rate of expansion of ex-
panding industries, both of which have the effect of slowing 
the absorption of displaced factors. 
The more successful the Central and East European 
countries are in rapidly restructuring their economies, the 
more trade frictions are likely to arise. The precise impact 
of a rapid take-off scenario on their main trade partners is 
difficult to gauge, but a comparison with the four 'tigers' in 
East Asia provides a useful illustration of the extreme trade 
effects in case of 'success'. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Poland taken together are in fact very similar, in terms of 
population and world trade shares, to the corresponding 
situation of the four 'tigers' in 1970, before their economic 
take-off which led to a four-fold increase in their combined 
export share (see Table 12). The past experience of the four 
East Asian countries suggests that, despite growing concerns, 
the world economy can accommodate relatively easily mar-
ket-share shifts of such an order of magnitude. However, 
given the scale of the necessary economic restructuring, it 
seems unlikely that export expansion in CEECs, even under 
the most extreme scenario, would keep the same pace as the 
dynamic Asian economies. It therefore seems reasonable to 
See Sampson, G.P. (1988), 'Structural change: accommodating imports 
from developing countries'. The countries surveyed by the study are: 
Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Taiwan, Yugoslavia, China and Singapore. 
expect that, even if fully achieved, their potential gains in 
export market shares would not pose major difficulties for 
their closer trade partners. 
Table 12 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the East Asian 'tigers' 
CSFR. Hun- Hong Kong. Singapore, 
gary. Poland South Korea, Taiwan 
1988 1970 1980 1990 
Population (million) 64,7 52,5 63,2 71,2 
Share(%) in world: 
Exports 1,4 2,0 3,8 7,7 
Imports 1,2 2,7 4,2 7,4 
1 Adapted from a paper by R. Blackhurst for the Kiel Institute. "Implications of the changes 
in Eastern Europe for the world economy'. The Economist, 6. 7. I 991. 
5. Conclusfons 
The Community has pursued the objective of providing 
Central and East European countries with the same preferen-
tial treatment as that already granted to its other European 
neighbours, EFT A and the Mediterranean countries, al-
though there is no reciprocity in the case of the latter. As 
soon as political changes occurred in the former centrally-
planned economies, the Community took steps to open up 
its market. The first step was the unilateral decision to 
grant its general system of preferences (GSP) treatment and 
remove or suspend a number of quantitative restrictions. 
The second involved extending Trade and Cooperation 
Agreements to those countries not yet covered by such 
agreements. Finally, in December 1991, Association Agree-
ments were signed with the Czech and Slovak Federal Re-
public, Hungary and Poland. These agreements, which 
entered into force in March 1992, aim at the establishment 
of a free trade area, and also contain sections on political 
dialogue and institutional provisions, as well as on economic 
and financial cooperation, in view of ever-closer relations 
between these countries and the European Community. The 
free trade area is to be established at the end of a transition 
period, of a maximum duration of 10 years, divided into 
two successive stages of five years each, starting from the 
entry into force of the agreement. 
The Association Agreements offer a substantial improve-
ment in terms of access to the Community market. The 
general principle is that, from the date of entry into force of 
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the agreement, free access is granted to imports from the 
CSFR, Hungary and Poland, though certain sensitive prod-
ucts are subject to specific transitional arrangements. After 
five years all non-agricultural goods will have completely 
free access to the Community market: all import duties and 
quantitative restrictions will have been eliminated. 
It is important to note that even in sensitive sectors, like 
textiles, iron and steel, and agriculture the Community has 
proved ready to take bold steps towards liberalization of 
access to its market despite strong internal political resist-
ance. As far as textiles is concerned, the Community will 
completely eliminate all tariffs and quantitative restrictions 
on imports from the CSFR, Hungary and Poland in five 
years or half the duration of the period agreed in the Uru-
guay Round for the phasing out of the Multifibre Arrange-
ment (MF A), whichever is longer. It is important to note 
that this explicit link between the Uruguay Round and the 
Agreements ensures that liberalization vis-a-vis Central and 
Eastern Europe will not be done at the expense of other 
trade partners, as some had feared. 
In the case of iron and steel products the situation for the 
three associated countries is even better than for textiles. 
The Agreement provides for the complete removal of all 
quantitative restrictions from its entry into force and the 
elimination of all import duties within six years. Although 
the Agreement does not envisage complete liberalization for 
agricultural products, it does none the less provide improved 
access to exports from Central and Eastern Europe in terms 
of both larger quantities and smaller import duties. Whether 
the Community's concessions in this area, perceived as being 
of crucial importance by the CEECs, will be sufficient to 
meet the demands of the latter remains to be seen. 
By ensuring access to the EC, the world's largest market, 
the Association Agreements provide an important element 
of stability for both domestic and foreign firms to invest in 
the associated countries. This represents a crucial condition 
for the transformation process to take place. There is some 
evidence of positive supply response in Central and East 
European countries to improved access to the Community 
market. But much remains to be done by these countries to 
take full advantage of the new opportunities available. If 
and when exports from Central and Eastern Europe to the 
Community will rise significantly, there might be pressure 
by some affected sectors to limit again these countries' access 
to the EC market. 
In addition to improved market access, it is important to 
recall that the Community is contributing to the develop-
ment of these countries by actively participating in the in-
ternal process of restructuring towards a market economy, 
through its own assistance programmes and the coordination 
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of the G-24 actions, including medium-term assistance to 
help macroeconomic stabilization and to cushion the adverse 
macroeconomic impact on the restructuring itself. 
In conclusion, by providing a stable environment for trade 
expansion, the EC is encouraging foreign private investors 
Table 13 
to build production capacities, contributing to the develop-
ment of these countries through the transfer of skills and 
technologies. Financial assistance is playing a complemen-
tary role, by providing resources, both human and physical, 
and by easing in the short to medium term the macro-
economic constraints faced by these countries. 
The Community's trade regimes towards Central and East European countries (CEECs)I 
Product/ 
Trade regime 
Before the 'new' trade 
and commercial and 
economic Agree-
ments 
Trade and commer-
cial and economic 
Cooperation Agree-
ments (CAs) (they 
focus on trade in in-
dustrial products, ex-
cluding ECSC prod-
ucts and textiles) 
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General 
Imports subject to 
specific QRs (quotas 
specifically aimed at 
EC and operated na-
tionally by Member 
States) and non-spec-
ific Q Rs ( covering 
glass, shoes, toys, le-
ather, some machin-
ery, some non-MF A 
products and some 
non-ECSC steel 
products) 
Romania: in 1980 
first agreement for in-
dustrial products 
After German unifi-
cation, GA TT 
waiver, expiring end-
1991, for imports into 
former DDR of ag-
reed duty-free (incl. 
AD) quantities from 
traditional EC sup-
pliers 
CAs: Entry into 
force: Dec. 1988 
(Hungary), Dec. 1989 
(Poland), Nov. 1990 
(CSFR), Jan. 1991 
(Bulgaria) and May 
1991 (Romania). Re-
moval of specific QRs 
and suspension of 
non-specific QRs: 
Jan. 1990 
(Hungary & Poland), 
Oct. 1990 (CSFR), 
Jan. 1991 (Bulgaria) 
and May 1991 (Rom-
ania) 
GSP 
Romania: GSP since 
1974 
Hungary & Poland: 
Jan. 1990 
CSFR: Jan. 1991 
Bulgaria: Jan. 1991 
Romania: improved 
GSP as from Jan. 
1991 
Agriculture 
Bilateral arrange-
ments since 1976 
(meat) 
Variable levies appli-
cable also to EC's 
'waiver' exports to 
former DDR (except 
for beef & live ani-
mals) 
Textiles & clothing 
Since 1976 bilateral 
arrangements. The 
latter contain pro-
visions on OP traffic: 
OP quotas estab-
lished in addition to 
normal quotas. OP of 
MFA and non-MF A 
clothing with Bulga-
ria, Romania and 
CSFR subject to uni-
lateral import quotas 
CSFR, Hungary, Po-
land: VERs under 
MFAIV 
Bulgaria (not partici-
pating in the MFA): 
VERs for MFA 
products 
AD measures: acrylic 
fibres and synthetic 
fibres of polyester 
(Romania) 
CSFR, Hungary, Po-
land: for 1990 and 
1991 new protocols 
to CAs providing for 
quota increases ( + 13 % for Hungary; 
+ 23 % for Poland) 
Residual QRs of MS 
on non-MFA textiles 
imports from both 
countries eliminated 
in Nov. 1989. OPT 
quotas for Hungary 
and Poland sus-
pended for 1990. 
New agreements con-
tain 'price clauses' 
ECSC products 
Bulgaria, CSFR, 
Hungary, Romania & 
Poland: since 1978 bi-
lateral arrangements 
(VRAs) 
Imports from EC 
also subject to auton-
omous quotas in 5 
Member States (B, 
D, I, L & NL) 
In 1990 and 1991 
VRAs were still in 
force for Bulgaria, 
CSFR, Hungary, Po-
land and Romania 
(also covering auton-
omous quotas) 
Polish and Hungar-
ian Cooperation 
Protocols on ECSC 
products were put 
into effect from 
December 1991 and 
January 1992 
Product/ 
Trade regime 
'Europe Agree-
ments': CSFR, 
Poland & Hungary 
General 
(excl. sensitive sectors) 
Agreements signed 
on 16 Dec. 1991; 
entry into force on I 
March 1992. Con-
solidation of all uni-
lateral trade conses-
sions. Establishment 
of a free trade area at 
the end of a transition 
period of maximum 
JO years divided into 
two successive stages 
of 5 years. Before end 
of first stage, decision 
on transition to 
second stage to be 
made 
Tariffs: (a) 'base 
products' (Annex Ila 
of Agreement): im-
port duties elimin-
ated after one year; 
(b) certain metal base 
products (Annex 
Ilb ): progressive re-
du~tion (by 20 % of 
the MFN duty per 
year) and elimination 
by the end of fourth 
year; ( c) some 'sensi-
tive' products 
(Annex III): suspen-
sion of import duties 
within the limits of 
(increasing) annual 
tariff quotas/ceilings: 
import duties on 
quantities in excess of 
quotas progressively 
reduced (by 10-15% 
per year). All duties 
completely abolished 
by the end of fifth 
year 
QRs: abolished on 
the date of entry into 
force of the Agree-
ment. No new import 
or export duties or 
discriminatory fiscal 
charges 
Specific provisions 
on phasing out of tar-
iffs and QRs for trade 
with Spain and Portu-
gal (Protocol 5) 
AD, State aids, safe-
guards, rules of origin 
AD: State-trading co-
untry legislation no 
longer applicable. Ad 
hoe legislation likely 
to be adopted during 
the transition period 
State aids: appli-
cation of existing EC 
legislation, but im-
plementation rules 
(in the area of compe-
tition policy) to bees-
tablished within 
3 years. During first 
5 years, same treat-
ment as the least de-
veloped areas within 
EC 
Safeguards: measures 
can be taken, on a bi-
lateral basis, in case 
of: (a) serious injury 
to EC products or (b) 
serious sectoral dis-
turbances or difficult-
ies leading to serious 
economic deterio-
ration in a Com-
munity region 
Rules of origin: same 
treatment as EFTA 
countries (before 
EEA). Cumulation 
possible for products 
made in the EC or 
one of the other two 
countries 
Agriculture 
CAP products: prod-
ucts in Annex VIII 
will benefit from re-
ductions of customs 
duties and levies 
within tariff quotas/ 
ceilings. QRs related 
to Council Reg. 
3420/83 abolished at 
date of entry into 
force. Quantities 
within tariff quotas 
will increase by 10% 
per year (compared to 
1990) for each of the 
first 5 years after 
entry into force. Tar-
iffs progressively re-
duced until elimin-
ation (in most cases 
within I year). The 
variable levies re-
duced by 60% (30% 
for certain products) 
by 1994, in three steps 
of20%-10% each; 
these reductions ap-
plied only to quan-
tities within quota. 
For quantities above 
the tariff quota the 
variable levy will 
apply. Minimum im-
port price arrange-
ments for certain 
products (e.g. soft 
fruits). Beef: 20% an-
nual reduction on im-
port duties and levies 
over next 3 years, and 
10% annual increase 
in reduced-rate im-
ports over 5 years. 
Provisions concern-
ing 'triangular' oper-
ations, safeguards 
and sanitary 
measures. Protocol 
No 3 lays down trade 
concessions 
(abolition/reduction 
in customs duties and 
levies) for non-CAP 
products (processed 
goods) 
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Textiles & clothing 
(Protocol No I of 
Agreement): pro-
gressive elimination 
of import duties over 
six years from date of 
entry into force 
QRs eliminated 
within a period not 
shorter than 5 years 
(but no longer than 
half the period agreed 
in the Uruguay 
Round for the phas-
ing out of the MFA) 
as from 1.1.1993. 
Modalities for phas-
ing out of QRs to be 
negotiated bilaterally 
Import duties and 
QRs on OPT elimin-
ated since I March 
1992 
ECSC products 
(Protocol No 2 of 
Agreement): Iron & 
steel: progressive re-
ductions of import 
duties until elimin-
ation over 6 years 
from date of entry 
into force. As from 
March 1992 removal 
of all remaining na-
tional quotas 
Coal: progressive re-
duction of import du-
ties over 6 years. 
After I year removal 
of all QRs, except for 
exports to the FRG 
and Spain (informal 
agreement). After 
4 years also the latter 
will be eliminated 
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Product/ 
Trade regime 
'Europe Agree-
ments': Bulgaria & 
Romania 
General 
(excl. sensitive sectors) 
Negotiations started 
in mid-May 1992, ex-
pected to be com-
pleted by end of the 
year. Trade pro-
visions as for the pre-
vious three countries 
AD, State aids, safe-
guards, rules of origin 
As for the CSFR, 
Hungary and Poland 
Agriculture 
Similar to CSFR, 
Hungary and Poland 
Textiles & clothing 
Similar to CSFR, 
Hungary and Poland 
ECSC products 
Similar to CSFR, 
Hungary and Po-
land, but negotiating 
mandate requires for 
the possibility of 
stronger safeguard 
provisions in the case 
of steel imports 
1 Bulgaria, CSFR, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Abbreviations: CA(s) = (Trade and commercial and economic) Cooperation Agrccment(s); OP(T) a outward processing (traffic); MS -
Member States (of the EC); AD = anti-dumping (measures); ECSC = European Coal and Steel Community; MFA = Multilibre Arrangement; QR(s) • quantitative rcstriction(s); VER(s) -
voluntary export rcstraint(s); VRA(s) = voluntary restraint agrccment(s). 
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C - Regional integration initiatives among developing countries: their nature, past performance 
and current challenges 
1. The European Community's support 
for regional initiatives among 
developing countries 
A subject frequently mentioned in the final communique of 
the June 1992 meeting of Heads of State or Government of 
the Member States of the European Community (EC) at the 
Lisbon Summit as regards the EC's external policies was 
'regional integration'. Thus, 
(i) indicating that 'particular account will be taken of re-
lations ... which have been established with regional 
and other groupings', when speaking about Latin Amer-
ica, the European Council 'stressed the importance of 
supporting the efforts of economic integration which 
are developed at the regional level'; 
(ii) when speaking about the Maghreb, the European 
Council selected the '[support for] the current moves 
towards regional integration' as one of the five priority 
areas for Community policy towards the region. The 
support for 'moves towards regional integration' in the 
Middle East was likewise selected as one of the five 
priority domains for Community action; 
(iii) when speaking about Central and Eastern Europe, the 
European Council declared its will to 'contribute to 
the creation of ... frameworks that encourage regional 
cooperation or moves· towards regional or subregional 
integration'. 
All of this evidence provides a rather clear indication of the 
importance attached nowadays by the Community to this 
policy matter. Still, this Community interest, while increased 
by both current events and the ongoing revival of older 
developing countries' regional initiatives, is not new. 
In fact, in its dealings with developing countries, the Com-
munity has traditionally favoured regional policy ap-
proaches (notably with the ACP States and the Mediter-
ranean countries) and has supported these countries' efforts 
towards cooperation and integration (most notably, those 
in Africa and Latin America). 
Thus, the Second Yaounde Convention (the predecessor to 
the Lome Convention), signed in 1969, already established 
that regional organizations of'associated States' (as the non-
EC signatories of this Convention were then known) could 
be beneficiaries of Community aid. The Convention also 
granted special preferences to those African regional en-
terprises bidding for EC-financed development contracts. 
Finally, it contemplated the possibility of the EC offering 
lower than MFN (most-favoured nation) import duties on 
Community imports from regional groupings of associated 
African States with similar levels of development. 
With the definition of a 'global' Community development 
policy in the early 1970s, the support for regional integration 
became one of the pillars of that policy. Thus, the 1971 
development policy memorandum sent by the Commission 
to the Council considered the idea of using the 'degree of 
commitment' to regional cooperation as one of the standards 
to determine the allocation of development funds to benefici-
ary countries. Although this idea was never formally carried 
out, the special meeting of the Development Council of April 
1974 adopted for the first time a resolution on regional 
integration among developing countries in which the Com-
munity expressed its willingness to respond favourably to 
development aid requests from countries engaged in regional 
cooperation and regional integration efforts. 
Since then the support for regional integration and cooper-
ation has been a cornerstone of Community development 
policy, particularly in the cases of those counties and zones 
(mostly Africa and Latin America) that have shown an 
interest in receiving part of their technical and financial 
assistance in the form of support for regional institutions 
and projects. Until recently, this support has been less signifi-
cant in those other zones (such as Asia and the Mediter-
ranean) where this interest was less evident. 
In the redesign of Community development policies that has 
taken place at the turn of this decade, regional integration 
has continued to play a major role and, in some cases, its 
support by the Community has become more explicit by 
earmarking, for the first time, some funds exclusively for 
regional projects (as is the case in the Lome IV Convention 
and in the new Mediterranean policy). In these cases, as well 
as with the new guidelines for Community cooperation with 
Latin America and Asia, regional integration has been sing-
led out as a priority issue in the provision of economic 
cooperation and technical and financial assistance to de-
veloping countries. 
2. The policy foundations of 
European Community support for 
regional integration initiatives 
among developing countries 
To some extent, the Community support for regional inte-
gration among developing countries is a consequence of its 
own success. While avoiding the explicit export of its own 
model of cooperation and integration, the Community sees 
regional initiatives as a way of overcoming the economic 
and political constraints of the traditional nation-State and 
views regional integration as providing an opportunity for 
developing countries to further their own political and socio-
economic progress. 
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As the economic and political arguments for integration are 
well established in the literature, a few brief remarks will 
suffice to establish the European Community's case for 
regional initiatives among developing countries. 
2.1. The economic arguments in support of 
regional integration 
Different forms of economic integration schemes necessarily 
lead to different effects. Nevertheless, as the avowed goal of 
most integration schemes is to establish a customs union, 
this form of integration will be considered here, as the 
paradigm of developing countries' regional integration 
schemes. 
From an economic point of view, the European Community 
sees regional integration as a sound opportunity for de-
veloping countries to reap gains from trade which would 
not otherwise be available. In effect, to the extent that, 
particularly until recently, most developing countries have 
had considerably high import barriers and have been reluc-
tant to lower them, regional integration is a first step in the 
process of liberalization. In assessing the benefits of such 
moves and as regards the changes in trade patterns resulting 
from integration, it is important to ensure that the correct 
comparison is between no liberalization at all versus regional 
integration, and not necessarily between regional integration 
and erga omnes liberalization. From this perspective the 
integration gains from trade are of two kinds, the so-called 
static and dynamic gains from trade. 
By eliminating trade barriers among themselves and replac-
ing those on imports from third countries by a common 
external barrier, the members of a customs union effectively 
establish a preference for their products against those from 
third countries. Since this makes member countries' goods 
comparatively cheaper and third countries' goods compara-
tively dearer, this tends to increase imports from other mem-
ber countries and decrease the relative level of imports from 
third countries. 
To the extent that the change in trade barriers leads a 
member country to increase its imports of a certain good 
from a low-cost producing partner, there is trade creation, 
i.e. a gain in welfare for both trading partners resulting from 
the exploitation of comparative advantage. Further gains 
accrue also to non-members as a result of the members' 
increased real income (thus increased imports). 
To the extent that the change in trade barriers leads a 
member country to replace imports of a certain good from 
a low-cost producing third country by higher-cost imports 
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from a member country, there is trade diversion, i.e. a 
loss in welfare resulting from the inability to fully exploit 
comparative advantage. The difference between both sorts 
of welfare effects (i.e. trade creation minus trade diversion), 
accumulated for each member country, is referred to as the 
overall net static gains from integration. 
Apart from these 'static' changes resulting from integration, 
there are also dynamic gains. While harder to quantify, they 
potentially are a more important source of welfare gains. 
These gains result from the changes that integration pro-
duces over time on the economic environment of member 
countries. In particular, dynamic gains are obtained from a 
better exploitation of scale economies (made possible by the 
larger size of the market, which also provides opportunities 
for a considerable saving of resources in research, education, 
health, etc.), improved market predictability and easier dif-
fusion of technology. Furthermore, both the larger potential 
market and the more stable environment make regional 
integration a significant enticement for foreign direct invest-
ment. 
To conclude, for developing countries regional integration 
can be a significant step forward towards freer trade and 
does not have to be a step backwards, as is sometimes 
argued, against multilateralism. Indeed, to the extent that 
overall protection declines and that erga omnes liberalization 
is contemplated, economic integration is a stepping stone 
towards integration in the world trading system and towards 
the strengthening of multilateral trade. 
2.2. The political arguments in support of 
regional integration 
Regional integration is more than eventually achieving a 
single market. Indeed, regional integration also involves 
more than economics and, as history has shown, the primary 
motivation for some regional integration schemes among 
developing countries, i.e. Asean, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, etc., has been non-economic. Likewise, the motiv-
ations for the creation and the successive enlargements of the 
European Community were as much political as economic. 
Thus, the gains from integration are not restricted to the 
static gains from trade creation and diversion, or to the 
scale economies and other dynamic effects from trade, or to 
perhaps obtaining better terms of trade. There are external 
relations gains for the countries involved, particularly in the 
form of geopolitical stability. While this can also be achieved 
through more specific, less interdependent means (such as 
security arrangements), regional integration schemes, by 
their very nature, are capable of anchoring countries with 
each other in a firmer way. In this context, regional inte-
gration is considered by inany as the best conceivable 'confi-
dence-building measure' for peace in the Middle East. 
On the internal side, regional integration has appeared in 
recent years as a means of strengthening democratic insti-
tutions. Thus, all over Latin America, the strengthening of 
regional integration schemes coincides with, and at least in 
part is responsible for, the political democratization and 
economic pragmatism which are the trade mark of today's 
Latin America. More to the point, in setting up new and 
renewed integration and cooperation schemes, it has been 
made clear that membership is restricted to countries with 
democratic governments and membership of integration 
groups has been interpreted as a guarantee against coups 
d'etat. 
Likewise, to the extent that a better allocation of resources 
and economies-of-scale gains will enhance income growth 
and employment prospects, regional integration can also 
contribute to reducing long-term social discontent as well as 
migratory pressures. 
3. Integration efforts among developing countries 
3.1. The spread and composition of 
well-established regional integration 
schemes 
Regional integration 1mt1at1ves have been numerous and 
widespread throughout the developing world since the 1960s. 
However, limitations of space make it impossible to describe 
in a comprehensive way all the existing schemes, even if the 
text were to be limited to those that have been under way 
for a long time and which are still providing mutual trade 
preferences for their members. Consequently, the major part 
of this subsection focuses on experience in Latin America 
whilst not neglecting developments in Asia and Africa. As 
regards certain Latin American groupings, more detailed 
data are given in the statistical annex to this chapter. 
Regional integration experiences in Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
As regards Latin America, the first integration scheme was 
the Latin American Free Trade Association or Asociaci6n 
Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio (Lafta/ALALC). Es-
tablished by the Montevideo Agreement of February 1960, 
it was formed by Mexico and the Spanish and Portuguese-
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speaking countries of South America. As Lafta never became 
the free trade area it was intended to be, the need to revamp 
the integration drive in the region, by adding flexibility to 
its arrangements and focusing on more realistic goals, led 
10 years later, in August 1980, to its being reconstituted, 
by a new Montevideo Agreement, as the Latin American 
Integration Association or Asociaci6n Latinoamericana de 
integraci6n econ6mica (LAIA/Aladi) which entered into 
force in March 1981. Less ambitious, in the short term, than 
Lafta, Aladi attempts to foster economic complementarity 
through the establishment of bilateral and subregional sec-
toral agreements, for which it acts as an umbrella organiza-
tion. It contemplates, nevertheless, the eventual establish-
ment of a single common Latin American market and given 
that goal it established in 1984 a mechanism for multilateral 
concessions under the name of PAR (Preferencia Arancelaria 
Regional). The challenges encountered in agreeing on and 
applying these preferences has shown how difficult it is to 
envisage an integration scheme (even a limited one) involving 
the whole region. As a result, Aladi's policy significance has 
been superseded by that of the subregional groupings in the 
continent, the emergence of some of which, namely Mercosur 
(to be discussed in the next section) has been nevertheless 
facilitated by the complementarity agreements (particularly, 
the Acuerdos de Alcance Parcial para la Complementariedad 
Econ6mica) conceived by Aladi. 
The earliest amongst the subregional groups in Latin Amer-
ica was the Central American Common Market or Mercado 
Com{m Centroamericano (CACM/MCCA), also referred to 
as the Sieca (Secretaria de! Tratado de Integracion Econ-
6mica Centroamericana), which was established just a few 
months after Lafta by the Treaty of Managua of October 
1960. It entered into force in June 1961 and its members 
are Costa Rica (which joined in July 1962), El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. The rapid reduction 
of intra-regional tariffs (whose elimination was contem-
plated by the Sieca agreement) led to a spectacular expansion 
of regional trade during the 1960s. The integration process 
(which reached the stage of a nearly fully implemented 
customs union) was interrupted and, in fact, reversed by 
the political and economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s 
(including ravaging civil wars, armed conflict between Hon-
duras and El Salvador, the oil and debt crises and the 
collapse of their payments-clearing mechanism), so that the 
quantitative restrictions then introduced and the lack of 
implementation of the common external tariff considerably 
reduced the importance of intra-regional trade. 
The end of the 1980s has witnessed a fundamental improve-
ment in the political and economic conditions in the region. 
The ending of hostilities in Nicaragua and El Salvador and 
the momentum provided by both economic reform and the 
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re-establishment of a payments-clearing mechanism (which 
has since become unnecessary, as currencies have become 
convertible) have provided a better atmosphere for the re-
sumption of both intra-regional trade (which has already 
begun to recover) and the furthering of integration. 
Thus, a Central American Parliament was inaugurated in 
October 1991 and a broad institutional reform of integration 
mechanisms was undertaken in December 1991 with the 
creation of SICA (Sistema de la Integraci6n Centroamer-
icana) to watch over the three main integration pillars: the 
Central American Common Market as the instrument for 
economic integration, the Central American Parliament as 
the instrument for political cooperation, and the Odeca 
(Organizaci6n de Estados Centroamericanos) as the insti-
tutional instrument. 
Although intra-regional trade has picked up in recent years, 
in nominal terms it is still half of what it used to be in 1980; 
thus, in spite of its recovery, as a proportion of total trade 
it is still somewhat above 10% while in the 1970s it exceeded 
20% of total trade. 
In contrast with extra-regional exports, more than two thirds 
of which tend to be agricultural, about three quarters of all 
intra-regional trade is in manufactures while agriculture 
accounts for most of the remainder. 
The regional market is particularly important for manufac-
tures: about 40% of El Salvador's, Guatemala's and Nicara-
gua's manufactured exports are regional, while Costa Rica 
and Honduras sell about 30% of their manufactures within 
the region. 
Even though Costa Rica and Guatemala are the two largest 
total (i.e. intra plus extra-regional) exporters, most of the 
intra-regional trade is dominated by Guatemala, which ac-
counts for nearly half of the intra-regional exports. Almost 
another half is accounted for, with roughly similar shares, 
by Costa Rica and El Salvador. Honduras and Nicaragua, 
the two weakest countries in the region, account together 
for about 10% of intra-regional exports. 
The regional market has some significance only for El Salva-
dor and Guatemala, for whom the region accounts for about 
20% of all their exports. For the other three countries, the 
significance of the regional market has decreased consider-
ably since the 1970s. 
The Andean Pact or Grupo Andino, in turn, was established 
in May 1969 by the Acuerdo de Cartagena, and entered into 
force in October 1969. Its members are Bolivia, Colombia, 
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Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela (which joined in February 
1973). Chile, an initial signatory, withdrew in October 1976. 
More ambitious than Lafta, it was avowedly created as a 
way of circumventing the impasse into which the latter 
organization had fallen. Its programme included the need 
to find an intra-regional balance in the distribution of the 
benefits and costs of integration. The means that was envis-
aged to achieve this goal was the allocation to each member 
country of different production sectors so as to allow for 
country specialization through various industrial cooper-
ation programmes. This attempt at regional programming 
was not very successful and this, together with the lack of 
implementation of the initial liberalization programme and 
the suspicious attitude towards foreign investment on the 
part of the region's governments, accounts for the very 
limited initial achievements of the Andean Pact. Various 
recent initiatives (notably the 1987 Quito Protocol and the 
1991 Caracas Act) show a more outward-oriented and less 
interventionist approach to integration and may have 
created the momentum for further political and economic 
integration. 
Yet, recent political events in the region (that have led to 
both internal instability and some frictions among member 
States), coupled with the resistance of the weakest countries 
(particularly, Peru and Ecuador) towards opening up to 
competition from the other member States, have prevented 
the attainment of the envisaged free trade area and the 
implementation of the common external tariff which had 
been foreseen for January 1992. 
Trade within the Andean Pact has experienced a recovery 
in value terms during the second half of the 1980s, in contrast 
with total exports of the region which are at about the same 
level as they were in 1985. Yet, at around 4 % of total trade, 
intra-regional trade is still considerably modest in relative 
terms. 
The substantial increase in the relative significance of manu-
factures within intra-regional trade (from around 20% in 
1970 to the current nearly 50%), mainly at the expense of 
agriculture and fuels, is probably one of the most important 
developments in the region's trade. This mirrors the evol-
ution of extra-regional trade which, although historically 
dominated by fuel exports, is witnessing a progressive growth 
in manufactured exports. Nevertheless, the regional market 
still accounts for less than 15% of the member countries' 
total manufactured exports. The regional market is even 
more marginal for the remaining commodity categories. 
Intra-regional trade tends to be dominated by Venezuela 
and Colombia (which are the major extra-regional exporters 
as well) which together account for about 60% of intra-
regional exports. Particularly significant in recent years has 
been the large increase in Ecuador's intra-regional exports 
which now account for about 20% of the intra-regional 
total. 
Only for Ecuador, and to a lesser extent Bolivia, is the 
Andean market of some significance: it accounts for about 
6 to 7% of these countries' exports. The opposite side of the 
coin is Venezuela which only sells about 2% of its exports 
within the region. 
In the Caribbean, a Caribbean Free Trade Association (Car-
ifta), was established in 1965 among the English-speaking 
Caribbean countries and territories with the objective of 
overcoming the smallness of these economies whose com-
bined population is less than 6 million and which altogether 
have a GNP which is one third of Ireland's. While its 
progress was rather limited, it was replaced by the Caribbean 
Community/Caribbean Common Market (Caricom), estab-
lished in 1973 by the Treaty of Chaguaramas. Its members 
are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis, 
St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad 
and Tobago. The Baliamas is a member of the Caribbean 
Community but not of the Caribbean Common Market. 
More perhaps than is the case of other regional groupings, 
the history of Caricom is one of over-ambitious goals and 
unfulfilled economic expectations. It is true that from a 
political point of view it has had its successes and has 
achieved increased cooperation in many technical and cul-
tural fields. However, the same cannot be said in trade terms 
as intra-regional trade never reached 10% of total trade and 
since the early 1980s it has fallen every year. 
In spite of a sense of a common cultural identity and of 
sharing a similar political history, the large number of 
countries involved and the enormous economic disparities 
between the two larger ones (Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago) and most of the rest, has made it difficult to agree 
on a consistent and durable integration strategy. 
Thus, in spite of frequent accords to eliminate intra-regional 
barriers to trade and enforce a common and single external 
tariff, the smaller islands have constantly pressed for and 
obtained waivers as regards the implementation of trade 
liberalization measures while the larger and more powerful 
economies have not hesitated to implement 'exceptional' 
measures on intra-regional trade when pressed by economic 
difficulties. One result has been uncertainty about trade 
prospects and consequently a reluctance by exporters to rely 
on regional markets. Another result has been an incomplete 
free trade area and insufficient progress in the creation of 
the foreseen customs union. 
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Nevertheless, at their summit meeting of July 1992 at Port 
of Spain, member States agreed to move forward towards a 
single market and established the year 2000 as their target 
date to achieve full monetary integration. 
Regional integration experiences in Asia 
As regards Asia, the Association of South-East Asian Na-
tions (Asean) is the only regional grouping that has im-
plemented (if somewhat timidly, until now) significant trade 
preferences among its members. Established in August 1967 
by the Bangkok Declaration, it did not have a permanent 
Secretariat until February 1976 when it was established by 
the Bali Concord. Its five founding members are Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei be-
came its sixth member in January 1984. 
The creation of Asean in 1967 was based on a desire to 
attain a stable and secure political environment so as to 
enable its member countries to focus on economic develop-
ment objectives. While members of Asean have individually 
become very successful as regards the growth of output and 
trade, Asean itself has not progressed much, until now, as a 
regional grouping. Indeed, although intra-regional trade is 
high by developing country standards, it has not changed 
significantly since its inception. The reasons are various. 
Notwithstanding the fact that there might be some lack of 
complementarity among Asean members, which, as a result, 
compete for many of the same international markets, other 
reasons also point to the lack of sufficient effective interest 
to further their integration and to Asean members' search 
for consensus in its decision-making. 
Arrangements reached by Asean members, and particularly 
the so-called 'preferential trading arrangement' have not 
been very successful. First, not many of the commodities 
included in that arrangement were of significance for the 
member States. Second, cuts in tariff rates were not substan-
tial. Third, non-tariff barriers were left untouched. Fourth, 
there has been a lack of institutions to implement and 
support integration efforts. 
Nevertheless, reported current efforts seem to suggest a 
further strengthening of regional ties through the establish-
ment of an Asean free trade area by the year 2007, the 
expansion of joint-venture industrial production and of 
'growth triangles', and the institutionalization of regional 
security arrangements. All of these moves are expected to 
increase the importance of the Asean market for its member 
countries and to encourage foreign investment. The adop-
tion, early in 1992, of the 'Six minus x' formula, allowing 
four or five member countries to integrate faster than the 
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group as a whole, could well have a significant impact on 
the pace of economic integration in the region. 
Regional integration experiences in Africa 
The earliest integration efforts in Africa were those which 
led to the creation of the Union douaniere economique 
des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Udeao) in June 1959. 
Reorganized in April 1973 by the Treaty of Bamako as 
the West African Economic Community or Communaute 
economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO), it entered into 
force in January 1974 and its members are Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. 
The most successful of Africa's integration schemes, it has 
reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers and allowed for factor 
movements, which has led to labour flows from the Sahe) to 
the coastal areas and facilitated specialization in production. 
Except for Mauritania, member countries have a common 
currency, a common central bank and limits on money 
creation and budget deficits. The grouping has dealt with 
the distributional effects of integration by creating a com-
pensatory mechanism. 
Unlike most other regional groupings, its intra-regional 
trade seems to have already overcome the difficulties of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s and, at more than 12% of total 
exports in the most recent years, it is at a historical high. 
On the other hand, the other early and still-continuing effort 
in Africa, the Central African Customs and Economic Union 
or Union douaniere et economique de l'Afrique centrale 
(Udeac), has been considerably less successful, even though 
its member countries also have the CF A franc as their 
common currency and from the beginning shared an invest-
ment code. Established in December 1964 by the Treaty of 
Brazzaville, it entered into force in January 1966 and its 
members are Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad 
(which withdrew in 1968 but became a member again in 
December 1987), Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. 
In spite of its auspicious start, the lack of sufficient political 
will and disagreements about the way to share the gains 
from integration made 'wet paper' out of most of the instru-
ments of cooperation and integration: the common external 
tariff was made irrelevant by the establishment by member 
countries of varying import taxes, internal taxes were used 
to discourage intra-regional competition, the financing of 
regional infrastructures gave way to national projects, etc. 
Nevertheless, recent policy changes suggest an attempt to 
both reduce the grouping's sheltering from international 
competition and to facilitate intra-regional competition. 
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3.2. Factors which account for the failure of 
developing countries' regional integration 
schemes in the recent past 
As most observers recognize, and as some of the remarks 
in previous sections suggest, regional integration among 
developing countries has not, so far, been very successful. 
The most significant symptoms of the disappointing per-
formance of regional integration schemes are the failure of 
intra-regional trade to grow as would have been expected, 
the failure of regional schemes to grasp a larger share of 
world markets and the institutional weaknesses of most 
integration initiatives. These three points are further ex-
plored below. 
Symptoms of poor performance 
The low growth rates, until recently, 
of intra-regional trade 
Even though some groupings such as CEAO in Africa have 
experienced an important recovery in trade in the late 1980s, 
in general intra-regional trade has not grown significantly 
over the last 20 years, and currently accounts for only 5,4% 
of all developing countries' trade (compared to 4,6% in 
1970). Secondly, as shown in Table 14, the share of intra-
regional trade within the total trade of the integration group-
ings considered here has remained relatively static and is only 
about 11 % of the total trade of these groupings (compared to 
almost 9% in 1970). 
The unfulfilled promise of infant industry arguments 
Two of the strongest arguments in support of early inte-
gration efforts and, particularly, their inward-looking orien-
tation were the need to overcome the secular decline in the 
terms of trade and the infant-industry argument whereby, 
given the small size of national markets, developing countries 
needed regional markets in order to expand their industrial 
base. In addition such a regional market needed to be pro-
tected because otherwise infant industries would be unable 
to grow. However, it was argued that, over time, these 
industries would become competitive and would be capable 
of surviving without protection in world markets. 
Although a direct test of this hypothesis is not possible with 
the available data, an indirect test, albeit insufficient, is 
provided in Table 15 below: the contribution to total de-
veloping countries' exports of countries belonging to inte-
gration schemes has shrunk from 60% in 1960 to around 
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Table 14 
Intra-regional trade of a sample of developing countries' regional integration groupings as a percentage of total exports of each group 
Group 1970 1976 
Aladi 10,2 12,8 
Andean Pact 2,3 4,2 
CACM (MCCA) 26,8 21,6 
Udeac 3,4 3,9 
CEAO 9,1 6,7 
Asean 14,7 13,9 
Total 1 8,8 11,0 
1 Includes the Bangkok Agreement. 
Source: Unctad. 
40% today. While part of the decline is the result of the 
considerable fall in the terms of trade faced by many de-
veloping coustries the evidence still supports the argument: 
the attempts made by developing countries to establish in-
ward-looking regional integration were unable to reduce 
sufficiently the dependence on primary exports and to gener-
ate industrial exports. 
The weakness of regional institutions 
Institutional weakness is a problem prevalent throughout 
the developing world and regional integration organizations· 
Table 15 
1980 1983 1985 1989 1990 
13,5 10,2 9,6 10,5 10,4 
3,5 4,3 3,1 4,9 3,8 
22,0 21,8 15,9 13,I 15,8 
4,1 2,0 2,0 5,9 4,3 
6,9 11,6 7,1 12,6 12,l 
17,8 23,1 17,9 17,7 18,5 
12,9 13,8 10,2 10,6 11,3 
are no exception. Nevertheless, the relation between insti-
tutional weakness and economic and political performance 
is particularly complex. Thus, it can be argued that the 
weakness of integration institutions is one of the contributing 
factors to the lack of success of these groupings. 
However, this lack of institutional strength is at the same 
time an indicator of the poor performance of these group-
ings: their inability or unwillingness to build the administrat-
ive and political capacity needed to carry out the tasks they 
set for themselves is evidence, in itself, of the lack of progress 
in integration. 
Exports of developing countries' regional integration groupings as a percentage of all developing countries' total exports 
Group 1960 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988 1989 1990 
Aladi 25,7 22,0 13,8 14,1 18,7 15,8 15,8 15,2 
Andean Pact 12,4 9,3 6,0 5,5 5,5 3,2 3,9 4,2 
CACM(MCCA) 1,6 1,9 1,1 0,9 0,8 0,6 0,7 0,6 
Caricom 2,1 2,0 2,6 1,9 1,4 0,9 0,9 0,9 
Udeac 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,9 0,6 0,5 0,6 
CEAO 1,1 1,4 0,9 0,8 1,0 0,8 0,7 0,6 
Asean 14,9 10,9 10,3 12,7 15,6 18,0 18,8 19,3 
Total 58,5 48,3 36,5 36,6 43,8 40,0 41,3 40,8 
Source: Unctad. 
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The financial fragility of regional institutions is additional 
proof of their weakness. This fragility is, to a large extent, 
caused by the lack of own resources so that administrative 
expenses have to be met by direct transfers from each mem-
ber State, something that doesn't always happen in a timely 
manner. This, in turn, is a source of their lack of manpower 
and of their difficulties in carrying through challenging pro-
jects and tasks without outside assistance. The problem is 
compounded by the heavy burden that the proliferation of 
regional institutions has placed on national budgets. Indeed, 
the existence of large numbers of these schemes (in sub-
Saharan Africa, for instance, there are more than 200 re-
gional organizations) shows the extent to which integration 
initiatives often merely receive lip-service since adequate 
financing of them all is virtually impossible. 
The underlying reasons for these 
unsatisfactory developments 
Thus the failure of developing countries' regional integration 
groups to live up to the expectations generated in the 1960s 
and the 1970s is the result of the conjunction of a variety of 
circumstances, some internal to the schemes and some exter-
nal to them. 
Foremost among the internal factors has been the absence 
of an effective political commitment by national leaders 
to accept the political and economic costs resulting from 
integration. 
A second element has been the philosophy and mechanics 
of integration as carried out by most regional integration 
schemes. As a rule, they embraced import-substitution stra-
tegies that, after some initial successes in achieving a degree 
of industrialization, led to increasing rates of inefficiency and 
biased the regional markets against exports. Furthermore, 
integration schemes often lacked the support of trade-facili-
tating physical and financial (i.e. payments-clearing mechan-
isms) infrastructures. 
Thirdly, the similarity of relative factor endowments coupled 
with the small regional market size made it difficult for intra-
regional trade to be a significant portion of total trade 
of each member State: export markets had to be found 
elsewhere. 
Fourthly, the lack of burden-sharing mechanisms to com-
pensate losers from policy changes made it difficult for 
national policy-makers to accept the risks of the short-term 
social and economic dislocations associated with integration. 
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Fifthly, the economic and financial crises led to placing a 
stronger emphasis on short-term national interests rather 
than on the long-term benefits from regional integration. 
Sixthly, the technical complexity of integration 'engineering', 
particularly as countries advance towards further stages of 
integration, combined with inadequate administrative and 
human resources, is likely to have limited the chances of 
success. 
As for the external factors, perhaps the most significant ones 
were the oil and debt crises and the concomitant reaction of 
many countries facing balance of payments constraints of 
erecting barriers to imports. This form of adjustment led to 
additional inefficiencies as well as to reductions in intra-
regional trade. 
Furthermore, when under pressure from international credi-
tors and aid donors, developing countries began structural 
adjustments, the regional constraints resulting from 
countries' membership of integration groupings were not 
always taken into account. Thus countries were often en-
couraged, and indeed, implemented liberalization measures 
without due consideration to integration commitments, in-
cluding the existence of regional preference margins. 
3.3. The new approach to regional integration 
and cooperation 
In contrast with the past, both the new as well as the renewed 
integration schemes now under way seem to be imbued with 
the new view of development that has become prevalent in 
recent years, namely the need for good governance, the 
critical role of structural adjustment, the significance of 
offering more room to private initiative and the progressive 
integration of developing countries in the world economy. 
What makes the new efforts at regional integration especially 
significant is that they purport to be different from past 
ones. 
First of all, as shown in Table 16, intra-regional trade has 
grown considerably in recent years in many of the groupings, 
thus suggesting that intra-regional liberalization has taken 
a higher priority than in the past. 
Second, the lowering of intra-regional trade barriers has 
often coincided with the implementation of erga omnes trade 
liberalization measures. 
Third, the new as well as the renewed schemes tend to be 
readily open to other possible partners. 
Table 16 
Most recent export performance of the major regional integration 
groupings of developing countries 
Group 
Aladi 
Andean Pact 
CACM (MCCA) 
Caricorn 
Udeac 
CEAO 
Asean 
Mercosur 
UMA 
GCC 
Sources: Comtradc, U nctad. 
Value of 
intra-regional 
exports, 1990 
(million USO) 
11 670 
1192 
664 
273 
180 
575 
26 290 
4 059 
372 
3 774 
Growth of exports, 1986-90 
Intra-regional Extra-regional 
(%) (%) 
10,5 16,0 
22,9 15,9 
1,8 1,6 
-2,2 6,3 
28,6 9,0 
22,9 -2,7 
34,2 27,4 
14,2 13,3 
33,5 13,1 
12,1 16,8 
Fourth, as part of active efforts towards economic liberaliza-
tion, regional integration does not exclude the use of other 
external and broader liberalization exercises; that is, 
countries are often undertaking the lowering of trade barriers 
on several fronts. This is quite evident in the case of Latin 
America. Thus while Mexico has negotiated an FT A (free 
trade area) with the US and Canada, it has already concluded 
a similar agreement with Chile. Likewise, the Central Amer-
ican countries have agreed to have an FTA with Venezuela 
and another one with Mexico. And while Mercosur is still 
being created, there are already talks of reaching an FT A 
with the US. 
Fifth, the programmatic definition of the new attempts is 
unambiguously outward-looking with clearly established 
deadlines for the establishment of common external tariff 
rates that are relatively low and have a low dispersion. 
With these considerations in mind, it can be concluded 
that new integration efforts are forward-looking rather than 
defensive. Thus, references to a hostile international environ-
ment or the need to protect infant industries have been 
replaced by others to the effect of taking advantage of the 
challenges and opportunities posed by international markets, 
etc. 
While it is still too early to gauge the results of the new 
efforts, available evidence attests to the dynamism of some 
of the new efforts. As shown in Table 16, the revival, in the 
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most recent years, of intra-regional trade is considerable 
with solid growth of intra-regional exports in most group-
ings. Yet, this has not been at the expense of extra-regional 
trade. On the contrary, external trade, while growing at rates 
lower than intra-regional trade, has often expanded, in some 
cases rather spectacularly. Moreover, where external trade 
growth has been slow, intra-regional trade has been, in 
several cases, equally unsatisfactory. 
3.4. Recent new regional integration initiatives 
The revival of regional integration among developing 
countries has manifested itself not only in a reformulation 
of existing schemes but also in the establishment of new 
ones. While most of these are still in their infancy thus 
making it difficult to predict their chances of success, three 
of them are worth mentioning. One of them, Mercosur, is 
the regional grouping that currently seems to exhibit the 
strongest degree of commitment to succeed as a regional 
unit. The other two, UMA and the GCC, are both of great 
significance to the European Community, as their success 
might achieve a higher degree of stability in two areas where 
the geopolitical interests of the Community are considerable. 
The Mercado Comun del Cono Sur or Southern Cone Com-
mon Market (Mercosur) was established in March 1991 by 
the Tratado de Asuncion. It is an extension, to a large extent, 
of a process of integration among Brazil and Argentina 
initiated in 1986 (as one of Aladi's partial complementarity 
agreements) and which in 1990 already contemplated the 
elimination of mutual tariff and para-tariff barriers by the 
end of 1994 and a binational common market. The Treaty 
entered into force in November 1991 and its members are 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. A measure of its 
increasing appeal is the growing interest (and participation 
as observers at some of Mercosur's meetings) on the part of 
both Chile (which rejected initial invitations to be a founding 
member of Mercosur) and Bolivia (which, although a mem-
ber of the Andean Pact trades more with Mercosur countries 
than with the Andean countries). It has shown great determi-
nation since its inception not to deviate from its deadlines 
and at its recent (June 1992) summit meeting at Las Lenas 
announced that intra-regional trade had grown by 25% 
between 1990 and 1992. Moreover, at this meeting Mercosur 
announced the adoption of a set of macroeconomic measures 
leading to economic convergence, the decision that a com-
mon external tariff will be approved by March 1993, and 
that the common market will be in place by December 1994. 
However, recent political and economic uncertainties in 
Brazil as well as concern about a deteriorating trade balance 
in Argentina, coupled with worries about the structural 
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disparities among its member States, have raised doubts 
about the ability of Mercosur to meet its ambitious targets. 
As available UN data (similar to those for other groupings) 
only run up to 1990, the increase in intra-regional trade 
resulting from the recent liberalization of trade barriers 
within the region can only partially be observed. Neverthe-
less, having declined significantly at the beginning of the 
decade (intra-regional trade in 1985 was half of its level in 
1980), by 1989 a significant recovery of trade within the 
region was already evident. Nevertheless, at 8,3% of total 
trade, intra-regional trade is still below the 11, 7% rate of 
1980 and even that of9,4% for 1970 (see statistical annex). 
While at the beginning of the 1970s nearly two thirds of the 
trade among current Mercosur members was in agricultural 
goods and about one third was in manufactures, the ratios 
were already the opposite by 1980, and have remained so 
until the end of the 1980s. This evolution mirrors that of 
Mercosur countries' trade with the rest of the world: while 
agriculture accounted for 80% of their exports in 1970, this 
rate fell to about 60% in 1975, about 50% in 1985 and about 
40% in 1989. As regards intra-regional trade, the figures 
for 1989 show, however, a change in the tendency, with a 
significant increase in the importance of agricultural trade, 
mostly the result of the growth of Argentinian exports to 
Brazil, an apparent result of the decline in trade barriers in 
these products. Fuels and mining altogether account for less 
than 10% of their trade. 
Within its overall limited importance, the regional market 
is significant for most sectors, although there are major 
variations across countries. Thus, the regional market for 
both agricultural and manufactured goods is important for 
Paraguay as well as for Uruguay. In each of these sectors, 
intra-regional exports account for about 40% and 25% of ( 
all sectoral exports of Paraguay and Uruguay. The regional 
market for agricultural goods is also somewhat significant 
for Argentina, accounting for about 20% of this country's 
agricultural exports. 
Even though total (i.e. intra plus extra-regional trade) ex-
ports from Brazil dominate the region's external trade (they 
account for nearly three quarters of all exports), the tra-
ditional dominant role of Brazil's trade within the region 
(accounting for about 50% of its trade) decreased markedly 
in 1989 to somewhat less than 40% as a result of the 
increased significance of Argentina's trade within the region 
(which has progressively increased since 1985 to a market 
share similar to Brazil's). 
The importance of the intra-regional market varies with the 
countries: it is particularly significant for Paraguay and 
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Uruguay for whom it accounts for about one third of total 
exports. It has some importance for Argentina, recently 
accounting for almost 15% of exports, and a marginal im-
portance for Brazil for whom it represents less than 5% of 
exports (versus 9% in 1980). 
The Union du Maghreb Arabe or Union of Arab Maghreb 
(UMA) was established in 1989 and consists of Algeria, 
Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Its creation was 
thought to reflect a new climate of peace in the region and 
was seen as an opportunity to develop trade links based on 
the perceived complementarities of the region (energy 
sources in Algeria and Libya, important agricultural and 
agro-industrial sectors in Morocco, heavy industry in Al-
geria, mining resources in Morocco and Mauritania). Never-
theless, in spite of the enthusiasm of early political declar-
ations, the process of integration has not taken off. 
Trade within the region has traditionally been marginal and, 
at less than 2% of total trade, remains so. This is in spite of 
a spectacular increase in intra-regional trade since the mid-
1980s propitiated in part by the decrease in intra-regional 
frictions as well as by the significant liberalization in the 
import regimes of both Morocco (since 1983) and Tunisia 
(since 1986). 
Still, some member States simply do not trade at all with 
certain other partners in the group, thus Libya does not 
import from any UMA country while Mauritania does not 
export to any of them. And this bleak picture is, nevertheless, 
a significant change from the situation in the mid-1980s 
when only Tunisia traded with two Maghreb countries, while 
all the other member States only had one Maghreb trading 
partner. 
Although there is some evidence of significant informal trade 
among neighbouring countries (particularly among Algeria 
and Morocco), the disparities in economic policy approach 
(the market orientation of Tunisia and Morocco contrast 
markedly with the statist orientation of the other two main 
partners, Algeria and Libya), coupled with the traditional 
orientation of their export strategies toward European mar-
kets, place a significant question mark on the extent to which 
integration will progress in the medium term. 
Furthermore, the current internal difficulties in some of its 
member countries and the still-unresolved political disagree-
ments on some bilateral issues help explain why the effective 
furthering of integration does not seem to have been on the 
top of the agenda of these countries and suggest the need 
for a waiting period as regards the ability to gauge how far 
UMA will go in the immediate future. 
Less recent than the UMA or Mercosur (it was established 
in 1981), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) differs 
from the groupings referred to in the earlier section in 
that it was created after the oil crisis of 1979-80 and 
precisely at the time when many integration groupings 
began to falter. 
Formed by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates, its original goal was, to a 
large extent, based on geopolitical considerations (namely, 
to face security threats in the region from Iraq, Iran and 
Yemen). Still, the countries in the region shared more than 
common threats; in particular they had similar views on 
global strategic issues. They also shared similar political 
systems, cultures and political history and in many respects 
the GCC agreement multilateralized the bilateral pacts and 
agreements that already existed as regards scientific, edu-
cational, cultural and economic cooperation. 
Although as a rule import duties among GCC member States 
were eliminated as of March 1983, there are significant 
exceptions to this rule, particularly as regards some indus-
trial products. As regards agricultural and animal products 
most are not subject to these duties. 
These exemptions mentioned above, as well as various other 
non-tariff barriers (including national preferences as regards 
public procurement, regional content and regional owner-
ship requirements), the absence of a common external tariff 
(there is, however a maximum tariff of 20% and a minimum 
tariff of 4%), and the strong (even if declining) specialization 
in oil exports go a long way in explaining the marginal role 
that intra-regional trade plays in the region: less than 5% 
of all exports is accounted for by those among GCC member 
States (versus 3% in 1980, the year before the establishment 
of the GCC). 
Indeed, intra-regional trade is currently somewhat less sig-
nificant, as a proportion of total trade, than it was in the 
mid-1980s. Furthermore, this aggregate figure overshadows 
substantial disparities among member States. Thus, Bahrain 
is the only country which can be said to depend on the 
regional market (its exports to the region account for nearly 
one quarter of all of its exports). On the other hand, the 
regional market is practically irrelevant for Oman and Ku-
wait (with intra-regional trade shares in total trade of less 
than I and 2% respectively). 
Numerous deadlines have been missed until now in the 
efforts to establish a common external tariff. However, as 
part of a reinforced drive towards further integration, mem-
ber States have agreed that the new tariff will be in force by 
March 1993. 
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Finally, while from the trade point of view there is ample 
room for improvement, other economic and political gains 
have been significant. As for the first, there has been an 
increased coordination in monetary policy and there is con-
siderable freedom of movement of people. As for the latter, 
GCC member countries now enjoy a larger international pol-
itical weight and frictions among them have been reduced. 
4. How to make regional integration a successful 
instrument of development 
The interest among developing countries in regional inte-
gration continues despite the failures of the past. This raises 
the important policy question as to what the factors are 
which increase or (on the contrary) reduce the chances of 
success of these schemes. 
As previous discussions have indicated, regional integration 
is not exclusively or even primarily an economic phenom-
enon but also a political one. Thus, two groups of factors 
affecting these chances of success (political and economic) 
can be identified. 
As regards the political conditions for successful regional 
integration, the will to carry out effectively the integration 
project is perhaps the critical factor in ensuring the success 
of regional integration schemes. In turn, for this will to go 
beyond political rhetoric, the countries concerned must be 
committed to accepting the short-term adjustment costs as-
sociated with integration, hopefully mitigated through the 
use of mechanisms (such as those discussed below) for the 
improvement of social and regional cohesion. They must 
be committed, as well, to the building of strong common 
institutions, establishing sensible and clear goals for them 
and providing for their rational management and their ac-
countability. 
As regards the economic conditions for successful regional 
integration, and noting that an increase in welfare via the 
growth of trade and foreign direct investment is, by defi-
nition, the major economic objective of regional integration, 
the factors that promote increases in trade and foreign 
investment are key determinants for the success of these 
schemes. 
In this respect, the most important conditions for success 
relate to three different areas. First, to the type of policies 
designed for the implementation of integration and economic 
reform. Second, to the existence of a trade-conducive atmos-
phere. Third, to the presence of certain institutional arrange-
ments that can help finance trade expansion and the struc-
tural adjustments engendered by it. 
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As for the first area, i.e. policy design conditions, the two 
most significant ones refer to the need for an integration 
model open to world trade and to paying due regard to the 
regional aspects of structural adjustment. In other words, 
the maintenance of some degree of regional preference has 
to be coupled with an openness of the integration schemes 
to new entrants and, more generally, to competition from 
abroad. 
This openness is the best insurance against the trade-divert-
ing effects overcoming those from trade creation. It also 
guarantees that intra-regional industries remain dynamic 
and make good use of their comparative advantage. The 
most direct test of this orientation is by observing the evol-
ution of import barriers vis-a-vis the rest of the world: the 
lower the barriers against third countries and the faster they 
decline, the larger trade expansion and the economic health 
of the regional industries will be. 
On the other hand, the design of structural adjustment 
measures must take account of the regional dimension of 
the changes conceived in the reforming member States. In-
deed, the objective of structural adjustment programmes is 
to reduce resource misallocations, increase the incentives for 
productive investment and create the conditions for durable 
growth thus furthering the integration of the developing 
countries concerned into the world economy. On these 
grounds, effective structural adjustment should assist re-
gional integration. 
Yet, as structural adjustment programmes are typically de-
signed and implemented at the national level, structural 
adjustment programmes undertaken by different countries 
belonging to the same integration grouping often exhibit 
substantive differences as well as different timetables and 
sequences of implementation. As a result, they may not 
be mutually consistent and coherent thus provoking intra-
regional distortions, imposing adjustment costs on partners 
in the integration grouping and adversely affecting the func-
tioning of regional agreements. 
To avoid these problems and thus facilitate the success of 
regional integration schemes, structural adjustment pro-
grammes of countries belonging to a regional grouping need 
to be coordinated and harmonized, so that regional interde-
pendence and economic policy commitments to integration 
partners are taken into account. 
As for the second area, trade-conducive conditions, three 
are specially relevant. The first refers to the very foundations 
of trade: intra-regional trade is more likely to expand the 
larger the opportunities are for the exploitation of compara-
tive advantage and of economies of scale. Other things being 
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equal, this calls for a large, rather than a small, number 
of partners and for partners with diverse relative factor 
endowments. 
The second concerns the existence of trade-facilitating infra-
structures (namely, transportation and communication net-
works), which, ceteris paribus, tend to be made more feasible 
with geographic proximity and less so in the presence of 
physical barriers such as seas or mountain chains. The exist-
ence of these infrastructures prior to integration is a signifi-
cant factor in the success of regional integration: thus, the 
difficulties of crossing the Andes are often mentioned as 
one of the main difficulties for Andean integration. But, 
evidently, policy decisions can do much, as well, to relieve 
bottlenecks in this area. 
The third is a supporting international trade environment 
provided by the industrialized countries as well as by inter-
national institutions, which can play a significant role in the 
success or failure of these schemes. Support from the former 
can be provided by streamlining rules of origin for goods the 
production of which takes place in more than one developing 
country. Support from the international institutions can be 
provided by not requiring developing countries that belong 
to integration units to undertake trade policy measures that 
go against their regional integration commitments. 
As for the third area, institutional arrangements necessary 
for success, two of them in particular can help reduce the 
short-term dislocations associated with the implementation 
of integration measures and thus the opposition from the 
parties in difficulties: intra-regional compensation mechan-
isms and payments-clearing facilities. 
Intra-regional mechanisms to compensate short-term losers 
and to reduce the unevenness in the distribution of the 
benefits from integration can be a powerful instrument to 
furthering integration. Indeed, the implementation of re-
gional integration measures, as any other policy change, is 
likely to produce not only gainers but, in the short term, 
losers as well. These losers will be the owners of production 
factors which, as a result of the price changes associated with 
the changes in import barriers, are no longer competitive at 
the regional level. 
The resistance and political opposition of these losers can 
be more easily overcome if there are mechanisms ('social 
funds') that compensate these losers, at least partially, via the 
provision of education or retraining, longer unemployment 
benefits, investment incentives, etc. To the extent that losses 
often affect industries located in particular areas similar 
mechanisms ('regional funds') can be used to finance local 
infrastructures or to provide tax advantages in the affected 
subregions. As some countries within the overall grouping 
are likely to benefit more than others from the implemen-
tation of regional measures, other mechanisms can provide 
for inter-country transfers ('cohesion funds') to assist the 
poorer members of the regional grouping. 
On the other hand, to the extent that many developing 
countries' currencies are non-convertible, exporting to indus-
trialized countries (thus, outside the integration grouping) is 
often more attractive than exporting to a member of the 
regional group because the former brings forth currency that 
can be used universally while the latter simply allows for a 
disguised form of barter trade. 
An effective way of getting around this problem and thus 
facilitating intra-regional trade, while economizing hard-
currency foreign exchange, is to establish payments-clearing 
facilities through which member countries can exchange 
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the payments credits with other members of the regional 
grouping. As the mechanism is designed, by definition, to 
accommodate short-term imbalances, its success depends on 
two factors. First, on a sufficiently large reserve of funds 
to finance these imbalances. Second, on the absence of 
permanent, structural payments imbalances, such as those 
caused by high barriers to intra-regional trade and by a 
long-term currency overvaluation or, even, undervaluation, 
in a given member country. When this is the case the accumu-
lation of large credits by some countries and corresponding 
debits by others will, inevitably, use up the funds that sup-
port the mechanism, thus resulting in its bankruptcy. 
Evidently, these 'conditions' do not apply equally to all 
integration groupings. Likewise, none of them, even to-
gether, might be sufficient for the success of integration 
efforts. However, the experience of past failures suggests 
that ongoing integration efforts need to be aware of the 
difficulties of succeeding when these conditions are not pre-
sent. 
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Statistical annex 
Southern Common Market (Mercosur) - Share of intra-regional trade in total trade, by country 
(%) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Argentina 10,2 9,8 14,2 8,0 12,7 12,1 9,6 14,9 
Brazil 8,2 6,8 9,1 3,9 5,5 5,0 4,7 4,4 
Paraguay 33,5 33,1 40,2 27,0 57,4 36,0 30,4 38,4 
Uruguay 9,5 25,2 32,7 24,7 34,8 27,2 24,2 32,9 
Total 9,4 8,5 11,7 5,6 8,5 7,4 6,6 8,3 
Southern Common Market (Mercosur) - Share of intra-regional trade in total trade, by product group 
(%) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Agriculture 6,8 5,2 7,0 3,9 7,4 5,3 4,4 8,1 
Fuels 20,4 32,9 32,4 7,2 16,3 10,2 11,7 11,3 
Minerals/mining 6,9 6,3 4,5 3,8 6,6 5,4 3,7 4,7 
Manufactures 25,0 15,8 19,8 7,8 9,7 9,7 8,8 9,0 
Total 9,4 8,5 11,7 5,6 8,5 7,4 6,6 8,3 
Southern Common Market (Mercosur) - Relative importance of each product group in intra-regional trade 
(%) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Agriculture 57,6 39,0 34,5 33,4 39,7 30,1 27,5 38,0 
Fuels 1,1 7,1 6,0 8,3 5,4 4,2 4,2 3,5 
Minerals/mining 4,5 6,7 2,7 5,0 6,5 6,1 5,0 5,3 
Manufactures 36,8 47,2 56,7 53,3 48,4 59,6 63,3 53,2 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Sources: Comtrade and Commission estimates. 
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Central American Common Market (MCCA) - Share of intra-regional trade in total trade, by country 
(%) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Costa Rica 19,7 21,6 26,8 14,8 8,9 9,7 n.a. n.a. 
El Salvador 32,3 27,6 41,1 25,7 12,4 19,5 n.a. n.a. 
Guatemala 35,3 26,9 27,2 20,5 17,9 25,8 n.a. n.a. 
Honduras 10,6 9,1 10,3 2,8 2,4 3,4 n.a. n.a. 
Nicaragua 26,4 24,9 18,2 9,0 6,5 11,7 n.a. n.a. 
Total 26,1 23,3 25,4 15,5 10,6 14,2 n.a. n.a. 
Central American Common Market (MCCA) - Share of intra-regional trade in total trade, by product group 
(%) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Agriculture 8,0 5,8 6,3 3,3 2,8 4,4 n.a. n.a. 
Fuels 16,3 39,4 50,4 29,8 8,6 6,1 n.a. n.a. 
Minerals/mining 21,1 13,3 12,4 29,7 30,8 32,0 n.a. n.a. 
Manufactures 92,l 82,8 82,3 67,8 55,2 55,7 n.a. n.a. 
Total 26,l 23,3 25,4 15,5 10,6 14,2 n.a. n.a. 
Central American Common Market (MCCA) - Relative importance of each product group in intra-regional trade 
(%) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Agriculture 23,4 18,7 17,6 16,9 21,8 24,5 n.a. n.a. 
Fuels 0,5 1,5 2,5 3,0 1,0 0,4 n.a. n.a. 
Minerals/mining 1,4 1,2 1,7 3,0 2,5 2,5 n.a. n.a. 
Manufactures 74,7 78,5 78,2 77,0 74,8 72,5 n.a. n.a. 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 n.a. n.a. 
Source.s: Comtrade and Commission estimates. 
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Andean Pact (Pacto Andino) - Share of intra-regional trade in total trade, by country 
(%) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Bolivia 2,2 3,8 4,1 2,5 3,8 5,4 4,6 6,3 
Colombia 7,1 11,3 9,7 6,1 5,5 5,2 7,0 5,4 
Ecuador 4,7 13,5 5,9 2,5 2,0 6,2 10,5 7,8 
Peru 1,8 3,2 8,5 7,0 6,2 6,4 6,3 5,6 
Venezuela 0,8 1,3 1,8 I, 1 1,9 3,1 2,3 2,4 
Total 2,1 3,6 3,9 2,6 3,4 4,3 5,0 4,1 
Andean Pact (Pacto Andino) - Share of intra-regional trade in total trade, by product group 
(%) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Agriculture 3,0 4,9 4,7 3,1 2,2 3,3 3,0 3,6 
Fuels 1,1 2,2 1,4 0,8 0,5 2,0 1,7 1,4 
Minerals/mining 1,6 2,1 2,9 3,2 6,6 7,4 6,5 4,3 
Manufactures 18,3 24,6 24,5 11,4 18,6 14,9 19,5 13,2 
Total 2,1 3,6 3,9 2,6 3,4 4,3 5,0 4,1 
Andean Pact (Pacto Andino) - Relative importance of each product group in intra-regional trade 
(%) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Agriculture 36,0 23,5 21,6 21,5 21,4 16,3 14,5 18,5 
Fuels 30,3 44,9 28,5 19,3 7,7 28,9 18,9 20,2 
Minerals/mining 12,7 5,4 7,8 13,6 15,4 14,7 15,7 11,2 
Manufactures 20,9 26,1 42,1 45,6 55,5 40,0 50,9 50,1 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Sources: Comtrade and Commission estimates. 
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A - The preferential regimes covering EC imports 
1. Introduction 
This chapter looks into some aspects of the Community's 
preferential trading relations, particularly those with the 
developing countries. Trade preferences have always played 
an important role in shaping the trading relations of the 
Member States, in particular with their former colonies. 
The successive Lome Conventions, succeeding the Yaounde 
Conventions of Association, extended and deepened such 
preferences, so that at present (Lome IV) 69 developing 
countries of the African, Caribbean and Pacific regions 
benefit from preferential, and in most cases unrestricted, 
access for almost all products to the largest market in the 
world. For the non-ACP developing countries the Mediter-
ranean preferences and the preferences accorded under the 
generalized system of preferences (GSP) constitute the major 
instruments through which the Community extends prefer-
ential access to its market. 
2. A brief overview of the Community's 
preferential trading relations 
The Community has -extended through a number of instru-
ments preferential, non-reciprocal, trade benefits to the vari-
ous groups of developing countries (ACP countries and the 
overseas territories of the Member States, the Mediterranean 
countries and the Asian and Latin American countries). In 
addition preferential, but reciprocal, trade agreements (free 
trade areas, customs unions and intermediate types of ar-
rangements) have been concluded with the EFTA countries 
(to be replaced in due course with the EEA), the East 
and Central European countries (Hungary, Poland and the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic), Turkey, Israel, Malta, 
Cyprus and San Marino. In the latter case, such type of 
agreements have often been precursors to membership of the 
Community for a number of countries; the United Kingdom, 
Spain and Greece are particular examples. The EFT A 
countries which have applied for membership of the Com-
munity (Austria, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland) are obvi-
ous examples of such cases in the near future, while also in 
the case of the East and Central European countries, the 
preferential trading relations are now considered as an inter-
mediate stage towards a free trade area, followed by full 
membership of the Community in the more distant future. 
Free trade area negotiations should shortly be under way 
with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bah-
rain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates), while for Romania and Bulgaria nego-
tiations have started for the conclusion of so-called 'Europe 
Agreements', similar to the ones concluded with Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Trade and cooperation agree-
ments have also been concluded with the Baltic States and 
Albania. These countries, together with Romania and Bulga-
ria, enjoy at present preferential treatment under the GSP. 
Lastly, at the Lisbon Summit of June 1992, the European 
Council indicated that 'ultimately, by stages' a free trade 
area between the Community and the Maghreb countries 
could be set up; in this context the Commission has already 
had some preliminary discussions with Morocco. 
These developments underscore the continued importance 
of preferential trading relations in the Community's external 
trading relations, which stem on the one hand from historical 
circumstances (in particular the relations of individual Mem-
ber States with individual ACP countries), and on the other 
hand from political exigencies. This policy has been criticized 
by trade policy analysts on the grounds that it has weakened 
the Community's commitment towards the multilateral 
GA TT system. While this remains ultimately a matter of 
judgment, it is important to underline the Community's 
commitment to uphold Article XXIV of the GATT, which 
defines under which conditions preferential trading relations, 
such as free trade areas and customs unions, are GA TT 
compatible. Also the Community's contribution to the work 
on Article XXIV in the context of the Uruguay Round 
should be noted in this respect. 
3. The Community's preferential trading 
relations, in particular with the 
developing countries 
Traditionally, preferential trading relations have concen-
trated on preferential tariff treatment. As tariffs constituted 
the main, and often only, instrument of protection, preferen-
tial tariff treatment constituted an effective device for ex-
tending an economic advantage to a preferred source of 
imports. 
However, as the importance of tariffs has been reduced, so 
the degree of preference is increasingly determined not by 
the tariff preference as such, but by other factors which 
determine to what extent a country can in actual fact benefit 
from trade preferences. Among the factors determining the 
extent to which a country can benefit from preferential 
trading relations the following are of particular importance. 
This concerns in the first place the so-called 'rules of origin'. 
Rules of origin determine what conditions are required to be 
fulfilled if an imported consignment from a certain preferred 
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country is to benefit from preferential treatment, that is to 
meet the requirement of'sufficient processing' in a particular 
country or group of countries. In the case of unprocessed 
agricultural and mineral products, the determination of the 
origin of a product does not pose in general a problem, but 
in the case of manufactured products, with the likelihood 
that different stages of processing are carried out in different 
countries, the situation is quite different. For these products, 
the preferential agreements concluded by the Community 
define a change of tariff heading in general as a sufficient 
condition to meet the rules of origin requirements, although 
in certain exceptional cases additional conditions are im-
posed, such as, for example, a de minimis requirement of the 
share of the value of non-originating materials. While such 
rules are necessary, in order to ensure that the benefits of 
the preferential treatment accrue to the preferred country, 
the definition of these rules always requires a careful balan-
cing of, on the one hand, the requirements stemming from 
preferential treatment (the preference should be utilized by 
the beneficiary country) and, on the other hand, the fact 
that the international economy is subject to a process of 
increasing specialization; too strict rules of origin require-
ments could have substantial distorting allocative effects on 
this process, particularly in cases where the preferential 
margins are considerable. Rules of origin of preferential 
trade regimes also contain provisions with respect to regional 
cumulation, as well as the treatment of the so-called donor 
content. Regional cumulation provisions allow preferential 
countries belonging to a recognized regional grouping to 
count inputs originating in any of the countries belonging 
to that regional group as originating inputs; 1 this fosters the 
process of regional specialization and cooperation. Examples 
of this are provisions in the Lome Convention, as well 
some of the Mediterranean agreements (Maghreb ), the GSP 
(Asean and Andean Pact), the Europe Agreements, the 
EFT A and the EEA agreement. Similarly, donor content 
provisions allow inputs originating in the country which 
extends the preferences to be counted as originating input; 
most Community preferential agreements, with the excep-
tion of the GSP, have provisions to this effect. 
The treatment of non-tariff barriers (quantitative restric-
tions, but also non-tariff barriers in the context, for example, 
of the common agricultural policy), are also important deter-
minants of the degree of preference extended. Equally, toler-
ance and derogation provisions, like for example those con-
tained in the Lome Convention, provide a degree of flexi-
bility which can be of particular importance to the countries 
for which the trade preferences are meant. Also the question 
of product exclusions or limitations of trade preferences is 
important, as well as the matters of safeguards and dispute 
settlement. 
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In this regard a further distinction can be made between the so-called 
cumulation of process system {'full cumulation') and the cumulation of 
origin system. 
In summary, the actual degree of preference extended under 
a preferential scheme does not only depend on the depth 
and the scope of the tariff preference; other factors, as briefly 
enumerated above, are of equal, if not greater, importance. 
As regards the Community's preferential schemes with de-
veloping countries, the main features are described in 
Table I 7 for each of the group of countries distinguished, 
i.e. the Lome countries, the Mediterranean countries, the 
GSP countries and the least developed countries regime 
extended under the GSP. While among each of these four 
groups of preferential regimes the beneficiary countries share 
important characteristics in their preferential treatment by 
the Community, this should certainly not be interpreted as 
meaning that countries belonging to the same preferential 
group receive identical preferential treatment. This is par-
ticularly the case for the GSP regime, which reveals in 
practice, as a result of the differences in product composition 
of the beneficiaries and, in particular, the graduation/differ-
entiation policy,2 important differences in the actual utiliza-
tion of trade preferences, as will be discussed below. 
4. The importance of preferential trading regimes 
The best way to obtain an overview of the importance of 
the preferential trading relations of the Community is by 
presenting the trade flows covered by the various preferential 
arrangements.3 This is done in Table 18. 
Table 18 shows clearly the relative importance of the various 
types of preferential agreements. About 33% of the total 
1991 Community imports originated in countries with whom 
the Community has entered, or will do so in the foreseeable 
future, into reciprocal preferential trading arrangements 
(EFT A, Israel, the East and Central European countries, 
Turkey, Malta and Cyprus, GCC countries), about 8% in 
countries to whom the Community has extended contractual 
Graduation for industrial products {excluding textiles and clothing) is 
applied through the progressive withdrawal of preferences, for sensitive 
products only, carried out in two stages. In Stage One the preferential 
tariff quota is reduced by 50%, with in Stage Two preferential treatment 
being completely terminated. Stage One of the reduction in preferential 
treatment is triggered by a minimum share in extra-EC imports of the 
product concerned (20%) or by a volume of imports of the product 
concerned exceeding 10 times the preferential tariff quota. Preferential 
treatment is withdrawn in the year following the reduction, provided 
one of the conditions for the preference reduction continues to be met. 
For textiles and clothing (MFA products) preferences differentiation is 
applied in a slightly different manner. 
Note that preferential trading relations with such countries as Andorra, 
San Marino and the Occupied Territories are not included, simply 
because the volume of trade falling under these arrangements is too 
small. 
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Table 17 
The Community's main preferential trading relations with the developing countries 
Beneficiary 
ACP countries 
Mediterranean 
countries 
GSP countries 
Safeguards, exceptions, 
rules of origin 
Safeguard measures 
authorized; these 
have, however, not 
been invoked. Rules 
of origin, which are 
in general the least 
restrictive compared 
to other preferential 
trade regimes pro-
vide for ACP/EC 
cumulation; pro-
visions for dero-
gation procedures in 
case rules of origin 
requirements are not 
met; provision for 
general tolerance on 
the use of non-orig-
inating materials. 
Rules of origin pro-
vide for EC/ben-
eficiary cumulation, 
as well as, for exam-
ple, Maghreb cumu-
lation for the Magh-
reb countries. 
Limitations on pref-
erences for sensitive 
products; for non-
sensitive products 
safeguard measures 
might be invoked if 
imports from a sin-
gle country exceed a 
certain reference 
margin. Rules ofori-
gin more restrictive 
than in the case of 
ACP and Mediter-
ranean preferential 
trade regimes; how-
ever regional cumu-
lation (Asean, An-
dean pact) is pro-
vided for. 
Agriculture 
Non-CAP products 
enter without re-
strictions. Preferen-
tial treatment for 
rum, bananas, sugar 
and beef. Abolition 
of customs duties 
on all agricul-
tural products; for 
selected products 
reduction of CAP 
charges (fixed com-
ponent, variable lev-
ies, etc.) within cer-
tain quantitative 
and seasonal limits. 
Non-CAP products 
enter without re-
strictions. At pre-
sent still reduction 
of duties on prod-
ucts covered by 
CAP; full elimin-
ation of customs du-
ties within certa'in 
quantitative and 
seasonal limits start-
ing in 1993. 
Reduction or abol-
ition of duty on cer-
tain agricultural 
products; for five 
product categories, 
limitations by tariff 
quotas (pineapples, 
coffee extracts, un-
manufactured tob-
acco). For a number 
of products 50% re-
duction in agricul-
tural levies (meat 
products and potato 
starch). 
Industrial products, 
excluding textiles 
Duty-free entry for 
all industrial prod-
ucts, with no quanti-
tative limitations. 
Duty-free entry for 
all industrial ex-
ports, with no quan-
titative limitations. 
Duty-free entry for 
industrial products 
with some primary 
products being ex-
cluded; no limita-
tions for non-sensi-
tive products. Limi-
tations (product/ 
country-specific) for 
sens1t1ve products, 
either through the 
imposition of coun-
try-specific fixed 
duty-free amounts 
or through so-called 
tariff ceilings. 
Graduation, i.e. ex-
clusion of preference 
benefits, based on 
Textiles and clothing 
No limitations on 
duty free preferen-
tial treatment. 
In general no limi-
tations on duty-free 
preferential treat-
ment; in a few cases 
administrative co-
operation in order 
to avoid disruption 
of the Community 
market. 
Within tariff quo-
tas/tariff ceilings 
duty-free access 
for GSP-eligible 
countries with 
whom the Com-
munity has con-
cluded MFA agree-
ments. Duty-free 
entry of jute and coir 
products for India, 
jute only for Thai-
land and coir only 
for Sri Lanka. 
ECSC products 
Duty-free access for 
all ECSC products, 
with safeguard 
clause. 
Duty-free access for 
all ECSC products, 
with safeguard 
clause. 
For one group of 
products duty-free 
access with country-
specific tariffs, quo-
tas or tariff ceilings, 
while for another 
group duty-free ac-
cess for each of the 
countries individu-
ally within the limits 
of a Community 
ceiling correspond-
ing to 102% of the 
highest maximum 
amount for 1980 
under each of the 
preferential ceilings 
opened for that 
year. 
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Beneficiary 
GSP countries, least 
developed countries 
regime 
Table 18 
Safeguards, exceptions, 
rules of origin 
Safeguard measures 
for ordinary GSP 
countries do not 
apply for these 
countries. Rules of 
origin at present still 
the same as for ordi-
nary GSP benefici-
aries. Reform con-
si de red (tolerance 
margin, derogation 
possibility, etc.). 
Agriculture 
Abolition of duty on 
selected agricultural 
products. No tariff 
quotas, except in 
case of coffee ex-
tracts. For a number 
of products 50% re-
duction in agricul-
tural levies (meat 
products and potato 
starch): 
Industrial products, 
excluding textiles 
objective criteria, 
that is related to per-
formance of a coun-
try in the Com-
munity market. 
Duty-free entry of 
all industrial prod-
ucts with no quanti-
tative limitations. 
Same products ex-
cluded as for ordi-
nary GSP benefici-
aries. No reimpo-
sition of duties once 
ceilings/fixed duty-
free amounts have 
been exhausted. 
Textiles and clothing 
Duty-free entry of 
textile and clothing 
products, as well as 
duty-free entry of 
jute and coir prod-
ucts. 
ECSC products 
Same as for ordi-
nary GSP benefici-
aries, but no reimpo-
sition of duties. 
The main preferential trading relations of the Community in 1986 and 1991 
(in billion ECU or, in bctw,en brackets, a., a% of total ,xtra-EC flows) 
Imports Exports 
1986 1991 1986 1991 
Total extra-EC 336,8 493,8 344,6 423,5 
(100,0) (100,0) (100,0) (100,0) 
Part of the Community's customs union 
Overseas departments 0,4 1,8 2,4 9,3 
Free trade area (reciprocal) 
91,5 114,8 All countries listed below 81,2 114,l 
(24,l) (23,l) (26,6) (27,l) 
EFTA 78,7 110,7 87,2 108,9 
Israel 2,5 3,4 4,3 5,9 
( Reciprocal) arrangements with East and Central 
European countries 
All countries listed below 15,0 23,7 19,4 24,3 
(4,5) (4,8) (5,6) (5,7) 
Former Yugoslavia 4,9 7,5 5,8 6,8 
Poland 3,0 6,2 6,8 7,9 
Czechoslovakia 2,1 4,1 1,9 3,8 
Hungary 1,9 3,6 2,4 3,5 
Bulgaria 0,6 0,8 1,5 1,0 
Romania 2,5 1,5 1,0 1,3 
Reciprocal concessions, moving to enhanced 
forms of integration 
7,5 6,3 11,l All countries listed below 3,8 
(1,1) (1,5) (1,8) (2,6) 
Turkey 3,1 6,2 4,7 8,2 
Malta 0,4 0,7 0,7 1,4 
Cyprus 0,3 0,6 0,9 1,5 
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Imports Exports 
1986 1991 1986 1991 
Non-reciprocal contractual concessions 
All countries listed below 31,5 36,6 33,9 35,4 
(9,4) (7,4) (9,8) (8,4) 
Lome Convention 19,7 19,1 16,2 15,9 
Overseas territories 0,2 0,7 0,7 1,4 
Mediterranean countries 
Maghreb 1 9,1 13,l 9,5 11,2 
Mashreq 1 2,5 3,7 7,5 6,9 
Non-reciprocal GSP concessions, moving to free trade area 
GCC countries I 2,5 13,5 14,8 16,8 
(3,7) (2,7) (4,3) (4,0) 
Other countries receiving unilateral GSP concessions 
All countries listed below 52,2 83,9 42,6 63,0 
(15,5) (17,0) (12,4) (14,9) 
Middle East 
Iran 3,0 6,3 3,7 7,5 
Irak 3,4 2,8 
Asia 
Asean 1 9,2 19,9 8,5 17,3 
Hong Kong 5,3 6,4 4,2 7,4 
China 4,3 15,0 6,5 5,6 
South Asia I 4,0 7,7 3,0 7,1 
Other Asia 1 0,7 1,0 0,4 0,5 
Latin America 
Andean 4 1 3,1 3,2 2,0 1,9 
CACM 1 I, I 1,0 0,6 0,7 
Mercosur 1 10,3 13,8 5,6 6,1 
Venezuela 1,5 1,6 1,9 1,9 
Mexico 2,4 3,0 2,0 4,8 
Chile 1,5 2,5 0,7 1,1 
Other countries, MFN or predominant MFN treatment 
All countries listed below 131,3 203,8 121,8 141,5 
(39,0) (41,3) (35,3) (33,4) 
USA 56,9 91,8 75,2 71,2 
Canada 6,5 9,9 9,1 9,3 
Japan 33,5 51,8 11,5 22,2 
South Korea 2 4,3 7,8 3,1 7,1 
Australia 4,1 4,5 5,8 6,2 
Taiwan 4,7 11,1 2,5 5,5 
Former USSR 13,2 18,5 9,9 14,2 
South Africa 8,1 8,4 4,7 5,8 
1 Maghreb Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia 
Mashreq Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria 
GCC countries Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates 
Ascan Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
South Asia Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan 
Other Asia Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Macao, Myanmar, Mongolia, Nonh Korea, Viet Nam 
CACM Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua 
Andean 4 Bolivia. Colombia, Ecuador, Peru 
Mcrcosur Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay 
2 South Korea is at present again a GSP beneficiary; however, from 1988 to 1991 GSP benefits for South Korea have been suspended because of discriminatory treatment of Community companies 
by South Korea in the area of intellectual property rights; for that reason South Korea is shown, in 1991, as a beneficiary ofMFN, rather than GSP, treatment. 
Source: Eurostat. 
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non-reciprocal trading concessions (Lome countries and the 
Mediterranean countries), 18% in countries to whom the 
Community has extended unilateral GSP concessions (the 
non-ACP developing countries), while the remaining imports 
(about 42%) originated in countries to whom the Com-
munity extends MFN treatment or predominantly MFN 
treatment (the industrial countries). 
Although the share of countries receiving exclusively or 
predominantly MFN treatment is only 42%, in actual fact, 
the overall importance of the MFN regime is, for various 
reasons, much greater. One of these reasons is the simple 
fact that part of the Community imports enter duty free, in 
which case tariff trade preferences do not represent a real 
benefit for the preferred country. In 1991 the share ofduty-
free imports1 in total extra-EC imports amounted to 28,9%; 
these imports were concentrated in a limited number of 
countries or selected group of countries as can be seen from 
the following data. From Iran 89,5% of total imports entered 
the Community MFN duty free, followed by, in descending 
order, the GCC countries (83,7%), Iraq (81,1 %), the Mash-
rek countries (77,1 %), the former Soviet Union (67,3%), 
Venezuela (66,1 %), the ACP countries (63,4%), Chile 
(63,0%), Australia (56,2%), Mexico (53,8%), and Canada 
(50,6%). Obviously, countries exporting predominantly oil 
and/or other raw materials to the Community face no or 
hardly any tariff barriers for their exports. The countries 
belonging to this group have, in the aggregate, that is ignor-
ing certain specific products, a relatively low interest in 
preferential treatment in the Community market. On the 
other hand, countries like Taiwan (of which only 1,8% 
of total imports entered the Community duty free), Japan 
(2,6%), Romania (4,3%), South Korea (4,8%), Hong Kong 
(5,9%), the CACM countries (7,8%), China (8,0%), Turkey 
(8,4%), former Yugoslavia (8,7%) and the Asean countries 
(11,5%) are among the countries for which a relatively low 
share of their imports entered the Community duty free. 
These countries share, with some exceptions, a relatively 
strong (developing) specialization in manufactured exports. 
The countries belonging to this group have in general a 
significant interest in preferential treatment in the Com-
munity market. 
After adding the duty-free share of imports of all partners 
qualifying for some form of preferential treatment to the 
imports from MFN sources, one obtains that in 1991 59% of 
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Note that duty-free imports are taken here to be represented by bound 
duty-free concessions, as well as autonomous duty-free concessions, but 
excluding agricultural products which carry a duty-free rate, but have 
at the same time a CAP charge applied to them. Excluded as well 
are temporary suspensions of duties on chemical and microelectronic 
products, implemented on the basis of Article 28 of the Treaty of Rome 
as amended by the Single European Act. 
all imports entered the Community on a non-discriminatory 
basis. However, the actual share of imports entering the 
Community on a non-discriminatory basis is even larger 
as not all imports from preferential sources entering the 
Community do actually receive preferential treatment. One 
reason for this might be the product exclusions in the rel-
evant preferential scheme (for example agricultural prod-
ucts), another might be limitations on preferential treatment 
(preferential tariff quota, for example). Moreover criteria 
regarding the origin of the product (rules of origin require-
ments) have to be met, while also certain administrative 
requirements have to be fulfilled. For all this and other 
reasons the share of trade from preferential sources actually 
receiving preferential treatment is less than 100%, with a 
corresponding increase in the share of imports entering the 
Community on a non-discriminatory basis. Except in the 
case of the GSP (see also Section 5), there are no reliable 
estimates available as regards the extent to which preferential 
countries have actually utilized their trade preferences in 
their trade with the Community. Only in the case of the GSP 
it is known that about one-third of the dutiable imports 
actually receive preferential treatment, with the remaining 
two-thirds entering the Community on a non-discriminatory 
MFN basis. This, when added to the proportion calculated 
above, brings the share of imports entering the Community 
on a non-discriminatory basis to about 67%.2 Adding to 
this percentage the imports from other preferential sources 
entering the Community on a non-discriminatory basis 
would yield a final, of course somewhat higher, figure of the 
share of imports in total extra-EC imports entering the 
Community on a non-discriminatory basis. It is clear that 
this figure could be well in excess of 70% of total extra-EC 
imports. 
As regards the export side, it is clear that the Community 
receives relatively little trade preferences in its overseas mar-
kets. The principal markets where the Community receives 
preferential treatment are the EFT A countries, as well as 
the markets of the East and Central European countries 
with whom trade and cooperation agreements have been 
concluded. The Community receives also some preferences 
from Israel, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus. This suggests that 
at most one-third of the Community's exports receive some 
form of preferential treatment; in actual fact trade prefer-
ences extended to the Community pertain to a smaller part 
In the case of the GSP, excluding the countries of Eastern and Central 
Europe, as well as the GCC countries, imports from GSP countries in 
1990 amounted to ECU 91,3 billion, of which ECU 34,2 billion entered 
duty free. Of the dutiable imports of ECU 57,2 billion, ECU 18,4 billion 
actually received preferential treatment; consequently the remaining 
ECU 38,8 billion (8% of total extra-EC imports) entered the Community 
on an MFN basis. 
of its exports, as not all exports are eligible for preferential 
treatment, or because the country concerned applies a zero 
tariff on an MFN basis. 
5. The impact and utilization of preferential 
trading regimes 
The theoretical comparative static impact of trade prefer-
ences is dealt with in detail in Box 1, while Box 2 provides 
some information on the impact of a concrete case of im-
proved preferential access to the Community market, that 
is the extension of GSP preferences to the four poorest 
Andean countries; these preferences were extended by the 
Box 1: The theoretical trade effects of preferences 
Following Viner, in a comparative static framework, the effects 
of a preferential trade regime can be broken down into a trade-
creating and a trade-diverting effect. The trade creation effect 
represents the additional imports from the preferred source as 
a result of the lowerjng of the landed price (import price plus 
customs duty) following the abolition or the lowering of the 
customs duty. The trade diversion effect represents the increase 
in imports from the preferred source at the expense of the 
traditional suppliers following the reduction or abolition of the 
customs duty on imports originating in the preferred country of 
supply. The lowering or abolition of duty causes an artificial 
lowering of the price of the preferred source in the market 
of the preference-giving country, inducing a switch in import 
procurement from the non-preferred country to the preferred 
country. 
More formally, and as described in detail in Cline,1 the trade 
creation and the trade diversion effects can be described as 
follows. 
1 Cline. W., Kawabane, N., KronsjO, T. and Williams, T., Trade negotiations in the 
Tokyo Round, a quantitative assessment, Washington, 1978. 
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Community for a four-year period, as a contribution to the 
fight against the production of drugs in these countries. 
As regards the theoretical impact of trade preferences, it is 
important to underline that, in addition to the unambiguous 
beneficial trade creation effect resulting from a trade barrier 
removal, the trade diversion effect is of less importance in 
cases when the preferences reinforce an existing comparative 
advantage in a certain line of production. One could there-
fore argue that the multitude of trade preferences given to 
developing countries with broadly similar factor endow-
ments, while undeniably causing some trade diversion for 
selected products, has in the first place acted as an incentive 
for these countries to increase their exports to the Com-
munity. 
Assuming perfectly elastic supply trade creation equals: 
in which ~ Mf is the trade creation effect, Em is the price 
elasticity of import demand, M1f is the initial level of imports 
from the preference receiving country and t stands for the 
relative price change as a result of the abolition of the import 
duty on imports from the preferred country. 
Trade diversion is estimated by the following formula: 
~
MPxMP.xsxt 
!l.M(d= I I 
I M(OI 
I 
in which ~ Mld is the trade diversion effect, Mf is the extra-
EC imports of good i from non-preferred countries, s is the 
substitution elasticity and Ml°' is the total extra-EC imports of 
good i. 
Obviously the choice of elasticities (import elasticity and substi-
tution elasticity) is crucial. In the absence of reliable empirical 
estimates, ranges oflikely elasticities are often considered, which 
in tum results in ranges of possible outcomes of the trade 
Percentage change in exports of preferred country as a result of a tariff preference (as a percentage of original exports) 
10% market share 20% market share 30% market share 
-I -2 -3 -I -2 -3 -I -2 -3 
5 % tariff 4,5 9,4 14,8 4,0 8,2 12,9 3,4 7,1 11,1 
10% 8,9 19,6 32,5 7,8 17,0 27,9 6,8 14,6 23,6 
15% 13,3 30,7 54,4 11,7 26,4 45,6 10,0 22,3 37,7 
20% 17,6 42,9 81,8 15,4 36,4 66,7 13,2 30,4 53,8 
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creation and the trade diversion effects. On this basis the table 
above has been compiled which shows trade diversion (as a 
percentage of original exports of the preferred source), as a 
function of the original market share, the tariff (ranging from 5 
to 20%) and the substitution elasticity S (ranging from - 1 to 
-3). 
The table shows clearly that the trade diversion effect is corre-
lated with the substitution elasticity, as well as with the magni-
Box 2: Trade preferences in practice 
Most trade economists are sceptical, if not negative, about the 
beneficial impact of trade preferences; this scepticism stems 
principally from concerns about the loss of economic welfare as 
a result of the misallocation of resources following the granting 
of discriminatory trade preferences. This is the so-called trade 
diversion effect. Another reason why trade preferences are 
viewed with scepticism is because often these preferences are 
limited, for example through tariff quotas, excessive restrictive 
rules of origin, and/or other (administrative) requirements pre-
venting their effective utilization.' Moreover, it is often argued 
that trade preferences can be withdrawn at will by the donor, 
such as in the case of the GSP, which in tum discourages the 
countries benefiting from such preferences from making the 
investments necessary to take advantage of the preferences; in 
such cases the supply effect of the preferences are therefore nil. 
While commonly the effects of preferences are analysed within 
the theoretical context of a comparative static framework (see 
Box I), relatively little research has been done into the practical 
effects of such trade preferences. It was for this reason that the 
Directorate-General for External Relations of the European 
Commission decided to commission a study into the effects of 
the special preferences granted to Colombia and Ecuador. In 
1990 the Community extended to these countries, together with 
Peru and Bolivia, on an exceptional and temporary basis (four 
years) additional GSP preferences, comparable to those granted 
to the least developed GSP-eligible countries, i.e. preferences 
not limited by tariff quotas (industrial products) combined with 
a much more liberal regime for agricultural products. It was 
argued that these preferences would assist these countries in 
their fight against drugs, as they would contribute towards the 
diversification of the domestic economies. 
1 See. for example, Laird, S. and Sapir. A .. 'Tariff prcrercnces' in Finger, J. M. and 
Olechowski, A. (eds), The Uruguay Round, a handbook on the multilateral trade 
negotiations, World Bank, 1987. 
tude of the tariff preference. At the same time it can be seen 
that the trade diversion effect is inversely related with the market 
share of the country receiving the tariff preference; this simply 
reflects the fact that if trade preferences are given to countries 
which already have a relatively strong comparative advantage 
in certain products, the trade diversion effects will be relatively 
minor as such preferences simply reinforce an existing specializa-
tion pattern. 
The study, carried out by the Institute of Development Studies 
at the University of Sussex (UK), of which the results are set 
down in a two-volume report entitled 'Study of the effects of the 
special tariff preferences extended to Colombia and Ecuador', 
reports in detail the development in trading relations between 
the Community and Colombia and Ecuador following the exten-
sion of these trade preferences. After a desk study phase, during 
which all the relevant statistics were collected and analysed, 
fieldwork was carried out in Colombia and Ecuador; interviews 
were held with over a hundred persons (manufacturers, ex-
porters, representatives of employers' federations, ministries, 
etc.) in order to assess the impact of the improved preferences. 
On the basis of the study several valuable conclusions can be 
drawn. 
Firstly, the additional preferences granted to Colombia and 
Ecuador had an impact on the trade performance of these 
countries in the Community market. However, 'anecdotal infor-
mation ... suggests that from an EC (demand-side) perspective 
the principal effect has been trade diversion', that is to say, the 
increased exports of the preference beneficiaries have been at 
the expense of other exporters to the Community market. 
Secondly, the short duration of the preferences (four years) 
prevents the associated supply effects (increased investment in 
competitive sectors) from materializing. The effectiveness of the 
preferences can be increased by granting them for a longer 
period. 
Thirdly, the effects of the preferences were more pronounced in 
Colombia than in Ecuador, most likely as a result of the fact 
that the special preferences were introduced in Colombia at a 
time when the country introduced substantial economic reforms, 
leading to the opening-up of the economy. In contrast in Ecua-
dor 'exporters ... had to obtain between 85 and IOI documents 
and between 232 and 254 signatures from 10 to 15 institutions, 
depending on the products, a process that takes between 125 
and 138 hours'. Ecuador has since taken measures to streamline 
these procedures. 
Fourthly, clear evidence exists that rules of origin, phytosanitary 
measures, standards and norms play a determining role in the 
eventual effective utilization of trade preferences. This seems to 
suggest that if trade preferences are to be effective, they should 
be embedded in a broader programme of trade cooperation. 
As regards the effects of trade preferences in actual practice, 
the evidence appears to suggest (see Box 2) that trade prefer-
ences can be of assistance to developing countries, provided 
they implement the necessary supporting policies which fos-
ter macroeconomic stability and the participation of the 
country concerned in the world economy (trade policy, insti-
tutional framework, etc.). 
As data on GSP utilization are by far the most comprehen-
sive and elaborate, it is worth while to present the impact 
of the GSP scheme in somewhat greater detail. Some stat-
istics on the actual utilization of GSP preferences are there-
fore provided in Table 19. 
Table 19 
GSP utilization in 1990 (in million ECU) 
Total imports from GSP countries 112 494,2 
of which: 
non-dutiable imports: 43 430,2 
covered by GSP scheme: 49 147,2 
of which: 
- sensitive products 27 079,6 
- non-sensitive products 22 067,6 
benefited from GSP prefer-
ences: 21 403,9 
of which: 
- sensitive products 10 230,7 
- non-sensitive products 11 173,2 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
As a percentage 
of dutiable imports 
71,2 
39,i 
32,0 
30,5 
14,8 
16,2 
Table 19 shows clearly the impact of the GSP scheme on 
the EC imports from the countries concerned. 1 Of total 
dutiable imports, 71,2% was covered by the GSP scheme in 
1990, and therefore in principle eligible for GSP benefits.2 
Of the dutiable imports covered by the GSP, more than half 
was classified as sensitive, that is products for which the 
GSP benefits are or can be limited under certain conditions. 
Note that in 1990 both Hungary and Poland were included among the 
group of GSP beneficiaries. 
Although the Community's GSP scheme has, compared to schemes of 
other industrial countries, a relatively favourable, that is, broad, cover-
age, some products are excluded a priori (principally some primary 
products), while also only a limited number of agricultural imports are 
covered. Also products originating in coutries which have been gradu-
ated from the scheme are not included under the heading 'Covered by 
GSP scheme'. 
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Of the total dutiable imports about 30% actually benefited 
from GSP treatment in 1990; these imports therefore entered 
the Community duty free. Of the sensitive products covered 
by the scheme, about 38% actually benefited from GSP 
preferences, compared to 50% for the non-sensitive prod-
ucts. This shows indeed, as might be expected, that for 
sensitive products GSP benefits are more difficult to obtain. 
However, it is also interesting to note that for non-sensitive 
products the actual GSP utilization is relatively low, even 
though in this case no limitations are applied. Non-fulfilment 
of the rules of origin requirements could be at the cause of 
this phenomenon, as also could a lack of compliance by the 
exporting country with certain administrative requirements. 
Another reason which is often quoted for the low utilization 
of preferences for non-sensitive goods is the low tariff bar-
riers applied to these products in the Community market, 
with hence very little incentive for utilizing potential GSP 
benefits. 
Which countries have gained the most from GSP benefits? 
A comparison of the utilization of GSP statistics shows that 
in the 1980s there has been a considerable change in the 
countries benefiting from the Community's GSP scheme. 
While up to the mid-1980s oil-producing countries like Ku-
wait, Venezuela and Saudi Arabia were among the 10 most 
important beneficiaries of the Community's GSP scheme, in 
1990, not a single OPEC country, with the exception of 
Indonesia, was among the top 10 beneficiaries of the Com-
munity's GSP scheme. The growing importance of China, 
accounting now for almost one-sixth of total GSP benefits, 
is noteworthy, as well as the importance of India. Table 20 
provides some details with respect to 1990. 
Table 20 shows that some very dynamic exporters belong to 
the group of top 10 beneficiaries of the Community's GSP 
scheme. Indeed some of them have shown a very rapid 
expansion in their exports to the Community; for example 
between 1980 and 1990 the average annual growth of imports 
in ecu terms amounted to 18,3% in the case of China, 12,5% 
for Thailand, 9,5% for Singapore and India and 7,5% for 
Hungary. Most of these countries have been very effective 
in utilizing GSP preferences, with a relatively high share in 
GSP benefits compared to their respective shares in dutiable 
imports. On the other hand there are also some dynamic 
exporters (Singapore and Hong Kong) which have a rela-
tively low share in GSP benefits in relation to their share in 
dutiable imports; this reflects the consequences of the policy 
of differentiation. 
It is also interesting to note that in the aggregate these top 
10 countries benefited relatively more from the GSP (70,7% 
in total GSP benefits) than could be expected on the basis 
of their share in total dutiable trade (62%). This is partly 
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Table 20 
GSP utilization in 1990 (as a percentage of imports from all GSP beneficiaries) 
Share in 
dutiable imports 
China 13,5 
India 4,9 
Brazil 7,5 
Thailand 5,4 
Poland 5,9 
Indonesia 3,3 
Singapore 6,2 
Malaysia 3,6 
Hungary 3,8 
Hong Kong 8,0 
Total top 10 62,0 
Sources: Eurostat and Commission services. 
the result of the inclusion of China and, in particular India, 
among the top beneficiaries, countries which have been 
partly excluded from GSP graduation with respect to their 
textiles and clothing exports to the Community. 1 Another 
reason for the more than proportional share in ·GSP benefits 
of this group of countries appears to be the effective utiliza-
tion of GSP preferences for non-sensitive goods by these 
countries (76,7% of the benefits for non-sensitive goods 
compared to a share in dutiable imports of only 62,0% ). 
This seems to suggest that these countries have been more 
successful in developing the necessary infrastructure to take 
advantage of the benefits granted under the GSP. 
6. Conclusions 
The above analysis makes it possible to draw a number of 
conclusions, which can be summarized as follows. 
Firstly, despite the importance of preferential trading re-
lations for the Community, it is only for a relatively small 
share,less than 30%, of Community imports that the Com-
munity effectively extends trade preferences, despite the fact 
that a large majority of countries do benefit from some form 
of trade preferences in the Community market. On the 
export side, the Community receives preferential treatment 
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The regulation on differentiation with respect to textiles and clothing 
allows for 'adjustments' when 'the gross national product per capita of 
the country concerned is low and the country does not provided more 
than 5% of total Community imports of textile products and apparel'. 
Equally, an adjustment can take place in the case that 'the total textile 
exports of the country concerned comprise almost exclusively a single 
product'. 
Share in Share in Share in 
GSP benefits GSP benefits, GSP benefits 
sensitive products non-sensitive products 
17,7 15,2 20,l 
9,4 13,7 5,4 
8,7 7,6 9,6 
6,7 7,3 6,2 
6,4 3,0 9,6 
5,2 6,5 4,0 
4,5 3,7 5,2 
4,3 3,6 5,0 
4,2 2,5 5,8 
3,5 1,0 5,8 
70,7 64,1 76,7 
for considerably less than one-third of its exports. These 
facts underscore the importance of the multilateral trading 
system for the Community, as well as for its trading partners. 
Secondly, there is a tendency towards a growing importance 
of regional trading arrangements between the Community 
and its neighbours. The arrangements recently concluded 
with the EFT A countries and the countries of Eastern and 
Central Europe, as well as new arrangements under consider-
ation with some of the Mediterranean countries and the 
GCC countries are examples of this. As regards the Euro-
pean countries, these arrangements are simply intermediate 
stages towards full membership of the Community. 
Thirdly, trade preferences can work, but they can only be 
of minor assistance to the exporting country, especially when 
the overall level of protection in the export market is low, 
as is the case in the Community. If countries want to take 
advantage of trade preferences, they have to prepare them-
selves. Donors of trade preferences should assist countries 
in seizing the opportunities created by the extension of trade 
preferences. It also appears that countries where exports 
have been growing rapidly in the 1980s have been relatively 
effective utilizers of the benefits offered under the GSP. 
Fourthly, provided the post-war trend of multilateral trade 
liberalization is not halted, the overall prospects for discrimi-
natory trade preferences are not very bright. It is also for 
this reason, ignoring some exceptions, that the negative 
effects of trade preferences have been kept within acceptable 
bounds, as the tariff preferences offered under preferential 
schemes have been eroded as a result of multilateral trade 
liberalization. 
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B - A variable growth and trade performance 
During the 1980s the growth of the world economy slowed 
down markedly compared to the performance recorded for 
previous years. Thus world output growth averaged 3,2% 
at an average annual rate in the decade to 1990 compared 
to 4% in the 15 years to 1980. This slowdown was experi-
enced in the industrialized world (for the OECD area the 
equivalent figures are 3, I and 3, 7% respectively) and also, 
to a much greater extent, in the developing world where for 
low and middle income countries1 growth slowed down to 
3,6% per annum from the very impressive 5,9% registered 
for the earlier period. 
Details of this growth performance, for broad groups of 
developing countries, are set out in Table 21. However it 
will be seen from this table that not all groups of developing 
countries participated in the growth slowdown recorded at 
the aggregate level. Thus vigorous growth was maintained 
in East Asia (which includes China) and a marked acceler-
ation was observed in South Asia. In contrast growth rates 
in Latin America and North Africa dropped dramatically. 
Indeed Table 21 suggests that the variation in growth per-
formance over the period 1980-90, between various groups 
of developing countries, was much greater than the variation 
observed over the pre_vious 15 years. This increase in the 
diversity of developing countries' performance is a major 
theme of this part of the report. · 
Table 21 
GDP growth rates 1965-90 
(average annual rates) 
Low and middle income countries 
of which: 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
East Asia (including China) 
South Asia 
North Africa and the Middle East 
Latin America 
OECD 
World 
Source: World Bank. 
1965-80 1980·90 
5,9 
4,2 
7,3 
3,6 
6,7 
6,0 
3,7 
4,0 
3,2 
2,1 
7,8 
5,2 
0,5 
1,6 
3,1 
3,2 
There are a number of ways in which the group 'developing countries' 
can be defined. One possible definition is to take all countries in the 
world less the OECD countries and less the former Eastern Bloc 
countries. This, broadly speaking, is the UN approach. However, this 
definition, like all definitions, leads to certain anomalies and the World 
Bank takes a different approach and classifies countries by income per 
head. The group 'low and middle income countries' covers the de-
veloping countries defined as above but excludes certain of the oil-
producing States of the Gulf, Hong Kong, Singapore and Israel, and 
includes China and the former East European countries of the Eastern 
Bloc. Cuba, North Korea and the States of the former USSR are 
excluded. 
Most commentators on these developments point to a range 
of factors to account for this significant change in perform-
ance. The second oil-price shock of 1979-80 and the policy 
response of industrialized countries to the substantial in-
crease in the relative price of oil led, in many cases, to a 
sharp and painful period of adjustment and declines in 
demand and output. At the same time tensions between 
monetary and fiscal policy in the United States of America 
led to a sharp rise in real interest rates world-wide and a 
marked upward movement in the value of the US dollar. 
Thus, in the opening years of the 1980s, developing countries 
received three contractionary shocks - higher oil prices, a 
drop in demand from the industrialized world and rising 
real interest rates. Faced with these shocks many developing 
countries were unable to repay or even service the debts they 
had accumulated in earlier years when expectations of ever 
rising oil prices had encouraged borrowing and lending 
on a scale which, in hindsight, seems imprudent. These 
developments led to the Third World debt crisis which threa-
tened at one stage to damage seriously the world financial 
system. It is a matter of record that Latin America, sub-
Saharan Africa, and North Africa were and remain particu-
larly affected by the debt crisis. 
Table 22 
Growth rates of GDP per head 
(average annual rates in volume terms) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
East Asia (including China) 
South Asia 
North Africa and Middle East 
Latin America 
Source: World Bank. 
1960-80 
0,8 
4,2 
1,3 
4,6 
2,8 
1980-90 
-0,9 
6,3 
3,1 
-0,5 
-0,5 
(%) 
Given the relatively vigorous rates of population growth 
observed in most of the developing world it is also clear 
that rates of growth of output per head have slowed down 
markedly in the past decade. 
In particular, as Table 22 shows, levels of output per head 
in 1990, in North Africa and the Middle East, Latin America, 
and in particular sub-Saharan Africa, were only 95 and 91 % 
respectively of their 1980 levels. 
An examination of Table 23 in conjunction with Table 21 
makes it possible to see to what extent export performance 
is linked to output growth. Thus the slowdown in world 
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export growth from 6,6% per annum in the 15 years to 1980 
to 4,5% in the 10 years to 1990 was also reflected in the 
performance of the OECD economies where export volume 
growth dropped sharply. However, in the developing world 
very diverse patterns of export growth were recorded. 
Although export growth virtually disappeared in sub-Saha-
ran Africa and fell markedly in North Africa and the Middle 
East (partly a reflection of developments in the oil market), 
East Asia remained a dynamic exporting zone and South 
Asia produced a remarkable performance. Much of this 
growth was concentrated in the second half of the decade 
and can partly be explained by the success of the Ghandi 
reforms in India (by far the largest economy in the area) 
which set out to liberalize the import regime faced by Indian 
producers, particularly in the textiles sector, so enabling 
them to specialize more and achieve substantial productivity 
gains which were reflected in prices. 
Moreover, Latin American exports also pushed vigorously 
ahead a development reflecting in part the severe internal 
domestic demand squeeze and the associated internal and 
external structural adjustments undertaken, as the Latin 
American countries sought to tackle the debt crisis. 
It can be argued that Tables 21 and 23 provide evidence 
in support of the general notion that a country's trade 
performance and growth performance are correlated in a 
positive way. 
On the theoretical side a positive link between output growth 
and export growth can be demonstrated provided two con-
ditions are fulfilled. 
Thus, economic growth will be favoured in those countries 
that provide for the efficient allocation of production re-
sources and for access to inputs, capital and technical know-
how on the best possible terms. This points to the need for 
an economy to be open. In an open economy producers are 
subject to the full force of competition but, at the same time, 
enjoy complete access to goods and services, technology, 
investment and other capital flows. However, to benefit fully 
from such openness, trade as well as tax and pricing policies 
need to be neutral as regards external versus internal supplies 
of goods, services, technology and investment. Such undis-
torted access enables producers to use efficiently competi-
tively priced resources so raising total factor productivity. 
In turn the stimulus of external competition ensures that 
productivity gains keep up with those of major competitors. 
Thus, undistorted openness and gains in productivity are 
likely to be positively correlated. 1 Moreover an open econ-
See World development report 1991, p. 100. 
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omy is one that will be better able to adapt to changes 
of circumstance and put into effect necessary structural 
reforms. 
Productivity growth benefits the economy as a whole by 
making it more competitive both internally and externally. 
Greater internal competitiveness favours all producers and 
so stimulates overall GDP growth. Greater external competi-
tiveness favours production for export in an open, undis-
torted economy. 
Table 23 
Export growth rates 1965-90 
(average annual growth rates in volume terms) 
Low and middle income countries 
of which: 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
East Asia (including China) 
South Asia 
North Africa and Middle East 
Latin America 
OECD 
World 
Source: World Bank. 
1965-80 1980-90 
4,1 
6,1 
8,5 
1,8 
5,7 
-1,0 
7,2 
6,6 
4,1 
0,2 
9,8 
6,8 
-1,I 
3,0 
4,1 
4,3 
(%) 
Hence, in an open, undistorted economy vigorous output 
and export growth are likely to be correlated. 
However the term correlated does not exclude the possibility 
that, in certain economies which are in many aspects closed, 
and which also have non-neutral trade regimes, output and 
export growth can still be vigorous and can move together. 
A range of evidence in favour of this output growth/export 
growth hypothesis has recently been examined by the World 
Bank).2 In considering this evidence the World Bank con-
cludes that: 
'The export gains of developing countries from trade lib-
eralization appear to be large .... Recent studies show that 
trade and growth are positively associated .... Higher shares 
of exports in GDP have a close association with higher 
productivity growth ... although the causal direction of this 
association is unclear.' 
Global economic prospects and the developing countries, 1992. 
Assuming that such a link is established, and setting aside 
for the moment the question of the direction in which the 
forces of causality move, this link between output and trade 
can be expressed in a formal way via the calculation of trade 
elasticities. Such elasticities are defined as the growth of 
export volumes associated with a growth of output volumes. 
They can be calculated for the world as a whole (thereby 
indicating, for the longer term, how much world trade can 
be expected to grow given an increase in world output or, 
to put the causality in the other direction, how much world 
trade needs to grow to ensure a given increase in world 
output), or on a regional basis. 
Firstly, considering the 25-year period from 1965 to 1990, 
as covered by Tables 21 and 23, a range of elasticities can 
be calculated. These are set out in Tables 24 and 25. 
Table 24 
World trade elasticities 1965-90 
GDP growth Export Export' 
rates growth elasticity 
rates 
Low and middle income countries 5,0 4,1 1, 10 (1,29)2 
of which: 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3,4 3,7 1,00 (0,10) 
East Asia (including China) 7,5 9,0 2,43 (3,06) 
South Asia 4,2 3,8 1,03 (2,13) 
North Africa and Middle East 4,8 3,0 0,81 
Latin America 4,2 0,6 0,16 (0,94) 
OECD 3,5 6,0 1,62 (1,28) 
World 3,7 5,7 1,54 (1,34) . 
' With respect to world trade. 
' Figures in brackets refer to the period 1980 to 1990. 
Source: World Bank. 
Tables 24 and 25 make it possible to illustrate the question 
of export growth/output growth causality from different 
points of view. Thus, to the extent that it is world activity 
(dominated by the OECD) that pulls developing countries 
exports along, then Table 24 shows that over the 25 years 
to 1990 it was East Asia that responded most dynamically 
to this pull and Latin America most sluggishly. Alternatively 
it is in the main the OECD and East Asian countries that 
have been best able to exploit the link between export growth 
and output growth via the multilateral trading system. The 
Latin American countries, in contrast, have depended more 
on internal developments to generate output growth. 
These observations are reinforced by the elasticities set down 
in Table 25 where the figure for the OECD shows, albeit in 
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Table 25 
Regional trade growth elasticities 1965-90 
Low and middle income countries 
of which: 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
East Asia (including China) 
South Asia 
North Africa and Middle East 
Latin America 
OECD 
World 
Source: World Bank. 
Export/GDP 
growth rate 
0,82 
0,82 
1,09 
1,02 
0,90 
0,81 
0,43 
1,71 
1,54 
a different way, that world trade is dominated by the 
OECD's trade with itself. Once again the rate of growth of 
exports in Latin America appears to have a relatively modest 
impact on the rate of growth of output (or alternatively 
growth generated in the domestic sector spilled over only to 
a limited extent into trade). For the other developing regions, 
by and large, exports advanced at broadly the same pace as 
out-put. 
The final column in Table 24 shows that the variations in 
the response of the growth of exports to an expansion of 
world output, as between the different developing country 
regions, has been even more marked in the last decade. 
East and South Asia were well ahead of the rest, but the 
performance of sub-Saharan Africa was particularly poor 
and that for North Africa and the Middle East not better. 
The above discussion illustrates the way in which, in matters 
of growth and trade, developing country regions have perfor-
med very differently over the decade to 1990. However, 
another feature of the global economy, over the last decade, 
has been the liberalization of capital movements of all kinds, 
by both industrialized and developing countries. These 
moves towards a more open liberal capital regime, which 
gathered pace towards the end of the decade, have impli-
cations for the relative importance of investment and trading 
links between the developed and developing world. 
Thus, as the constraints on foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and related flows (profits, interest, dividends, etc.) are re-
moved, then replacing direct trade by direct investment 
for certain countries, for certain sectors and for certain 
production activities becomes more attractive. In particular 
when capital and related flows are unconstrained trade and 
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investment can become substitutes in a way that is impossible 
when capital movements are subject to control. 
The liberalization of capital movements is one aspect of the 
major development policy reforms which many developing 
countries have undertaken in the 1980s. 
Thus, although, as already noted, many developing countries 
have spent much of the past decade struggling with their 
external debts, the debt problem itself, combined with the 
spectacular economic success of a number of South-East 
Asian economies, has been the catalyst for marked changes 
in the economic policy stance of many developing countries. 
Thus, the conclusion drawn by many from the success of 
South-East Asia is that development is best served by an 
economic policy mix that favours export growth based on 
open, undistorted markets and not by policies that promote 
import substitution particularly via protectionist measures. 
By following the former approach a number of South-East 
Asian economies have been able to exploit the dynamism 
generated by world trade in manufactured goods, despite 
the fact that certain sectors of particular importance to 
developing countries (textiles) are subject to fairly onerous 
restrictive regimes (the MF A). 
As regards the debt crisis a number of middle income de-
veloping countries, particularly in Latin America, now take 
the view that the best way to overcome this crisis is for the 
economic governance of the countries concerned to be placed 
on a sound footing, firstly by ensuring that the major macro-
economic disequilibria are tackled and secondly by ensuring 
that at the microeconomic level, markets are as open, free 
and undistorted as possible. In this way growth is stimulated, 
foreign direct investment and other forms of finance are 
encouraged, flight capital returns and the debt burden be-
comes more manageable. A number of Latin American 
countries (Mexico, Chile, Uruguay and Argentina) are em-
barked on this path. A number of others are beginning to 
follow the same route (e.g. India). 
It would be expected therefore that the liberalization of 
capital movements in the 1980s combined with other reforms 
being undertaken in the developing world would lead to a 
substantial expansion in the flows of direct foreign invest-
ment from developed to developing countries particularly 
towards the end of the decade. This expectation is broadly 
confirmed by the aggregate data. 
To begin with a recent study by the United Nations1 shows 
that between 1985 and 1989 total outflows of foreign direct 
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World investment report /99/, 'The triad in foreign direct investment', 
UNCTC, July 1991. 
investment virtually quadrupled. This amounts to an average 
annual increase of almost 40% at a time when the value of 
world trade was increasing by about I 0% per year in nominal 
terms. However, a substantial part of the increase was ac-
counted for by flows of foreign direct investment between 
developed countries. The increase in outflows of FOi to the 
developing countries was more modest. None the less, the 
increase was by no means insignificant and does suggest 
that the efforts at reform being undertaken by developing 
countries, and described above, are beginning to bear fruit. 
Thus according to OAC data total FOi flows from OAC 
members to developing countries, which fell to an annual 
average of USO 12 billion in the early 1980s, had risen to 
an annual average of USO 25 billion by the end of the 
decade. 
Preliminary statistical evidence also suggests that the Euro-
pean Community has contributed to this change. Thus, in 
the mid- I 980s the six European Community Member States 
particularly involved in FOi in developing countries (France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United 
Kingdom, an aggregate that might be termed the EC-6) 
accounted for an FOi flow to the developing world of about 
ECU 6 billion (about USO 4,5 billion). By I 989 this had 
increased to ECU 8,5 billion (about USO 10 billion). None 
the less the available evidence also suggests that this outflow 
fell sharply in I 990 possibly reflecting the negative impact 
of the invasion of Kuwait on investor confidence combined 
with the strengthening of recessionary forces in certain Euro-
pean countries. 
A further analysis of the available data shows that the 
most important destinations of FOi from the European 
Community (EC-6) were the countries of South-East Asia 
and Latin America. The latter accounted for 35% of the 
total for the period 1988-89 (57% in the period 1984-85). 
Thus, the strength of the FOi flow to Latin America appears 
to have been broadly maintained during a period when these 
countries were struggling to overcome the debt problem. 
South-East Asia was also a most important destination -
38% of the total for the period 1988-89, 32% in the period 
1984-85). 
In contrast investment by the EC-6 in other developing 
regions - the ACP countries, South Asia, the Mediter-
ranean and the Middle East - was very modest indeed, 
although FOi flows to the developing countries of the Medi-
terranean basin appear to have strengthened somewhat in 
recent years (11 % of the total in 1988-89). Moreover, in 
1989 (and also in 1990) investment in the oil sector in 
certain oil-producing States in Africa appears to have been 
particularly strong. Investment from EC-6 in South Asia has 
remained very weak indeed. 
Overall therefore, although the structure of FDI by Euro-
pean countries appears to favour those countries that already 
apply policies that encourage open market oriented develop-
ment, or are in the process of introducing such policies, there 
is as yet no clear evidence of a substantial increase in the 
level of FDI in response to the reforms already taken or 
under way. 
It is also interesting to consider to what extent the variations 
in performance of the 1980s are likely to persist into the 
future. As regards the outlook for the developing countries 
for the present decade a number of factors are likely to 
repress growth. Thus, 
(i) it will be some time before the rate of growth in the 
major industrialized countries regains the momentum 
observed in the second half of the 1980s. A number of 
factors may be advanced to account for this - the 
persistence of budgetary disequilibria in the United 
States, the costs of German reunification, a general lack 
of confidence resulting from the feeling that the world 
has entered a somewhat uncertain and turbulent era 
(the unresolved tensions in the Middle East and all the 
problems the Gulf.War failed to solve, the civil war in 
Yugoslavia, rising tensions in the ex-USSR, the uncer-
tainties of European integration, the massive environ-
mental problems confronting the human race and the 
apparent inability or unwillingness to solve them); 
(ii) the likelihood that real interest rates will remain high for 
some time to come, the result in part of the persistence of 
inflationary pressures, and in part of the need to call 
forth adequate savings to finance the massive capital 
needs of reconstruction in the East (not to mention· 
Yugoslavia, Kuwait and Iraq) and of the need to tackle 
the world's environmental problems; 
(iii) the unfinished Uruguay Round, leading to the possi-
bility that the world may split into competing trading 
blocs with all that might imply for the inefficient use of 
resources and the loss of welfare; 
(iv) continued commodity price weakness; 
(v) a shortage of concessional finance (e.g. aid) for the 
developing world. Indeed there is little sign that the 
donor community will be more generous in the decade 
ahead, as regards concessional development finance, 
than it was in the past 10 years. 
Set against these negative factors are the following positive 
factors: 
(i) a large number of developing countries are pressing 
on with economic reforms which should substantially 
enhance their prospects for output and export growth. 
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However, it can be argued that matters are delicately 
balanced here in that many developing countries con-
sider the pains and sacrifices resulting from economic 
reform only worthwhile if developed countries are will-
ing to lower tariffs and abolish non-tariff barriers to 
developing country exports, steps which the advanced 
industrial world appears reluctant to take (as revealed 
for example by the stalled Uruguay Round nego-
tiations); 
(ii) for a number of the former Eastern Bloc countries it can 
be argued that the worst aspects of the post cold war 
adjustment process may now be over with the most 
marked contraction in output (as these countries ad-
justed to the breakup of Comecon and the full threat of 
market forces) occurring in 1991. In the years ahead the 
outlook is for an expansion of output and exports by 
these countries with consequent benefits for all partici-
pants in world trade. 
On the basis of these considerations a recent study by the 
World Bank1 presents a very optimistic picture of output 
and export growth for the developing countries to the year 
2000. In making these forecasts the World Bank clearly gives 
weight to the impact of economic policy reforms on output 
and trade. The World Bank picture as regards output growth 
is set out in Table 26. 
Table 26 
The outlook for GDP growth 
(average annual growth rates) 
Low and middle income countries 
of which: 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
East Asia (including China) 
South Asia 
North Africa and Middle East 
Latin America 
G7 countries 
Source: World Bank. 
(%) 
1980-90 1990-2000 
3,2 4,9 
2,1 3,5 
7,8 7,1 
5,2 5,0 
0,5 4,5 
1,6 4,2 
2,8 2,6 
Global economic prospects and the developing countries, 1992. 
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The recovery foreseen for North Africa and the Middle East 
and for Latin America is particularly marked. 
As Table 27 shows this improvement in output is expected 
to depend to a substantial extent on stronger export growth 
combined with a trend to an increased share of manufactured 
goods in total exports - a trend from which all developing 
countries are expected to benefit including sub-Saharan Af-
rica. It is therefore the dynamics of international trade in 
manufactures that are expected to play a key role in enabling 
poorly performing developing regions to recover. , 
Table 27 
The outlook for export growth 
(average annual growth rates) 
Low and middle income countries 
of which: 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
East Asia (including China) 
South Asia 
North Africa and Middle East 
Latin America 
Source: World Bank. 
(%) 
198()..90 199()..2000 
4,1 7,0 
0,2 3,6 
9,8 9,8 
6,8 7,8 
-1,1 4,9 
3,0 4,9 
Overall Tables 26 and 27 point to the possibility of some 
modest convergence in the economic performance of the 
various developing country zones between now and the end 
of the century. 
Moving on from these more general considerations it is 
perhaps useful to examine the importance of the European 
Community as a market for developing country exports over 
the last decade. Thus, according to World Bank data, in 
1989 total exports of the developing countries amounted to 
USO 713 billion, of which some USO 148 billion went to 
the European Community (21 % of the total) as compared 
to USO 165 billion to the USA (24% of the total) and 
USO 90 billion to Japan (13%). 
In 1980 the figure, even at the current US dollar rate, was 
somewhat greater - USO 156 billion. 
As Table 28 shows this fall is more than accounted for by 
the marked drop in the value of Community oil imports. 
Excluding oil, developing country exports to the Community 
increased from USO 58 billion in 1980 to USO 111 billion 
in 1989. Table 28 also shows the striking increase in imports 
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of manufactured goods from 15% of the total in 1980 to 
48% in 1989. 
Eurostat data covering Community imports from developing 
countries and valued in ecus puts the proportion of manufac-
tured imports in total Community imports from the de-
veloping countries at 44% in 1989 and virtually the same in 
1990. The difference between these two proportions for 1989 
(44% as opposed to 48% using World Bank data) may be 
accounted for by differences of valuation and coverage (cif/ 
fob) and geographical and product definitions. None the 
less both sets of data confirm the fact that, by the end of 
the last decade, virtually half of the Community's imports 
from developing countries were of manufactured goods of 
which one-third was accounted for by textiles. 
Table 28 
Commodity composition of developing country exports to the 
European Community 
Primary commodities 
Fuels 
Agriculture and food 
Other 
Manufactured products 
Textiles 
Total 
Source: World Bank. 
(bU/ion USD, perc.ntages In brackets) 
1980 1989 
133 (85) 
98 (63) 
8 (5) 
25 (17) 
23 (15) 
11 (7) 
156 (100) 
77 (52) 
37 (25) 
10 (7) 
30 (20) 
71 (48) 
22 (15) 
148 (100) 
This particular feature of the Community's foreign trade 
reflects in part the success the East Asian countries have had 
in increasing their share of the Community market. Table 29 
shows how this share has increased over the period since 
1980. In particular trade with East Asia is now as important 
as trade with North Africa and the Middle East, a zone 
which has, in the past, dominated the Community's imports 
from the developing world because of its importance as a 
supplier of oil. However the Gulf countries of the Middle 
East still provide 14% of total fuel imports. Thus two fea-
tures of Table 29 are of particular interest - the decline in 
the contribution of the Middle East oil-producing States 
to Community imports from developing countries and the 
increasing importance of East Asia of which South-East 
Asia accounts for a major share. 
It is because of these marked changes in import structure 
that the remainder of this section is devoted to an assessment 
of developments in South-East Asia, North Africa and the 
Gulf States. 
Table 29 
Geographical origins of Community imports from 
developing countries 
( as percentage of EC U values) 
1980 1989 1990 
ACP 17,3 14,5 10,6 
East Asia 15,3 32,4 32,4 
of which: 
South-East Asia 6,3 10,4 11, 1 
South Asia 2,5 4,4 4,7 
North Africa and 
Middle East 52,7 30,8 32,2 
of which: 
Middle East 47,2 17,8 18,0 
Latin America 12,2 17,7 16,5 
Total 100 (109,1) 100 (146,5) 100 (153,0) 
Figuros in brackets relate to billion ECU. 
ACP: the coverage of this aggregate is close to that of sub-Saharan Africa. 
East Asia includes China. Separate data for China (billion ECU) are: 
1,9 9,1 10,6 
South-East Asia includes Asean, plus Burma plus lndo-China. It should be noted that the last 
two countries play only a limited role in international trade. 
Middle East excludes former Yugoslavia and Turkey for which data in billion ECU arc: 
Yugoslavia 2,2 7,1 7,7 
Turkey 1,1 5,5 5,9 
Source: Eurostat. 
1. The dynamic Asian economies 
The 1980s saw a group of dynamic economies in South-East 
Asia emerge as major players in the world markets. In· 
contrast to the rest of the developing world for Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, 
the 1980s were a decade of opportunity. 
With growth rates of 7% per annum in the period 1983-89 
these economies, which have come to be known as the 
dynamic Asian economies (DAEs), outperformed their 
Western counterparts by a healthy margin. By 1989 they 
accounted for 6% of global GDP as against Japan's 24%. 
Their share of the world market for manufactured goods 
amounted to 21 % in that year, in comfortable range of 
Japan's 24% and the Community's 26%. 
Preliminary data for 1990 and 1991 suggest that their share 
of the market for manufactures continued to increase in 
those years. 
The spectacular growth of these economies is a reflection 
both of their competitiveness and of the commitment of 
their governments to business-oriented policies. Private sec-
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tor driven development, backed by high public sector invest-
ment in physical and institutional infrastructure, created 
an investor-friendly environment. Successful restructuring 
policies have moved production towards capital-intensive 
and high technology based activities. The composition of 
exports shifted towards technologically sophisticated prod-
ucts destined for the markets of the industrialized world. 
By 1989 five of the DAEs ranked amongst the top 
25 exporters at the global level. 1 The same nations also 
ranked amongst the world's 25 top traders in commercial 
services. Japan has become the group's principal trading 
partner, a phenomenon which, whilst partly reflecting physi-
cal proximity, is in some measure the natural consequence of 
the sharp increase in Japanese investment in those countries 
during the latter part of the 1980s. 
Japan's share of their exports rose from just under 12% at 
the beginning of the decade to 22% by 1990. Japanese 
exports to the DAEs likewise rose, although less sharply. At 
the beginning of the 1980s they accounted for a little over 
21 % of the total. By the end of the decade they stood at 
almost a quarter of the total. 
Table 30 
Total increase in exports 1984-90 
(%) 
From To 
EC us Japan 
Malaysia 101 95 22 
Singapore 249 145 101 
South Korea 259 92 178 
Taiwan 281 48 165 
Thailand 239 292 299 
Hong Kong 84 12 158 
Source: Eurostat. 
Trade with the European Community as a proportion of 
total trade increased slightly. Imports from the Community 
rose from 10,4% of total imports in 1982 to 15,3% in 1990; 
exports to the Community rose from 13,8% in 1982 to 
15,4% in 1990. Exports of manufactures dominated the 
DAEs' trade with the Community. Almost 90% of these 
nations' exports to the Community fell into this category in 
1989: a decade previously the proportion was 69% . 
These were Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Heng Kong. 
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Exports of food and primary materials, on the other hand, 
accounted for as much as 20% of total American exports 
to the DAEs in 1989. The relatively high share of non-
manufactures in the American exports has contributed to 
the deterioration of the US trade balance with the DAEs 
from USD 6,9 billion in 1982 to USD 36,3 billion in 1989, 
whereas in the case of Japan this effect has worked in the 
opposite direction and partly accounts for the increase in 
the latter's surplus from USD 12,4 billion in 1982 to 
USD 30,6 billion in 1989. 
Exports of foodstuffs were of rather greater importance in 
the case of Japan, where they accounted for almost 17% of 
the DAEs' total exports to that country, but in the case of 
Japan too manufactured goods accounted for about 60% of 
total exports. For all three major trading partners com-
modity exports declined sharply in relative importance dur-
ing the 1980s. 
Success in the external markets was a major factor underly-
ing the strong growth of these economies over the past 
decade. Growth rates were highest in South Korea and 
Taiwan. In the decade 1981-90 these economies achieved 
annual growth rates of 9,9 and 8,5% respectively. Thailand 
and Hong Kong recorded rates of expansion of 7,8 and 
7, 1 % over the same period. For Malaysia and Singapore 
economic expansion proceeded at an impressive 5,2 and 
6,3% respectively. 
Table 31 
Total increase in imports 1984-90 
(%) 
From To 
EC us Japan 
Malaysia 104 87 92 
Singapore 162 121 132 
South Korea 336 147 142 
Taiwan 305 138 158 
Thailand 314 186 276 
Hong Kong 168 123 99 
Source : Asian Development Bank. 
Yet although these economies share a history of achievement 
in the 1980s structurally they are far from homogeneous. 
Hong Kong and Singapore, though possessed of major 
manufacturing sectors, are first and foremost significant as 
regional centres offering a wide range of financial and trade 
facilitation services. South Korea and Taiwan are major 
manufacturing centres. Malaysia and Thailand retain an 
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important agricultural sector. Rather the similarities lie in 
high savings rates, high investment and strong export per-
formance. 
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Source: Asian Development Bank. 
Saving as a proportion of GDP has been high, even by Asian 
standards. Over the decade 1981-90 the proportion of GDP 
saved annually ranged from a high of 42% in Singapore to 
a 'low' of 24,5% in Thailand. The equivalent figures for 
Japan and the United States in 1990 were 20 and 3,2% 
respectively. Savings as a proportion of GDP in the EC 
amounted to 21,1% in 1990. 
A number of factors contributed to these rates of saving, 
not least of which were relatively stable currencies, low 
inflation and social services which emphasized the virtues of 
self-reliance. 
This savings-friendly environment was in many instances 
enhanced by official intervention. In Singapore the govern-
ment-sponsored Central Provident Fund has been a major 
medium through which savings have been mobilized. In 
Taiwan public policy has favoured the saver through a 
combination of incentives, e.g. tax exemptions on term de-
posits, backed by penalties for the profligate, e.g. taxes 
on luxury and leisure goods. In Malaysia the Employees 
Provident Fund, and in lesser measure the National Savings 
Bank and the National Unit Trust, have provided channels 
through which savings, particularly those of the small savers, 
have been mobilized for development. 
The strong savings performance has been mirrored by a 
sustained upward trend in investment. In the decade I 98 I 
to 1990 investment as a proportion of GDP ranged from a 
high of 42% in Singapore to a 'low' of 20% in Thailand. 
The equivalent figures for Japan and the United States in 
1990 were 32, l and I 6,6% respectively . In the EC investment 
as a proportion of GDP was 20,8% in I 990. 
In all the countries covered there was, in greater or lesser 
measure, a focus on upgrading production facilities together 
with a shift towards less labour and more technology-inten-
sive industries. Singapore focused strongly on the chemical 
and petrochemical industries in the mid-I 980s. By the late 
1980s the focus had shifted towards computers and elec-
tronics which in their turn appear likely to be displaced by 
biotechnology and informatics-based industries by the mid-
l 990s. 
In Taiwan the food and beverage industries which had been 
the mainstay of the manufacturing sector in the early 1980s 
have given way to the plastics and electronics industries. 
Taiwan is now a major producer of television sets, computer 
monitors, electronic calculators and audio equipment. In 
Korea consumer electronics, integrated circuit boards and 
computer peripherals have displaced the traditional textile · 
and clothing industries as the mainspring of growth. 
Developments in Malaysia typify the growth pattern of the 
South-East Asian economies. Over the last two decades 
Malaysia has moved from dependence on a limited range of 
primary commodities to become one of the faster growing 
manufacturing economies of the region. A radical revision 
of the country's foreign investment rules, reorientation of 
policy from import substitution towards the exploitation of 
export opportunities and a rigorous pruning of loss-making 
public sector enterprises underlie the turn-about in the na-
tion 's economic profile. In common with other fast-growing 
economies Malaysia's positive approach towards human 
resource enhancement and the consequent availability of a 
well-educated workforce has been a significant factor in 
enabling the country to avail of the opportunities offered by 
the increasing mobility of investment. 
Foreign investors played a significant role both in the diversi-
fication of industrial structures and in facilitating technology 
transfer. 
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GRAPH 16: DAEs - rowth ofvalue-added in industry 
(annual average (1981-90)) 
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This phenomenon is particularly marked in those economies 
which also form part of Asean (i.e. Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand). In Singapore foreign investment has been a major 
factor underlying the economy's rapid expansion. During 
the period 1985 to 1990 foreign investors, amongst whom 
US and Japanese enterprises predominated, accounted for 
84% of total investment in manufacturing industry. The 
bulk of that investment was in high-technology sectors such 
as chemicals, petrochemicals and electronics. 
Malaysia has likewise benefited from a strong inflow of 
investment from abroad, principally from Japan and Tai-
wan, in the latter part of the 1980s. Thailand, the third of 
the Asean nations, has profited from the relocation strategies 
of the major Japanese corporations. Japan's direct invest-
ment, estimated to account for a quarter of total foreign 
investment in Thailand, rose from ECU 108 million in 1986 
to ECU 1,04 billion in 1990. 
Investment by the Community nations has been significant. 
A recent survey of the six major investor nations 1 com-
missioned by the Community indicates that investment total-
led ECU 5,2 billion in the period 1987-90. Investment was 
highest in the industrial and primary sectors which ac-
counted for 63 and 21 % of the total respectively. 
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Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and 
Spain. 
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The survey does not permit direct comparison with inflows 
from the United States and Japan, nor are such comparisons 
easy to draw from alternative sources. A survey of invest-
ment in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand over the period 
1987-89 conducted by the EC-financed Joint Investment 
Councils suggests that the Community trailed Japan and the 
United States in terms of direct investment. 
But these figures tend to understate the strength of the 
European presence. Unlike its competitors, much of the 
Community's investment tends to be indirect, channelled 
through subsidiaries domiciled elsewhere in the region and 
thus 'hidden' in official statistics. Europe's historical pres-
ence in South-East Asia, dating virtually without break from 
the 17th century, lends force to this argument. 
Whilst the enviable record of these countries in attracting 
foreign investment can be attributed in large measure to the 
business-friendly orientation of public policy, there has been 
a certain dirigiste element in the formulation and implemen-
tation. In all countries forms of indicative planning have 
been established and, in greater or lesser measure, insti-
tutional structures have been set up to develop sectoral 
strategies and provide guidance and support to the business 
community. 
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Not all countries have carried these measures quite as far as 
the Korean authorities, who, influenced by Japanese models, 
have established the Kotra (Korean Trade Promotion Coop-
eration) , a clone of Japan 's formidable Jetro , to undertake 
market research and promote exports, activities in which it 
has achieved remarkable success. The authorities have also 
encouraged the formation of general trading companies, the 
chaebol, along the lines of the Japanese Sogo Shosha , to 
which they accorded fiscal privileges. 
Taiwan's approach has been less overtly centralized than 
that of South Korea. None the less a certain resemblance 
may be discerned. Cetra, the Taiwanese trade promotion 
agency, maintains a sophisticated database on export oppor-
tunities, acts as a highly effective market research institute 
and organizes participation in trade fairs . Publicly aided 
producer and exporter association libraries provide a reliable 
source of information for local enterprises. Research and 
development is supported by the Industrial Technology Re-
search Institute. At the mezzanine level , the Industrial Devel-
opment Bureau transforms the indicative plan into detailed 
sectoral working plans, identifies products which 'merit' 
fiscal incentives and provides Japanese-style 'administrative 
guidance' . 
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GRAPH 21: DAEs- 'External debt 
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In Singapore, on the other hand, government presence in 
the market place has been rather less obtrusive. The Govern-
ment of Singapore Investment Cooperation (GSCI) has been 
an important channel for technology transfer. The Economic 
Development Board has maintained a lower profile than its 
counterparts elsewhere in the region. That said, however, 
it has provided capital for enterprises in priority sectors, 
supported research and development and sponsored a wide 
range of training programmes. The Trade Development 
Board, like its counterparts elsewhere in South-East Asia, 
offers sophisticated product promotion services and main-
tains an up-to-date and relevant database. Malaysia's devel-
opment strategy, set out in the 'new economic policy', whilst 
essentially similar in conception and design to those of the 
other DAEs, places rather more emphasis on the attainment 
of social goals, inter alia opportunity creation for the bumi-
putra. 
The success of the DAEs in ensuring the technology transfer 
and direct foreign investment critical to the realization of 
their development programmes rests on clearly defined and 
structured sectoral strategies administered by highly trained 
and motivated professionals. Foreign investment in labour-
intensive sectors has been discouraged and indeed, in certain 
instances, prohibited. 
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Export requirements have been set (and export restrictions 
outlawed). Access to the domestic market is conditional on 
export performance and on local sourcing. Criteria by which 
a value may be set on the transferred technology and a cost-
benefit analysis undertaken have been established. Local 
sourcing, upgrading and research and development require-
ments exist. Discretion is exercised. Incentives and obli-
gations are tailored to sectoral goals. Moreover, the incen-
tives offered to a particular enterprise are usually related to 
the investor's commitment to those goals and may be varied 
if necessary in the light of subsequent experience. 
Financial linkages vary both internally within these countries 
and externally amongst these countries reflecting differences 
in their approach to the financial markets and portfolio 
adjustment. Singapore and Hong Kong are closely inte-
grated into the international financial system. Malaysia's 
domestic financial sector, comprising some 23 local and 
16 foreign banks as well as a smaller number of r.on-bank 
financial intermediaries, has undergone a significant broad-
ening and deepening over the past four years to the point at 
which it may shortly play a significant role as a channel for 
regional capital. Current reforms will reinforce this trend. 
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Financial institutions in Taiwan and South Korea on the 
other hand, although becoming more market oriented, have 
long been segmented from the international financial system. 
Financial policy has been perceived primarily as an element. 
of development policy and has been characterized by tight 
control over interest rates and credit allocation, with little 
discretion allowed to lending institutions. Outward capital 
flows, now significant in both countries, have tended to be 
directed through non-financial intermediaries. 
These economies do not face the external financing con-
straints encountered by many developing countries. On the 
contrary the economic expansion of the region has been 
largely self-financing. Prudent policies, an inflow of invest-
ment capital and the basic resilience of their economies has 
kept external indebtedness low. The range of debt service 
obligations, running from 15,4% of export earnings in the 
case of Thailand to 0,9% in that of Taiwan contrasts favour-
ably with Latin American countries such as Brazil , Argentina 
and Mexico in which debt service ratios were 31 ,3, 36, 1 and 
39,6 respectively in 1989. 
The success of the outwardly oriented development strategies 
adopted by these countries is most clearly demonstrated by 
the increasing integration of their economies with those of 
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GRAPH 24: Structure of exports 
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Source : OEDC. 
the industrialized world. In 1982 56,8% of the DAEs' exports 
and 55,8 % of those countries' imports were directed towards 
the industrialized nations. 
Although the pace of growth slowed appreciably towards 
the end of the 1980s, due in part to higher factor costs and 
a less buoyant global trading environment, by 1990 the 
proportion of exports destined for the markets of the indus-
trialized world had risen to 62 ,9% and that of imports to 
60 ,6%. 
Of the four DAEs 1 for which the data have been compiled 
the increase in technology-intensive exports as a proportion 
(in value) of total exports was most marked in the case of 
Singapore. Singapore raised the proportion of technology-
intensive exports to total exports from 40% in 1980 to 60% 
in 1987. In Korea the increase was from 18% in 1980 to 
26% in 1987 whilst in Taiwan the corresponding figures 
were 22 and 28% respectively. In Hong Kong the increase 
was from 24 to 29%. 
The rapid development of the South-East Asian economies 
in the 1980s derived in the first instance from their capacity 
Singapore. South Korea. Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
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to formulate and effectively implement strategies which em-
phasized the role of the private sector in the development 
process and created an enterprise-friendly environment in 
which business could operate with minimal interference from 
third parties. A buoyant global economy, a favourable exter-
nal trading environment, and the capacity to attract and 
retain export-oriented investment created a context essential 
to the success of that strategy. 
These elements may well prove rather more elusive in the 
1990s. Prospects for the global economy have been analysed 
elsewhere in these papers and need not be reiterated here. 
The external trading environment will be determined in 
significant measure by the outcome of the Uruguay Round. 
Cost pressures, rising real wages, exchange-rate appreciation 
and the emergence of a more leisure-oriented society has 
altered the parameters within which development objectives 
have been pursued. The DAEs have accumulated valuable 
technological and marketing resources in the 1980s. Their 
success in the coming decade will depend in large measure 
on their capacity to deploy those resources on their own 
account. 
2. The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
With oil production as the economic driving force and partly 
in response to the massive increase in oil revenues following 
the first oil-price shock, the six countries of the Gulf Cooper-
ation Council (GCC) began developing very quickly in 1973-
74. In the 1980s, however, falling oil prices and changes in 
the industrialized countries' patterns of demand led to much 
Table 32 
GNP, living standards and population 
GNP 
(billion USD) 
Saudi Arabia 86 
Kuwait 32 
UAE 28 
Oman 8 
Bahrain 3 
Qatar 7 
Total 164 
OECD (token entry) 14 748 
1 1988 
Source: World Bank. 
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slower growth and several years of recession, forcing the 
Gulf States to adopt strategies for industrial diversification. 
2.1. Background 
It is against this backdrop of falling prices and falling de-
mand that Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates set up the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) in 1981. Its main objectives are the pro-
motion of cooperation and coordination in economic, politi-
cal, social and defence matters. Chief among the GCC's 
economic goals are the adoption of a common external tariff 
and the establishment of a customs union, which are seen 
as first steps towards greater integration. 
The end, at the start of this decade, of the old bipolar world 
order, the fragmentation of the former Soviet Union and 
the new cooperation ties developing in the region, the reper-
cussions of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict on relations between 
Arab States and the resumption ofnegotiations for a Middle-
East peace process have all altered the political climate and 
the place of the GCC countries in the regional landscape. 
This new situation gives rise to a whole host of new risks 
and uncertainties. 
Meanwhile, there is an increasingly urgent need for change 
and internal development on the part of the Gulf countries. 
The conflict with Iraq and the intervention of the coalition 
highlighted the need for reform, especially with regard to 
participation in the political system and the modernization 
of the economic structures, particularly the financial sector. 
Per capita GNP Population Population: annual 
1989 (USD) (million) percentage increase 
1980-89 
6020 14,4 5,0 
16 380 2,0 4,4 
18 430 1,5 4,6 
5 220 1,5 4,7 
6 3601 0,5 
n.a. 0,4 
8 060 20,3 4,9 
19 090 773 0,6 
These factors make it imperative for the Gulf countries to 
strengthen their development strategies and should lead them 
to step up their cooperation and regional integration efforts. 
This is made all the more urgent by the recognition of a 
whole series of problems (other than those of security), such 
as environmental problems or problems related to the use 
of water. 
Yet progress regarding regional integration since 1981 has 
been on the modest side, for reasons connected with both: 
(i) the political systems in force, which maintains rivalries, 
keeps the recurrent border issues alive and sustains the 
fears arising from the group's asymmetry; 
(ii) the relatively underdeveloped state of the market econ-
omy in the Gulf States. Most business depends heavily 
on public contracts and a massive system of subsidies. 
2.2. Economic trends in the 1980s 
Exceptional growth in the GCC countries from 1973/74 to 
1979 was followed by a marked downturn which began in 
certain member countries in 1980 and spread to the others 
between 1982 and 1985, as the industrialized countries' de-
mand for petroleum products fell and energy substitution 
and energy-saving policies took effect. 
The latter half of the 1980s saw a return to positive growth, 
although well below the levels of the previous decade. Econ-
omic recovery in certain industrialized countries is undoubt- . 
edly the main reason for this upturn, although industrial 
diversification policies implemented by the Gulf States since 
the late I 970s have also played their part. 
Table 33 
Volume growth in GDP 
/%p.a.) 
1980-81 1982-85 1986-89 
Saudi Arabia 8,3 -7,6 3,7 
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Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and the outbreak 
of war the following February, paralysed economic life -
and above all investment - in the region for several months. 
By January 1993, however, it was more or less business as 
usual (apart from Kuwait oil production). 
2.3. The GCC countries' share of world trade 
The GCC countries' share of world trade is closely related 
to the price of oil. The downturn in oil prices which began 
in 1980 and sharpened in 1982 was a result of both falling 
demand in the industrialized countries and increased supply 
as oil fields in other parts of the world came on stream. It 
led to an appreciable drop in the Gulf States' export earn-
ings: they fell from USO 165 billion in 1981 to 
USO 69 billion in 1989. The subsequent fall in imports was 
somewhat delayed and different in magnitude and so the 
GCC countries' trade surplus shrank considerably, falling 
from USO I 05 billion in 1981 to USO 10 billion in I 986, 
although subsequently recovering to about USO 20 billion 
in 1989. 
Table 34 
External trade 
/billion USD) 
1980 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Exports 156,2 47,2 55,1 58,1 69,2 
Per cent oil 95 66 58 52 n.a. 
Imports 52,0 37,5 38,2 46,7 48,4 
Trade surplus 104,3 9,7 16,9 12,0 20,7 
p.m. oil price 1 35,7 13,0 16,9 13,2 15,7 
I Arabian light - USO per barrel. 
Sources: IMF, Unctad. BP Statistical Re\•iew of World Energy. 
Kuwait -21,3 -1,0 6,5 The GCC countries' share of total world exports dropped 
UAE 14,6 
Oman 10,3 
Bahrain -5,2 
Qatar n.a. 
Weighted average 4,4 
Source.s: based on World Bank data. 
-3,9 
15,0 
0,1 
n.a. 
-4,4 
4,3 from 8,2% in 1980 to 2,4% in 1989, while their share of 
3
,
5 world imports fell in the same period from 2, 7 to I ,6%. 
3,7 
n.a. 
4,3 
Oil remains the Gulfs key export. Falling prices and some 
export diversification, however, led oil's share in the Gulfs 
total exports to fall from 95% in 1980 to a little over 50% 
by the end of the decade. 
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Table 35 
Oil output, refining capacity and oil reserves 
Oil Refining Billion Oil reserves 
output capacity barrels reserves/production (I OOO barrels ( I OOO barrels 
per day) per day) % share years 
1990 1990 world total 
Saudi Arabia 6 700 1 860 257,5 25,5 100 
Kuwait 1 065 820 94,5 9,4 100 
UAE 1 850 92,2 9,1 100 
Abu Dhabi, Dubai and 
Northern Emirates 450 5,9 0,6 36,6 
Oman 660 4,3 0,4 18,0 
Bahrain 250 
Qatar 455 4,5 0,4 27,8 
GCC 11 180 2 930 458,9 45,5 
World (token entry) 64 875 75 775 1 009,2 100,0 43,4 
OPEC 24 775 
Source: BP, Statistical Review of Energy. 
2.4. Oil reserves 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, 
Bahrain and Qatar together control 45% of the world's 
known oil reserves. Qatar and Saudi Arabia also possess 
major gas reserves. The GCC countries currently account 
for between 15 and 20% of world oil production. The ratio 
of reserves to output is considerably greater than in most 
producer countries. In its medium-term forecasts, the World 
Bank foresees the world coming to depend increasingly on 
a handful of countries for its oil supplies, namely Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and the UAE. Such a concen-
tration of supply depends of course on the discovery of new 
oilfields and the policies of other producers, particularly the 
former Soviet Union. 
2.5. Geographical breakdown of GCC 
countries' trade 
The GCC countries' leading export partners in 1989 were 
Japan (25%), followed by the Community (16%) and the 
United States of America (13%). 
In the 1980s the Community not only cut the total volume 
of its oil imports, it also appreciably reduced its dependence 
on GCC producers: whereas in 1980 they had supplied 37% 
of Community oil imports, they now supply only 14%. This 
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explains the marked drop in the share of GCC exports going 
to the Community. Thus falling oil exports were only partly 
offset by diversification to other products. 
The Community is far and away the leading supplier of 
GCC imports (36% of all imports in 1989), followed by the 
USA (13%) and Japan (13%). Intra-regional trade remains 
insignificant. 
Throughout the 1980s the Community held its market share 
at about 35% in the face of increasing pressure from certain 
developing countries. The GCC countries account for a far 
from negligible 3,2% of Community exports. 
Besides the capital goods making up most of the indus-
trialized countries' exports to the Gulf, agricultural products 
account for a relatively large share of Community exports 
to the region: 12,9% in 1990, which is considerably more 
than the share of agricultural products in the Community's 
total exports to non-member countries (8,5%). 
Seeking to go beyond their traditional cooperation, the Com-
munity and the GCC countries are currently considering 
negotiating a free trade agreement, which would gradually 
reduce tariff barriers between the two regions. This would 
enable the Gulf countries to expand their petrochemical 
capacity and in turn enable Community exporters to increase 
their market share in the Gulf countries: markets which 
show considerable potential for growth. 
Table 36 
Geographical breakdown of the GCC's exports and imports 
/%) 
Exports Imports 
1980 1989 1980 1989 
Industrialized countries 71,2 56,6 73,8 67,6 
Community 34,5 15,6 34,7 36,1 
USA 11,7 13,2 16,7 13,0 
Japan 21,2 24,7 17,6 12,5 
Developing countries 25,0 35,1 22,l 29,0 
WithinGCC 3,0 5,2 6,6 7,1 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Sources: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
2.6. Diversification of economic activities 
In the late 1980s oil and ·gas continued .to account for about 
30% of the six Gulf States' total GDP. Most government 
revenue came from oil. 
Oil's economic importance has, however, been in decline 
since the early 1980s. This is attributable not only to falling 
prices, but to a policy of economic diversification. 
The uncertain behaviour of oil prices over the long term, 
their often short-term instability and, perhaps more im-
portant, the finite nature of petrocarbons as a resource, have 
Table 37 
Composition of exports to the GCC countries in 1990 
(%) 
EC EFfA USA Japan 
Agricultural products 12,6 6,4 16,7 0,4 
Manufactures 76,8 90,6 71,9 98,5 
Chemicals 11,l 10,2 5,2 1,4 
Semi-finished goods 4,4 11,2 2,5 4,9 
Engineering products 42,0 38,9 53,5 70,2 
Textiles and clothing 4,0 3,5 3,4 8,0 
Other consumer goods 12,5 26,0 6,8 8,0 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Source: Comtrade. 
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led the Gulf States to prepare an industrial diversification 
strategy. 
Short of labour (immigrant workers make up over half 
the working population), the GCC countries have naturally 
chosen a development strategy based on capital-intensive 
activities and sectors in which they enjoy a clear comparative 
advantage. 
Table 38 
Economic importance of oil and gas 
% % % 
of GDP of government of exports 
(1989) revenue (1988) 
Saudi Arabia 27 66 83 
Kuwait 41 80 88 
UAE 36 83 70 
Oman 41 79 91 
Bahrain 14 55 78 
Qatar 29 n.a. n.a. 
Weighted average 31 
Sources: World Bank. World Tables. 1991; The Economist Intelligence Unit; OECD, IEA, 
Energy Statistics and Balances. 
There has been substantial investment in the petrochemical, 
aluminium, steel and cement industries. Traditional manu-
facturing sectors have also seen some development. Notwith-
standing that, construction remains (if oil is disregarded) a 
major economic driving force. 
Table 39 
GDP by sector (1989) 
(% of total) 
Saudi Arabia 
Kuwait 
UAE 
Oman 
Bahrain 
Qatar 
Agri· Oil/gas Manufacturing Construction Services Other 
culture 
7 27 8 10 44 3 
I 41 14 2 42 0 
2 36 9 9 38 5 
4 41 4 4 45 2 
I 14 16 6 61 2 
I 29 13 5 50 I 
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit. 
As already noted in the 1980s, being a period of more 
moderate increases in oil revenue, growth led by the public 
sector (the State being at one and the same time responsible 
for redistributing oil earnings and the chief investor) was 
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down appreciably on the 1970s. However, supported by 
incentives (subsidies, tax exemptions, provision of pre-equip-
ped industrial estates), the private sector is now developing. 
Table 40 
Product composition of imports from the Gulf countries: 1980 and 1990 
EC 
1980 1990 1980 
Oil 97,l 85,8 95,3 
Manufacturing products 1,6 11,7 
of which: 
Chemical products 0,0 2,9 
Engineering goods 1,3 5,6 
Others 0,2 1,7 
Source: Comtrade. 
2.7. Development aid, investment and 
capital inflows 
Current-account surpluses have led to the accumulation of 
considerable foreign holdings of various assets by the Gulf 
countries. Most of the Gulfs foreign investment has been 
in the industrialized world. 
The external holdings and the finances of the Gulf States 
have, however, fluctuated considerably owing to unstable 
oil prices (up in 1973/74 and 1979, starting downward in 
Table 41 
Official development assistance 
Saudi Arabia 
Kuwait 
UAE 
GCC 
Total 
OECDDAC 
World total 
Source: OECD DAC. 
90 
Billion USD 
1980-81 1989-90 
8,0 2,2 
1,6 0,8 
1,4 0,4 
11,0 3,4 
37,4 47,6 
55,4 55,2 
l,l 
0,0 
0,0 
0,8 
The impact of the diversification of the Gulf countries both 
as regards trade with the world as a whole and with the 
Community is set out in Table 40. 
(%) 
EFfA USA Japan 
1990 1980 1990 1980 1990 
44,7 99,5 96,2 99,8 97,2 
34,0 0,0 2,6 0,0 1,2 
8,4 0,0 0,9 0,0 1,2 
2,8 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 
16,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
1981 and falling considerably in 1986), the instability of the 
US dollar, the world business situation and interest rates. 
Until the early 1980s the trade surplus and the income from 
holdings abroad greatly exceeded the deficit recorded on 
services (particularly freight and insurance) and the consider-
able private transfers (immigrant workers sending home their 
wages). 
Part of the surplus was allocated as development aid. The 
GCC countries provide a great amount of official develop-
( /989 prices and exchange rat,s) 
% world ODA %GNP 
1980-81 1989-90 1980-81 1989-90 
14,5 4,0 4,0 6,1 
3,0 1,5 3,6 5,9 
2,5 0,7 3,3 3,5 
19,9 6,2 
67,5 86,5 0,36 0,35 
100 100 
ment assistance (ODA). In 1980-81 they provided 20% of 
world ODA. In 1989-90 that percentage had fallen to a little 
over 6%. The Gulf States still, however, allocate between 
3 and 6% of GDP in ODA, compared with a world average 
of0,35%. 
During the 1980s the Gulf States' external asset holdings 
declined and they began to experience budget deficits (Saudi 
Arabia recorded its first in 1983-84). These deficits were 
covered by the repatriation of public capital. More recently, 
the exceptional costs of the Gulf crisis in I 990-9 I (aid to the 
countries hit hardest by the embargo and the crisis, and 
transfers to help finance the coalition's military operations) 
caused the Saudi and Kuwaiti authorities, in 1991, to 
seek Jong-term loans abroad (USO 4,5 billion and 
USO 5,5 billion respectively). 
Against this backcloth, and in view of the investment re-
quired for domestic industrial development, foreign invest-
ment and in particular foreign direct investment, to which 
the Gulf States have always taken a relatively liberal attitude, 
is playing, and is likely to continue to play, an increasingly 
important role. 
In the past there has been little European investment in the 
GCC countries. Outside the oil sector, it has been concen-
trated mainly in financial services. 
3. The developing countries of the Mediterranean 
If the Community's Mediterranean Member States are disre-
garded, the Mediterranean - the very birthplace of inter-
national trade - today accounts for only a modest share of 
world trade. The main statistical sources do not even con-
sider the region a market in its own right, often splitting its 
countries between Africa, Western Europe or the Middle 
East. 1 
The I 980s saw the first signs of a divide between those 
Mediterranean States recording significant growth, others 
experiencing slower growth and, lastly, those beset by 
mounting problems. 
Neither the IMF's trade statistics nor those of the GAIT or Unclad 
group the Mediterranean countries in a single area. Any study of the 
region therefore requires a reconstitution based on data from individual 
countries, which is often published with considerable delays. 
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3.1. Modest and uneven trade performances 
Taken together the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia 
and Libya),2 the Mashreq (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jor-
dan), the Northern Mediterranean countries (Yugoslavia, 
Turkey, Malta and Cyprus) and Israel, the region's exports 
in 1990 totalled USO 81,7 million or 2,46% of the world 
total. Imports totalled USO 110,1 million or 3,19% of world 
imports (see Table 42). 
In 1980 the region's exports represented 3,55% of world 
exports and 3,84% of world imports. Thus the Mediter-
ranean's share of world trade declined in the 1980s, even if 
in a somewhat irregular way. The loss of market share is 
also apparent when compared with that of the developing 
countries as a group. Whereas the Mediterranean countries 
accounted for 10,5% of developing countries' exports in 
1980, that share had dropped to 9,4% by 1990 (see Table 43). 
However, this general downturn conceals figures that differ 
appreciably from country to country. 
The Maghreb has been hit hardest, seeing its share of world 
exports fall from 2,22 to 0,92% and that of imports from 
1,28 to 0,83 % . This is directly attributable to deteriorating 
terms of trade caused by a substantial drop in oil and gas 
prices3 and the long-term erosion of commodity prices.4 
Libya and Algeria have suffered most. In the period 1980-
90 Libya's exports fell from USO 21,9 million to USO 
I 0,4 million and those of Algeria from USO I 5,6 million to 
USO 12,3 million. Tunisia's exports also sagged around the 
mid-l 980s. Morocco too was affected, particularly in the 
first half of the decade, by an appreciable drop in phosphate 
prices. 
The Mashreq's overall trade figures have been Jess disap-
pointing than the Maghreb's. Its trade was none the less 
also damaged by the same adverse commodity price move-
ments, to which must be added the conflict in Lebanon. 
This is the Greater Maghreb. The very broad definition of the Greater 
Maghreb used in the Treaty of Marrakesh, which set up the Maghreb 
Arab Union, included Mauritania. The latter is excluded in this paper 
because it does not border the Mediterranean. 
In the case of Algeria, the terms of trade went from 195,8 in 1980 to 
73,4 in 1988. In the absence of any formal reference in the Unclad 
statistics, these figures may be extended to Libya. 
Tunisia's terms of trade declined from 141,2 in 1980 to 94 in 1988, while 
those of Morocco fell in the same period from 108,8 to 103,9, after 
touching 88,8 in 1985. 
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Table 42 
Trade statistics of the Mediterranean countries 
Exports 
1980 1985 
Algeria 15,6 12,8 
Libya 21,9 10,9 
Morocco 2,4 2,2 
Tunisia 2,2 1,8 
Maghreb 42,2 27,7 
Egypt 3,0 1,8 
Syria 2,1 1,6 
Lebanon 1,0 0,4 
Jordan 0,5 0,8 
Mashreq 6,7 4,6 
Turkey 2,9 8,0 
Yugoslavia 8,9 10,7 
Cyprus 0,5 0,5 
Malta 0,5 0,4 
North Mediterranean 12,9 19,5 
Israel 5,5 6,3 
Total 67,3 58,l 
Developing countries 636,3 547,6 
EC (incl. intra-EC trade) 691,2 647,5 
World I 895,5 1 820,1 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 
Although not major energy suppliers (22nd and 23rd in the 
· world in 1987 /88), Syria and Egypt were also affected by the 
fall in demand for oil following the second oil-price shock 
and the subsequent developments. The Mashreq saw its 
share of world exports fall from 0,35 to 0,32%, while that 
of imports went from 0,77 to 0,59%. 
In contrast, the countries to the north and north-east of the 
Mediterranean have seen their share of world trade increase. 
They benefited from the very factors which brought a con-
siderable deterioration in the Mashreq and Maghreb 
countries' terms of trade. 1 This benign trend contributed, in 
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Turkey, Cyprus and Yugoslavia saw their terms of trade improve by up 
to 15 points in the period 1980-88. 
(billion USD) 
Imports 
1990 1980 1985 1990 
12,3 10,6 9,8 10,5 
10,4 6,8 5,4 5,9 
4,3 4,2 3,9 6,9 
3,5 3,5 2,8 5,5 
30,5 25,l 21,9 28,8 
4,9 4,9 5,5 12,8 
4,4 4,1 4,0 2,5 
0,5 3,8 2,0 2,4 
0,9 2,4 2,7 2,8 
10,7 15,2 14,2 20,5 
12,4 7,7 11,3 20,8 
14,3 15,1 12,2 18,9 
1,0 1,2 1,3 2,6 
1,1 0,9 0,8 2,0 
28,8 24,9 25,6 44,3 
11,7 9,6 10,0 16,5 
81,7 74,8 71,7 110,1 
867,1 557,8 519,5 881,9 
1 370,9 772,5 660,8 1 416,2 
3 325,0 1 946,4 1 885,7 3 455,0 
the 1980s, to an increase of almost 50% in Malta's share of 
world trade and, more important still, to that of Turkey. 
Thus, while Yugoslavia and Cyprus more or less held their 
shares of the world export market, Turkey more than doub-
led its share between 1980 and 1990 (from 0,15% of world 
exports in 1980 to 0,37% in 1990), overtaking Israel (0,35% 
of world exports in 1990) and - in 1990 - practically 
equalling Yugoslavia (0,43% of world exports), which had 
long been the region's main non-Community economic and 
trading power. Disregarding the Community, and noting the 
developments in what was once Yugoslavia, Turkey is now 
the Mediterranean's leading trade power. 
An analysis of trade in services would, in the main, produce 
similar conclusions to these set out above. Thus, during the 
latter part of the 1980s and apart from Yugoslavia, whose 
Table 43 
Trade statistics of the Mediterranean countries 
Exports 
1980 1985 
Algeria 0,82 0,71 
Libya 1,15 0,60 
Morocco 0,12 0,11 
Tunisia 0,11 0,10 
Maghreb 2,22 1,52 
Egypt 0,16 0,10 
Syria 0,11 0,09 
Lebanon 0,05 0,02 
Jordan 0,02 0,03 
Masbreq 0,35 0,25 
Turkey 0,15 0,44 
Yugoslavia 0,47 0,59 
Cyprus 0,02 0,02 
Malta 0,02 0,02 
North Mediterranean 0,68 1,07 
Israel 0,29 0,34 
Total 3,55 3,19 
Developing countries 33,57 30,09 
EC 36,47 35,57 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 
balance of trade in services deteriorated considerably, the 
Northern Mediterranean countries (i.e. Turkey, Malta and 
Cyprus) registered substantial growth in services, achieving 
a surplus in this sector of the economy (see Table 44). 
The same is true of Tunisia and Morocco, which were also 
the Maghreb countries which recorded the best trade results. 
3.2. Substantial differences in the rates of 
economic changes and 
transformation observed 
There is a clear correlation between the trade figures of the 
Mediterranean countries, their overall economic perform-
ance and the gradual realignment of their exports in the 
course of the 1980s. Those which achieved the best economic 
results, that is improved the people's standard of living 
without unbalancing the economy, are those which thor-
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(% of world trade) 
Imports 
1990 1980 1985 1990 
0,37 0,54 0,52 0,30 
0,31 0,34 0,28 0,17 
0,13 0,21 0,20 0,20 
0,11 0,18 0,15 0,16 
0,92 1,28 1,16 0,83 
0,15 0,24 0,29 0,37 
0,13 0,21 0,21 0,07 
0,02 0,20 0,10 0,07 
0,03 0,12 0,14 0,08 
0,32 0,77 0,75 0,59 
0,37 0,39 0,59 0,60 
0,43 0,77 0,64 0,55 
0,03 0,06 0,06 0,08 
0,03 0,04 0,04 0,06 
0,87 1,27 1,36 1,28 
0,35 0,49 0,53 0,48 
2,46 3,84 3,80 3,19 
26,08 28,65 27,55 25,53 
41,23 39,69 35,04 40,99 
Table 44 
Trade in services1 
Aggregate figures (billion USD) 
1985 1991 
Earnings Expenditure Earnings Expenditure 
Turkey 2,6 1,3 7,5 2,8 
Malta 0,3 0,2 
Israel 3,1 2,7 4,6 5,7 
Cyprus 0,8 0,3 
Jordan 1,2 1,3 
Yugoslavia 3,2 3,4 2,5 5,6 
Morocco 1,0 0,8 1,8 1,3 
Tunisia 1,1 0,6 1,4 0,8 
I Data for Algeria, Lebanon, Libya and Syria not available; Egyptian figures in non-standard 
format and consequently excluded. 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. 
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oughly transformed their structures of production and diver-
sified exports. Trends in the relative shares of a country's 
exports accounted for by agricultural products, raw ma-
terials and manufactures provide a measure of the economic 
transformations that have been made. 
From this point of view, the Mediterranean countries may 
be divided into three broad groups (see Tables 45 to 48). 
Table 45 
Structure of exports 
Turkey 
Malta 
Israel 
Cyprus 
Jordan 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Syria 
Yugoslavia 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
Agriculture 
6,5 
5 
16 
35 
25 
l 
22 
27 
0 
16 
18 
31 
8 
Source: Unctad Handbook of International Trade Statistics, 1990. 
Table 46 
Debt of the Mediterranean countries 
Total debt 
(USD billion) 
1980 1985 
Turkey 19,I 26,0 
Malta 0,1 0,2 
Cyprus 0,5 1,3 
Jordan 1,9 4,1 
Algeria 19,3 18,3 
Egypt 21,0 41,8 
Lebanon 0,5 1,0 
Syria 3,5 10,8 
Yugoslavia 18,5 22,2 
Morocco 9,7 16,5 
Tunisia 3,5 4,9 
Source: World Debt Tables /99/-92. 
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1980 
Energy 
and minerals 
8 
l 
2 
10 
41 
99 
67 
8 
100 
78 
9 
45 
56 
1990 
49,1 
0,6 
3,0 
7,6 
26,8 
39,8 
1,9 
16,4 
20,7 
23,5 
7,5 
The first comprises Algeria, Libya, Syria and Jordan, where 
economic structures have undergone little change. 
The Algerian and Libyan economies have continued to de-
pend heavily on the exploitation of their raw energy re-
sources. The percentage share of manufactures in Algeria's 
industrial output grew very modestly from 9% in 1980 to 
11 % in 1989. The same is probably true of Libya, even if 
(%) 
1988 
Manufactures Agriculture Energy Manufactures 
and minerals 
27 26 8 66 
94 5 3 92 
82 10 3 87 
55 38 3 59 
34 10 45 45 
0 l 96 3 
11 20 41 39 
64 28 4 66 
0 0 98 2 
6 27 42 30 
73 12 8 80 
24 30 23 47 
36 II 23 66 
(%) 
Ratio of debt service Ratio of total debt 
to exports to GNP 
1980 1985 1990 1980 1985 1990 
28 35 28 34 51 46 
1 2 2 9 17 25 
8 15 II 25 56 56 
8 18 25 87 226 
27 36 59 47 32 53 
15 28 26 98 133 127 
II 13 26 27 66 118 
21 19 14 26 48 24 
33 33 23 53 137 97 
15 25 26 42 62 62 
Table 47 
Net inflow of foreign investment 
Turkey 
Malta 
Israel 
Cyprus 
Jordan 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Libya 
Syria 
Yugoslavia 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
I to 1989. 
2 to 1988. 
Source: World Debt Tables 1991-92. 
Table 48 
Trends in the terms of trade 
Turkey 
Malta 
Israel 
Cyprus 
Jordan 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Syria 
Yugoslavia 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
Source: World Bank World Tables /991. 
1980 
92,2 
104,2 
103,6 
97,7 
108,2 
195,8 
161,6 
153,4 
88,3 
108,8 
141,2 
1981-85 
408 
130 
-82 
329 
272 
-96 
5 251 
- I 405 
0 
0 
251 
I 026 
/million USD) 
1986-90 
I 954 
134 
479 1 
360 
86 
34 
5 917 
-3482 
0 
0 
478 
352 
(Index: /987= /()()) 
1985 1988 
86,4 107,1 
88,9 100,4 
103,7 100,9 
95,0 101,7 
94,3 106,9 
182,8 73,4 
135,3 97,0 
131,4 77,7 
94,8 107,1 
88,8 103,9 
114,9 94,0 
precise statistics are unavailable. With agriculture remaining 
a very marginal economic sector in these countries, their 
exports consist almost entirely of unrefined or basic energy 
products (Libya was the world's sixth exporter of crude oil 
in 1987/88, Algeria was tenth). Unable to find any means 
of offsetting falling oil earnings, their worsening financial 
situation I has been aggravated by the deliberate discourage-
Algeria's debt increased from USD 19,3 billion in 1980 to USD 26,8 
billion in 1990. Figures for Libya are not available. 
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ment of foreign investment or by considerable disinvestment 
by overseas investors. 2 Algeria's real per capita GDP rose 
by a mere 0,2% on average annually between 1980 and 
1989.3 
The above is also largely true for Syria4 and Jordan. 
Syria, an exporter of energy products but also of cotton (of 
which it was the world's seventh producer in 1987/88), is 
cut off from foreign investment.5 Heavily in debt (its total 
external debt went from 27% of GNP in 1980 to 118% in 
1990), Syria has done practically nothing to diversify exports 
(the concentration index went from 0,619 to 0,518 in the 
period 1980-88);6 its real per capita GNP fell by 1,6% in the 
course of the decade. 7 
Table 49 
Trends in per capita GNP 
I current USD) 
1980 1985 1989 
Turkey I 390 I 080 I 370 
Malta 3 150 3 390 5 820 
Israel 5 390 6 570 9 750 
Cyprus 4 117 5 026 7 050 
Jordan I 636 1 I 880 I 730 
Algeria I 940 2 580 2 220 
Egypt 500 660 630 
Libya 9 740 6 560 5 4102 
Syria I 410 I 720 I 1002 
Yugoslavia 3 250 2 040 2 920 
Morocco 930 610 880 
Tunisia I 280 I 170 I 260 
I 1983. 
l 1988. 
Source: World Bank World Tables /991. 
In the course of the decade Algeria lost USD 62 million in foreign 
investment and Libya USD 1,753 billion. 
Unclad Handbook of International Development Statistics, 1990, p. 437. 
4 A lack of statistics prevents accurate assessment of trends in the structure 
of Syria's production. 
5 The World Bank recorded no foreign investment in the 1980s. 
6 The export concentration index used is that of Unctad. The index ranges 
from O to the maximum of I. 
Unctad Handbook of International Developmelll Statistics, 1990, p. 439. 
95 
Part One: Trade, integration and growth 
Although Jordan's economic system is not shaped by ideol-
ogy like the countries considered above, the country has 
none the less experienced major economic difficulties. I The 
structure of production changed very little during the 1980s 
(agriculture accounting for about 7% of GNP and manufac-
tures for another 13%) and its export concentration index 
rose appreciably from 0,352 in 1980 to 0,439 in 1988. Exter-
nal debt has grown substantially (from 87% of GNP in 1985 
to 226% in 1990) and the inflow of foreign investment 
has been tailing off for some time (inflows amounted to 
USO 272 million for the period 1980-90, whereas the period 
1985-90 accounted for only USO 86 million). Moreover, real 
per capita GNP rose by a mere 0,3% on average annually 
between 1980 and 1989.2 
The second group is made up of countries which, unlike 
those above, have - sometimes radically - restructured 
their economies. Turkey and Tunisia belong to this group 
as do, in some aspects at least, Egypt and Morocco. 
Turkey has undertaken major industrialization; manufactur-
ing increased its share of GNP from 20,9% in 1980 to 25,5% 
1 The dearth of statistics notwithstanding, Lebanon seems to be in a 
similar situation to Jordan. Its present economic decline would, however, 
seem to be more pronounced, given the seriousness and duration of its 
travails throughout the 1980s. 
2 Unctad Handbook of International Development Statistics, 1990, p. 439. 
Table 50 
Geographical breakdown of Mediterranean countries' exports in 1980 
EC EFfA USA 
and Canada 
Turkey 43 10 5 
Malta 78 5 2 
Israel 40 11 18 
Cyprus 31 2 1 
Jordan 2 2 0 
Algeria 40 5 48 
Egypt 46 9 8 
Lebanon 7 4 4 
Libya 39 9 36 
Syria 63 1 4 
Yugoslavia 26 5 5 
Morocco 56 11 2 
Tunisia 72 15 
by 1989, while the share of agriculture fell in the same 
period from 20,7 to 16,4%. This industrialization, assisted 
by vigorous growth in the inflow of foreign investment 
(USO 2,3 billion in the period 1981-90) and bringing no 
excessive increase in the external debt,3 has had a more 
than equivalent impact on export structure. The share of 
agricultural products fell from 65 to 23% while that of 
manufactures increased from 27 to 66%. The country's 
export concentration index decreased considerably from 
1980 to 1989 (0,230 in 1980, 0, 101 in 1988). It is now more 
or less comparable to that of the leading industrialized 
nations. Real per capita GNP increased by 3% on average 
annually in the period 1980-89.4 
Tunisia has developed in a relatively similar fashion, charac-
terized by a reduction in agriculture's share of GNP (from 
17% in 1980 to 13,6% in 1989), an increase in that of 
manufacturing industry (from 12,8% in 1980 to 16,4% in 
1989) and an appreciable restructuring of exports: manufac-
tures increased their share of Tunisia's exports from 36 to 
66% in the course of the decade. Its debt has, however, also 
increased considerably, even if the country has so far been 
3 The total external debt for 34% of GNP in 1980 and 46% in 1990. 
4 Unclad Handbook of International Development Statistics, 1990, p. 439. 
(%) 
Japan Mediterranean Other Eastern Europe 
::~~~!:f 
1 11 13 17 
0 8 2 4 
4 2 21 1 
0 27 32 6 
3 16 68 8 
3 1 1 2 
2 9 9 11 
0 14 64 7 
1 5 7 3 
0 6 10 18 
0 6 12 45 
2 4 14 11 
0 5 6 
I Total trade with developing countries is calculated by subtracting trade with the developed countries, the countries of Central Europe and the Mediterranean. 
Source: Unclad Handbook of International Trade Statistics, 1990. 
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Table 51 
Geographical breakdown of Mediterranean countries' exports in 1988-89 
(%) 
EC EFfA USA Japan Mediterranean Other Eastern Europe 
and Canada ::~~~~~f 
Turkey 47 3 9 2 8 21 8 
Malta 76 1 6 0 6 8 2 
Israel 32 4 32 7 21 
Cyprus 55 3 2 18 14 7 
Jordan 8 0 0 2 8 77 4 
Algeria 58 2 20 3 2 13 2 
Egypt 43 2 5 4 14 8 17 
Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Libya 78 6 0 0 5 6 5 
Syria 34 2 0 5 15 41 
Yugoslavia 37 7 5 0 5 10 35 
Morocco 65 2 3 5 8 13 4 
Tunisia 74 0 2 0 8 14 2 
I Total trade with developing countries is calculated by subtracting trade with the developed countries, the countries of Central Europe and the Mediterranean. 
Source: Unctad Handbook of lnrernationa/ Trade Statistics, 1990. 
able to honour its commitments. The inflow of foreign 
investment (USO 1,378 billion in the period 1981-90) slowed 
in the latter half of the decade. However, only two countries 
in the region attracted more foreign investment than Tunisia. 
Real per capita GNP increased by 0,8% per annum in the 
course of the decade. 1 
Egypt and Morocco do not possess all the economic and 
financial features observed in Tunisia and still more apparent 
in Turkey. They are, however, diversifying their exports 
considerably (in 1988 manufactures accounted for 47% of 
Morocco's exports and 39% of Egypt's against 24 and 11 % 
in 1980). A series of agreements with public and private 
creditors alike has enabled them to control and reduce their 
external debt, even if it remains considerable.2 Last but 
not least, foreign investment is climbing. Morocco gained 
USO 729 million in the period 1981-90, notching up 
USO 478 million in the second half of the decade, while 
Egypt attracted USO 11,168 billion, including USO 
5,917 billion from 1986 to 1990. The decade saw Morocco's 
per capita GNP decrease at an average annual rate of 0,3% 
Unctad Handbook of International Development Statistics, 1990, p. 437. 
2 Egypt's debt amounted to USO 39,8 billion in 1990, 127% of GNP, 
while Morocco's stood at USD 23,5 million or 97% of GNP. 
in real terms and Egypt's increase at an average annual 
rate of 2,5%.3 Egypt remains, however, the Mediterranean 
country with the lowest per capita GNP. It stood at 
USO 630 in 1989. 
The third group brings together the remammg Mediter-
ranean countries: Cyprus, Israel, Malta and Yugoslavia. 
Malta, Israel and Cyprus in particular differ from the other 
countries of the region in their markedly higher per capita 
GNP (upwards of USO 5 000). 
Their export structure is made up primarily of industrial 
products (manufactures account for over 80% of these 
countries' exports, except for Cyprus, where they represent 
59%). They are among the least heavily indebted countries 
of the region, even if Yugoslavia had to restructure its 
external debt several times in the 1980s. 4 Although the World 
Bank recorded no foreign investment in Yugoslavia during 
that decade, Malta and Cyprus attracted USO 264 million 
and USO 689 million respectively. Notwithstanding the dif-
ference of scale between the two economies, Cyprus in the 
I 980s attracted foreign investment comparable in absolute 
terms to Morocco. 
Unctad Handbook of International Development Statistics, 1990, p. 437. 
In 1990 Cyprus's debt service to GNP ratio stood at 56%, Malta's at 
25% and Yugoslavia's at 24%. 
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3.3. The European Community: an important 
trading partner 
Libya has been the only Mediterranean country not to 
benefit from the preferential trade arrangements that the 
Community has been establishing for over 15 years (includ-
ing where applicable the GSP) with a view to providing 
easier access to its market for products originating in these 
countries. 
That the Community is proving an increasingly attractive 
trading partner for many Mediterranean countries is demon-
strated by Unctad and IMF statistics on world trade (see 
Tables 50 and 51). 1 
Apart from Libya and Algeria, which export only petroleum 
products, the markets for which differ significantly from 
those for other exports, five Mediterranean trading partners 
in the last decade increased the proportion of their exports 
destined for the Community: Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Morocco, 
Turkey and Tunisia. 
The Community is not only their leading trading partner, it 
absorbs more than half their exports: 76% of Malta's, 74% 
of Tunisia's, 65% of Morocco's and 55% of Cyprus's. Tur-
key is on the verge of joining this group, since 47% of its 
exports are destined for the Community. 
In contrast, the Community's influence is less dominant and 
would indeed seem to be declining in Israel (40% of 1980's 
exports was destined for the Community against 32% in 
1989), Egypt (46% in 1980, 43% in 1989) and Syria (63% 
in 1980, 34% in 1988). Although growing, Jordan's share of 
Community imports remains insignificant (4% of Jordan's 
total exports in 1980 and 8% in 1989). 
Reference to the latest Community statistics on trade with 
the Mediterranean countries would suggest that the trends 
in the development of trade flows discerned above are con-
tinuing into the 1990s. In line with past trends, the Com-
munity's trade (both exports and imports) with Cyprus, 
Malta, Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco continued to increase 
substantially in 1991. The trend is, however, either less 
pronounced or markedly unfavourable in Egypt, Jordan, 
Syria, Israel, Yugoslavia, Algeria and Libya. 
1 The percentages referred to below are based on Unclad statistics. 
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3.4. To sum up 
The Mediterranean is currently doubly divided: 
(a) One division results from the fact that one group of 
Mediterranean countries is moving increasingly into the 
Community's trade orbit. The countries concerned are north 
of the Rabat-Tunis-Ankara line. Conversely, those below 
that line seem less subject to Community influence. 
(b) A second division, identical in many ways to the one 
above, is that between Mediterranean countries with satis-
factory or clearly improving economic situations. Apart 
from Yugoslavia, which has now ceased to exist, all countries 
above the line plus Egypt belong to that part of the Mediter-
ranean which is on the way to recovery and/or growth. The 
position of the other Mediterranean countries, to which 
Albania will have to be added, is less encouraging. 
This leaves the borderline case of Algeria, whose economic 
and trade policy choices will determine to which of the two 
Mediterranean groups it belongs. 
4. Concluding remarks 
The introductory analysis of this section pointed to the 
marked variations in performance during the 1980s as be-
tween developing regions. 
The subsequent examination of the pattern of events in these 
developing zones at greater length suggests a number of 
points or conclusions that might explain the different per-
formances observed. 
Firstly, however, a more general point should be considered. 
Two of the developing zones considered in this chapter 
reflect administrative rather than economic, political or even 
geographical considerations. The term 'administrative' 
means that they follow the grouping adopted for various 
reasons by the international and national institutions and 
aid agencies. 
Thus, the grouping 'the dynamic Asian economies' refers to 
a group of South-East Asian economies of diverse political 
states, size, and economic structure, somewhat separated 
geographically but which exhibit certain similarities of econ-
omic performance. They do not form, however, a particu-
larly well-integrated economic or political grouping and each 
country has enjoyed a somewhat different development ex-
perience. 
As regards the developing countries of the Mediterranean 
basin the unifying features of this grouping are firstly the 
proximity of these countries both to the Community and to 
each other and secondly, for the majority of them, a certain 
cultural and ethnic affinity. Although certain regional politi-
cal groupings have been established - Maghreb, Mashreq 
- these groupings have so far exhibited very limited econ-
omic and political integration. 
In contrast the countries of the Gulf are taking deliberate 
steps along the path of economic and political integration 
and there have been solid achievements in this regard. 
Such considerations suggest that a substantial diversity of 
economic experience within the developing zones examined 
may make it difficult to draw more general conclusions. 
None the less, despite this disadvantage the following general 
points can be made: 
(i) As regards the dynamic Asian economies the rapid 
development they have enjoyed must reflect in part their 
capacity to generate substantial internal resources for 
investment. At the same time a strong export perform-
ance, partly due to the orientation of output and export 
structures towards the fast-growing high-tech parts of 
trade in manufactures, has encouraged a healthy inflow 
of external resources to finance investment - foreign 
direct investment. In this way investment as a pro-
portion of GDP has remained high and growth rates 
III - The developing countries in the 1980s 
have been maintained at exceptional levels - often into 
double figures. 
(ii) As regards the Gulf countries it is now possible to 
discern, in the available data, the benefits of the policy 
of industrial diversification introduced at the beginning 
of the last decade. Thus, policy designed to reduce the 
dependence of the Gulf countries on one product - oil 
- has led first and foremost to the development of an 
important petrochemical capacity. In addition it has 
begun to move the Gulf economies away from a struc-
ture based on massive oil earnings, plus their redistri-
bution via the State and their use by the State to finance 
public sector investment, to one where the private sector 
is beginning to expand both in manufacturing and in 
services. 
(iii) The developing countries of the Mediterranean basin 
present a very mixed picture - those that have managed 
to adapt their economies to the realities of the world 
market - Turkey, Tunisia - have done well: those 
countries dependent upon a limited range of primary 
products, and which have been unable to adapt and 
diversify their industries, have seen their relative econ-
omic performance become less and less satisfactory. 
Overall the experience of these three groups of developing 
countries points to the importance for the development 
process of internal reform and change. The external environ-
ment can only do so much. Developing countries must 
continue to search within themselves for the wellsprings of 
their own development. 
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Part Two 
• Expert contributions on 
in international trade 
new issues 
This section contains three contributions by independent experts on new 
issues in international trade which flow from greater global economic interde-
pendence. Opinions expressed in these contributions are those of the authors 
alone, and do not in any way reflect the views of the Commission or its 
services. 
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I - Trade and foreign direct investment, 
D. Greenaway 
Nottingham University, Nottingham, United Kingdom 
Summary 
The post-war period has seen dramatic growth both in 
international trade and foreign direct investment (FOi). 
Over the last decade the growth in investment has been 
especially marked. 
The European Community is both the major source of FOi 
worldwide, and the major host to inward investment. The 
United States of America is also important, both as a host 
and as a source, whilst Japan is important as a source but 
not as a host. 
EC inward investment is dominated by EFT A, the USA and 
Japan; it is located primarily in the United Kingdom, Spain, 
the Netherlands and France; and concentrated principally 
in banking and finance, food products and chemicals. The 
key location for outward investment is the US, followed by 
EFTA; the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France 
are the main sources; and the investment goes mainly into 
energy, chemicals, machinery and transport equipment, and 
banking and finance. 
Japan is now the key marginal supplier of inward investment, 
with most flowing to the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands. Recent Japanese FOi has been predominantly in non-
manufacturing, especially finance and insurance. 
FOi occurs when firms have proprietary assets like repu-
tation or brand image which they wish to exploit in a 
particular location. The presence of market imperfections of 
one form or another leads firms to invest directly to exploit 
such assets, rather than licence their product/technology, or 
engage in arm's-length trade. 
FOi promotes international specialization, thereby promot-
ing static and dynamic gains. On some counts, concern is 
sometimes expressed regarding the activities of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). Typically this focuses on the quality 
and quantity of employment generated, trade balance effects 
and income redistribution through transfer pricing. In gen-
eral these anxieties are exaggerated, and the evidence sug-
gests that the Community has benefited from inward invest-
ment. 
Because of the crucial contribution which investment forma-
tion makes to economic growth, policy-makers often attempt 
to influence the level or composition of aggregate invest-
An earlier draft of this paper benefited from discussion at a European 
Commission workshop in Brussels. The comments of the paper's dis-
cussant, Silvano Presa, were especially helpful. The author above is 
responsible for its contents. 
ment. To this end, a wide array of policy instruments can 
be deployed. 
Investment policy may operate through direct investment 
measures, or trade-related investment measures. The former 
are generally incentive measures, the latter disincentive. It is 
quite common to see both sets of instruments operating 
simultaneously, especially in developing countries. The con-
junction of both makes it difficult to evaluate their welfare 
consequences. It is clear, however, that many of these instru-
ments have direct trade effects. 
The 1992 programme represents a regime change in the 
Community. The programme has stimulated a great deal of 
cross-border investment within the Community. It has also 
stimulated an upsurge in inward investment, as MNEs at-
tempt to position themselves to exploit the benefits of bridge-
head investment and/or rationalization investment. The po-
tential rents associated with the ownership advantages of 
Japanese firms in particular have been enhanced by 1992 
measures and led them to invest more in Europe than would 
otherwise be the case. 
Once the single market measures are implemented in full, 
the scope for independent policy actions on the part of 
Member States will be further constrained. Should there be 
adjustment pressures in particular sectors, as is likely, the 
governments of Member States may come under pressure to 
take action. This may provide a temptation to use investment 
policy to attract inward investment to the affected sectors/ 
regions. This necessitates attention being paid to the issue 
of policy coordination across Member States. 
Policy compatibility is also an important issue. Different 
policy instruments can have equivalent effects. Unless com-
patible policies are in place, policy conflict can arise to avoid 
negative feedback across policies, and agencies. 
Policy conflict between the EC and other countries is also 
important given the scope for intervention elsewhere. A 
range of regional and multilateral arrangements or codes 
have been arrived at, directed largely at setting standards 
rather than influencing behaviour. 
The inclusion of trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) 
and subsidies as agenda items on the Uruguay Round offer 
the opportunity for GA TT to become more directly involved 
in specifying multilateral disciplines to govern the use of 
investment measures. However, a more rules-based system 
is necessary for such a role to be fulfilled. 
Progress within the GA TI cannot be secured by attempting 
to transpose the provisions which apply to merchandise 
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trade to investment. However, the principles on which trade 
disciplines are based, most notably national treatment and 
mutual recognition, should provide the foundation to new 
disciplines for investment measures. GA TT can learn from 
progress made on intra-Community cross-border investment 
in this respect. 
1. Introduction and outline 
Why, in the context of a trade study, are we interested in 
investment issues? There are both analytical and policy-
based responses to this question. A number of analysts have 
commented upon the contemporaneous growth of cross-
border trade and cross-border investment - indeed in recent 
years growth of the latter has outstripped the former. More-
over, it does appear to be the case that the growth in foreign 
direct investment (FDI) has been especially rapid in a setting 
of formal integration arrangements. It can, therefore, be 
expected that as market integration proceeds in the Com-
munity there will be increased intra-EC cross-border invest-
ment, and increased investment in the Community from 
non-member States. In turn, this raises some pertinent and 
interesting policy issues: the harmonization of regulatory 
and incentive structures across Member States is one; the 
interface between regulation of intellectual property rights, 
services, competition policy and investment is another; and 
then there is the pressures for multilateral disciplines. Tog-
ether these combine to make investment a major policy issue, 
especially from an EC perspective. 
This paper aims to document trends in FDI, evaluates ana-
lytical issues concerned with the regulation of investment 
flows and considers policy compatibility with other 
measures, all with particular reference to the Community. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on 
trends and patterns in FDI. Here we examine both global 
and regional trends. In Section 3 we review the determinants 
of FDI, and the factors which influence the net benefits of 
a particular inward investment. Section 4 is concerned with 
policy towards investment. From an EC standpoint this 
involves both internal measures, and measures vis-a-vis non-
Community entities. It also involves both investment incen-
tives and disincentives. In Section 5 we consider how Europe 
1992 and the completion of the internal market can be 
expected to impact on inward investment. This sets the 
agenda for Section 6 where the focus is policy coordination 
in the Community. Since EC trade and investment policies 
are set against the wider firmament of multilateral rules and 
disciplines, Section 7 concentrates on activity in the GA TI 
and OECD. Finally, Section 8 offers some concluding com-
ments. 
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2. Trends in investment 
The post-war period has seen an extraordinary growth of 
world trade, and this growth has been well documented (for 
example in annual GA TI reports). Over the same period 
there has been a concomitant growth in foreign direct invest-
ment, which has in fact been less well documented - in part 
due to data deficiencies, in part because of problems of 
separating out stocks and flows: Recent data shows evidence 
of impressive growth, especially over the last decade. As can 
be seen from Table 52, the total world stock of FDI is 
now well in excess of USO 1 trillion. The reasons for the 
contemporaneous expansion of trade and investment, es-
pecially over the last decade, are not hard to find. There are 
'natural' linkages between the two flows - since a large 
proportion of international trade is intra-firm trade, invest-
_meiit naturally leads to trade expansion. Moreover, the 
globalization strategies of multinationals in general, and 
East Asian multinationals in particular, have been facilitated 
by deregulation of financial markets._ 
-----~-~ -------
Graph 25 gives details of the regional composition of invest-
ment flows across the three largest trading bodies - the 
United States of America, Japan and the European Com-
munity. As can be seen, the Community is both the major 
source and the major recipient of FDI, with a particularly 
large stock in the United States. The latter is also a major 
recipient and source of FDI, with most US investment being 
in the Community. Japan is of growing importance as a 
supplier of FDI but not as a recipient. It is in fact the fastest 
growing supplier of foreign investment, but there is a very 
significant imbalance between inflows and outflows with 
both the USA, and the Community. 
Since the focus of this paper is the Community, Graphs 26 
to 32, and Tables 53-55 document trends and patterns. From 
Graph 26 we can see that FDI in the Community has 
grown steadily since 1970, with step increases associated 
with enlargements (e.g. in the mid-1970s, due largely to the 
accession of the United Kingdom, and mid-1980s, due larg-
ely to Spanish accession), and market deepening (in the case 
of the latter part of the 1980s). In Graph 26, FDI inflows 
as a proportion of GDP are documented. Here we can see 
a relatively flat trend over the period 1970 through 1984, 
albeit with peaks and troughs around it, and a dramatic 
increase since the mid-1980s. The latter is dominated by 
inflows of FDI from Japan, and has in part been motivated 
by expectations associated with the 1992 programme. 
Graph 27 details the sources of inward investment to the 
Community. This is dominated by OECD countries in gen-
eral and EFT A, the USA and Japan in particular. The last 
Table 52 
The share of leading investors in world stock of FDI 
1960 
World Stock 67,7 
USA 31,9 
Japan 0,5 
UK 12,4 
Germany 0,8 
Switzerland 2,3 
Netherlands 7,0 
Canada 2,5 
France 4,1 
Italy 1,1 
Rest of world 5, I 
Source: UN Centre on Transnational Corporations (1990). 
GRAPH 25: Foreign direct investment 
Investment 
stock, 1988 
USO 1.7 billion 
USO 12,5 billion 
(%) 1980 
100,0 551,0 
47,1 220,3 
0,7 36,5 
18,3 81,4 
1,2 43, 1 
3,4 38,5 
10,3 41 ,9 
3,7 21,6 
6,1 20,8 
1,6 7,0 
7,6 39,9 
I Selected countries where a single Triad member accounts for over so•;. of inflows of FOi, 
or is 1he single biggest inveslor by a margin of I O percen1age points. 
Source. The Economist. 
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, ( in billion USD ) 
(%) 1985 (%) 1988 (%) 
100,0 714,0 100,0 I 101 ,0 100,0 
40,0 250,7 35,1 334,0 30,3 
7,0 83,6 11,7 186,0 16,9 
14,8 104,7 14,7 179,0 16,3 
7,8 60,0 8,4 90,0 8,2 
7,0 45 ,3 6,4 55,0 5,0 
7,6 43,8 6, 1 6 1,0 5,5 
3,9 36,5 5,1 52,0 4,8 
3,8 21,6 3,0 51,0 4,6 
1,3 12,4 1,7 23,0 2,1 
6,8 55,4 7,8 71,0 6,3 
World foreign direct investment and trade by region, percentage of total, 1988 
Investment stock: 
Outward Inward 
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80 
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20 
0 
l Excludes intra-EC investment and exports. 
Sources: UNCTC, !MF. 
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Table 53 
Inward direct investment of the Community 
(millionECU) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
World1 6 177 5 637 6 805 12 578 14 278 
of which: 
USA 2 919 1 766 2 484 2 356 606 
Japan 390 646 445 1 502 1 461 
EFTA 1 661 1 666 3 267 3 543 9 021 
Others 1 207 1 559 609 5 177 3 190 
I Excluding intra-EC invesunents. 
Source: Eurostat, European Community Direct Investment, 1984-88. 
Table 54 
Outward direct investment of the Community 
(mi/lion ECU) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
World1 17 395 15 349 22 164 30 780 30 711 
of which: 
USA 11 650 10 063 17 662 23 901 20 074 
Japan 295 . 36- -. 116 18 187 
EFTA 929 760 9 1 826 2 306 
Others 4 521 4490 4 395 5 035 8 144 
I Excluding intra-EC investments. 
Source: Eurostat, European Community Direct Investment, 1984-88. 
country is now the key marginal supplier, with the total 
stock of Japanese MNEs having doubled between 1988 and 
1991. Comparing this with Graph 28 shows that the USA 
is overwhelmingly the most important host to EC outward 
investment. Graphs 29 and 30 record the share of Member 
States in inward and outward investment respectively. The 
striking feature here is the dominance of the United 
Kingdom in both. France and· the Netherlands are also 
significant hosts and sources. Germany is a major source of 
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Table 55 
Annual flows of Japanese FDI, 1974-89 
(million USD) 
Year Current prices Constant 1980 prices 
1974 2 396 4 608 
1975 3 280 5 655 
1976 3 462 5 969 
1977 2 806 4 384 
1978 4 598 6 673 
1979 4 995 6 077 
1980 4 693 4 693 
1981 8 932 9 087 
1982 7 703 8 265 
1983 8 145 9 162 
1984 10 155 11 713 
1985 12 217 14 322 
1986 22 320 25 479 
1987 33 364 34 396 
1988 47 022 46 100 
1989 67 540 65 572 
Annual average flows Annual average growth rate 
1974-79 1980-89 1974-79 1980-89 
Current prices 
(million USD) 3 590 22 209 19,2% 33,8 % 
Constant prices 
(million USD) 5 561 22 879 9,0% 31,2 % 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan. 
outward FDI, but relatively unimportant as a host; this 
pattern is reversed in the case of Spain. Finally, Graphs 31 
and 32 document the sectoral breakdown of inward and 
outward investment. Services in general, and finance and 
banking in particular, are the principal sectors where inward 
investment occurs. Of the industrial sectors, food products, 
chemicals and electrical equipment are important. The port-
folio of outward investment is more diversified. Energy is 
the largest sector, followed by chemicals, machinery and 
transport equipment and banking and finance. 
I - Trade and foreign direct investment 
GRAPH 26: EC FDI inflows 1970-89 as a percentage of GDP 
(%) 
1,6 .-------------------------------, 
1,5 
1,4 
1,3 
1,2 
1,1 
1,0 
0,9 
0,8 
0,7 
0,6 
0,5 
0,4 
0,3 
0.2~~-~~------·-----------------
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 
Source: Thomsen and Nicolaides ( 1991 ). 
GRAPH 27: Geographical breakdown of inward direct investment of the Community (1984-89 average) 
Japan--~ 
.,---USA 
--- Not allocated 
EFTA----
~--- Class2 
~--Other Class I 
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GRAPH 28: Geographical breakdown of outward direct investment of the Community (1984-89 average) 
---USA 
EFTA----
Other Class I ---' 
Japan----' 
GRAPH 29: Share of each Member State in inward direct investment of the EC (1984-89 average) 
NL-
p 
UK 
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GRAPH 30: Share of each Member State in outward direct investment of the EC (1984-89 average) 
NL 
UK 
GRAPH 31 : Sectoral breakdown of inward direct investment of the Community (1984-89 average) 
Food products 
Other industries 
Other services 
Real estate 
Finance and banking 
Trade, hotels, etc. 
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GRAPH 32 : Sectoral breakdown of outward direct investment of the Community ( 1984-1989 average) 
Food products 
Metals and engineering 
Energy 
Chemicals 
Not allocated 
Other industries 
The key marginal supplier of FDI in recent years has been 
Japan. Although the Japanese share in the total stock of 
FDI is still smaller than that of the USA, as can be seen 
from Table 55, FDI has grown dramatically over the last 
decade both in nominal and real terms. Over the decade of 
the 1990s Japanese FDI grew at a remarkable 30% per 
annum in real terms. In terms of annual flows, it is now the 
major supplier of FDI to the Community. As Table 56 
shows these inflows are not evenly spread throughout the 
Community. In excess of one-third goes to the United 
Kingdom, a further quarter flows into the Netherlands. 
Even if one scales these figures for country size, the United 
Kingdom remains the major recipient. The sectoral distri-
bution of this investment is interesting (Table 57) with 
around one-fifth being located in manufacturing and four-
fifths in non-manufacturing. The latter is dominated by 
finance and insurance which alone accounted for around 
half of all Japanese FDI in 1989. 
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Table 56 
Japanese FDI in the Community 
Country' 1987 
EC 100,0 
UK 39,4 
Netherlands 13,2 
Luxembourg 28,1 
Germany 6,4 
France 5,3 
Spain 4,5 
Belgium 1,1 
Ireland 0,9 
Portugal 0,1 
I Data no t available for Grcccc: and Denmark. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan. 
1988 
100,0 
47,5 
28,3 
7,9 
4,9 
5,6 
1,9 
2,0 
0,5 
0,1 
(%) 
1989 1951 -89 
100,0 100,0 
37,4 37,7 
32,4 24, l 
4,7 3,0 
7,7 8,2 
8,1 6,9 
3,6 3,7 
2,3 3,2 
1,0 1,3 
0,5 0,3 
Table 57 
Sectoral distribution of Japanese FDI in the Community 
(%) 
1986 1988 1989 
Manufacturing 17,0 16,0 18,0 
of which: 
metals 1,8 1,1 0,9 
chemicals 1,6 2,0 2,5 
electrical machinery 3,6 4,2 4,5 
transportation equipment 3,4 3,0 3,0 
textiles 1,5 1,0 1, 1 
general machinery 1,9 2,1 3,0 
Non-manufacturing 83,0 84,0 82,0 
of which: 
mining 6,2 3,6 3,1 
commerce 19,9 13,l 12,0 
finance and insurance 41,3 49,2 47,3 
transport 0,3 0,3 0,3 
Total (billion USD) 14,5 30,2 50,0 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan. 
In summary, as well as being the world's largest source of 
FDI, the Community is also the world's largest recipient 
(even if one nets out intra-Member State cross-border invest-
ment). Inward FDI has grown steadily since the formation 
of the Community with particularly marked increases being 
associated with market enlargements and market deepening. 
With respect to the latter, there has been a sharp increase in 
inward FDI associated with the 1992 programme, and this 
has been dominated by inward investment from Japan. In-
vestment flows from the latter are regionally concentrated 
(towards the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) and 
sectorally concentrated (towards non-manufactures in gen-
eral, the financial sector in particular). 
3. International trade and capital flows: 
analytical context 
The links between international trade and capital flows, the 
forces driving FDI, the benefits and costs of FDI and the 
operation of MNEs have all attracted detailed and extensive 
analytical work. Here we are concerned with a subset of 
these issues, namely the determinants of FDI, and the net 
benefits associated with it. We need to do so in order to 
understand what is driving the current upsurge in inward 
investment to the Community, and its potential. 
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3.1. Determinants of FDI 
A wide range of models have focused on the issue of what 
motivates firms to engage in FDI rather than arm's-length 
trade (for a review see Cantwell, 1992). Results depend upon 
model specification and, in tum, this is fashioned by the 
precise features of what is after all a very complicated pro-
cess. Although many results are therefore model specific it 
is possible, as Dunning (1988) has shown, to organize and 
summarize the factors which drive foreign investment under 
the 'eclectic paradigm'. According to this, the decision to 
engage in local production and/or intra-firm trade, rather 
than license, or engage in arm's-length trade is driven by 
considerations of ownership, location and internalization. 
What this so-called OLI paradigm claims is that conditions 
under all of these headings must be met before FDI will 
occur. In other words, although it may be necessary for a 
firm to have certain ownership advantages before it considers 
overseas investment, this in itself is not sufficient. Likewise, 
although it may be desirable that the market in which a 
subsidiary is located have certain characteristics, again this 
in itself is not sufficient. The sufficiency condition is that it 
must be infeasible for the firm to exploit ownership and 
locational advantages without recourse to the internal mar-
kets which FDI creates. 
Take a specific example of a firm which has a valuable 
proprietary asset - say a strong brand image. The positive 
rate of return which this yields confers an ownership advan-
tage. Now suppose there is a foreign market with no compet-
ing brand where this asset can yield a rate of return at least 
as high as on the home market. Production conditions/ 
transportation costs may lead the firm to decide on a strategy 
of supplying locally rather than at arm's-length. Why should 
it set up a production plant rather than license? One possi-
bility is to ensure certain quality control conditions are met. 
Alternatively the proprietary product may be produced by 
a proprietary technology which the firm wishes to retain 
control of. Either way the result is the same: to fully exploit 
the ownership/locational advantages the firm has to internal-
ize the transaction by setting up a production facility. 
Table 58 lists possible ownership, locational and internaliza-
tion advantages. Associated with the former there may be 
advantages attached to size, or intangible assets like repu-
tation or government policy. Where location is concerned, 
access to particular inputs or economies of scale or govern-
ment policy or infrastructural factors might be important. 
Internalization advantages might derive from failures or 
imperfections in input or output markets. Alternatively 
product differentiation or government policy can all play a 
role. The great advantage of this eclectic paradigm is that is 
provides a general explanation for FOi which encompasses 
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all other model-specific theorems. In the context of FOi in 
the Community there are a number of locational advantages 
which are/have been influentiaL These are only provided in 
Table 59 for illustrative purposes at this stage. In Section 4 
we will investigate EC factors in more detail. 
3.2. Net benefits of FDI 
FOi can stir strong emotions - especially when 'national 
interest' or 'strategic' issues are seen as being at stake. 
Analysis of the welfare impact revolves around, inter alia, 
employment effects; externalities; income redistribution; and 
trade balance effects. Each issue is controversial. 
Employment effects. How does FOi affect aggregate employ-
ment, and the composition of employed labour? Opponents 
argue that FOi must be employment reducing. Their argu-
ment is as follows: foreign firms replace local firms as sup-
pliers of final goods, and typically the former rely on im-
ported inputs to a greater extent than the latter. Moreover, 
it is sometimes also argued that those jobs which are created 
are low value-added/low human capital intensive jobs. Evi-
dence from the USA does suggest that foreign MNEs in 
general and Japanese MNEs in particular are more import-
intensive than indigenous firms (see for instance Lipsey, 
1991; Graham and Krugman, 1991). However, this does not 
necessarily mean that they will be a source of net employ-
ment decline. As Graham and Krugman (1991) point out 
aggregate employment has much more to do with supply side 
conditions, in particular the occupational and geographical 
mobility of labour. Indeed, in so far as inward investment 
results in changes in work practices in indigenous firms, it 
may even impact favourably on aggregate employment. In 
the European context, a strong case can be made to the effect 
that the net impact of the US multinationals on aggregate 
employment has been favourable. Besides which, the higher 
import intensity of Japanese production may be a transient 
phenomenon which changes once local networks are estab-
lished. 
The 'quality of employment' argument is no more serious. 
Critics argue that MNEs basically set up 'screwdriver' plants 
geared towards low value-added, low-wage functions. 
Longer term evidence from US investment in Western Eur-
ope, and more recent evidence on Japanese investment in 
the USA, suggests that this is not in fact generally the case. 
Externalities. It is possible to argue that FOi has positive 
spillover effects through its impact on technology transfer. 
The contribution of modern endogenous growth theory has 
been to provide an explicit role for technology in the growth 
process. FOi is an obvious source of embodied technology 
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Table 58 
The OLI paradigm 
Ownership advantages 
(a) Size 
Obtain inputs more cheaply or exclusive access to inputs 
Better access to product markets 
Product or process diversification 
Economies of scale, both at plant-level and firm-level 
(b) Intangible assets 
Proprietary knowledge, technology, trade marks, product man-
agement, marketing, R&D, bank of human capital 
(c) Government 
Policies which favour business in home country 
Location advantages 
(a) Inputs 
Spatial distribution of inputs and markets 
Input prices, quality and productivity 
(b) Economies of scale 
Extent to which plant-level economies of scale make for cen-
tralization of production 
(c) Government 
Government intervention 
Control of imports (tariffs, etc.), tax rates, incentives, invest-
ment climate, political stability 
(d) Other 
Transport and communications costs 
Infrastructure (commercial, legal, transportation) 
Psychic distance (language, culture, business, customs) 
Internalization advantages 
(a) Market failure in market for final goods 
Reduce costs associated with market transactions 
Compensate for absence of futures markets 
(b) Market failure in market for inputs 
Avoid costs of enforcing property rights 
Buyer uncertainty about nature and value of inputs 
Control supplies and conditions of sale inputs 
(c) Monopoly power 
Where market does not permit price discrimination 
Control market outlets 
Engage in anti-competitive practices such as cross-
subsidization and predatory pricing 
(d) Product differentiation 
Need of seller to protect quality of product 
(e) Government 
Avoid or exploit government intervention (quotas, tariffs, 
taxes, price controls) 
Source: adapted from Dunning, 1988. 
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Table 59 
Locational advantages in the Community 
Advantage Applicability to Comments 
a. Inputs 
Price 
Non-price 
b. Economies of scale 
c. Government policy 
Investment incentives 
Protected markets 
Expectation of fortress Europe 
d. Infrastructure 
Political 
Transport and communications 
Community 
v' 
v' 
- cross-border investment is potentially a major stimulus 
to growth. In an EC context this is one of the factors which 
leads Baldwin (1989) to identify such spectacular gains from 
the 1992 programme. Clearly it is not peculiar to FDI which 
originates within the Community. There is some evidence to 
suggest that in some sectors (e.g. automobiles) foreign firms 
install best practice technology and management techniques 
and that these trickle down to local producers. 
Trade balance effects. Concern here derives from the alleg-
edly high import dependence of foreign firms, combined 
with the allegedly low value-added nature of the operations. 
The combination of these impacts adversely on the trade 
balance. As noted earlier, there is some evidence from the 
USA (Lipsey, 1991; Graham and Krugman, 1991), and from 
Australia (Kreinin, 1988), to the effect that Japanese firms 
tend to have a higher import dependence than local firms. 
Balasubramanyam (1988) among others has argued that this 
is in fact just a temporary phenomenon. Once the foreign 
firm becomes established it sets up local supply networks 
for sourcing inputs. Moreover, the initial investment itself 
often brings in its wake subsequent investments from down-
stream producers. Another response is to point out that the 
goods which are actually produced may replace imports 
Individual 
Member State 
v' 
v' 
Especially important in Southern States 
Especially important in Northern States 
Given additional importance by 1992 and 
single market 
Range of incentives offered, especially in 're-
gions'. May become more important after 1992 
May have been a mechanism for side-stepping 
source-specific restraints 
Concern regarding fortress Europe may have 
stimulated FDI 
Stability conducive to investment 
Good communications and transport systems 
conducive to investment 
rather than domestically produced import substitutes. This 
has probably been the case in consumer electronics and 
automobiles. Finally, the key point to note is that fundamen-
tally it is macroeconomic factors which are responsible for 
the trade balance at a particular point in time. Specifically, 
it is driven by savings and investment imbalances across 
trading partners. Even if a particular investment resulted in 
net imports, it would ultimately be offset by the export 
stimulus induced by lower exchange rate. (This of course 
only applies to investment flows from outside the Com-
munity. With exchange rates between Member States fixed, 
the same equilibrating mechanism does not operate.) 
Income redistribution. We noted in the previous subsection 
how crucial the presence of internal markets is to FDI. 
Typically, because market imperfections preclude a potential 
supplier from fully appropriating the returns to firm-specific 
assets, FDI allows certain transactions to be internalized. 
However, the existence of such internal markets creates 
opportunities for MNEs to engage in transfer pricing. By so 
doing they can minimize their tax liability in the host econ-
omy. In so far as this results in revenues which would 
otherwise accrue to the host government leaking overseas, 
it represents a welfare loss. There is evidence from developing 
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countries which shows that transfer pricing does occur on a 
non-negligible scale. The same kind of evidence is not avail-
able for the Community or North America. This could 
represent a lack of appropriate empirical work. However, 
the practice is likely to be less important in the Community 
and North America for three reasons: first the range of 
controls and restrictions which stimulate the practice are 
nothing like as pervasive as in developing countries; second 
double taxation agreements are more common; third disclos-
ure rules are tighter. 
Summary. FOi, like international trade, promotes the specia-
lization process. As with international trade, one can identify 
static gains (through resource reallocation), and dynamic 
gains (through exploitation of scale economies, pro-competi-
tive effects on local markets, and a stimulus to growth), 
which are a corollary of the process. As we have seen, it is 
possible to argue that, on some counts, there may be costs 
associated with FOi. Clearly the net employment effects, or 
trade balance effects, will vary from one industry to another, 
depending upon supply conditions, market structure and so 
on. Overall, however, there is a strong presumption that 
FOi confers net benefits. In the context of the Community 
this has never really been an issue, given the volume of cross-
border FOi between Member States, and the.fact that the 
Community is both the largest supplier and recipient of 
FOi. On occasions concern has been voiced at inflows from 
particular sources (the USA in the early 1960s; Japan more 
recently). None the less, this has not been as intense as 
elsewhere, no doubt because the Community is a major 
source of FOi, as well as a major host. 
4. Policy towards investment 
Investment is a key determinant of economic growth. Al-
though there may be disagreement among policy-makers and 
analysts regarding the exact relationship between investment 
and growth, the fact that there is a direct relationship is 
beyond dispute. This being so, policy-makers strive to create 
an environment which is conducive to investment formation. 
The pervasiveness of investment codes in developing 
countries and the diversity of investment incentives in indus-
trialized countries is testimony to this. Historically invest-
ment measures have been regarded as a non-border issue. 
When economies were relatively closed this was a reasonable 
simplification. However, with the remarkable growth of 
trade over the post-war period, and the concomitant glo-
balization of production discussed earlier, the border/non-
border distinction has become increasingly meaningless. The 
fact that trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) were 
an agenda item in the Uruguay Round is a reflection of this. 
114 
From an EC standpoint this is a two-track issue involving 
internal measures which might influence cross-border invest-
ment, and measures vis-a-vis non-EC entities. Both will be 
examined in greater detail later. For the moment we focus 
on the range of instruments which can be deployed to influ-
ence the level and composition of investment, their usage 
and their economic effects. 
4.1. Investment incentives 
Investment formation is often viewed as an appropriate area 
for public support. Many initiatives to encourage capital 
investment are economy-wide, regionally based or sectorally 
based. These can take the form of accelerated depreciation 
arrangements for all new capital investment (economy-wide); 
or regional initiatives, such as the old regional employment 
premium in the United Kingdom; or less commonly they 
may be intended to alter the relative returns to investment 
across sectors, like the selective employment tax which oper-
ated in the United Kingdom in the 1960s. Such interventions 
tend not to discriminate between indigenous and foreign 
investment. In addition and/or instead of these provisions it 
is not unusual to find incentives targeted specifically at 
MNEs considering FOi. 
The rationale behind discriminatory arrangements is three-
fold: first, it presumes that FOi supplements indigenous 
investment, and no crowding out takes place; second, it 
presumes that there are net benefits to the host economy 
arising from FOi; third it presumes that the supply of FOi 
is responsive to incentives. We will comment on the veracity 
of these assumptions later. For the moment, let us be more 
specific about the kind of incentives which host governments 
typically offer to MNEs. 
Table 60 lists a range of instruments of investment policy, 
and their intended effects. Instruments are classified accord-
ing to whether their initial impact is aimed at the input or 
output side. A common incentive is the duty drawback. 
This allows the MNE to claw back any import duties (and 
possibly other charges) on imported inputs. If successful the 
drawback operates as an input subsidy and raises the effec-
tive rate of protection to the production process. Tax exemp-
tions on equipment operate in a similar fashion. The exemp-
tion, however, would apply whether the materials were pur-
chased locally or imported. Clearly this is a capital subsidy, 
the value of which is higher the more capital-intensive the 
production process. Equally clearly, in the absence of offset-
ting labour subsidies, it is likely to have the by-product 
distortion of stimulating more capital-intensive production 
techniques. Investment allowances which can take various 
forms operate in a similar fashion, as does accelerated de-
preciation. The latter allows the investor to bring forward 
depreciation allowances to the early years of the investment, 
with a view to easing cash flow problems. 
Table 60 
An inventory of investment incentives 
Instrument 
Duty drawback 
Input incentives 
Intended effect 
Tax exemptions on equipment 
Accelerated depreciation 
Subsidy on imported inputs 
Input subsidy 
Subsidy to capital equipment 
Subsidy to capital equipment 
Subsidy to human capital forma-
tion 
Investment allowances 
Training credits 
R&D support 
Instrument 
Export subsidy 
Tax holiday 
Encouraging high technology 
Output incentives 
Intended effect 
Specifying that exported output 
gain bounty 
Exempting profits from taxation 
for specified period 
Market reserve commitments Local market monopoly con-
ferred on investor 
Export retention schemes Allow MNE to retain foreign ex-
change earnings 
Training credits often take the form of tax allowances for 
training programmes or staff development programmes. 
Thus the MNE reclaims, in whole or in part, the costs of a 
particular programme, or offsets it against tax liabilities. 
The intention here is to encourage the formation of human 
capital. In so far as there may be first mover disadvantages 
associated with endowing labour with sector-specific skills, 
this instrument can also be an optimal response to a common 
externality. The same can be said of R&D subsidies. Here 
the MNE is allowed to offset investment in R&D against 
tax liabilities or receives a direct subvention for R&D. As 
well as aiming to attract technology-intensive firms, such an 
instrument is also directed at encouraging MNEs to transfer 
part of the innovation process to the subsidiary. 
Input incentives tend to be more widespread than output 
incentives, for obvious reasons - capital formation is what 
is being encouraged. Input incentives provide support at an 
early stage in the production process and transparently raise 
the effective protection conferred on the firm. However, 
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some output incentives are deployed. For instance, some 
developing countries offer direct export subsidies to MNEs, 
often when the investment is in an export-processing zone 
(EPZ). The intention is clearly not only to encourage invest-
ment per se, but investment in a particular sector. Direct 
export subsidies are of course illegal under GATT. Market 
reserve commitments are often given to provide the MNE 
with a local monopoly. Frequently, in developing countries, 
these will be tied to an obligation to export. In effect the 
MNE is being allowed to cross-subsidize. Analytically the 
tying functions like an export subsidy, with the subvention 
being provided by local consumers to the product in ques-
tion, rather than the domestic exchequer. Export retention 
schemes can also operate as a form of export subsidy. Where 
foreign exchange rationing operates, it is not unusual to find 
regimes where export earnings have to be sold to the dom-
estic central bank at the official exchange rate. Clearly, if 
the exchange rate is overvalued, this operates as an export 
tax. Freedom to retain all, or part of export earnings, in 
effect permits the firm to trade at the shadow exchange rate, 
and vis-a-vis indigenous firms, provides an export subsidy. 
Finally, many governments offer tax holidays. Typically 
these offer a tax amnesty for a designated period of time. 
Clearly this is aimed at subsidizing the entire operation and 
changing the attractiveness of one investment location vis-
a-vis another. 
Table 61 summarizes empirical evidence on the incidence of 
investment incentives. As can be seen, they tend to be more 
prevalent in developing than industrialized countries; tend 
to be geared towards input rather than output support; 
tend to be targeted at encouraging investment in the export 
sectors in developing countries, and in high-tech sectors 
in industrialized countries; and are frequently used as an 
instrument of regional or social policy. 
Table 61 
Incidence of investment incentives 
Investment incentives are often used in a non-discriminatory fashion 
as instruments of regional or social policy. 
Input incentives are more prevalent than output incentives. 
Incentive programmes are often enshrined in investment codes in 
developing countries. 
Reliance on discretionary incentives is more prevalent in developing 
countries than industrialized countries. 
Developing countries make widespread use of incentives to attract 
MNEs into export sectors. 
Industrialized countries commonly provide support to encourage 
investment in R&D-intensive sectors. 
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4.2. Trade-related investment measures 
The declaration which initiated the Uruguay Round drew 
specific attention to the need to examine the applicability of 
GATT articles to ' ... the trade restricting and distorting 
effects of investment measures .. .'. What are these measures? 
Table 62 provides details of TRIMs classified on an input-
output basis. 
Perhaps the most pervasive of investment measures are vari-
ous forms of local content requirements. These specify that 
some proportion of value-added, or of intermediate inputs, 
must be locally sourced. If local inputs are higher cost than 
their imported counterparts, then this particular instrument 
has obvious trade effects. Trade balancing requirements can 
take a variety of forms. They could for instance link imports 
of one product (e.g. an input) to a specified performance· on 
exports of some other product, which could be the final 
good. Again the instrument has clear trade effects. Laws of 
similars require foreign investors to use local substitutes for 
imported inputs if a 'similar' component is manufactured 
locally. Clearly, if an MNE would otherwise import the 
input, the trade restricting and distorting effects are obvious. 
Limitations on imports, generally by quota, accomplish the 
same end, though by a slightly more transparent route, 
and are self-explanatory, likewise with foreign exchange 
restrictions. These are often directed at constraining an in-
vestor in terms of the amount of intermediate inputs which 
can be imported. 
Local equity participation is a common precondition for 
investment, which like local hiring targets, expatriate quotas 
and national participation in management, is designed to 
indigenize part of the operations of the affiliate. The trade 
effects of these requirements are less obvious than those 
discussed above. Both R&D requirements and technology 
transfer requirements distort the type of investment under-
taken, and the firm's commitment to technology transfer. 
These may reduce import requirements, and/or limit oppor-
tunities to export. Earnings remittance limits typically re-
strict the amount of profit which can repatriated. In turn 
this can result in a diversion of earnings into investment for 
local production. 
The most frequently reported form of output intervention 
is minimum export requirements. Where this intervention is 
effective, it can have potentially serious trade effects -
exports would be higher than otherwise, resulting in trade 
deflection elsewhere. Trade balancing requirements can op-
erate in a similar fashion by compelling the investor to 
export more of its output than it would do otherwise. Less 
common is export controls directed at ensuring that exports 
of specified commodities are precluded, or restricted. Market 
reserve policy is applied when the local market is reserved 
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Table 62 
An inventory of TRIMs 
Input TRIMs 
Instrument 
Local content requirements 
Trade-balancing requirements 
Laws of similars 
Limitations on imports 
Foreign exchange restrictions 
Local equity participation 
Local hiring targets 
Expatriate quotas 
National participation 
in management 
R&D requirements 
Technology transfer 
) 
Intended effect 
Specifying that some proportion 
of value-added or intermediate 
inputs be locally sourced 
Linking imports of one product 
to export performance of some 
other 
Requiring MNEs to use local sub-
stitutes for imported inputs if a 
'similar' component is locally 
manufactured 
Self-explanatory 
Constraining investor in terms of 
amount of intermediate inputs 
which can be imported 
Specifying that some proportion 
of equity must be shed locally 
Ensuring specified employment 
targets are hit 
Committing MNE to investment 
inR&D 
Committing MNE to local use of 
specified technology 
Output TRIMs 
Instrument Intended effect 
Minimum export requirement Specifying a certain proportion of 
output to be exported 
Trade-balancing requirements As above 
Export controls Specifying that certain products 
may not be exported 
Market reserve policy Specifying that local market is re-
served for local producers 
Product-mandating require- Obliging the investor to export 
ments the mandated product from host 
country only 
Licensing requirements Obliging investor to licence pro-
duction of output in host country 
Technology transfer Committing MNE to specified 
embodied technology 
for actual, and sometimes even potential, producers of a 
competing product. If it locks the affiliate into exporting 
rather than supplying the domestic market, again it has clear 
trade effects. Product mandating requirements oblige the 
investor to export the mandated product from the host 
country only. Depending upon the level of demand to be 
satisfied globally, and the parent company's global invest-
ment strategy, this could lock the MNE into exports from 
higher cost locations. These differ from licensing require-
ments which oblige the investor actually to license pro-
duction of the output in the host country. Table 63 summar-
izes the evidence on incidence of TRIMs. 
Table 63 
Incidence of TRIMs 
The principal TRIMs are local content requirements and minimum 
export requirements. 
About one-sixth of (US) affiliates are subject to TRIMs. 
The incidence of TRIMs in developing countries is four times that 
in developed market economies (DMEs). 
TRIMs are more heavily concentrated in mining and manufactures 
than in services. 
The main sectors in manufactures are automobiles, high-tech and 
petrochemicals. 
The principal developing countries in terms of incidence are Brazil, 
Mexico, India and Nigeria. 
The principal DMEs in terms of incidence are Canada, Australia 
and Spain. 
There is a tendency towards rules-based regimes in some developing 
countries. 
There is a high correlation between positive investment incentives 
and TRIMs. 
There is a high correlation between import protection and TRIMs .. 
TRIMs are intended to accomplish three things: first, to 
influence the location and pattern of economic activity; 
second, to ensure that the likelihood of benefits which the 
host government wishes to secure is greater than it otherwise 
would be; and third, to redistribute part of the surpluses 
generated by FOi away from the MNE and towards resi-
dents of the host country. We will refer to these as the 
resource allocation target, the insurance target, and the rent-
shifting target, respectively. 
The latter is especially important in the bargaining which 
precedes inward investment. TRI Ms offer a vehicle for alter-
ing the distribution of rents associated with investment in-
centives and/or protection. Benefits which are provided 
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through one set of instruments are reclaimed, at least in 
part. The redistribution is less transparent than if the parties 
had simply negotiated on the incentive package - the trans-
fers associated with a cash grant are more visible than 
those associated with a minimum export requirement. This 
probably suits both parties to the contract, however. 
This conjunction of investment incentives and/or protection 
and TRIMs is crucially important. Where TRIMs are bind-
ing, they are explicitly investment disincentives in that they 
oblige investors to do something they would not otherwise 
have done. The reason they comply is that it gives them 
access to the benefits of investment incentives/protection. 
Compliance with the TRIMs simply means trading off some 
of these rents. 
Viewed in this light, TRIMs are seen by host countries as 
instruments of investment policy rather than trade policy. 
However, looking at the list in Table 62, it is clear that some 
TRIMs have direct trade-distorting effects. Local content 
requirements, which have been extensively evaluated by 
Grossman (1981), Davidson et al. (1985), Richardson (1990) 
and Greenaway (1990) are cases in point. So too are mini-
mum export requirements, trade balancing requirements and 
export controls. Thus, even if one accepts that they are 
measures designed to influence investment rather than trade, 
the fact remains that they have a direct impact on the latter. 
As such, there is at least a prima facie case for extending 
GA TT disciplines to cover TRI Ms. As we shall see later, 
arguably local context and minimum export requirements 
are outlined by Articles III and XI. 
The second complication is that the interdependence between 
TRIMs and other interventions complicates the analysis of 
their welfare effects considerably. The evidence on incidence 
cited above suggests that TRIMs complement other instru-
ments, particularly investment incentives and import protec-
tion. This makes it very difficult to comment on their welfare 
effects. 
Following on from the above, there may be circumstances 
in which TRIMs appear to be relatively effective and efficient 
forms of intervention from the standpoint of the host coun-
try. Thus, Grossman (1981) has demonstrated that a content 
protection scheme can be a more effective means of support-
ing input suppliers than an equivalent tariff, and Richardson 
(1990) has extended this to argue that it also may be more 
efficient. In the case of a minimum export requirement, 
Greenaway (1990) shows that although this may be a more 
efficient means of supporting an export-oriented industry 
than an outright export subsidy, in the absence of some 
pre-existing distortion it remains unambiguously welfare 
reducing. Rodrik (1987) has shown, however, that if the 
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export requirement is introduced alongside a pre-existing 
tariff it may be welfare improving. 
Note that we are not arguing that the combination of import 
protection with a content requirement, or a minimum export 
requirement, is optimal. It is not. Eliminating import protec-
tion and not introducing the content requirement/export 
requirement would be the first best solution. The point is 
that in a second best situation where pre-existing inter-
ventions are regarded as constraints, the introduction of 
certain TRIMs can, possibly correctly, be viewed as welfare 
improving by the host government. However, they are se-
cond best policies, and can be 'beggar-thy-neighbour' poli-
cies. 
5. Europe 1992, the single market and inward 
investment 
A number of studies have pointed to a connection between 
economic integration and FOi (UNCTC, 1990; Greenaway, 
1987; Shepley, 1991; Yannopolous, 1990). In each case the 
data appear to support a positive association, particularly 
in the case of the Community. This association is tied into 
the opportunities which integration offers to exploit firm-
specific ownership advantages. The data also shows, as we 
saw earlier, that the Europe 1992 programme has given a 
stimulus to inward FOi. We should note too that it has also 
stimulated an upsurge in cross-border intra-Community FOi 
as European firms seek to exploit scale economies, diversify 
risk, gain access to distribution networks and ultimate con-
sumers. Among other things the abolition of exchange con-
trols, free rights of establishment and expected harmoniza-
tion of the regulatory framework have helped. It is easy 
to see then how market completion can stimulate intra-
Community cross-border investment - this after all is one 
of the principal objectives of the programme. What about 
non-EC firms - how might the 1992 programme be expected 
to impact upon them? 
In Section 2 we examined the interaction of ownership, 
locational and internalization advantages in explaining FOi. 
When all of the 1992 Directives are implemented the nature 
of the European market will alter fundamentally. The abol-
ition of customs controls, harmonization of standards, elim-
ination of national restraints, harmonization of policy and 
so on offer the lure of a market of some 340 million con-
sumers. This is almost as large as the USA and Japan 
combined. The potential scale benefits of this have rightly 
been emphasized, as has the potential for real income 
growth. Together these enhance the locational advantages 
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of the Community and raise the rate of return to ownership 
assets both in the short and long run. In turn this stimulates 
opportunities for bridgehead investment and/or rationaliza-
tion investment and/or export-oriented investment. 
Bridgehead investment refers to new investment in a specific 
location which is regarded as a base to gain a presence in, 
and potentially service the wider European market. The 
potential locational advantages of the Community, and indi-
vidual Member States after 1992 are summarized in 
Table 59. These relate to inputs, scale economies, govern-
ment policy and infrastructure. Where the advantages are 
EC-based, it is not obvious that a specific location within 
the Community will be chosen as the bridgehead. Choice of 
location will then be fashioned by country-specific factors 
such as the price and/or quality of inputs, or the availability 
of particular investment incentives. Take the example of 
Japanese investment in the United Kingdom. The United 
Kingdom has some locational advantages, most notably 
relatively low labour costs and a language which is attractive 
to Japanese investors. There is some survey-based evidence 
to indicate that using the United Kingdom as a bridgehead 
has been an important factor in the decision to locate, 
especially in the consumer and electronics industries and in 
car manufacture where minimum efficient scale of pro-
duction is large relative to the total Community market (see 
Dunning, 1988; Jetro, 1990). The 1992 programme reinforces 
these locational factors. This, of course, is a particular form 
of export-oriented investment in so far as the subsidiary 
intends to serve markets outside of the host. With the cre-
ation of a European Economic Area, the likelihood of Com-
munity enlargement (with applications from Sweden and 
Austria pending and others ready to follow) and the opening-
up of Eastern Europe, the Community will become an in-
creasingly attractive location for exporting to the wider pan-
European market. 
The foregoing pertains to the market access strategies of 
new entrants. It is also likely that incumbents will undertake 
additional investment in response to Europe 1992 measures, 
in part too for the reasons outlined above, but also as 
rationalization investment. Market completion may necessi-
tate a restructuring of existing operations, for instance clos-
ing down some facilities and concentrating on others, or 
building additional plants to service the entire market rather 
than subsets of it. There are a number of sectors where 
NTBs have resulted in market segmentation and frustrated 
rationalization. Good examples are pharmaceuticals, tele-
communications equipment and electrical power equipment. 
By contrast significant horizontal and/or vertical specializa-
tion has occurred in motor vehicles, microelectronics, tele-
vision receivers and agricultural machinery. Experience in 
these sectors offers an indication of the scope for rationaliza-
tion which may exist in other areas. 
There is nothing in the 1992 programme which is protection-
ist vis-a-vis outside countries. However, a potential for mar-
ket closure or restricted market access has been widely dis-
cussed. Potential threats to arm's-length exports are per-
ceived in Japan and North America via: the rationalization 
of national source-specific restraints; aggressive reciprocity 
especially in financial services; discriminatory government 
procurement; standard setting in consumer electronics and 
high-tech activities and so on. The potential for restraints 
on the activities of MNEs through local content and rules 
of origin provisions has also been commented upon. These 
are added together by some commentators in portraying the 
so-called 'fortress Europe' scenario. Notwithstanding the 
recent auto-arrangement, these fears are exaggerated. Never-
theless, it would be foolish to deny that they have led to 
some fortress jumping investment. Survey evidence identifies 
this as an important consideration. Kume and Tutsuka 
(1990), for example, provide evidence linking FDI to rules 
of origin, VERs and anti-dumping actions. The probability 
of impeded market access may be low, but some MNEs 
regard it as positive and have undertaken investment by way 
of insurance. 
Thus, one can make a credible case to the effect that the 
locational characteristics and locational advantages of the 
Community are altered by the regime change accompanying 
the single market programme, as summarized in Graph 33. 
This offers a lure to overseas investors, and especially to 
Japanese investors with pronounced ownership advantages 
centring on organizational and managerial skills. In turn 
this is stimulating an increase in FDI in the Community, 
over and above what would have occurred in the absence of 
the single market programme. It may be recalled that in the 
late 1950s and the decade of the 1960s there was a surge 
of FDI from the USA into the member countries of the 
Community following its establishment. It is now well estab-
lished in the literature that the increased flows of FDI into 
the Community was in response to the enlarged market 
opportunities and growth in incomes of the Community 
rather than tariff barriers to American exports. Preliminary 
statistical analysis of the determinants of Japanese FDI in 
the Community during the period 1975-88 also suggests that 
enlarged market opportunities in the Community appears 
to be a much more powerful stimulant than potential barriers 
to trade. 
The importance of the financial services sector to the recent 
growth of FDI is worthy of comment. Because of the nature 
of financial services, producers generally require a local 
presence. The key role of confidence and direct contact with 
consumers mean that reputation and credibility are crucially 
important. Reputation is an ownership advantage which is 
easily transferred from one location to another. Demand for 
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financial services is income-elastic, and expected income 
growth is one factor in explaining increased FDI. Expected 
regulatory changes are also important. Service-based activity 
is generally more regulation-intensive than manufacturing 
production. This is especially true of financial services. This 
also means that production needs to occur locally. The 
harmonization associated with the single market programme 
brings with it great potential for market penetration across 
erstwhile national borders. Thus, the single market pro-
gramme is acting to stimulate market entry investment on 
the part of suppliers of financial services. 
It is clear then that FDI inflows have been positively affected 
by the 1992 programme. Thomsen and Nicolaides (1991) 
argue, however, that the market completion programme has 
only affected the timing of this investment boom and not its 
long-term level. In other words, overseas corporations have 
a long-term globalization strategy driven by long-term profit 
maximization. In time they would have invested a compar-
able amount in Western Europe, independent of the 1992 
programme. In terms of Graph 34, OS is the optimal stock 
of FDI which is achieved at t* along some steady state path 
(i.e. flow) OD. Suppose market completion is announced at 
t 1 and is completed by t 2. This serves to alter investment 
intentions, with future investment being brought forward. 
Accordingly we get a higher flow between t 1 and t 2 , offset 
by a lower flow between t 3 and t*. The end result is the 
same, i.e. an optimal stock of OS ( = OA) and t*, with just 
replacement investment of OR ( = OD) occurring. 
It seems reasonable to suppose that there are macroeconomic 
factors combining with corporate strategy to encourage a 
globalization mentality on the part of overseas investors in 
general and Japanese investors in particular. However, the 
view that we still end up in t* with the target stock OA 
assumes that the 1992 programme offers nothing in itself 
which makes the market a more attractive location for 
investment than it would otherwise be. As we have seen, 
however, there are additional locational attractions to the 
European market. In these circumstances the potential rents 
to be realized from the ownership advantages of Japanese 
corporations are higher and more investment takes place in 
Europe than otherwise. The flow in Graph 34 becomes 
OBCFD', with the optimal stock at t* being OG rather than 
OA. 
This is not inconsistent with a long-term globalization strat-
egy, since the additional investment which comes to Europe 
may be diverted from elsewhere. The likelihood is that we 
are seeing investment which will result in the long-term stock 
being higher than otherwise, rather than simply a change in 
the timing of investment. This results partly because, as we 
have seen, the 1992 programme represents a regime change 
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GRAPH 33: Investment strategies for MNCs after 1992 
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offering additional locational advantages to the Community; 
partly because the programme will enhance the longer term 
growth prospects of the European market. Moreover, as 
Japanese MNEs mature the extent of their involvement in 
local production rather than exporting wi ll increase. As 
Table 64 shows there is a marked difference between US 
and Japanese MNEs in their relative dependence on exports 
and local production in the Community. This is partly a 
renection of market conditions in the 1960s and 1970s when 
the two waves occurred . However, it is la rgely d ue to the 
position of Japanese MNEs in the investment-product cycle. 
As Dunning and Cantwell argue, ' ... as Japanese companies 
become more internationalized it is reasonable to ass ume 
they will gain from the economies of expansion, scope and 
geographical diversification as have their European and US 
predecessors.' (p. 176). 
t' time 
In this section we have foc used primarily on Japanese inward 
investment. A combination of pull and push facto rs makes 
Japanese MNEs the key marginal suppliers of FOi. As we 
have seen, there are important pull factors associated with 
the 1992 programme. The obvious push factors are the 
dramatic Japanese current account surplus, and the associ-
ated appreciation of the yen. It is, however, important to 
note that other sources of inwa rd FOi will also be important 
in the 1990s. 'Traditional' sources like the USA and EFT A, 
especia ll y the latter given the EEA agreement signed in May 
1992, will be significan t. So too, however, will some of the 
NIEs. A number of the larger corporations in Korea and 
Taiwan are beginning to become footloose. A dynamic Euro-
pean market in the 1990s offers obvious a tt ract ions, not the 
least of which is faster growth, which is correlated with the 
growth of FOi. 
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Table 64 
The structure of Japanese and US involvement in EC manufacturing, 1976-86 
Japan USA 
1976 1986 1976 1986 
Value Share Value Share Value Share Value Share 
(million USD) (%) (million USD) (%) (million USD) (%) (million USD) ('lo) 
Exports 8,635 78,0 31,121 69,9 13,190 11,2 41,779 16,3 
International 
production 1,213 11,0 7,085 15,9 99,033 84,4 201,237 78,5 
Non-affiliate licensing 1,218 11,0 6,321 14,2 5,120 4,4 13,360 5,2 
Total 11,066 100,0 44,527 100,0 117,343 100,0 256,376 100,0 
Source: Eurostat: (1986) Industry statistical yearbook, (1987) External trade statistical yearbook; US Department or Commerce, US direct investment abroad, 1982 benchmark survey data, and US 
direct investment abroad (1977), Survey of Current Business, February 1977, January 1980, March 1988, August 1988; Japanese Ministry or Finance (1982, 1987) Zaise/ Kinyu togel Geppo · 
IMP (1988) Balance of payments statistics yearbook. · ' 
6. Policy coordination in the Community 
Chapter Four (Title II) of the Treaty establishing the EEC 
provides for the implementation of a common commercial 
policy, whose main element is represented by the common 
external tariff. Variations in the level of the tariff, exceptions 
to it, and trade agreements with third countries are nego-
tiated at the Community level, rather than by individual 
Member States. In recent years, however, this common pol-
icy has been eroded to some degree by national measures -
most notably source-specific restraints such as voluntary 
restraint arrangements (VRAs) and State aids. Together with 
a wide range of other non-tariff measures these have served 
to fragment the European market in some sectors (e.g. 
automobiles, textiles and clothing). The 1992 programme 
will of course sweep these away. Harmonization of a range 
of policies, together with the abolition of Article 115 pro-
visions will result in a truly common commercial policy. 
This reduces the scope for independent action of the part of 
individual Member States. 
In the past measures like VRAs have proved attractive as a 
palliative to adjustment problems. Once that degree of free-
dom is foreclosed, there is a possibility that investment 
policy could be more actively deployed to influence industrial 
location. The extent to which this occurs will be fashioned 
by adjustment pressures on the one hand, and the degree to 
which State aid and regional support policies are harmonized 
on the other hand. The Cecchini Report and other analyses 
have forecast adjustment pressures in the form of transitional 
unemployment. From an economic standpoint, this is neither 
a surprise, nor necessarily a problem. After all, adjustment 
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is the price we pay for change. However, from a political 
economy standpoint, adjustment pressures can be trouble-
some, particularly when they are non-randomly distributed. 
It is not easy to forecast exactly which sectors/regions will 
be most affected. Two points can, however, be made. First, 
some recent research suggests that the marked increase in 
intra-industry specialization may have recently tailed off, 
and possibly even reversed (Greenaway and Hine, 1991). 
The importance of this is that both a priori theorizing and 
some empirical evidence suggest that adjustment to trade 
expansion may be smoother in a setting of intra- as opposed 
to inter-industry expansion. The second point to note is that 
the Community already has a 'regional problem' in that a 
number of areas, largely on the periphery, are relatively 
underdeveloped, have relatively low incomes per head, and 
relatively high unemployment. These sectors could be more 
exposed in the adjustment to market completion. 
For these reasons governments could come under pressure 
to provide adjustment assistance of some form. As already 
noted, source-specific restraints have proved popular in the 
past; some alternative like State aid could prove popular in 
the future. A recent Commission study has drawn attention 
to the level and distribution of State aid in the Community. 
Between 1986 and 1988, an average of 2,2% of GDP (or 
4,5% of total government expenditure) was disbursed as 
State aid by Member States. 1 This amounts to more than 
twice the Community budget. Moreover, there is a large 
This figure includes public transfers to the following sectors: agriculture, 
fisheries, transport and coal. 
variance around this figure from 1,0% of GDP in Denmark 
to 4, I% in Luxembourg. Additional data on State aid to 
manufacturing are provided in Table 65. Already therefore 
there exists quite a wide disparity in the practices of Member 
States. In adjusting to the completed market, and beyond 
that in preparation for the single currency, there will be 
obvious pressures on providing State aids to encourage in-
vestment. Where this is coordinated and provided under one 
of the exemption Articles of the Treaty (e.g. relating to 
regional aid), it is not a problem. Where, however, it is 
selective, and used to confer advantages on particular en-
terprises, it clearly is a problem. From the Community's 
standpoint there are dangers associated with uncoordinated 
action. First, some of the benefits of a common commercial 
policy could be eroded if Member States make greater inde-
pendent use of investment incentives. Second, conflicts over 
investment policy could spill over to other issues thereby 
threatening consensus. Third, from the standpoint of the 
Community as a whole, competition between Member States 
to attract inward investment redistributes some of potential 
gains from FOi away from the host country, and towards 
the investing corporation. 
Table 65 
State aid to manufacturing - yearly averages, 1986-88 
Million ECU Percentage Percentage Percentage ECU 
GDP GVA 1 GFCF1 per person 
employed' 
B 1 054 0,9 4,3 19,0 1 437 
DK 275 0,3 1,9 5,52 519 
D 7 639 0,8 2,7 15,7 963 
GR 1 043 2,5 15,8 n.a. n.a. 
E 2 930 1,2 4,9 n.a. 1 207 
F 5 664 0,7 3,7 17,5 1 253 
fRL 408 1,6 6,1 35,03 1 947 
I 9 563 1,5 6,3 27,72 1 900 
L 34 0,7 2,5 10,52 892 
NL 1 070 0,6 3,2 10,6 1 182 
p 462 1,4 5,3 28,4 568 
UK 3 570 0,6 2,6 15,2 666 
EUR 12 33 714 0,9 3,8 n.a. I 1474 
1 Gross value-added, gross fixed capital formation and occupied population in manufacturing. 
Manufacturing GVA estimated for Ireland. 
2 1986 only. 
3 Average of 1986 and 1987. 
4 Excluding Greece. 
Source: European Economy No 48, Sept. 1991. 
One has to take care not to overstate the potential dangers 
here. The evidence on intra-industry specialization is limited. 
Moreover, FOi appears to be related to intra-industry speci-
alization - thus the increase in FOi which has occurred 
is likely to stimulate intra- as opposed to inter-industry 
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specialization. Important efforts have been made at the 
Community level to avoid the undesirable consequences that 
uncontrolled State aid could have for the internal market 
and trade among Member States. We should also note that 
progress has been made on consensus building· and recent 
measures have been undertaken to improve transparency 
and enforce disciplines (e.g. the repayment of illegal subsid-
ies). In addition, the Commission has attempted to bring in 
a systematic force in the form of increased resources for 
regional support. 
Thus, policy coordination across Member States may be an 
important issue. So too might policy compatibility. The 
discussion in the previous section implied that alternative 
policies can substitute for each other. The basic theory of 
trade policy confirms that this is so. Recent research has 
revealed important interconnections between trade policy, 
investment policy, competition policy and regulation in the 
services sector. Therefore, in addition to harmonization of 
investment measures, there is also an issue of the compati-
bility of investment measures and other measures. 
The problem of policy compatibility arises for three reasons. 
First, as we have already stressed, increasing openness of 
economies means that investment policy can no longer be 
thought of simply as a non-border measure. Many instru-
ments of investment policy have trade effects. Second, and 
related to the foregoing, different instruments of policy can 
have equivalent effects. Third, investment policy might have 
multiple objectives - both macroeconomic and microecon-
omic. This potentially gives rise to two problems - feedback 
between policy instruments, and porosity across instruments. 
Feedback can be positive or negative, reinforcing or counter-
acting the effects of other policies. An example of positive 
feedback is where tax allowances encourage investment in 
a particular region, where other government policies like 
location of central services are in place. An example of 
negative feedback would be where State aid to encourage 
investment in a particular sector run counter to the objectives 
of competition policy. Clearly in the latter case policy con-
flict arises. Not only can this lead to conflict between agen-
cies it can also stimulate further feedback effects. From the 
Community's standpoint it is not a trivial issue. Macro-
economic policy coordination is high on the political agenda, 
as it is seen as central to securing the full benefits of the 
single market, and moving the Community closer to a single 
currency. Microeconomic policy coordination across policies 
is also necessary if the full benefits of a single market are to 
be realized. 
This is related to the problem of porosity. Because different 
policy instruments can have equivalent effects, regulation in 
one area can lead to increased use of unregulated instru-
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ments. If, for example, investment grants are tightly regu-
lated, more flexible arrangements on reporting, or tax incen-
tives, could be offered to attract a MNE. This is important 
both from a regional and multilateral standpoint. If there are 
perceived to be net benefits from FOi, and if governments 
compete to secure such investment, the by-product distor-
tions of intervention are minimized with compatible policies. 
Again, one must take care not to exaggerate this. The whole 
point of harmonization is to reduce the potential for po-
rosity. 
There is also a global dimension to this. One of the major 
priorities for the Uruguay Round negotiations is to ensure 
that agreements on TRIMs, subsidies, services and IPRs are 
compatible. Beyond Uruguay, a key issue for any world 
trade organization is the compatibility of regulation in these 
areas with competition policy. These are issues we return to 
in the next section. 
7. Multilateral rules on investment 
From the data provided in Section 2, and subsequent dis-
cussion, two points stand out. First, MNEs are key actors, 
and increasingly so, in the process of international specializa-
tion and exchange. Second, a wide range of policy instru-
ments are available to influence the locational decisions of 
MNEs. By definition MNEs are internationally mobile. 
Their ability to arbitrage regulatory regimes or support 
measures can be a source of both policy competition and 
policy conflict. The growing influence of MNEs has resulted 
in a great deal of international negotiation and cooperation 
to set standards regarding the treatment which they face 
in host countries and, to a lesser extent, to regulate their 
behaviour. The output of international negotiations has var-
ied somewhat depending upon the nature of the agreement 
and its coverage: from legal instruments through codes of 
conduct to understandings; and agreements/arrangements 
which can be bilateral, regional or multilateral. 
As noted in Section 3, investment policy has historically 
been regarded by host governments as a non-border instru-
ment. This being so, it is hardly surprising that bilateral 
treaties should have proliferated, with close to 300 in exist-
ence. Their function is largely as a signalling mechanism -
host governments commit to certain standards of treatment 
relating to nationalization, compensation, most favoured 
nation treatment, dispute settlement and so on. As such they 
can offer insurance of sorts to inward investors. As with 
bilateral trading arrangements, however, the resulting patch-
work is a less efficient, less transparent solution than a 
multilateral regime. 
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As Table 66 shows, there have been a large number of 
regional and multilateral agreements relating to MNEs since 
the early 1960s, especially regional arrangements. The titles 
of the various treaties, conventions and codes give an indi-
cation of their coverage. Mostly they are directed at setting 
standards relating to inter alia: treatment of investors; invest-
ment climate; entry conditions; ownership; conditions of 
employment; transfer of technology; consumer protection; 
jurisdiction; dispute settlement. The most active multilateral 
forum has been the OECD, followed by the World Bank. 
Since, however, GAIT is now involved in the issue, it could 
become the lead institution. Although there are a myriad of 
agreements/arrangements there appears to be some conver-
gence of practice, and this has laid the foundation for the 
draft UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations. 
In so far as MNEs arbitrage regulatory regimes, and this 
can distort investment flows, some kind of multilateral ar-
rangements are clearly in order. MNEs can also arbitrage 
policy regimes, however. Thus, we need to enquire into the 
status of informational agreements governing the use of 
investment incentives both by home and host governments. 
The principal instrument of the former is export credits; 
whilst as we have seen, many host governments are known 
to have recourse to a range of incentives and TRIMs. 
TRIMs were explicitly included as an agenda item on the 
Uruguay Round. Developing countries in particular have 
resisted multilateral disciplines on the grounds that many 
TRIMs do not have direct trade-distorting effects, and even 
those that do are investment measures rather than border 
measures. The submissions of most industrialized countries 
are equally adamant that some TRIMs (most notably local 
content and minimum export requirements) have trade-dis-
torting effects, and their use needs to be disciplined. At the 
time of writing, a draft text including the principle of a 
waiver for developing and least developed countries, on a 
time-constrained basis, has been informally agreed. Since 
local content requirements have been found by a GA TT 
panel to be contrary to Article III in at least one important 
case (against the Canadian Foreign Investment Review Ag-
ency (FIRA) ), it is probable that greater discipline can be 
brought to bear on TRIMs through existing mechanisms. 
This together with the (surprising) degree of consensus on 
the part of industrialized countries regarding the principle 
of disciplining trade-distorting TRIMs make an eventual 
agreement likely. 
Investment incentives are also a fairly heterogeneous mix of 
instruments. The most commonly used are some form of 
direct subsidy typically operating through a cash grant, 
accelerated depreciation or development subvention. Several 
GATT Articles pertain to subsidies - VI, XVI and XXIII. 
Table 66 
Main international arrangements relating to transnational corporations 
Title 
A - Comprehensive instruments 
Draft UN code of conduct on trans-
national corporations 
Date of adoption 
Declaration on international investment 21 June 1976 
and multinational enterprises 
Andean foreign investment code: Com- 12 May 1987 
mon regime of treatment of foreign 
capital and trade marks, patents, 
licences and royalties (Decision 220) 
B - Instruments dealing with particular issues 
Organization 
United Nations 
OECD 
The Cartagena 
Agreement 
(Andean Pact) 
Code of liberalization of capital move- 19 December 1961 OECD 
ments 
Code of liberalization of current invis- 13 December 1961 OECD 
ible operations 
Convention on the settlement of invest- 18 March 1965 
ment disputes between States and 
nationals of other States 
Convention establishing the inter-Arab 1970 
Investment Guarantee Corp. (IAIGC) 
Convention on a code of conduct for 6 April 1974 
Liner Conferences 
European Convention on product Jiab- 27 January 1977 
ility with regard to personal injury and 
death 
Model convention for the avoidance of 11 April 1977 
double taxation in respect of taxes on 
income and on capital 
Recommendation concerning the safety 
of consumer products 
Guidelines on the protection of privacy 
and transborder flows of personal data 
The set of multilaterally agreed equi-
table principles and rules for the control 
of restrictive business practices 
International code on the marketing of 
breast milk substitutes 
Principles concerning transfrontier 
movements of hazardous wastes 
First, Second and Third ACP-EEC 
Conventions of Lome 
United Nations guidelines for consumer 
protection 
' Multilateral/regional. 
18 December 1979 
23 September 1980 
5 December 1980 
21 May 1981 
I February 1984 
28 February 1975 
31 October 1979 
8 December 1984 
9 April 1985 
World Bank 
Council for Arab 
Economic Unity 
(CAEU) 
Unctad 
Council of Europe 
OECD 
OECD 
OECD 
Unctad 
WHO 
OECD 
ACP/EC 
Governments 
UN 
I - Trade and foreign direct investment 
M/R 1 ugal form Status 
M To be decided Under negotiation 
R Recommendation and 
decision of the Council 
R Decision of the 
Commission 
R Decision of the Council 
R Decision of the Council 
M Convention 
R Convention 
Adopted 
Adopted 
Adopted 
Adopted 
Adopted 
In force 
Adopted 
M International Convention Adopted 
In force 
R Convention Adopted 
R Recommendation of 
the Council 
R 
R 
M 
M 
R 
R 
M 
Recommendation of 
the Council 
Recommendation of 
the Council 
General Assembly 
Resolution 35.63 
Resolution of the World 
Health Assembly (34.22) 
Recommendation and 
decision of the Council 
Conventions 
General Assembly 
Resolution 39.248 
In force 
Adopted 
Adopted 
Adopted 
Adopted 
Adopted 
Adopted 
Adopted 
In force 
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Table 66 - contd. 
Title Date or adoption Organization M/R 1 Legal fonn Status 
Declaration on transborder data flows 11 April 1985 OECD R Declaration Adopted 
Convention establishing the Multilat- 11 October 1985 World Bank M Convention Adopted 
era! Investment Guarantee Agency Not in force 
(MIGA) 
International code of conduct on the 28 November 1985 FAO M Resolution of the Adopted 
distribution and use of pesticides F AO Conference 
Revised code of conduct for companies 19 November 1985 Ministers for R Recommendation Adopted 
from the EC with subsidiaries, branches Foreign Affairs of 
or representatives in South Africa EC States 
Draft UN code of conduct on the trans- Unctad M To be decided Under negotiation 
fer of technology 
Draft international agreement on illicit United Nations M Not adopted 
payments 
' Multilateral/regional. 
The first sanctions recourse to countervailing duties (CVDs), 
if material injury can be associated with a subsidy. Article 
XVI places an obligation on contracting parties to notify any 
trade relevant subsidies, whilst XXIII sanctions retaliation if 
rights under XVI are impaired or nullified. The Code on 
Subsidies agreed in the Tokyo Round supplements and clari-
fies these obligations but has not worked well. Thus, subsid-
ies too are an agenda item on the Uruguay Round. Some 
convergence has occurred on the part of contracting parties 
around the so-called traffic light approach. This states that 
some State aid be prohibited (e.g. export subsidies); some 
be permitted (e.g. non-discriminatory measures like pro-
vision for infrastructure); and some be actionable where 
material injury can be established. The sticking point to an 
agreement here relates not to the traffic light principle but 
to the components of the various categories. As with TRIMs 
if an agreement is reached, it should bring greater discipline 
to the use of investment incentives. 
The final issue we should address on multilateral issues is to 
consider how disciplines could evolve under the auspices of 
GA TT. This is not to assert that the GATT is the only 
forum in which agreement could be reached - as we have 
seen, both the UN and the OECD have been active in this 
respect. If, however, significant progress is to be made, the 
GA TT is the key institution. The OECD is essentially seen 
as a Northern club by developing countries and the UN is 
not in a position to nest any codes in the wider framework 
of trade rules. The latter is especially important since invest-
ment rules are part of a much bigger picture. As borders 
shift back with increasing openness, and the role of conven-
tional trade instruments, most notably tariffs, declines, issues 
that were formerly regarded as non-border measures -
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investment policies, regulation of services, protection of in-
tellectual property, competition policy - are increasingly 
becoming the subject of trade friction. The inclusion of 
services, intellectual property rights (IPRs) and TRIMs on 
the Uruguay Round agenda is an acknowledgement of this 
imperative. Circumstances in the world economy and world-
trading system have changed profoundly since the GA TT's 
inception; and the need for a more rules-based system which 
can accommodate investment, as well as other issues, is 
paramount. 
This, of course, begs the question of exactly how investment 
can be accommodated under GA TT disciplines. This is an 
issue recently addressed by Greenaway and Sapir (1992) in 
an assessment of progress on all the new issues, i.e. services 
and IPRs as well as investment. It was argued there that 
GA TT disciplines as they apply to merchandise could not 
be transposed to the new issues - complete harmonization 
is not necessarily desirable, let alone feasible. This is so 
because differences in regulatory regimes arise for historical 
reasons, and it is not always clear that one regulatory regime 
is necessarily more efficient than another. Efforts at complete 
harmonization would quickly run up against the buffer of 
national sovereignty. However, the principles on which 
GA TT disciplines are based can be extended to the new 
issues in general, and investment in particular. Specifically, 
national treatment, mutual recognition and most favoured 
nation are all transferable. In the case of investment the first 
two are especially important. For the Uruguay Round this 
means identifying those TRIMs which have significant trade-
distorting effects and affirming the applicability of appropri-
ate GA TT articles. Thus, in the case of local content require-
ments, Article III is clearly germane. As argued above, 
however, TRIMs are only part of the picture and, in the 
longer term a code covering direct investment is required, 
embracing rights of establishment, home and host country 
obligations and dispute settlement mechanisms. It is notable 
that in the European Community where a great deal of 
convergence has already taken place and where Member 
States have a long history of cooperation, progress is being 
made on the basis of directives which affirm national treat-
ment and mutual recognition, rather than attempts to secure 
harmonization. That experience offers a valuable guidepost 
to the wider trading community. 
8. Conclusions 
FOi has a long history as a market access strategy. Over the 
last decade its importance has increased dramatically, due 
largely to the interaction of a number of globalization forces 
- the continued growth of international trade; increasing 
liberalization and openness of national markets; integration 
of capital markets; innovations in managerial structures. 
The European Community is at the forefront of these devel-
opments, as the major host to and source of FOi globally. 
The Community's single market programme has increased 
its attractiveness as an investment location, especially to 
Japanese corporations which are the key marginal suppliers 
of FOi. The 1992 programme has also stimulated an upsurge 
I - Trade and foreign direct investment 
in intra-Community cross-border investment, as restructur-
ing efforts prepare European firms for the single market. 
The continued decline of 'traditional' border m<.asures like 
tariffs, combined with increasing openness, will place invest-
ment measures at the forefront in the 1990s. Governments 
have at their disposal a wide array of instruments which can 
be deployed in an attempt to influence the location, level 
or composition as well as the distribution of gains, from 
investment. Notwithstanding a large number of codes and 
arrangements/agreements multilateral disciplines on invest-
ment measures are weak. In the absence of further multilat-
eral measures, there will be pressures for regional and/or 
bilateral agreements. As with merchandise trade this would 
be second-best to multilateral disciplines which encompass 
all GATT signatories. Multilateral disciplines will maximize 
the potential net benefits of cross-border investment, and 
minimize the likelihood of investment tensions replacing 
trade tensions as a source of policy competition. Since the 
process of integration is further advanced in the Community 
than elsewhere, more progress has been made in affirming 
national treatment and mutual recognition as key principles 
governing cross-border investment. The wider international 
community could usefully learn from this in framing the 
more rules-based regime which will be necessary to incorpor-
ate investment, services, intellectual property protection and 
competition policy into the GA TT framework. 
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Summary 
This paper provides evidence about the recent trend towards 
more global markets in services, surveys the economic argu-
ments behind liberalization efforts, and examines the dy-
namic relationship between the single market programme in 
services (SMPS) of the European Community and the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services (GA TS) in the coming 
years. It yields seven main results. 
1. The shares of the major world trading countries for trade 
in services are similar to their shares for trade in goods 
(including the fact that developing countries successful in 
trade in goods are among the leading trading countries in 
services). However, the shares of foreign direct investment 
devoted to services, a crucial element for international com-
petition in services, are not very different between the major 
world trading countries. 
2. Evidence suggests an early, yet modest, impact of the 
SMPS on EC trade in services. The growth of intra-EC trade 
in services is faster than the growth of extra-EC trade, 
though the intra-EC share of EC total trade is lower in 
services than in goods. Intra-EC inflows of foreign direct 
investment have increased more than extra-EC inflows 
though extra-EC mergers and acquisitions operations ar; 
more numerous than intra-EC operations. 
3. Trade liberalization in services is a profitable policy. 
Comparative advantage is valid for services as well as for 
goods, despite the non-storability and intangible nature of 
services. Moreover, a 'dualistic' specialization pattern (with 
developed countries completely specialized in services and 
developing countries completely specialized in goods) is un-
likely. Trade barriers are not the best solution to the complex 
problems of information or reputation related to the intangi-
bility of services, particularly in the context of 'infant' service 
industries. 
4. 'Offers' tabled at the Uruguay Round negotiations aimed 
at promoting trade liberalization lead to two observations: 
OECD countries' offers tend to cover more sectors than 
developing countries or NIEs, and the breakdown of the 
initial offers by sector presents a wide range of liberalization 
offers. 
5. Trade liberalization would benefit from the implemen-
tation of a multilateral 'trade policy review' of the major 
policy instruments used by the countries for restricting trade 
I would like to thank A. Sapir, J. Scheele, B. Hoekman and the partici-
pants of the working group for very useful comments and suggestions. 
in services. Such a review mechanism could rely on a tax-
onomy based on quantitative measures (quotas on domestic 
consumption, on imports and exports, and on inputs), on 
price instruments (tariffs, minimum or maximum prices), 
and measures aimed at creating a competitive environment 
(competition laws, laws specifying property rights) or an 
adequate level of information (prudential or disclosure 
rules). 
6. There is a fundamental difference between the liberaliza-
tion approaches of the SMPS and the GA TS. According to 
the Treaty of Rome, the foundation of the SMPS, the single 
market goal requires the liberalization of both cross-border-
based and establishment-based trade in services typically 
through the structure of 'mutual recognition' and 'minimal 
harmonization'. In contrast, the GATS defines four 'modes 
of supply' (cross-border trade, movement of service con-
sumers, movement of service producers, and establishment 
of services providers in the foreign markets) and leaves open 
the possibility to liberalize only certain modes of supply, 
and thereby to limit the extent of trade liberalization. In 
particular, liberalization limited to establishment-based 
trade may lead to small gains. Competition in the service 
market concerned may not be greatly enhanced and it may be 
accompanied by adjustment costs high enough to discourage 
further steps of liberalization. 
7. As a result, interactions between the SMPS and the GATS 
will be important for determining the real extent of trade 
liberalization in the coming years. It is argued that the SMPS 
is likely to be a driving force for exploiting the 'sleeping' 
opportunities of the GA TS for three reasons. First, the 
SMPS conceives national regulations as dynamic instru-
ments of competition, a heritage from the crucial 'Cassis de 
Dijon' ruling of the European Court of Justice. A constant 
search for optimal national regulations within the Com-
munity may spill over to the rest of the world through 
reciprocity or mimetism. In particular, mimetism is a channel 
through which the SMPS could influence the rest of the 
world, as illustrated by the SMPS acting as a source of 
inspiration for the reforms of US regulations on banking. 
Second, the whole SMPS exercise is based on a sophisticated 
enforcement of the competition rules of the Treaty of Rome, 
not only Articles 85 and 86, but also Article 90 (competition 
rules for public firms), 'exemptions' and 'block exemptions' 
from competition rules. Moreover, the SMPS is a multilat-
eral effort to solve the difficult problem of 'sustaining' com-
petition in services (deregulation of service industries may 
be followed by an increase in concentration, often after a 
period of decreased concentration). As a result, the SMPS 
may shift the GATS from a neutral attitude in terms of 
market structures (monopolies and 'exclusive service pro-
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viders' are recognized as legitimate market structures) to an 
attitude fully concerned with the possible impact of non-
competitive market structures on market access. Lastly, the 
wide range of levels of economic development among EC 
Member States suggests that countries having wide differ-
ences between their regulatory framework can indeed engage 
in services liberalization without the need for 'special treat-
ment', provided there are adequate measures for introducing 
progressive liberalization. 
Introduction 
Until the 1970s, international trade in services was ruled by 
a complex set of bilateral and sectoral agreements, with no 
widely endorsed multisectoral and multilateral agreements. 
The 1980s have witnessed two decisive efforts to integrate 
all services sectors into the kind of unified legal framework 
existing for international trade in goods: the free trade-
oriented single market programme in services (hereafter 
SMPS), and the liberalization of service industries under-
taken at the world level under the auspices of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (hereafter GATS) of the 
Uruguay Round. 
The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to provide evidence 
about the recent trend toward more global markets in ser-
vices and to examine economic arguments behind liberaliza-
tion efforts (and the erosion of the factual and conceptual 
differences between services and goods which have been 
prevailing since World War I); second, to examine the dy-
namic relationships between the SMPS and the GA TS which 
are likely to characterize the coming years. Examining ser-
vices also requires covering forms of competition other than 
cross-border trade: the analysis will thus review foreign 
direct investment, labour mobility, and the establishment of 
firms in foreign markets in the area of services because, 
until now, these instruments have been frequent tools of 
international competition in services. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 documents 
trends in world trade in services, and focuses on the evolution 
of EC trade in services since the start of the SMPS ( 1986). 
Section 2 presents the main analytical issues raised by lib-
eralization of trade in services in the Community as well as 
at world level. Section 3 provides an overview of the main 
types of barriers to trade in services and suggests a taxonomy 
of the major policy instruments used for regulating services 
industries. Section 4 outlines the fundamental differences 
between the SMPS and the GATS. Lastly, Section 5 exam-
ines the likely impact of the SMPS on the service industries 
of the rest of the world in the future. 
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1. International competition in services: 
major trends 
In order to see whether there are early signs of the impact 
of the SMPS, 1 this section presents the increasing importance 
of trade in services in the world trade during the 1980s, with 
special emphasis on both extra-EC and intra-EC competition 
in services. The analysis on the Community is split into two 
time-periods, before and after the publication of the White 
Paper (1985). This exercise requires two caveats. First, as 
most of the 55 directives concerning all the major service 
industries which constitute the SMPS were introduced into 
Member States' laws in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
data here reveal more about the preparations to the SMPS 
than its direct impact. Second, it is well known that data on 
international competition in services have not reached the 
same level of detail and quality as data on trade in goods. 
In particular, a substantial risk of error flows from the 
growing interest in services, which has generated increasing 
efforts to produce more exhaustive data, potentially leading 
to inflated annual rates of growth (Hoekman, 1990).2 
1.1. Trends in world competition in services 
Table 67 presents an overview of world competition in 
services at the level of cross-border trade and establishment. 
Cross-border trade is illustrated by leading exporters and 
importers which represent more than 1 % of world exports 
or imports of private services. 3 It leads to two observations. 
First, the structure of trade in services by countries is not 
very different from the pattern for trade in goods: the shares 
of the USA, Japan, intra- and extra-EC trade in world trade 
are not very far from their levels in trade in goods; and those 
developing countries which are successful in manufacturing 
are among the leading trading partners in services. Second, 
Until 1985, unilateral liberalizations undertaken by a few EC Member 
States were not accompanied by EC measures, except for a first gener-
ation of EC Directives in insurance adopted in the 1970s which aimed 
at facilitating the freedom of establishment, but failed to do so. 
The use of averages for the pre- and post-1986 periods reduces but does 
not eliminate this risk. Most of the data used in this section are based 
on Eurostat estimates which rely on balance-of-payments statistics. Such 
statistics have many shortcomings: they can be based on net flows 
(telecommunications) or gross flows representing transactions larger 
than the value of the services (insurance, trading), or they do not cover 
all transactions (banking). For details on the methodology used to 
address these problems, see Eurostat (1991 ). 
Private services include travel, transport, non-merchandise insurance, 
communications, advertising, brokerage and management services, leas-
ing, trading, and other professional and technical services. 
II - Services 
Table 67 
Leading traders and FDI host economies in services 
Countries Private services Foreign direct 
(1987) investment 
Expons lmpons Total FDI in Year FDI (c) services (d) 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
European Community 
Belgium and Luxembourg 19 3,8 17 3,3 6,6 17,3 1981 
Denmark 8 1,6 7 1,4 
France 53 10,5 43 8,3 2,7 63,3 1985 
Germany 41 8,1 65 12,6 6,5 46,1 1985 
Italy 33 6,5 26 5,0 3,9 37,0 1985 
Netherlands 23 4,6 23 4,5 16,2 42,7 1984 
Spain 22 4,4 8 1,6 4,4 30,9 1984 
United Kingdom 43 8,5 33 6,4 11,9 34,5 1984 
EFT A countries 
Austria 15 3,0 9 1,7 4,4 44,6 1981 
Finland 5 1,0 1,3 41,3 1986 
Norway 8 1,6 10 1,9 
Sweden 9 1,8 10 1,9 
Switzerland 14 2,8 12 2,3 
Other countries 
Australia 5 1,0 8 1,6 10,5 47,0 1983 
Canada 11 2,2 16 3,1 18,4 28,9 1984 
Hong Kong 7 1,4 5 1,0 89,0 63,2 1981 
Japan 28 5,6 52 10,1 0,4 28,6 1986 
Korea 8 1,6 5 1,0 2,1 31,8 1986 
Mexico 7 1,4 5 1,0 5,6 23,7 1981 
Saudi Arabia 9 1,7 
Singapore 7 1,4 5 1,0 63,5 51,2 1981 
South Africa 5 1,0 
Taiwan 6 1,2 8,3 23,7 1986 
Thailand 4 0,8 5,4 45,0 1985 
USA 56 11,1 56 10,9 5,0 53,1 1986 
Yugoslavia 5 1,0 
(f) (f) 
World 504 100,0 516 100,0 
Countries (e) 421 83,5 445 86,2 14,0 39,7 
EC countries 242 48,0 222 43,0 7,5 38,8 
EFT A countries 46 9,1 46 8,9 2,8 42,9 
(a) Values, in 1987 billion USD. 
(b) Shares as a percentage of world trade in private services. 
(c) Inward stock of total FDI, as a percentage of the GDP of the year mentioned. 
(d) FDI in services as a percentage of total inward stock of FDI. 
(e) All countries (with available data) listed. 
(f) Unwcighted averages. 
Sources: Hockman (1990); UNCTC (1988). 
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net trade flows in services show a mirror image in terms of 
net trade flows in goods - a manifestation of the trade 
balance constraint: net exporters of goods (Germany, Japan) 
tend to be net importers of private services, and vice versa 
(France, United Kingdom, and USA). 
Factor movements and establishment of subsidiaries in for-
eign markets are essential tools of international competition 
in services. Table 67 provides the total inward stock of 
foreign direct investment for selected leading trading part-
ners (as a percentage of GDP) and the share of this FDI 
devoted to service industries. On average, the Community 
is not very different from the rest of the world (excluding 
the special cases of Hong Kong and Singapore), though the 
variance between EC Member States is lower than that 
observed between the countries in the rest of the world, and 
despite the fact that two EC Member States (France and 
Italy) appear less open than the rest of the Community (and 
most industrial countries). 
Table 68 
1.2. EC cross-border trade in services 
EC cross-border trade in services is examined by trading 
partners (Table 68) and by sectors (Table 69). Tables 70 to 
72 refine these overviews by giving a breakdown by Member 
State. Table 73 aims at providing some information on other 
major forms of international competition in services, e.g. 
establishment through mergers, acquisitions, and foreign 
direct investment. All these tables seek to test whether there 
has been an early impact of the SMPS, through an increase 
in intra-EC competition (trade or establishment), and by an 
acceleration of extra-EC competition. 
Table 68, which presents a breakdown of cross-border trade 
flows in services by class of trading partner, yields three 
results. First, the intra-EC share of the EC total (intra- and 
extra-) trade is lower in services than in goods. Second, the 
growth of the intra-EC trade in services between the two 
periods is faster than the growth of extra-EC trade in ser-
Geographical breakdown of cross-border trade in services and merchandise of the Community (1980-89) 
Credits Rate Debits Rate 
or or 
Average 1980-85 Average 1986-89 growth Average 1980-85 Average 1986-89 growth 
Mio ECU % Mio ECU % Mio ECU % Mio ECU % 
Services 
World 171 557 100,0 222 412 100,0 29,6 153 033 100,0 206 577 100,0 35,0 
Intra-EC 70 737 41,2 98 766 44,4 39,6 68 688 44,9 100 627 48,7 46,5 
Extra-EC 100 821 58,8 123 647 55,6 22,6 84 345 55,1 105 950 51,3 25,6 
Class I countries 58 497 34,1 80 323 36,1 37,3 52 981 34,6 69 563 33,7 31,3 
USA 29 918 17,4 38 138 17,l 27,5 25 408 16,6 32 332 15,7 27,3 
Japan 3 852 2,2 6 399 2,9 66,1 2 339 1,5 3 605 1,7 54,1 
EFT A countries 17 078 10,0 25 801 11,6 51,1 18 903 12,4 24 746 12,0 30,9 
Class 2 countries 35 236 20,5 34 873 15,7 -1,0 24 919 16,3 28 139 13,6 12,9 
Class 3 countries 3 204 1,9 3 762 1,7 17,4 3 163 2,1 4 230 2,0 33,7 
Not allocated 3 884 2,3 4 689 2,1 20,7 3 282 2,1 4018 1,9 22,4 
Merchandise 
World 636 156 100,0 857 564 100,0 34,8 647 737 100,0 835 998 100,0 29,1 
Intra-EC 335 880 52,8 498 271 58,1 48,3 329 290 50,8 484 508 58,0 47,1 
Extra-EC 300 276 47,2 359 293 41,9 19,7 318 447 49,2 351 490 42,0 10,4 
Class I countries 152 458 24,0 218 816 25,5 43,5 158 960 24,5 215 477 25,8 35,6 
USA 54 624 8,6 74437 8,7 36,3 55 117 8,5 63 602 7,6 15,4 
Japan 7 390 1,2 15 323 1,8 107,3 22 022 3,4 39 074 4,7 77,4 
EFT A countries 64 262 10,1 95 496 11,1 48,6 60 161 9,3 85 941 10,3 42,9 
Class 2 countries 115 911 18,2 108 171 12,6 -6,7 123 124 19,0 100 854 12,1 -18,1 
Class 3 countries 24400 3,8 27 295 3,2 11,9 29 084 4,5 28 398 3,4 -2,4 
Not allocated 7 507 1,2 5 011 0,6 -33,2 7 280 !,! 6 761 0,8 -7,1 
Values are in million ECU. Rates of growth are between the two periods. Class 2 countries concern developing economics. Class 3 countries concern non-mark.et economies. 
Sources: OECD-Eurostat (1991); author's computations. 
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vices. Lastly, the difference between intra- and extra-EC 
trade growth in services is smaller than the difference ob-
served in the case of trade in goods. 1 All together, these 
observations are consistent with an early impact of the 
SMPS, albeit a modest one, since so far there has been no 
catching-up effect vis-a-vis trade in goods. 
Table 69 provides a breakdown of EC cross-border trade in 
services by sector. A first indicator is the 'openness ratio', 
i.e. the share of total (extra-EC and intra-EC) imports in 
services with respect to the EC GNP. For the two periods, 
High growth rates of cross-border trade with Japan are partly due to 
the low initial figures, and also to the rapidly expanding links between 
the Japanese and EC economies (as shown by data on merchandise). 
Table 69 
Sectoral breakdown of cross-border services trade of the Community 
Sectors 1980-85 
Average Variance 
Openness ratios2 
Merchandise 23,5 
All services 5,6 
Intra-EC trade share of the EC total trade3 
Merchandise 52,8 0,9 
All services 41,3 0,6 
Travel 52,1 7,5 
Sea freight 38,1 1,3 
Sea passenger 41,3 0,9 
Air freight 22,2 3,1 
Air passenger 25,3 0,9 
Other transport 50,3 0,8 
Banking 28,6 0,6 
Insurance 18,6 1,9 
Trade earnings 42,9 1,1 
Advertising 48,8 2,3 
Business services 32,1 1,3 
Construction 12,0 1,4 
Telecommunications 30,7 0,6 
Films and TV 22,8 2,1 
Patents incomes 32,3 0,4 
Other services 48,2 0,9 
Ratio of the growth rate for intra-EC trade with respect to the growth rate for total EC trade. 
Total (extra- and intra-EC) debits as a per cent of the GDP of EC 12. 
J Intra-EC credits as a per cent of the total (extra- and intra-) EC credits. 
Sources: OECD-Eurostat ( 1991 ); author's computations. 
II - Services 
the ratios are four times smaller than the corresponding 
ratios for the manufacturing sector, a result which confirms 
the striking difference between trade levels in services and 
in goods observed for all the OECD countries (Hoekman, 
1991). Table 69 also allows the examination of the changes 
in intra-EC trade share with respect to total (extra-EC and 
intra-EC) trade in services between the pre- and post-SMPS 
periods. It shows a substantial increase in intra-EC trade 
shares between the two periods. At this early stage of the 
SMPS, these changes can reflect either the SMPS liberaliza-
tion process concerning both intra-EC and extra-EC trade 
(with a more important impact on the intra-EC side), or the 
effects of the existing Member State protection against non-
EC providers of services. Finally, the relative growth rate 
(intra-EC trade compared to total EC) for the whole service 
sector is still lower than the relative growth rate observed 
1986-89 Relative 
rnte of 
Average Variance growth 1 (%) 
21,2 
5,2 
58,0 2,9 38,9 
44,3 1,6 33,6 
53,2 1,0 10,3 
38,1 0,8 -14,5 
48,J 2,9 79,5 
24,5 1,9 31,2 
27,7 6,9 53,0 
49,2 1,5 -17,7 
32,7 4,4 30,1 
20,5 13,7 21,6 
46,0 2,3 40,4 
52,8 6,5 24,3 
42,0 8,7 244,6 
18,3 1,8 -150,7 
32,7 3,9 23,0 
35,6 6,1 139,2 
33,9 0,2 14,7 
50,9 13,4 17,3 
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for goods, and is likely to reflect the fact that the SMPS is 
still at an early stage. 
Tables 70 and 71 present the share of each Member State in 
extra-EC trade for the more recent period (1986-89). The 
fact that data are not of equal quality among EC Member 
States (for instance, the German shares in the extra-EC trade 
in banking are largely related to data problems) limits the 
range of robust observations. The shares of the whole ser-
vices sector (in terms of debits) are relatively close to the 
shares of goods for all the EC Member States. Table 72 also 
presents the growth rates for the pre- and post-SMPS periods 
of the shares held by EC Member States in extra-EC trade. 
It shows that several changes have affected all the Member 
States (such as construction), whereas most changes may 
reveal ongoing structural adjustments in each Member State. 
Table 70 
1.3. Establishment-based competition 
in EC services 
Protection imposed until 1986 by most Member States 
against intra-EC and extra-EC service providers is likely to 
have discouraged cross-border trade in services, and thus to 
have favoured (in relative terms) other forms of competition, 
in particular through establishment-based competition 
(which in turn may tend to further reduce incentives to cross-
border trade). 
Table 73 provides two crude indicators for measuring the 
intensity of the establishment-based competition in services 
in the Community, foreign direct investment and the number 
Share of each Member State in extra-EC cross-border trade in services (average shares in extra-EC debits for 1986-89) 
Service industries B/L DK D GR E F IRL NL p UK 
Travel 4,7 3,6 39,6 1,1 3,9 17,0 0,2 3,8 7,0 0,7 18,6 
All transport services 7,5 6,6 17,3 1,0 4,5 14,4 0,9 17,1 11,4 0,9 18,5 
Sea freight 12,7 4,0 12,9 5,1 8,6 26,5 19,2 7,7 
Sea passenger 0,4 50,6 1,0 5,9 18,6 1,4 20,5 
Air freight 14,9 0,3 7,4 2,0 22,0 18,1 4,5 22,8 
Air passenger 3,0 0,5 21,9 3,2 18,7 8,5 6,6 35,3 
Other transport 4,1 13,2 19,5 4,8 17,8 11,6 6,5 20,6 
All other services 7,9 2,8 29,4 1,0 3,2 19,5 0,7 16,8 6,4 0,5 11,5 
Banking 13,2 0,5 2,0 2,1 52,8 24,0 3,1 
Insurance 7,9 3,5 23,8 9,9 23,5 22,5 5,5 1,5 
Trade earnings 9,5 4,2 36,8 4,0 13,5 16,9 9,6 4,0 
Advertising 7,0 30,8 3,9 15,3 22,5 15,6 
Business services 9,2 24,2 3,1 20,1 20,5 9,5 7,3 
Construction 2,1 47,3 0,6 14,1 a 
Telecommunications 29,3 1,6 8,3 4,7 3,8 39,2 
Films and TV 2,0 0,6 15,5 4,3 14,0 23,7 9,0 28,5 
Patents incomes 7,4 3,6 25,5 3,5 16,2 7,8 10,9 22,6 
Other services 33,8 2,2 21,3 1,6 
All services 6,9 4,3 27,2 1,0 3,7 17,8 0,6 13,7 8,2 0,7 15,6 
Merchandise 6,8 3,0 26,8 1,2 5,8 15,2 1,1 12,4 7,4 1,2 19,2 
I Negative data have been disregarded. 
Sources: OECD-Eurostat (1991 ); author's computations. 
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Table 71 
Share of each Member State in extra-EC cross-border trade in services (average shares in extra-EC credits for 1986-89) 
Service industries 8/L DK D GR 
Travel 2,9 3,9 11,9 3,7 
All transport services 7,3 10,0 16,6 2,2 
Sea freight 12,8 12,7 11,7 
Sea passenger 0,9 5,5 4,4 
Air freight 18,8 1,4 27,7 
Air passenger 3,3 3,0 21,9 
Other transport 2,9 13,5 16,6 
All other services 7,7 2,3 18,8 2,0 
Banking 9,6 0,3 5,5 
Insurance 4,3 0,9 5,9 
Trade earnings 10,4 3,7 19,1 
Advertising 12,4 17,2 
Business services 10,7 14,5 
Construction 1,4 0,7 37,5 
Telecommunications 27,8 
Films and TV 0,3 3,9 
Patents incomes 5,1 4,9 22,0 
Other services 22,6 
All services 6,3 5,0 15,9 2,4 
Merchandise 6,5 3,3 34,0 0,6 
Sources: OECD·Eurostat (1991}; author's computations. 
of mergers and acquisitions. 1 These indicators provide two 
interesting results. Intra-EC inflows of foreign direct invest-
ments have increased more than extra-EC inflows, in appar-
ent contradiction to the more numerous extra-EC than intra-
EC mergers and acquisitions (stricto or largo sensu). How-
ever, these two diverging evolutions may be reconciled. Non-
EC firms may view mergers or acquisitions as a more necess-
ary step for the post-SMPS period than do EC-based firms 
which may consider themselves to be adequately 'European' 
so as to avoid this form of investment. Second, concerning 
the comparison between services and manufacturing, the 
two indicators provide the same results, at least if one looks 
at the intra-EC aspect stricto sensu. Growth rates for services 
at the extra-EC level are larger than growth rates for manu-
facturing, whereas they are lower at the intra-EC level. 
Moreover, it is interesting to observe that mergers and acqui-
Sapir (1991) provides evidence on world market shares (in terms of 
sales) for the largest firms in certain service and manufacturing sectors. 
E F IRL NL p UK 
16,I 23,3 1,0 10,9 2,6 2,6 21,0 
4,8 15,6 0,7 12,8 11,8 0,9 17,1 
2,4 9,1 26,1 4,2 15,6 
0,7 5,1 29,0 0,9 49,8 
1,2 20,1 4,6 7,2 17,1 
7,5 14,3 10,4 8,7 28,4 
6,3 22,1 2,8 22,0 10,2 
2,2 19,9 0,3 14,8 5,6 0,4 25,8 
1,8 24,7 14,5 2,7 38,4 
3,0 15,8 9,0 58,9 
4,4 7,3 20,1 11, I 20,9 
3,6 19,0 16,8 19,6 6,1 
1,2 25,3 10,6 6,5 26,1 
0,9 19,3 5,2 
3,6 12,1 6,0 3,5 32,9 
3,5 14,9 8,9 10,6 54,7 
0,6 12,6 3,8 7,2 41,1 
2,1 26,6 3,9 
6,3 21,5 0,6 12,8 6,7 1,1 21,3 
3,1 14,9 1,3 13,3 5,6 0,7 16,8 
sitions are increasing more rapidly in services than in goods 
at the intra-Member State level. This evolution may indicate 
that EC service providers are preparing the post-SMPS 
period by creating larger 'national' firms, an evolution 
which may mirror the willingness, either to lower transaction 
costs when building larger firms, or to put internal (Member 
State) markets under increased control. 
These results raise the following question: will the dis-
mantlement of trade barriers in services lead to a profound 
change in the relative role of cross-border trade and estab-
lishment as the two alternative instruments of international 
competition in services? Answering this question requires a 
comparison between the growth rates of cross-border trade 
in services (Table 68) and the growth rates of establishment 
in services (Table 73). Bearing in mind the low quality of 
the available data, the differences in the growth rates are 
large enough to suggest that, so far, the SMPS has triggered 
a more marked evolution in terms of establishment-based 
competition than in terms of cross-border-trade-based com-
petition. 
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Table 72 
Changes in shares of each Member State in extra-EC cross-border trade in services (growth rates between 1980-85 and 1986-89) 
Service industries Extra-EC credits 
EC B/L D F NL 
Travel 41,0 39,2 45,3 45,3 15,6 32,2 
All transport services 14,3 14,2 11,5 18,0 35,2 3,1 
Sea freight 4,8 25,2 -23,9 -35,4 79,8 -12,5 
Sea passenger 11,9 -63,2 100,5 1,9 26,4 -9,3 
Air freight 37,3 64,5 53,9 39,0 31,5 2,1 
Air passenger 20,2 17,7 26,4 0,9 8,6 2,0 
Other transport 17,4 -32,6 26,6 82,7 -47,0 6,8 
All other services 21,0 13,3 7,6 2,4 55,8 24,7 
Banking 108,4 106,9 63,3 280,4 14,6 74,5 
Insurance 66,8 82,6 71,9 39,5 60,6 
Trade earnings 15,9 -1,0 -9,2 -10,5 47,4 20,3 
Advertising 42,I 35,8 73,4 -0,1 148,6 25,5 
Business services -2,3 -22,2 46,3 -14,3 35,8 28,3 
Construction -30,8 -46,8 -36,I -47,9 -21,2 
Telecommunications 40,0 61,3 24,9 36,5 113,I 
Films and TV 39,3 8,1 210,I 34,7 90,6 
Patents incomes 53,5 76,6 61,5 58,6 40,4 102,2 
Other services 48,4 48,8 8,9 25,2 
All services 22,6 17,5 14,3 15,6 40,3 12,2 
Merchandise 19,7 9,5 34,I 11,7 18,3 19,9 
Sources: OECD-Eurostat (1991); author's computations. 
2. Analytical context 
As underlined by Sapir and Winter (1991), 'services have 
generally been ignored by trade economists on the ground 
that they are "non-traded" activities'. The early 1980s wit-
nessed the first studies on international trade in services. 
These studies were empirical, and written at a time when 
there existed virtually no theoretical papers specifically de-
voted to trade in services: their main objective was to test 
the hypothesis that trade in services is as consistent with 
cross-country differences in factor endowments and tech-
nology as trade in goods. Evidence provided by Sapir and 
Lutz (1981) gave the first robust support to the general 
presumption that services and goods follow similar economic 
rules. 
The rest of the 1980s witnessed a large increase in interest 
about trade in services as a result of a two-way influence 
between academics and trade officials. 1 The starting-point 
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For a detailed presentation of the empirical and theoretical studies on 
trade in services, see Sapir and Winter ( 1991 ). 
Extra-EC debits 
UK EC B/L D F NL UK 
30,8 50,8 34,5 40,I 52,6 91,I 33,9 72,5 
-3,8 15,2 8,2 5,9 10,3 49,4 4,9 11,7 
-16,2 6,0 9,5 -21,I -31,2 56,8 13,7 -19,1 
6,0 46,5 -345,5 45,8 65,4 237,5 11,1 42,8 
11,2 40,1 54,8 104,6 39,4 42,5 10,5 22,0 
28,8 52,7 -8,8 40,5 48,7 138,6 10,9 70,2 
-24,2 8,8 5,3 12,3 28,1 17,0 -17,7 -4,4 
32,6 25,5 20,5 22,1 24,0 39,9 21,4 9,2 
52,I 159,3 44,5 300,8 -42,6 49,1 
42,1 85,3 35,0 22,9 45,8 5,3 
27,I 17,9 -8,5 19,3 7,2 36,9 6,5 39,2 
43,9 40,0 55,2 -18,3 150,2 28,5 
-13,2 8,1 -36,1 19,6 46,3 59,7 5,4 -53,8 
-37,1 -41,5 -45,7 -36,6 -119,9 
28,0 41,0 55,4 1,5 88,3 74,5 32,8 
16,2 86,3 93,5 45,7 191,0 105,4 51,2 77,7 
42,7 59,4 66,4 71,6 33,0 -1,1 79,0 79,4 
43,8 68,4 -0,7 -18,6 
21,0 25,6 17,3 23,2 20,8 46,6 14,6 22,9 
7,4 10,4 6,3 21,0 5,7 -5,5 1,3 23,7 
was the US initiating document submitted to the GATT in 
1982 which underlined the importance of services to the 
world economy and called for a more liberal approach to 
trade in services (Lazar, 1990). 
The US text and the reactions triggered reoriented economic 
analysis in three directions. First, the close link the US 
document created between services and goods in terms of 
negotiations (through a marked reference to the GA TT) 
prompted a large literature on the differences between ser-
vices and goods in terms of their economic nature, and on 
the economic implications of these differences. Second, the 
focus of the US text on a liberal approach generated strong 
incentives to check the existence of the theoretical under-
pinning necessary for recommending free trade policy, i.e. 
proof that the principle of comparative advantage in the 
case of trade in services is as rigorous as the proof in the 
case of trade in goods. Third, the US document left the 
impression that liberalization of trade in services would lead 
to 'dualistic' patterns of specialization (i.e. where a few 
industrialized countries would export services to the rest of 
II - Services 
Table 73 
Establishment in EC services: foreign direct investment, mergers and acquisitions (1984-89) 
Years 1 Periods 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1984-85 1986-89 Growth(%) 
Foreign direct investment inflows to the Community (billion ECU) 
Intra-EC inflows 
Total 4,4 5,7 10,4 11,7 23,0 n.a. 5,1 15,0 197,7 
Manufacturing 1,3 1,6 3,8 4,1 10,3 n.a. 1,5 6,1 318,4 
Services 3,1 4,4 6,2 8,1 12,5 n.a. 3,8 8,9 138,2 
Extra-EC inflows 
Total 6,2 5,6 6,8 12,6 14,3 n.a. 5,9 11,2 90,4 
Manufacturing 2,4 2,0 1,7 5,1 5,2 n.a. 2,2 4,0 81,8 
Services 3,7 3,2 4,9 7,1 8,6 n.a. 3,5 6,9 99,0 
Mergers and acquisitions in the Community (number of operations) 
Intra-Member State operations 
Total 193 189 290 321 352 353 191 329 72,3 
Manufacturing 146 145 211 214 233 241 146 225 54,5 
Services 47 44 79 107 119 112 46 104 129,1 
Distribution 30 27 40 40 53 31 29 41 43,9 
Banking 10 12 22 53 51 65 11 48 334,1 
Insurance 7 5 17 14 15 16 6 16 158,3 
Intra-EC (stricto sensu) operations2 
Total 60 65 90 145 225 315 63 194 210,0 
Manufacturing 44 52 75 111 197 257 48 160 233,3 
Services 16 13 15 34 28 58 15 34 132,8 
Distribution 3 6 5 8 4 17 5 9 88,9 
Banking 6 4 3 12 16 23 5 14 170,0 
Insurance 7 3 7 14 8 18 5 12 135,0 
Intra-EC (largo sensu) operations3 
Total 253 254 380 466 577 668 254 523 106,2 
Manufacturing 190 197 286 325 430 498 194 385 98,8 
Services 63 57 94 141 147 170 60 138 130,0 
Distribution 33 33 45 48 57 48 33 50 50,0 
Banking 16 16 25 65 67 88 16 61 282,8 
Insurance 14 8 24 28 23 34 11 27 147,7 
Extra-EC operations4 
Total 22 43 35 92 89 165 33 95 193,1 
Manufacturing 18 30 17 58 62 124 24 65 171,9 
Services 4 13 18 34 27 41 9 30 252,9 
Distribution 1 0 4 9 1 4 1 5 800,0 
Banking 2 9 10 13 16 25 6 16 190,9 
Insurance I 4 4 12 10 12 3 10 280,0 
Fiscal years for mergers and acquisitions. 
Operations involving firms from different EC Member States. 
J Operations involving firms from the same EC Member State or from various Member States. 
4 Operations involving firms from outside the EC. 
Sources: Sapir (1991); EC Reporl on Compelilion Policy, various years. 
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the world, and import goods from the rest of the world), a 
perspective which generated many questions from countries 
which did not deregulate their service industries. 
Are services similar to goods? 
The US proposal underlined the role of GA TT as a 'solid' 
basis for a framework for trade in services. This insistence 
on the similarity between goods and services has led to a 
large literature analysing the consequences of the different 
economic nature of services and goods. This search for the 
theoretical grounds of the specific nature of services has led 
to two major conclusions. 
The first crucial difference between the nature of services 
and goods is the non-storability of services (Bhagwati, 1984; 
Sampson and Snape, 1985). It echoes the focus of the US 
1982 proposal on the 'right of establishment' in trade in 
services (a focus without equivalent in trade in goods). It 
led to a typology of trade in services comprising four types. 
Pure cross-border trade in services corresponds to traditional 
trade in goods, where producers located in one country 
export their services to consumers located in another coun-
try. Trade in services based on factors which are inter-
nationally mobile occurs when one of the two agents travel 
to the other country in order to produce (mobile providers) 
or consume (mobile users) the service. Last but not least, 
trade in services based on 'factor establishment' occurs when 
service providers create permanent subsidiaries in the 'im-
porting' country in order to produce and sell the services, a 
type of trade which is similar to trade in goods associated 
with foreign direct investment and/or labour movement. 
The second crucial difference between services and goods 
underlined by the literature is the intangible nature of ser-
vices, that is, the fact that services 'exist' only when they 
are being consumed, implying that the quality of services 
generally cannot be assessed before they are consumed. 
Information is therefore important for services. As a result, 
both producers (to develop a policy of goodwill and repu-
tation) and public authorities (by elaborating norms in regu-
lations) have incentives to produce information. 
This comparison between goods and services may seem 
rather abstract. However, Section 4 shows it has a consider-
able impact on the way services can be liberalized for two 
reasons. First, the typology of four types of trade in services 
has been the analytical support for the definition of the 
'modes of supply' adopted by the Uruguay Round draft on 
services. Second, the mere existence of this typology is likely 
to have an important impact on the liberalization process. 
As suggested by Hindley (1987), liberalization based on freer 
establishment rules maintains the coexistence of different 
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regulations in the trading partners, whereas liberalization 
based on opening cross-border trade implies a direct compe-
tition between these diverging regulations through the types 
and prices of the competing services. In sum, the potential 
in terms of competition of these two types of liberalization 
may be quite different. 
Is the principle of comparative advantage verified for trade 
in services? 
The US proposal created hesitations among industrialized 
countries (including EC Member States) and faced fierce 
opposition from developing countries (in particular, from 
Brazil and India). As a result, the US document, though 
written for practical negotiating purposes, created a strong 
incentive to verify the theoretical basis for recommending a 
free trade policy for trade in services, i.e. to get rigorous 
proof of the principle of comparative advantage. The prin-
ciple states that the price of goods imported once trade is 
liberalized is lower than their price under autarky. 
Deardorff (1985) demonstrated the validity of this principle 
in a first case based on the Heckscher-Ohlin framework and 
is well adapted to countries having reached the same stage 
of development (with trading partners using the same tech-
nologies). This model assumes that two economies produce 
one good and one service from two factors which are labour 
and 'management', that the service sector uses management 
intensively as an input and that the domestic economy is 
well endowed with management. Thus, it can be shown that 
in autarky, the relative price of services (with respect to the 
price of the good) is lower in the domestic economy than 
in the foreign economy. The consequences are twofold: in 
autarky, the salary of the managers is lower at home, and 
once trade is possible, the domestic economy will export the 
use of its management factor, in order to pay for importing 
goods from the foreign country. Thus, the principle of com-
parative advantage is verified. 
Jones (1985) completed Deardorffs results by examining a 
more complex case based on a Ricardian framework (where 
the trading partners use a different technology for producing 
the service) which is better adapted to analysing trade be-
tween countries at different stages of development. The 
model assumes that the domestic country has a (Hicksian) 
neutral technological superiority. The salary of domestic 
managers (in terms of the price of the good) is higher than 
the salary of foreign managers. When this gap is less than 
the productivity edge favouring domestic managers, once 
free trade is possible, domestic managers will work for for-
eign enterprises while remaining in their home country. This 
export flow seems to contradict the principle of comparative 
advantage. However, it is not contradictory since high qua!-
ity domestic managers have higher productivities than their 
foreign counterparts. The salary of domestic managers, once 
adjusted for quality, is lower than the salary of foreign 
managers, a result which makes the export flow mentioned 
above consistent with the principle of comparative advan-
tage. 
Will trade liberalization in services lead to dualistic trade 
specialization patterns? 
Behind the US 1982 text, there was the perception that 
the USA and the few industrialized countries which were 
deregulating their services sectors were losing comparative 
advantage in goods while they were enjoying rising compara-
tive advantage in services, hence their need for freer access 
to service markets in trading partners in order to compensate 
the evolution in trade in goods. As a result, trade officials 
during the late 1980s were concerned by the potential impact 
of trade liberalization in services. Will liberalization necess-
arily lead to 'dualistic' trade specialization patterns which 
many countries are unlikely to accept? This concern has led 
to three main conclusions. 
Many services are an intrinsic part of the infrastructure of 
an economy: for instance, transport or telecommunications 
are used for producing and for trading goods (in other 
words, these services are intermediate products), and giving 
up all these services to foreign firms could create political 
problems. Economic analysis shows that dualistic trade spec-
ialization patterns are not likely when services are intermedi-
ary products, as best illustrated in two crucial cases examined 
by Burgess (1990). First, in a model with cross-country 
differences in technologies necessary for the production of 
services, cheap services in the country with advanced tech-
nology may confer comparative advantage in goods that use 
services relatively intensively in their production, alterna-
tively, they may not confer such an advantage (in this case, 
it might be the manufacturing industry that uses intensively 
the factor employed intensively in the service sector which 
will expand). Second, free trade in services and goods could 
well lead to the survival of the service sector in the country 
with the inferior technology; specialization may result in the 
contraction of one of the industries producing goods rather 
than of the service sector. 
In the second case examined by Burgess, the intangibility 
of many services implies that they may be produced and 
purchased in markets characterized by imperfect compe-
tition. For instance, services which are prone to customeriza-
tion generate strong incentives for discrimination, which may 
induce service providers to implement price discrimination 
policies and/or non-price (monopolistic) competition. Does 
the introduction of imperfect competition increase the risks 
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of the emergence of dualistic trade specialization patterns? 
Jones and Kierzkowski (1989) have shown that the liberaliza-
tion of trade in services ensures a more efficient international 
allocation of production under pure and imperfect compe-
tition, and that, in the latter case, it helps realize the potential 
economies of scale, also by an increased geographic specializ-
ation of production among trading partners. 
Lastly, if the heavy regulation imposed on services in most 
countries has been perceived as a source of backwardness, 
it has also led to the conclusion that once deregulated, the 
formerly protected service industries will not be able to 
compete with innovative and well-established firms used to 
a more open environment; and as a result, they should be 
granted transitory protection. This renewed version of the 
familiar 'infant industry' argument was apparently re-
inforced by the abovementioned problem of the information 
about the quality of services: information that established 
foreign firms could use as a barrier against the entry of cost-
efficient domestic entrants seemed to provide a valid reason 
for temporary protection. It was thus important to examine 
this suggestion: Grossman and Horn (1988) have shown that 
temporary tariff protection to promote entry of domestic 
firms lowers the welfare of the country for two reasons: it 
does not change the incentives domestic firms have to pro-
vide high-quality goods and it generally reduces consumer 
surplus. As a result, there are no new and robust theoretical 
foundations for dropping trade liberalization in favour of 
transitory protection for infant industries in the case of 
services. 
In sum, the last decade has provided theoretical foundations 
reinforcing the empirical approach taken by Sapir and Lutz, 
and the statement by Hindley and Smith (1984) that there 
is no need for a specific approach to trade in services. 
Trade liberalization in services is unlikely to bring dualistic 
specialization patterns under perfect or imperfect compe-
tition and trade instruments (such as tariffs) are not the 
best solution to the complex problems of information and 
reputation related to the intangibility of services (confirming 
the usual results of the theory of distortions). 
3. Policy towards services 
Before looking at the liberalization processes launched by 
the SMPS and the GATS, it would be useful to have a 
structured survey of the major policy instruments which 
disrupt international competition in services. This section 
presents a crude overview of the major barriers in services 
for the two most important trading partners, the USA and 
the Community: a short presentation is then undertaken of 
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the major sectors for which countries are ready to negotiate 
trade liberalization in the Uruguay Round. 
3.1. A typology of restrictions on international 
competition in services 
A catalogue of the major barriers restricting international 
competition in services will be increasingly important in the 
future for two reasons. The first is related to international 
issues. During the past five years of negotiations of the 
GA TS, the most urgent task has been to conceive a lib-
eralization mechanism. However, in the future, the 'trade 
policy review mechanism' (i.e. the review of the trade policy 
of each GA TT member by the GA TT Secretariat on behalf 
of all the contracting parties) will be introduced in services, 
and this procedure will require some kind of systematic and 
standard framework to be imposed on all the reviewers and 
reviewed countries as has been the case for trade in goods. 
The second reason is related to domestic issues. To estimate 
ad valorem equivalents of existing restrictions in services is 
very difficult, and hence the economic costs of these restric-
tions are seldom known, as in the case for goods where 
similar measures are applied. Quite independently of the 
question of opening up trade in services, the mere recognition 
of the role of service industries in the domestic economy will 
generate a growing demand for a better assessment of the 
net costs of the policy instruments, and a desire to shift to 
more transparent barriers, in line with moves in the Uruguay 
Round negotiations to shift barriers on trade in goods from 
quotas to ad valorem tariffs (so-called tariffication). 
A first taxonomy of policy instruments has been suggested 
in the context of the GA TS negotiations for the presentation 
of the schedules of offers by the various countries. This 
taxonomy consists of four essential types of policy measures 
based on two criteria: quantitative measures versus 'qualitat-
ive' measures (that is, requirements that service providers 
meet certain regulations, standards or qualifications, as co-
vered by GA TS Article VI); and discriminatory versus non-
discriminatory measures. This first taxonomy is adapted to 
the goal of presenting trade offers. However, the future 
requirements of a TPRM-type approach and the prerequi-
sites for analysing domestic policies in services may require 
a more detailed catalogue which could be structured along 
the following lines. 
Quantitative measures could be split into quantitative re-
strictions on domestic consumption (hereafter consumption 
quotas), quotas on imports and exports, and quotas on 
inputs. Consumption quotas which reserve all or part of 
domestic demand for domestic service providers offer a 
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palatable feature for risk-averse policy-makers: they erect 
the most severe barriers in case of economic downturns 
and thus are particularly suitable for the stabilizing role 
of services. 1 Consumption quotas have two other valuable 
features for policy-makers. Their protectionist impact is 
independent of the degree of substitution between foreign 
and domestic services, in sharp contrast with other instru-
ments, such as quotas on imports. Also, their enforcement 
often requires the involvement of domestic service providers 
as the de facto 'agency' in charge of monitoring the protec-
tion. As a result, such quotas more easily give domestic 
service providers a stronger grip on the protection imposed 
and its associated rents. 
All these features explain why consumption quotas are by 
far the most frequently used measures for regulating service 
industries as shown by the following indicative list. Domestic 
monopolies leave a zero market share to foreign service 
providers. Domestic sales requirements allow market shares 
for foreign providers of services larger than zero, but fixed 
at some predetermined level. Public procurement corre-
sponds to cases where the consumer is a public authority 
which decides the market share to be left to foreign service 
producers on a transaction-by-transaction basis. Limitations 
on production or business scope are equivalent to domestic 
monopolies or domestic sales requirements for a limited 
range of differentiated services. Licensing procedures can be 
granted by the public authorities with the view that the 
foreign producers as a whole should not go beyond some 
maximum number of operators or market share, and are 
often used as Jax forms of monitoring market shares held 
by foreign producers. 
This long list is in sharp contrast with the relatively short list 
of quotas on imports used against foreign service providers, 
essentially quotas imposing targets on import-substitution 
or trade balances, and limits on trans-border movements of 
consumers. Quotas on exports are also rare except under the 
form of export prohibitions of services (for national defence) 
and limits on trans-border movements of producers (scien-
tists in certain fields). 
However, experience has induced policy-makers to be aware 
of the negative consequences of import/export quotas. Such 
quotas tend to create powerful domestic lobbies operating 
in non-competitive markets. As a result, they often lead 
This motive flows from the fact that services have been perceived (rightly 
or wrongly) as labour intensive (indeed, most of them have been labour 
intensive and many services still are) and hence are a source of counter-
cyclical stabilization in terms of growth and employment. During re-
cessionary periods, service providers have often been slower to reduce 
their levels of employment and they have often undergone smaller 
adjustments. In sum, policy-makers see services as shelters. 
to the conclusion that the protection has been excessively 
captured by domestic service producers and that it has im-
posed 'too large' a cost on domestic consumers. When pol-
icy-makers have been influenced by these considerations, 
they have tended to rely on quotas on inputs for two reasons. 
First, limiting the quantities of a crucial input for producing 
a specific service can provide the same level of protection as 
a consumption quota. However, it does so by providing 
tangible protection of the quantities used of certain physical 
inputs (such as steel in public works, vessels in shipping, 
etc.) which can be monitored by public authorities without 
the cooperation of the domestic service providers, and can 
also open up the possibility of politically profitable transfers 
under the aegis of public authorities (for instance, the dom-
estic steel industry benefits from restrictive rules in public 
procurements concerning construction). Second, quotas on 
inputs can help control the economic consequences of con-
sumption quotas (or quotas on imports) related to the cap-
ture of rents by primary factors (workers or owners). Con-
sumption quotas are usually accompanied by rents which 
can be captured by foreign owners of domestic firms if there 
are no limits on foreign ownership, or by foreign workers 
in domestic firms if there are no constraints on the compo-
sition of the work-force or on the technology used (foreign 
skilled labour could obtain rents through the use of foreign 
technology). 
Such a wide range of considerations helps to explain the 
frequent use of quotas on inputs. These quotas include 
restrictions on foreign ownership and employment of skilled 
or unskilled labour, domestic content requirements, 
measures (if used in a discriminatory manner) such as norms 
and standards, rules on copyrights and trade marks, arid 
requirements on technology and external financial transfers 
(including foreign exchange controls which impose limits on 
the availability of foreign currencies, i.e. essential inputs for 
trading services or inputs which are necessary for producing 
services). 
The need to control the economic consequences of consump-
tion quotas also explains that the most frequent price 
measures observed in services are minimum and maximum 
prices, whereas ad valorem or specific tariffs which are the 
most common protectionist instruments in trade in goods 
are rare, except under the form of price preferences (ad 
valorem price margins granted to domestic services compet-
ing with foreign services in tenders). Maximum and mini-
mum prices have a strong impact on the structure of dom-
estic service markets. Maximum prices are often imposed by 
the government in order to limit the monopoly power of 
domestic service providers and the total value of associated 
rents (maximum prices have no impact on the sharing of the 
rents). Minimum prices are often imposed by governments 
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in order to give public support to uncompetitive pricing and 
to eliminate what the government is led to consider as 
'excessive' competition, by sending a clear signal to all firms 
to align their own prices to the minimum price. As a result, 
maximum and minimum prices can often be used in conjunc-
tion with consumption quotas. For instance, maximum 
prices can be used by a government for limiting the mon-
opoly power generated by a consumption quota imposed 
by the government itself, and minimum prices can induce 
domestic firms not to expand their existing market shares 
by price-cutting, i.e. they can impose a set of implicit quotas 
between firms operating on the service market in question. 
Finally, the above considerations yield a last set of measures 
aimed at providing a competitive environment through com-
petition laws or laws specifying property rights and an ad-
equate level of information about the quality of the services 
through prudential or disclosure rules, protection of inves-
tors' and workers' rights. I 
3.2. EC and US barriers against foreign services 
Table 74 is based on two catalogues of the major barriers to 
trade in services elaborated by the US Trade Representative 
(Foreign trade barriers, 1985) and by the EC Commission 
( US trade barriers and unfair trade practices, 1990). It is 
essential to note that these two catalogues do not have a 
common methodology. The USTR document relies on a 
survey of the major barriers imposed by US trading partners 
against US providers and exporters of services in many 
countries. Though it is relatively systematic, it still mirrors 
the interests of the surveyed firms (implying that it may 
overestimate the scale of barriers in sectors and Member 
States where US firms would like to export more, and 
underestimate the barriers in the other services sectors and 
Member States). The EC document on US barriers in ser-
vices is even more sketchy since it focuses on crucial points 
of contention between the US and the Community. As a 
result, the two documents cannot be compared. 
The structure of the EC barriers confirms the leading role 
of the United Kingdom among EC Member States in terms 
of unilateral service liberalization (Messerlin, 1990). The 
structure of US barriers is concentrated in service industries 
that the US negotiators hesitate to introduce into the current 
round of negotiations (banking and telecommunications) 
and those which they have clearly excluded (shipping). 
Prudential regulations can be associated with competition rules because 
they increase transparency within the financial services industry, thus 
reducing the possibility of 'unfair' competition flowing from bad or 
incomplete information on the financial situation of banks. 
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Table 74 
Main barriers to services trade: EC and US cases 
European Community1 USA2 
B DK D GR E F 
Airlines 2 2 2 3 
Banking 3 
Construction 
Insurance 1 1 4 2 1 I 
Films and TV 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Business services 2 1 3 4 
Telecommunications 2 2 5 2 2 2 
Tourism 1 2 4 2 
Shipping 2 5 4 4 8 4 
All services 12 11 18 13 25 18 
(%) 7,3 6,7 10,9 7,9 15,2 10,9 
Source for all sectors, except shipping: USTR (1985). For shipping: White (1988). 
Source for all sectors, including shipping: EC Commission ( 1990). 
Trade balances could be interpreted as a crude indicator 
of the likely reactions of the concerned service sectors to 
prospects of liberalization. Under this hypothesis, negative 
or deteriorating balances, which can be observed in four EC 
service sectors (telecommunications, advertising, audiovisual 
and sea freight), are likely to trigger or maintain arguments 
for protection. Rising positive balances, which can be ob-
served in three EC service industries (banking, insurance, 
and travel), could help pro-trade arguments. The attitude of 
the other sectors is more difficult to predict, either because 
trade balances are positive but deteriorating (air transport 
and construction) or because no clear trend has emerged 
(trade earnings). 
3.3. Service sectors tabled for negotiation 
in the Uruguay Round 
The offers tabled in the Uruguay Round are elaborated in 
terms of lists (or schedules) of commitments on service 
industries that future GA TS members are ready to envisage 
liberalization and negotiate upon. The mechanism of nego-
tiation adopted for services is close to the traditional mech-
anism adopted for trade in goods: countries have tabled 
their initial offers of the service sectors or subsectors which 
they are ready to open, and negotiations may lead to an 
expansion or a contraction of the initial lists. 
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IRL NL p UK Total (%) Number (%) 
2 3 18 10,9 
3 1,8 2 16,7 
I 1 2 1,2 1 8,3 
2 3 I 1 1 18 10,9 2 16,7 
2 2 2 2 2 22 13,3 
2 1 2 15 9,1 1 8,3 
2 2 2 2 2 25 15,2 2 16,7 
3 4 2 18 10,9 
5 3 5 1 3 44 26,7 4 33,3 
12 18 11 11 16 165 100,0 12 100,0 
7,3 10,9 6,7 6,7 9,7 100,0 
Table 75 presents an overview of a few representative offers 
initially tabled. Offers, which have been aggregated into 16 
subsectors or sectors, suggest three observations. 1 First, the 
offers of industrial OECD countries tend to cover more 
sectors than those of developing countries and NIEs. Only 
two NIEs, Korea and Mexico, have tabled initial offers close 
to the offers of industrialized OECD countries in terms of 
sectors. Nine out of the 15 developing countries and NIEs 
have tabled offers covering less than 50% of the sectors. 
Among the industrial OECD countries, a handful have offers 
in almost all sectors, e.g. Austria, the Community, Finland, 
Iceland, and Sweden. Australia is the only industrial OECD 
country with initial offers covering less than 50% of the 
sectors. Second, the breakdown of the initial offers by sector 
presents strong differences. One sector, tourism, is tabled by 
all countries, and two sectors, education and distribution, 
are not well covered by the initial offers. Education is a 
service industry largely dominated by public providers, how-
ever the reluctance for opening distribution and franchise is 
Table 75 requires three caveats. First, it does not show the possibility 
that a country can offer to eliminate restrictions on one or several modes 
of supply, but not on all of them (a crucial consideration, as examined 
in Section 4). Second, the offers may have different levels of quality 
which are not reflected by the simple Yes/No classification. Lastly, the 
table is based on a traditional classification which does not reflect the 
relative economic weight of the different sectors. 
more surprising, and it may mirror the backwardness (and 
desire for protection) of these sectors in the countries con-
cerned. Lastly, there are wide differences between the sec-
toral coverage of the two groups of countries. On the one 
hand, tourism and hotels are tabled in a similar way by the 
two groups of countries. On the other, developing countries 
and NIEs are more reluctant to cover certain sectors than 
industrialized OECD countries. This reluctance may be re-
lated to the fact that certain services are much less regulated 
in developing countries and in the NIEs than in OECD 
countries (likely for accounting, banking, and franchise). 
Alternatively, it may be related to the protection of certain 
producers (likely for computer services, audiovisual media, 
and education). 1 
4. The framework for liberalization: 
SMPS versus GATS 
At a first glance, the SMPS and the GA TS which would 
emerge from a successful Uruguay Round exhibit a similar 
formal structure.2 Both the Treaty of Rome for the SMPS, 
and the Articles of Agreement for the GA TS contain a 
'framework' comprising a few general principles. The frame-
work is accompanied by detailed sectoral regulations (the 
directives and recommendations for the SMPS, the existing 
and future 'Annexes' for the OATS). 
However, these apparent similarities hide fundamental dif-
ferences about the basic approaches that the SMPS and the 
OATS have adopted on the rules needed for trade in services. 
These differences are likely to have a profound impact on 
the process and extent of liberalization. 
The complexity of the offers is enormous, in particular for federal or 
quasi-federal trading partners, such as the USA and the Community. 
For instance, the 180 items included in the detailed list of sectors used 
in the GA TS negotiations on offers (see the Annex) correspond to 
roughly I 500 basic 'cells' (180 times four modes of supply for Article 
XVI and four modes of supply for Article XVII) at the EC or US level. 
However, EC or US offers require special mention. For instance, looking 
at the EC offer suggests that this factor can increase by three to four 
the number of possible combinations (roughly 5 OOO to 6 000) making the 
complexity of negotiations on offers in services close to the complexity of 
trade negotiations on goods. As underlined by Hoekman (1991), trade 
negotiations on services can be examined, as can trade negotiations on 
goods, from two perspectives. The first perspective looks at what the 
trading partners of the country under consideration have tabled, a 
'mercantilist' approach which insists on opening export markets. The 
second perspective focuses on what the country has tabled, adopting a 
more economically-sound view of the negotiations focusing on the 
benefits for the consumers of opening domestic markets to foreign 
competition. 
Both were initiated in the mid-1980s. The SMPS was launched by the 
1985 White Paper on the single market, and the negotiations on the 
GATS followed the 1986 Punta del Este decision to launch world 
negotiations on services following the 1982 US proposal. 
II - Services 
4.1. Two different approaches on rules 
for trade in services 
The differences in the economic nature of goods and services 
mentioned in Section 2 have led policy-makers "to a crucial 
question: are these differences important enough for requir-
ing the imposition of rules on trade in services which are 
not the same as for trade in goods? 
The Treaty of Rome provides a negative answer to this 
question. Despite the fact that the Treaty devotes distinct 
Titles for trade in goods and trade in services, it basically 
imposes identical rules on both. The Chapter entitled 'Ser-
vices' (Articles 59 to 66) is based on the general concept of 
'free delivery' of services, a concept also used for trade in 
goods, and does not evoke the existence of the four different 
types of international competition in services which were 
described in Section 2. The Chapter on 'Establishment' con-
tains provisions to be applied to both producers of goods 
and providers of services. Only one Article (Article 57) of 
this Chapter mentions the need for specific rules on 'non-
wage activities' (that is, banking and health services); how-
ever, it does so only for procedures. Chapter 4 (Articles 67 
to 73) on 'Capital' is often presented as the chapter of the 
Treaty dealing with financial services, but in fact it focuses 
on exchange controls and free movements of capital; while 
these two topics are of prime interest for banks and invest-
ment firms, they also concern all the services and manufac-
turing sectors. Lastly, Title IV devoted to 'Transport' (rail, 
road and inland water) is limited to very general principles, 
i.e. the need for a common policy, the principle of uncon-
ditional non-discrimination, the reduction of economic dis-
tortions (aids and taxes), all of which are very similar to 
those adopted for trade in goods.3 
In contrast, the OATS provides a positive answer to the 
initial question. This difference between the SMPS and the 
GA TS is not astonishing. The Treaty of Rome aims at 
creating free trade in all economic activities (including invest-
ment related to trade). The OATS approach follows the 
GATT line: to create the conditions for 'liberal' international 
trade in services. As a result, it is, de facto, more concerned 
with transparency and moderate protection than with free 
trade. 
The Treaty of Rome has left aside sea and air transport, without any 
provision at all (Article 84:2). The Treaty of Maastricht contains new 
provisions for Articles 73 and 75. These new provisions do not modify 
the 'neutral' approach between services and goods. 
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Table 75 
Service industries covered for selected country offers 
Developing countries and NICs All DCs and NICs 
Argentina Brazil China Colombia Hong Indonesia Korea Malaysia Mexico Peru Poland SingaporeTurkey UruguayYugoslavia Number (a) 
Kong (%) 
Accounting y y y y y y y 7 46,7 
Business services y y y y y y y y y y y II 73,3 
Computer services y y y y y y 6 40,0 
Professional services y y y y y y y y y y 10 66,7 
Banking y y y y y y 6 40,0 
Insurance y y y y y y y y 8 53,3 
Distribution y y y y y 5 33,3 
Franchise y I 6,7 
Construction y y y y y y y 7 46,7 
Audiovisual media y y y y y y 6 40,0 
Tourism y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y 15 100,0 
Hotels, restaurants y y y y y y y y y y y y y y 14 93,3 
Education y y y y 4 26,7 
Health services y y y y y y y 7 46,7 
Telecommunications y y y y y y y y y 9 60,0 
Transport y y y y y y y y y 9 60,0 
Total: number 8 10 8 4 10 8 13 6 13 4 II 7 8 6 9 125 52,1 
Total: percentage 50,0 62,5 50,0 25,0 62,5 50,0 81,3 37,5 81,3 25,0 68,8 43,8 50,0 37,5 56,3 52,1 
Industrialized OECD countries All industrialized All countries 
countries 
Australia Austria Canada EC Finland Iceland Japan New Norway Sweden Switzer- USA Number (b) Number ('lo) (c) 
Zealand land ('lo} 
Accounting y y y y y y y y y y y II 91,7 18 66,7 50,9 
Business services y y y y y y y y y y y y 12 100,0 23 85,2 73,3 
Computer services y y y y y y y y y y 10 83,3 16 59,3 48,0 
Professional services y y y y y y y y y y y 11 91,7 21 77,8 72,7 
Banking y y y y y y y y y y y 11 91,7 17 63,0 43,6 
Insurance y y y y y y y y y y 10 83,3 18 66,7 64,0 
Distribution y y y y y y y y 8 66,7 13 48,l 50,0 
Franchise y y y 3 25,0 4 14,8 26,7 
Construction y y y y y y y y y y 10 83,3 17 63,0 56,0 
Audiovisual media y y y y y y y y y y y 11 91,7 17 63,0 43,6 
Tourism y y y y y y y y y y y y 12 100,0 27 100,0 100,0 
Hotels, restaurants y y y y y y y y y y y y 12 100,0 26 96,3 93,3 
Education y y y y y y y y 8 66,7 12 44,4 40,0 
Health services y y y y y y y y y 9 75,0 16 59,3 62,2 
Telecommunications y y y y y y y y y y y II 91,7 20 74,1 65,5 
Transport y y y y y y y y y y y II 91,7 20 74,1 65,5 
Total: number 7 15 10 15 15 16 14 12 14 15 13 14 160 83,3 285 66,0 62,5 
Total: percentage 43,8 93,8 62,5 93,8 93,8 100,0 87,5 75,0 87,5 93,8 81,3 87,5 83,3 66,0 
Figures in column c are the ratios of figures in column a to column b, in per cent. 
Source: Coalition or Service Industries, 1991. 
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This different approach has an important corollary. As the 
Treaty of Rome is the foundation of the SMPS, the SMPS 
has adopted an approach which aims at maintaining equally 
open the opportunities of trade liberalization in services 
whether it is provided by cross-border trade (or 'light' estab-
lishment, such as branches) or by establishment (subsidiaries 
of the service providers). 
It may be argued that these opportunities of trade liberaliza-
tion through cross-border trade or through establishment 
have not been used (and are not used) at the same speed by 
the Community. Even the Court of Justice, which has been 
the engine for full liberalization has recognized that lib-
eralization does in fact vary between different modes, as best 
illustrated in its rulings on insurance and on free movement 
of labour. 1 Indeed, Section 2 suggests that this tendency 
should be expected because cross-border trade tends to gen-
erate more competition in service markets than establish-
ment alone. As a result, it may be expected that both the 
regulating authorities and the EC firms concerned will be 
more reluctant to liberalize cross-border trade than establish-
ment-based trade. Regulatory authorities will lose their pow-
ers more rapidly and EC firms will see their rents associated 
with market segmentation arising through regulations 
eroded by a more complete competition. However, the cru-
cial point is not the existence of these tendencies but the fact 
that the Treaty of Rome has a 'built-in' balance between 
cross-border-based and establishment-based trade liberaliza-
tion (competition). There are examples where the SMPS has 
adjusted the pace of these two tracks of liberalization, as 
shown by measures aimed at giving investment services firms 
(a strategy which is more based on cross-border trade) the 
same opportunities as universal banks (a strategy which is 
more dominated by establishment). 
Minimizing differences between cross-border and establish-
ment-based trade liberalization has given the SMPS its typi-
cal character based on two elements. The liberalization as-
pect aims at favouring 'free delivery' through cross-border 
trade or through establishment, in particular by opening EC 
markets to service providers already operating and licensed 
in one EC Member State, i.e. the so-called 'single licence' 
For the rulings on insurance, see Section 5.1. A recent ruling on the 
movement of labour (the 1990 Rush Portuguesa case) restricts intra-EC 
labour movements in the context of providing services in tightly defined 
limits (right of a service provider to bring in its own workers, non-access 
of these workers to the labour market of the service-importing Member 
State). However, this ruling may reflect the fact that the case emerged 
during a period of transition characterized by both free delivery of 
services between Portugal (the country of origin of the service provider) 
and France (the importing country) and postponed free movement of 
labour (until January 1993) between Portugal and the Member States 
of EC 10. 
II - Services 
(passport) or 'mutual recognition' approach. The harmoniz-
ation aspect imposes minimum common EC rules on the 
crucial features and behaviour of the service providers and 
on the main features of the control to be exerted by the 
home EC Member State (the EC Member State where the 
provider is established). 
In contrast, GA TS Article 1:2 defines four 'modes of supply' 
corresponding to the four types of trade in services described 
in Section 2: cross-border trade, movement of service con-
sumers, movement of service producers, and establishment 
of service providers in the foreign markets. Also, the crucial 
GA TS Article XVI on market access specifies market access 
rules 'with respect to market access through the modes of 
supply identified in Article I', thereby opening the possibility 
to liberalize only certain modes of supply and introducing a 
potential discrimination between these modes. 
4.2. The impact on the process and extent 
of liberalization 
What is the likely impact of these differences between the 
SMPS and GA TS on the process and extent ofliberalization? 
Clearly, one can convincingly argue that all these differences 
are a matter of legal presentation, and not ones of substance, 
in the case of countries determined to completely open their 
service markets: the GA TS draft will easily accommodate 
countries willing to liberalize the four modes of supply in 
one move. 
However, in the case where countries decide to undertake 
limited liberalization (by far the most frequent case), the 
GATS approach is a powerful way to regulate the extent of 
trade liberalization by limiting it to certain modes ofsupply.2 
In particular, liberalization limited to the mode of supply 
'establishment' may well lead to smaller benefits (because 
competition in the concerned service market may not be 
greatly enhanced) and nevertheless create adjustment costs 
high enough to discourage further steps of liberalization.3 
The liberalization of the Korean insurance industry under US pressures 
is a likely example of such a situation (Cho, 1988). 
That services liberalization in recent years has been more establishment-
based than cross-border-trade-based may merely reflect the lasting im-
pact of the existing heavy restrictions on services trade, rather than the 
result of intrinsic economic features. This approach fits the evidence, as 
suggested by three examples. First, many service industries before World 
War I were worldwide activities organized in industrial structures similar 
to those adopted nowadays by manufacturing sectors. Second, goods 
can be non-storable, as best illustrated by electricity. Third, there might 
be huge potential substitution effects between goods and services: for 
instance, the technical advice of highly qualified surgeons could be given 
without the movement of the surgeons (or of the patients), if adequate 
HDTV and telecommunications services are provided. 
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The more segmented approach of the GA TS is often ex-
plained by technical constraints. The GA TS forum would 
be too large (it would cover a too wide spectrum of different 
regulatory structures) for getting the consensus required to 
overcome the costs of defining the minimal harmonization 
necessary for rendering the principle of recognition intro-
duced by GA TS Article VII workable and credible. How-
ever, such an argument should not be pushed too far. In 
many service sectors, industrial countries are probably di-
verse enough to represent the whole spectrum of the legal 
structures existing in the entire world, suggesting that the 
problem of the costs of minimal harmonization can be more 
easily solved than is often stated. 1 Major difficulties may lie 
on the other side of the problem. If services firms do not 
play the same role in developing countries as in industrial 
countries (as in the case of banks), then the costs associated 
to minimal harmonization might be higher than the expected 
gains of developing countries, even if these costs are per se 
low. 
5. The impact of the SMPS 
on world services liberalization 
Do these fundamental differences between the SMPS and 
the GA TS approaches mean that the impact of the SMPS 
is likely to be confined within the Community? Or is the 
SMPS likely to have an impact on liberalization of world 
service sectors? There are two reasons favouring the latter 
hypothesis. 
The first reason is related to the role of regulation in the 
EC services liberalization. The SMPS conceives national 
regulations as potentially dynamic instruments of compe-
tition, and this view is likely to spread at the international 
level either through reciprocity or 'mimetism' thereby mak-
ing the SMPS a driving force for exploiting the 'sleeping' 
opportunities of the GATS. 
The second reason concerns the role of competition in ser-
vices liberalization. The declared goal of the SMPS, to favour 
competitive markets in services, contrasts with the GA TS 
Article VIII which adopts a neutral attitude vis-a-vis market 
structures, and hence is also likely to have an impact on the 
rest of the world services. 
The costs for adopting minimal harmonization are twofold. There are 
costs related to the political consensus before the adoption of the 
harmonization, and there are costs after the adoption of minimal rules 
(because of ambiguities) which require legal, not political, procedures, 
e.g. through the European Court of Justice. 
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5.1. Regulations and services liberalization 
EC authorities often insist on the fact that the SMPS aim 
at 'liberalizing' services, not at deregulating them. This insist-
ence has often been seen as reflecting political sensitivities, 
e.g. an opposition to the US 'deregulations', and/or as a 
basic instinct for regulating. 2 
These explanations miss an essential point. The SMPS is 
anchored in a crucial ruling of the European Court of 
Justice (the so-called Cassis de Dijon ruling) which conceived 
national regulations as dynamic instruments of competition, 
a vision which has led to the principles of mutual recognition 
and minimal harmonization. Leaving the 'non-harmonized' 
portions of national regulations in the hand of the EC 
Member States will improve (rather than deteriorate) the 
welfare of the EC consumers, because it provides EC con-
sumers with a choice between services differentiated by alter-
native regulatory frameworks applying in each Member 
State. What follows is a presentation of this concept of 
'competitive national regulations' and its potential extension 
to non-EC countries through reciprocity or mimetism. 
'Competitive' national regulations 
Regulations provided by State (or private) regulators can be 
seen as inputs for producing services, often leading to the 
conclusion that services are systematically more 'regulation-
intensive' than goods. There are no strong economic argu-
ments suggesting that this relatively higher intensity should 
be a permanent feature of all services, as illustrated in the 
three following examples. Food products have become more 
regulation-intensive than many services (and than most other 
goods). The fact that retail services are tightly regulated 
often reflects anti-competitive intents rather than a real need, 
and removing these regulations will be beneficial to the 
consumers. Even the banking sector, in one of its wide 
varieties of niches, can provide counter-examples to the 
allegedly higher 'regulation-intensity' of services: 'J. P. Mor-
gan and perhaps Bankers Trust are so well capitalized and 
diverse that they probably could operate quite profitably in 
the marketplace without the cushion of deposit insurance 
and without direct access to the bank payments system for 
clearing financial transactions. •3 
The substantial deregulation in the USA has been thoroughly debated by 
Kasper ( 1988) for airlines and Crandall (1990) for telecommunications. 
Robert Litan quoted by the National Journal, 14 December 1991, 
p. 3012. 
The general perception of regulation-intensity makes more 
difficult the definition of trade liberalization (Kay and Vick-
ers, 1990; Hoekman, 1991). Regulations reducing discrimi-
nation against foreign producers are not enough to free 
trade: e.g. a domestic monopoly eliminates discrimination 
between foreign providers without liberalizing trade. Alter-
natively, trade liberalization does not necessarily imply com-
plete deregulation: potential consumers may have different 
levels of risk aversion and/or information costs, and they 
may be better off if they face different rules between which 
they can choose (by buying the corresponding services). 
In sum, competition through differentiated services may 
improve welfare and it may require the inputs of different 
regulations. 
As a result, liberalization in services is a balance between 
eliminating regulations imposing barriers to enter national 
markets and keeping (or improving) regulations which pro-
vide the provisions necessary for producing an economically-
sound differentiation between the competing services. This 
balance is delicate because provisions aimed at providing 
competition through differentiated services can also impose 
barriers to entry. 
The SMPS close parallel between trade in goods and services 
has rendered service providers as the active agents in charge 
of assessing the competitiveness of regulations. 'Inefficient' 
rules will be removed or modified by EC Member States 
when the Member State authorities observe that their na-
tional services providers are increasingly supplying services 
from other EC Member States which provide better 'regulat-
ory inputs' (as best illustrated by the sharp and permanent 
competition between a few Member States for regulating 
financial markets during the few last years). Competitive 
pressures come from the fact that EC services providers have 
the widest possible range of instruments of competition at 
their disposal, ranging from establishment through subsidi-
aries to establishment through branches and cross-border 
trade. 
EC producers (and consumers) can lodge complaints with 
the European Court of Justice (hereafter, the Court). In the 
mid- l 980s, a few 'pockets' of competitive markets shaped 
by unilateral liberalizations in EC Member States (particu-
larly the United Kingdom) have generated firms (and con-
sumers) eager to see their rights to competition more strongly 
enforced. These firms (and people) went to the Court which 
then was in the crucial position of designing the basic prin-
ciples of the SMPS (and elaborating on specific problems of 
competition in typical cases, as shown beiow). Indeed, the 
role of the Court in shaping the SMPS has been more crucial 
than the actions of the Commission or the Council. 
II - Services 
Following the spirit of the Treaty of Rome, the Court has 
extended to trade in services (in five rulings on insurance and 
telecommunications), the two basic principles elaborated for 
trade in goods in the famous 1978 Cassis de Dijon case. In 
this ruling, the Court stated that EC Member States should 
not erect trade barriers between themselves on products 
which were produced and sold in accordance with the Jaws 
of one EC Member State. This statement is clearly similar 
to the one described above as the liberalization (mutual 
recognition) principle of the SMPS. At the same time, the 
Court envisaged the possibility of limiting the proclaimed 
freedom of trade in the name of 'imperative reasons relating 
to the public interest'. An EC Member State could erect 
trade barriers to a good sold in another EC Member State 
if the conditions of production and marketing in the ex-
porting EC Member State could really harm 'confused' 
consumers in the importing EC Member State. When ex-
tending these principles to the case of 'mass risks' in in-
surance, the Court suggested that harmonization should 
reach a point where small policy-holders could not be con-
fused about the real coverage offered by insurance products 
imported from another EC Member State. Far from being 
a set-back to intra-EC liberalization, as sometimes argued, 
the Court's rulings on insurance can be seen as a precious 
help for striking the right balance between liberalization and 
harmonization. I 
Reciprocity and mimetism 
At the world level, the de facto GA TS discrimination be-
tween the various instruments of competition in services 
(modes of supply) limits the incentives for governments to 
compete in terms of regulation. Moreover, the absence of a 
world institution comparable to the European Court of 
Justice makes seminal rulings impossible. As a result, there 
are only two forces, reciprocity and mimetism, which can 
convey the message of competition between national regu-
lations at the international level. 
Reciprocity can be defined as the threshold of mutual con-
cessions that trade partners consider necessary to sign a trade 
agreement. In cross-border trade in services, the principle of 
national treatment tends to relate reciprocity to home coun-
try rules. In the case of establishment-based international 
competition in services, reciprocity would instead refer to 
The 'general interest' principle will also be useful for solving disputes 
likely to emerge when enforcing mutual recognition and will require 
precise borders between licensing and operating rules. It will also be a 
powerful criterion for examining the impact of monopoly power. 
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host country rules. In practice, there is always a mixture of 
both rules. I 
Is reciprocity likely to expand the SMPS approach in trade 
agreements which will involve the Community? The answer 
is mixed. Agreements concerning establishment-based lib-
eralization are much less likely to lead to such a result. For 
service suppliers to obey host country rules may not be 
considered acceptable by both trading partners: the suppliers 
of the more regulated country may be seen as 'disadvan-
taged' relative to the service providers of the more liberal 
country, though there is no economic rationale for this 
proposition (indeed, consumers may prefer the more strin-
gent rules).2 These difficulties can be best illustrated by using 
the approach of Key and Scott (1991), who have built a 
matrix of cases corresponding to optimal combinations of 
policy goals and methods of providing services. They take 
into account five policy goals (competitive markets, safety 
and soundness, avoidance of systemic risks, deposit in-
surance and disclosure) and five methods of providing ser-
vices (cross-border trade, entry and operations for both 
branches and subsidiaries). Out of the 19 cases in which a 
decision on host or home rules has to be made, 11 cases 
would be based on host rules (including the four cases where 
host rules should be accompanied by harmonization) and 
the rest 'on home rules (a very mixed result indeed)'. 
Mimetism is another channel through which the SMPS could 
influence the rest of the world. The 1980s have already 
provided instances of unilateral liberalizations mimicking 
liberalizations previously undertaken in other countries. 
In this context, the 1990s are likely to see cases where the 
SMPS acts as a source of inspiration, as suggested by the 
reform of the US regulations on banking. The initial intent 
of the reform of the US banking system was to introduce 
provisions relatively similar to the EC Banking and Invest-
ment Directives: i.e. adoption of uniform accounting stan-
dards, elimination of the branching restrictions which have 
imposed on many US banks an over-reliance on a single 
region and a few industries, elimination of the product 
restrictions which have frozen the US 'banks' in an increas-
ingly narrow set of activities, elimination of free-riding prob-
lems raised by the system of the US Federal Deposit In-
surance, and permission for new foreign banks to operate 
148 
The principle ~f 'comp~rable_ competitive opportunities' introduced by 
the EC D1recttves deahng with the relations between the Community 
and the rest of the world is based on reciprocity with a balance between 
host and home country rules and markets. 
The alternative principle of comparable competitive opportunities may 
not be more successful because it implicitly requires a comparison 
between the host and home country rules and markets. 
in the USA partly based on bank supervision in its home 
country. However, the final text adopted by the Congress 
fell short of these drastic changes, but it is worthwhile to 
underline that the resulting disappointment in the financial 
services industry has led to indications of the desire for 
minimal regulations. The expanding US Federal Deposit 
Insurance system has been perceived as one of the major 
sources of incentives for bankers to run poorly managed 
?anks and to impose costs on tax-payers. More strikingly, 
~t has been suggested that restructuring the US banking 
mdustry does not require new laws: banks which are mem-
bers of the Federal Reserve system could get the flexibility 
and credibility they need by di~solving their parent holding 
companies and becoming State-chartered, non-Federal 
members, a solution which clearly relies on the idea of 
competition between the regulators of US States, one which 
may be more easily conceivable because of the EC situation. 
5.2. Competition and services liberalization 
The GA TS adopts a neutral attitude in terms of market 
structures: monopolies and 'exclusive service providers' are 
recognized as legitimate market structures though the GA TS 
takes into account the possible impact of monopolies on 
market access. In contrast, the whole SMPS exercise is based 
on the principle of competition in services. The seminal 
actions of the Court and the subsequent actions of the 
Commission in enforcing competition rules, and in carefully 
defining exemptions from them, reveal strong doubts about 
~he possibility that competition can survive in the long run 
m sectors where monopolistic structures exist. 
This focus on competition was initially supposed to raise a 
difficult problem. Is trade liberalization possible when trad-
ing partners have wide regulatory differences? This problem 
appears much less serious once the experience on trade 
liberalization in goods is considered. In contrast, the focus on 
competition reveals a problem which is relatively marginal in 
the case of manufacturing goods and which is much more 
serious in services than initially expected, namely, the sus-
tainability of competition in services. 
The enforcement of competition rules 
The Treaty of Rome is based on two competition rules 
Articles 85 on collusive practices and 86 on abuses of domi~ 
nant position, which have been increasingly enforced in 
services, as shown in air transport. In 1986, the Court liter-
ally launched the SMPS with a ruling stating that EC compe-
tition rules apply to scheduled air transport in a case examin-
ing allegations by Air France of price undercutting by the 
French tour operator Nouvelles Frontieres. In April 1989, 
a second ruling de facto extended the scope of competition 
rules to routes between the Community and the rest of the 
world. The Court's ruling concerned 'abusive air fares' on 
the Frankfurt-Tokyo route. According to the International 
Air Transport Association (IA TA) pricing rules, the fares 
Lisbon-Frankfurt-Tokyo were 60% less expensive than the 
direct Frankfurt-Tokyo fares. This was due to differences 
between market exchange rates and exchange rates used by 
IAT A when setting the global network of European fares. 
An association 'for the campaign against unfair competition' 
backed by EC flag airlines lodged a complaint about unfair 
competition and price undercutting by two German travel 
agents who were selling Lisbon-Frankfurt-Tokyo fares. The 
Court stated that price-fixing agreements for flights between 
EC and non-EC airports fall under the scrutiny of Article 
86, if they induce competitors to charge excessively high or 
low price fares on a single route. Moreover, the Court stated 
that airlines carrying out a task of 'general interest' (that is, 
flag carriers) are also subject to competition rules, so far as 
the application of such rules does not obstruct the perform-
ance of these particular tasks (a consequence of Article 90 
philosophy). 
Moreover, the Court has created a robust legal basis for the 
enforcement of Article 90 which states that public enterprises 
are not exempt from competition rules (embodied in Articles 
85 and 86) except when they are performing their 'general 
interest' tasks. The procedure under Article 90 (available 
only if public firms that enjoy exclusive rights use them in 
a way that restrains competition) has been used by the 
Commission for adopting the Tern1inal Equipment Directive 
in order to overcome EC Member States' opposition and 
to ensure that the Directive would be ready on time for 
liberalizing telecommunications services per se. 1 Several EC 
Member States (France, Belgium, Germany, Greece and 
Italy) have brought a case in the Court contesting the Com-
mission's use of Article 90. The Court confirmed that com-
petitors to the telecommunications organizations (TOs) 
should be able to import, market, install and maintain tele-
A first Court ruling (on telex forwarding, in 1985) stated that govern-
ment-sanctioned monopoly practices could conflict with Article 86 of 
the Treaty. Since the Terminal Equipment Directive, the Commission 
has used the Article 90 procedure twice, for liberalizing the Community's 
ECU 65 billion market of value-added services, and for requesting 
regulatory changes in the Dutch express-mail regulations (Financial 
Times. 9 January 1990). 
II - Services 
communications terminal equipment, and that independent 
regulatory bodies should handle approval responsibilities.2 
Since the late 1980s, the Commission has imposed stricter 
enforcement of competition rules in a growing number of 
cases in banking, telecommunications, postal services, air 
and maritime transport, insurance and audiovisual services. 
The Commission has also the power to grant 'exemptions' 
and 'block exemptions' from competition rules. For instance, 
after having received many notifications of potentially re-
strictive cooperation agreements in insurance, the Com-
mission proposed rules for 'block exemptions' for agree-
ments deemed to have net positive effects. In telecommuni-
cations, the Commission published a set of guidelines on the 
application of EC competition rules, such as the criteria 
which the Commission will use to evaluate the harmoniza-
tion and coordination agreements between the TOs, the 
suppliers of new equipment, and the providers of new ser-
vices in newly opened markets. The guidelines focus on 
justified restrictions of competition, the definition of the 
'relevant' market, mergers and joint ventures, and the effect 
of international conventions. It is too early to assess the 
impact of all these exemptions. However, the unfortunate 
experience of the USA during the 1930s and 1940s, when 
service sectors were progressively exempted from compe-
tition laws, suggests that increasing attention should be 
devoted to these exemptions in order to check their economic 
foundations. 
Services liberalization with wide regulatory differences 
More open trade in services is likely to generate changes in 
the portfolio of activities (and strategies) of providers of 
services, as well as between services and goods. For instance, 
last year, British Railways stated its willingness to enter the 
British telecommunications market by both leasing lines and 
providing services; also, the Bell companies under strict 
regulations on their regional monopolies have moved to the 
production of sophisticated telecommunications equipment. 
These evolutions raise a general problem: can the changes 
It is interesting to note that the Court did not follow the Advocate-
General's conclusions (which stated that the Commission had exceeded 
its substantive competence by attempting to abolish the TOs' special 
and exclusive rights on importation, marketing, installation and main-
tenance of terminal equipment). In the same ruling, the Court annulled 
customers' rights to break anti-competitive long-term leasing contracts 
with the TOs, leaving open the possibility of prosecutions on a case-by-
case basis for reaching this goal. The Court's approach in telecommuni-
cations can be compared to the approach taken by the European 
Parliament in insurance which has expressed reservations about the role 
of competition, and has suggested the creation of a 'code of good 
conduct' with a European supervisory body (two risky moves for compe-
tition). 
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mentioned above be more dramatic when the two trading 
partners have very different rules? Can countries having 
wide regulatory differences engage in services liberalization, 
or is there a need for 'special treatment'? 
The SMPS approach, relying on similar rules between trade 
in goods and in services, leads to a clear answer: wide 
regulatory differences may raise the case for progressive 
liberalization, but not for 'special treatment' as illustrated by 
the longer time-spans granted to the less-developed Member 
States for adopting the Directives of the SMPS. 
The approach favouring progressive liberalization over spe-
cial treatment is based on two arguments. First, the more 
different the trade partners are, the larger the likely gains 
from trade. Wide regulatory differences may lead to diver-
gences in differentiated competing services and hence gener-
ate large benefits in accordance with the golden rule on the 
gains from trade. In this case, each country will continue to 
provide a range of services, though trading partners may 
make important adjustment efforts for the remaining range 
of services (hence, the possibility of progressive liberalization 
in order to spread adjustment costs over a longer time-span). 
Second, wide regulatory differences may reflect the fact that 
one of the trading partners is inefficient in the production 
of a relatively homogeneous service. In this case, imposing 
similar rules on trade in goods and services may lead to a 
marked specialization in services and goods, as illustrated 
by recent experiences in telecommunications' liberalization. 
Competing in telecommunications services has induced the 
TOs of the industrial countries to abandon their traditional 
production of basic equipment in order to concentrate on 
more attractive service markets (and their associated more 
sophisticated equipment), whereas newly available services 
have induced European consumers to demand more and 
cheaper equipment which could be more efficiently produced 
by developing countries. Table 76 provides results which 
suggest such an evolution in the case of telecommunications' 
liberalization. Developing countries have increased their 
market shares of the EC imports of telecommunications 
equipment by 20% (on average) during the first two new 
years following the beginning of liberalization in the three 
EC Member States observed. It is interesting to note that 
developing countries are trying to upgrade their products 
from basic phone sets to small phone terminals. 
A difficult problem: 'sustaining' competition 
It has been observed that deregulation of service industries 
may be followed by an increase in concentration, often after 
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a period of decreased concentration. The role of public 
authorities in such cases is still hotly debated, in large part 
because the move towards concentration and its relationship 
with competition are still subject to scrutiny. 
In any case, the Commission has felt it necessary to act 'in 
favour of competition', that is, to 'sustain' competition, 
as illustrated in air transport. Despite the Court's rulings 
mentioned above, and the two first liberalization packages, 
there have been little signs of increased competition. The 
coverage of multiple designation has increased from 5% of 
the scheduled air routes in June 1987 to 7% in June 1989, 
mainly because of the UK's policy. The coverage of the fifth 
freedom is even lower: one-fifth freedom service ( out of 494 
routes) was operated by a Community airline before 1988, 
and only eight in 1989. Another worrisome sign is that 
efforts to implement competition on routes under multiple 
designation basis have not been encouraging. Entrants are 
rapidly driven out of the markets or bought by the dominant 
(flag) carriers. Price collusion is frequent: following a recent 
British complaint on the United Kingdom-EC fares, the 
Commission has observed that 55% of the 88 examined air 
fares contravened the EC rule requiring that fares be related 
to costs. In sum, the EC airline industry emerging from the 
two first liberalization packages may already share certain 
aspects of the US airline industry: price discrimination and 
market power based on an integrated 'hub-and-spoke' sys-
tem, where each hub tends to become monopoly disciplined, 
if at all, by spokes from other hubs. 
Looking at the US example suggests that sustaining compe-
tition may have two components. It requires an 'economi-
cally-sound' definition of the service industry in question, 
which may be larger than the technical definition: airlines 
are services produced by aircraft and airports combined in 
time-schedules. It also implies a combination of domestic 
competition policy and international competition - it is 
likely that the US airline industry would be under more 
competitive pressures if competition on airports, reservation 
systems and domestic routes (by foreign carriers) had been 
more open. 1 As a result, if there are risks that sustaining 
competition could lead to excessive public intervention 
(through a too large a scope for intervention or a too heavy 
a domestic competition aspect) these risks are manageable 
by a careful examination of the cases. 
In its White Paper (June 1991), the Association of the European Airlines 
strongly supports measures with a clear non-competitive impact: rein-
forcing hub-and-spoke networks, not discriminating in favour of new 
entrants, and not hampering mergers, acquisitions and alliances. 
II - Services 
Table 76 
Imports of telecommunications equipment, 1980-88 
lmponing Year of lmpons from LDCs Imports from Japan countries libera-
lization Growth Growth Import shares 
rate 
Import shares 
rate 
Before 
USA 1984 23,6 
Japan 1987 19,3 
EC 12 
UK 1983 3,2 
France 1987 7,3 
Germany 1988 6,6 
USA 1984 51,6 
Japan 1987 8,4 
EC 12 
UK 1983 12,0 
France 1987 9,5 
Germany 1988 13,2 
USA 1984 46,0 
Japan 1987 4,7 
ECI2 
UK 1983 1,9 
France 1987 1,0 
Germany 1988 0,4 
Japan 1987 6,1 
EC 12 
UK 1983 0,5 
France 1987 1,1 
Germany 1988 0,2 
Sources: TARS system, ICC: author's computations. 
6. Conclusion 
Over the last decade, the importance of services in inter-
national trade relations has increased dramatically due to 
the growing awareness of the contribution of this large 
proportion of productive sectors to domestic growth and 
welfare and of the gains that certain countries have made 
by starting to open up their national markets. Since the 
After (%) Before After (%) 
Line equipment (SITC 7641) 
29,3 24,2 45,7 48,0 5,0 
33,2 72,3 
11,1 245,9 13,2 28,9 119,3 
8,2 13,2 10,1 26,8 165,8 
8,8 32,9 27,5 58,9 113,8 
Transmitters (SITC 7643) 
51,0 -1,3 36,0 38,3 6,4 
29,7 252,8 
3,9 -67,3 14,7 19,9 35,4 
9,9 4,0 14,1 7,5 -46,8 
13,6 3,2 24,5 17,3 -29,4 
Receivers (SITC 76481) 
47,6 3,5 52,5 48,2 -8,3 
7,2 52,7 
3,7 93,1 10,2 23,9 134,0 
0,4 -57,2 16,4 18,4 12,0 
1,2 201,0 10,6 10,0 -5,5 
Line equipment parts (SITC 76491) 
16,6 171,I 
1,6 230,3 1,2 4,4 272,4 
7,3 553,0 10,5 27,5 162,8 
1,1 505,5 5,8 7,4 28,1 
mid-1980s, the Community has taken a pivotal role in this 
evolution. The single market programme in services has 
given the Community credibility as a potential major trading 
partner in services and an unsurpassed experience in terms 
of opening domestic service markets. Meanwhile, the Com-
munity has evolved from a cautious attitude towards the 
introduction of trade liberalization in services in the Urug-
uay Round agenda to a staunch supporter of the general 
agreement on trade in services. 
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The decline in measures restricting all kinds of competition 
in services, from cross-border to establishment-based trade, 
will place domestic production patterns in services under 
increasing pressures for adjustment and innovation. This 
evolution is already perceptible not only in the Community, 
but also in Western Europe as a result of the single market 
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programme in services. Being a driving force for change in 
one of the largest services markets in the world, the single 
market programme in services will exert constant pressures 
for additional commitments on the Community and its trad-
ing partners within the framework of the general agreement 
on trade in services. 
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Annex: Indicative list of service industries used in GATS offers 
Business services 
Professional services 
Legal services 
Accounting, auditing, bookkeeping 
Taxation services 
Architectural services 
Engineering services 
Integrated engineering 
Urban planning 
Medical and dental services 
Veterinary services 
Other health-related services 
Other 
Computer-related services 
Consultancy on installation 
Software implementation 
Data processing 
Database 
Other 
R&D services 
R&D on natural sciences 
R&D on social sciences 
Real estate services 
Real estate (own/leased) 
Real estate (fee/contract) 
Rental/leasing without crew 
Relating to ships 
Relating to aircraft 
Relating to other transport 
Relating to others 
Other business services 
Advertising services 
Franchising 
Market research 
Management consulting 
Services relating to management consultancy 
Technical testing 
Services relating to agriculture 
Services relating to fishing 
Services relating to mining 
Placement and supply personnel 
Investigation and security 
Related scientific consultancy 
Installation and assembly work 
Repair of equipment, vessels, etc. 
Building-cleaning services 
Photographic services 
Packaging services 
Translation services 
Sewage and refuse disposal 
Printing, publishing 
Other 
Communication services 
Postal services 
Courier services 
Telecommunications services 
Voice telephone 
Packet-switched data transmission 
Circuit-switched data transmission 
Telex 
Telegraph 
Facsimile 
Private leased circuit 
Electronic mail 
Voice mail 
On-line information retrieval 
Electronic data interchange (EDI) 
Enhanced facsimile 
Code and protocol conversion 
On-line information and/or data processing 
Other 
Audiovisual services 
Motion picture and video tape production and 
distribution 
Motion picture projection 
Radio and television 
Sound recording 
Other 
Other communication services 
News and press agency 
Libraries and archives 
Other 
Construction and related engineering services 
Project planning 
Feasibility studies 
General construction for buildings 
General construction for civil engineering 
Installation and assembly work 
Building completion 
Maintenance and repair 
Other 
Distribution services 
Commission agents' services 
Wholesale trade services 
Food retailing services 
Non-food retailing services 
Educational services 
Environmental services 
Financial services 
All insurance 
Life 
Non-life 
Reinsurance 
Auxiliary services 
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Banking 
Acceptance of deposits 
Lending 
Financial leasing 
All payment 
Guarantees and commitment 
Trading 
Participation in issues 
Money broking 
Asset management 
Settlement and clearing 
Advisory 
Provision and transfer 
Health-related services 
Tourism, travel 
Hotels and restaurants 
Travel agencies and tour operators 
Tourist guides 
Entertainment services 
Sporting and recreational 
Other 
Transport services 
International maritime 
Passenger 
Freight 
Rentals 
Maintenance 
Supporting services 
Internal waterways 
Passenger 
Freight 
Rentals 
Maintenance 
Pushing and towing 
Supporting services 
International air 
Passenger 
Freight 
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Rentals 
Maintenance 
Supporting services 
Space transport 
International rail 
Passenger 
Freight 
Pushing and towing 
Maintenance 
Supporting services 
Internal rail 
Passenger 
Freight 
Pushing and towing 
Maintenance 
Supporting services 
International road 
Passenger 
Freight 
Rentals 
Maintenance 
Supporting services 
Internal road 
Passenger 
Freight 
Rentals 
Maintenance 
Supporting services 
Pipeline 
Transport of fuels 
Other 
Services auxiliary to transport 
Cargo-handling 
Storage and warehouse 
Freight transport agencies 
Other 
Other transport services 
Other services not included elsewhere 
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Summary 
1. Trade in intellectual property has increased rapidly in 
recent years both through its embodiment in goods and 
through flows of foreign direct investment and licences for 
the use of technologies and trade names. Firms in the Euro-
pean Community are prominently involved in this trade, 
both inside and outside the Community. 
2. This growth reflects, in part, the increasing globalization 
of business competition as firms employ sophisticated forms 
of international activity to exploit the economic value in-
herent in their innovative and creative work. Again, this 
form of competition is pronounced in the Community, es-
pecially as firms prepare for the unified market. 
3. In this environment, government measures to protect 
intellectual property rights with patents, trade marks, copy-
rights and related devices take on greater importance as part 
of the background rules governing international trade and 
investment. 
4. In general terms, the European Community has two 
broad interests in the intellectual property area. First, it is 
important to establish greater harmonization of national 
policies among the Member States in order to rationalize 
incentives for engaging in innovative activity and product 
marketing. Second, continued efforts need to be made 
through the GA TT and other multilateral organizations to 
achieve stronger protection for intellectual property outside 
the Community, particularly in developing countries. 
5. It must be recognized, however, that stronger levels of 
intellectual property protection carry certain costs as well as 
benefits. The essential reason for this tradeoff is that such 
protection attempts to overcome the dynamic economic 
problem that infringement limits the returns to innovation, 
resulting in an underinvestment in new technology and prod-
uct development. In doing so, however, protection worsens 
the static economic problem that new information should 
be provided to users at marginal cost, which is likely to be 
too low to compensate innovators fully. Thus, intellectual 
property protection is inherently a crude solution to prob-
lems of a 'second-best' nature and changes in policy could, 
in principle, raise or lower welfare. Each package needs to 
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
6. In this context, technologically advanced countries with 
high-income consumers that have a strong preference for 
great product variety and quality achieve significant dynamic 
benefits from intellectual property protection. However, 
even in countries that should gain overall, there is a risk that 
stronger intellectual property protection could result in high 
costs for consumers and input users, and limited competition 
and technology diffusion. That is why there is a need for an 
effective competition policy to offset unwarranted abuses of 
stronger intellectual property rights. 
7. In the multilateral context, a balance of advantages for 
movements toward global harmonization of ·IPRs could 
appropriately come from a comprehensive agreement in the 
Uruguay Round that guarantees greater access to markets 
in the developed countries for products in which developing 
nations have a clear export advantage. 
1. Introduction and outline 
It is important for this trade report to evaluate questions 
involving the links between international trade in goods 
and intellectual property rights (IPRs). Trade in intellectual 
property, the name for assets generated through industrial 
or commercial innovation and artistic creation, has grown 
rapidly both through its embodiment in goods and through 
flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and licences for 
the use of technologies and trade names. As creators and 
consumers of intellectual property, firms in the EC are keenly 
interested in arrangements for such trade, both within and 
outside the Community. Further, as economic integration 
unfolds in the EC there is likely to be accelerated competition 
based on innovative activity and the control of valuable 
information. Accordingly, policy issues covering IPRs, in-
cluding pressures for the internationai harmonization of 
regulations and the relationships to investment and compe-
tition policy, require careful consideration. 
Briefly, IPRs are the protective mechanisms used to safe-
guard the rights of creative interests to exploit the economic 
value in their inventions. These policies include patents, 
trade marks, industrial designs, trade secrets, copyrights and 
neighbouring rights, and various hybrid devices for use in 
specific circumstances. I 
During the 1980s there was a dramatic rise in concern about 
the forms of protection afforded IPRs by various nations 
and the effects that such protection may have on inter-
national trade, investment and technology transfer. Among 
the reasons for this concern, three loom as most significant. 
First, expanding globalization of industrial competition has 
induced firms to look for greater strategic advantages in 
setting international production and sales plans. Strong in-
tellectual property protection may provide such advantages. 
Second, the growing ease and quality with which creative 
products may be copied has generated alarm over sales 
and profits lost to unauthorized duplication. Finally, the 
increasing commercial importance of new forms of tech-
nology and information, such as semiconductor devices and 
biotechnological products, the protection of which under 
Annex I to this paper provides detailed definitions of IPRs and circum-
stances under which they are used. 
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traditional IPRs may be ineffective or controversial, has led 
to a re-examination of the suitability of existing intellectual 
property regimes. 
This interest in intellectual property has elevated IPRs to a 
high-priority status in bilateral and multilateral negotiations 
over international commercial policy. The EC has played a 
crucial role by strongly asserting its interests in the GATT. 
Moreover, the EC continues to move toward greater har-
monization of IPRs among its members, consonant with the 
formation of a unified market. Any substantive changes in 
international levels of protection for intellectual property 
will have fundamental impacts on business competition and 
economic welfare. Whereas the liberalization of direct bar-
riers to trade, such as tariffs and quotas, may strongly be 
presumed to improve welfare in both the liberalizing 
countries and the rest of the world, greater international 
protection (including harmonization of such protection) for 
intellectual property should result in a complicated set of 
benefits and costs that may be unevenly distributed across 
nations. These effects should further be distinguished as 
either static or dynamic in nature, in that greater protection 
may be expected to promote more rapid growth and inno-
vation with global benefits. 
The main aim of this report is to provide an economic 
assessment of this trend toward enhanced protection .of 
IPRs. It will be argued that there is little evidence on which 
to reach firm conclusions about the extent of potential 
welfare impacts. None the less, it is important to understand 
the various tradeoffs inherent in such changes in policy in 
order to evaluate their desirability in general terms. 
The report is organized as follows. In Section 2 information 
is presented on recent trends and directions of trade in 
intellectual property, with emphasis on the EC. There is also 
a brief characterization of the current situation regarding 
international protective regimes. Section 3 contains a de-
tailed discussion of the economic arguments regarding the 
social costs and benefits of providing IPRs and a review of 
the limited evidence available on how well social objectives 
have been met. Concluding comments in Section 4 consider 
a basic framework for IPR policy in the Community. The 
primary issues include negotiations over IPRs outside the 
EC, harmonization within the unified market, and the re-
lationship between intellectual property protection and the 
need for an active competition policy. 
2. Trends in intellectual property trade 
A firm's ability to appropriate returns to innovative activity 
is enhanced by a judicious choice of its global marketing 
strategies. In general, there are three means by which intellec-
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tual property may be traded. The first mechanism is simply 
to engage in international exchange in goods that embody 
a creative component. To some extent the value of such 
trade reflects the inherent economic benefits of the embodied 
information. A second choice is to undertake foreign direct 
investment to establish various production locations. Among 
the reasons that could motivate this choice is the fact that 
firms may see greater opportunity to safeguard their pro-
prietary informational advantages through FOi. Finally, 
firms may trade their intellectual property directly by licens-
ing rights to use it in return for negotiated royalty payments. 
Although it is impossible to ascertain the precise values of 
these various forms of trade in intellectual property, it is 
worth while to consider the available evidence on trends and 
patterns. 
2.1. Trade in goods embodying intellectual 
property 
One major reason for the current interest in IPRs is that 
international trade in intellectual-property-intensive (IPI) 
goods is an important part of trade for many countries. 
Perspective on this issue is provided in Table 77, which 
shows the percentage growth in total exports and imports 
for the EC-12 countries, EFTA, the United States, Japan, 
and three developing nations between 1985 and 1989 and for 
trade in aggregations of selected manufactured IPI goods. 1 It 
should be noted that these figures are expressed in terms of 
US dollars. Were they expressed in ecus, the percentage 
changes would be considerably less. These goods are grouped 
into categories that tend to face serious problems of foreign 
infringement of patents, trade marks and copyrights, respect-
ively. These categories do not include all IPI goods, nor even 
necessarily the most important ones, largely because services 
are excluded. For example, the group of copyright goods 
comprises only printed matter and sound recording media, 
with no consideration for the value of international broad-
casts. The selection of goods here reflects their significance 
in current international disputes over IPRs. 
Also listed are exports of these grouped goods as a share of 
total merchandise exports in 1989, as a basic indication of 
the relative advantages of different countries in producing 
IPI goods. Further, estimates of the amount of each EC 
Member State's exports of these goods to places outside the 
See Annex 2 for a classification of the goods included. 
Community as a share of national extra-EC exports are 
presented. Comparisons of these two columns provide an 
indication of how intensively the member countries export 
these goods to non-EC sources relative to their overall trade 
in IPI goods. Finally, for each country an estimate of the 
1989 trade balance (in millions of US dollars) by type of 
good (including, for EC members, trade both within and 
outside the Community) is included. Note that positive or 
negative trade balances in various groups of goods in a 
particular year should not be taken as literal measures of 
comparative advantage, because such trade balances are 
largely driven by national macroeconomic conditions. 
Trade figures for the Republic of Korea, Brazil and India 
are included because these are important countries at varying 
levels of industrialization and technological development. 
These nations also have been strongly criticized for their 
weak intellectual property laws. 
Recognize that values of international trade flows reflect 
many influences and it is not possible to estimate separately 
the effect of intellectual property pricing and protection. For 
example, trade in both inputs and outputs is often carried 
out within multinational enterprises (MNEs). Thus, internal 
prices may have little relation to the economic value of the 
intellectual property embodied in goods. I For such reasons, 
trade data present only a broad picture of implicit inter-
national transactions in intellectual assets. 
Given these caveats, note in Table 77, Panel A, that the late 
1980s saw 76% increases in overall merchandise imports 
and exports for the EC-12 countries. Spain and Portugal 
experienced particularly rapid increases in trade. However, 
gross trade (both within and outside the EC) in goods for 
which patents are important forms of protection (largely 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, certain machinery, semiconduc-
tors, and precision instruments) rose somewhat less, es-
pecially on the export side, as shown in Panel B. Only 
Belgium-Luxembourg displayed near-balanced growth in 
both imports and exports in these products. In contrast, 
except for India, countries outside Europe enjoyed relatively 
larger increases in trade in patent goods than in overall 
trade, with an especially rapid rise in Korean exports. India's 
exports actually declined in nominal terms. 
Despite the slower growth in exports, patent goods consti-
tuted a significant share of total exports and extra-EC ex-
ports for many Member States in 1989, accounting for 8,1 % 
of the UK's total exports, for example. Remarkable in this 
See Maskus (1990) for further discussion. 
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context is Ireland, which exported a disproportionately high 
value of automatic data-processing equipment. Most of these 
exports were assembled and shipped to EC partners and 
other countries under licence to foreign firms. This fact 
points out that the data in Table 77 do not imply that firms 
in the exporting country necessarily own the relevant patents. 
Germany and the Netherlands also had high export shares 
in patent goods in 1989. Patent goods loomed somewhat 
larger in German extra-EC exports than in total exports, 
reflecting Germany's strong competitiveness in supplying 
world markets with them. This situation also characterized 
the UK, France and Denmark. Spain, Portugal and Greece 
exhibited smaller export proportions in patent goods, which 
are not yet areas of comparative advantage for them. 
Although the data are not shown, the nominal values of 
trade were large. For example, in 1989 Germany exported 
USO 27,2 billion in patent goods overall, with some USO 
13,3 billion going outside the EC. Imports and exports for 
the EC-12 in these goods totalled USO 162,6 billion in 
1989, with an external trade deficit of USO 3,8 billion. If 
infringement caused total trade flows to be distorted by as 
little as 2% in 1989, EC firms in these industries lost perhaps 
USO 3,3 billion in sales. 2 The main IPR interest of innova-
tive firms in Germany and elsewhere would be strengthened 
foreign patents to prevent unauthorized duplication and 
sales of new products and processes. 
The United States and Japan stand out among the other 
countries as strong exporters of patent goods, while Korea 
is rapidly expanding its relative advantage as well, primarily 
in automatic data-processing equipment and semiconduc-
tors. In contrast, Brazilian and Indian exports have stag-
nated in relative terms. The figures for India suggest that, 
in general, the poorer developing nations have strong com-
parative disadvantages in the development of new technol-
ogies and products.3 These countries are concerned that a 
tightening of their intellectual property laws would result 
only in higher import prices with little offsetting benefits in 
terms of induced innovation and technology transfers. 
As shown in Panel C, trade by Member States in selected 
goods in which trade mark protection is prominent (al-
coholic beverages, cosmetics, glassware, automobile parts, 
furniture, luggage, clothing, watches and toys) grew more 
rapidly than overall trade. Starting from a small base, Spain, 
Feinberg and Rousslang (1990) report that US firms claim infringing 
sales ranging from 2,8 to 14,3% of global sales in !PI-intensive goods. 
No comparable claims exist for EC firms. Note, however, that since the 
gross trade data discussed here include much exchange among EC 
Member States, wherein IPRs are more strongly protected than in many 
other areas of the world, such damages are likely to be slighter than 
indicated. 
This point is shown clearly in the case of Africa, as detailed by Maskus 
(1990). 
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Table 77 
Growth in international trade in total and in selected intellectual-property-intensive goods, 1985-891 
Country Growth in Growth in 1989 export 1989 extra-EC 1989 
imports(%) exports(%) sharc2 export sharc-1 TB' 
Panel A - Trade in total merchandise 
EC-12 75,8 75,8 100,0 100,0 -32 783 
Belgium-Luxembourg 77,4 88,4 100,0 100,0 1 587 
Denmark 50,9 71,0 100,0 100,0 1 417 
Federal Republic of Germany 70,2 86,1 100,0 100,0 72 489 
Greece 59,0 66,1 100,0 100,0 -8 583 
Spain 130,4 77,I 100,0 100,0 -26 962 
France 78,5 83,2 100,0 100,0 -13 638 
Ireland 73,9 99,6 100,0 100,0 3 258 
Italy 68,0 75,4 100,0 100,0 -14 410 
Netherlands 59,9 58,0 100,0 100,0 3 611 
Portugal 144,7 124,1 100,0 100,0 -6271 
UK 81,0 50,3 100,0 100,0 -45 281 
EFTA 68,9 70,9 100,0 1 629 
USA 36,4 66,3 100,0 -129 383 
Japan 62,8 56,6 100,0 64 333 
Korea 97,4 106,0 100,0 927 
Brazil 39,0 34,l 100,0 16 111 
India 27,9 79,2 100,0 -4256 
Panel B - Trade in goods with potential patent problems 
EC-12 77,8 51,4 7,1 7,4 -3 783 
Belgium-Luxembourg 74,0 69,6 5,5 5,1 110 
Denmark 47,6 41,6 5,6 6,4 -630 
Federal Republic of Germany 76,1 51,6 7,9 8,7 7 506 
Greece 41,0 30,8 1,1 0,3 -576 
Spain 88,5 28,I 4,1 5,1 -1 546 
France 75,6 56,2 5,7 6,4 -3 094 
Ireland 94,1 57,0 13,8 12,5 I 213 
Italy 92,6 36,0 6,6 6,5 -2 543 
Netherlands 117,9 70,7 7,7 6,6 -1 269 
Portugal 114,0 41,3 2,7 3,2 -662 
UK 56,0 46,0 8,1 8,5 -2 292 
EFTA 52,3 40,9 6,7 -1 222 
USA 75,4 81,6 10,5 I 900 
Japan 104,5 98,9 13,2 26 500 
Korea 149,4 308,6 10,1 1 155 
Brazil 169,7 73,8 3,9 -446 
India 34,7 -27,8 1,1 -1 598 
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Table 77 (Continued) 
Country Growth in Growth in 1989 export 1989 extra-EC 1989 
imports(%) exports(%) share' export share3 TB4 
Panel C - Trade in goods with potential trade mark problems 
EC-12 100,5 75,2 8,3 (5,6) 8,0 3 752 
Belgium-Luxembourg 30,4 87,8 4,8 (3,3) 2,6 -2 939 
Denmark 59,8 51,7 7,6 (5,3) 10,9 237 
Federal Republic of Germany 105,6 92,2 7,4 (5,8) 7,6 -847 
Greece 266,9 127,5 21,0 (1,4) 15,4 594 
Spain 257,8 90,4 7,7 (6,7) 9,5 -948 
France 139,8 105,3 10,1 (8,0) 9,9 I 060 
Ireland 74,3 54,5 4,5 (2,9) 3,5 - 213 
Italy 124,1 78,0 14,7 (7,8) 12,9 13 851 
Netherlands 90,3 82,3 3,4 (2,0) 1,6 -4461 
Portugal I 005,9 135,8 25,0 (4,8) 26,9 I 795 
UK 98,8 34,4 6,3 (4,7) 4,7 -6 584 
EFTA 86,2 73,9 6,0 (4,8) -6 295 
USA 39,0 40,5 5,2 (4,6) -37 647 
Japan 246,0 58,9 4,9 (4,7) I 528 
Korea 187,7 98,1 18,2 (3,6) 10 547 
Brazil 148,0 21,2 2,5 (1,8) 239 
India 20,8 122,2 14,9 (1,5) I 996 
Panel D - Trade.in goods with potential copyright problems 
EC-12 115,3 84,8 0,8 0,9 397 
Belgium-Luxembourg 89,7 81,3 0,5 0,3 -268 
Denmark 69,9 88,4 0,9 0,9 34 
Federal Republic of Germany 127,8 100,1 0,8 1,0 917 
Greece 204,0 16,7 0,2 • -62 
Spain 222,1 -4,7 0,6 1,2 -132 
France 116,0 68,8 0,6 0,8 -524 
Ireland 86,0 444,4 4,9 2,9 832 
Italy 134,1 40,7 0,4 0,3 -174 
Netherlands 117,9 95,8 1,0 0,7 177 
Portugal 292,6 71,4 0,2 • -82 
UK 76,9 47,7 1,1 1,3 -113 
EFTA 94,2 84,8 0,4 -1 376 
USA 31,7 123,2 1,1 I 347 
Japan 101,9 14,3 0,8 1451 
Korea 151,6 233,9 1,3 672 
Brazil 195,3 72,2 0,1 -96 
India 76,9 0,0 0,1 -76 
' See Annex 2 for a list or the goods included. 
' Share or this type or product in total exports (figures in parentheses in trade mark goods exclude clothing). 
l Share or estimated extra-EC exports or this type or product in total extra-EC exports. 
• Trade balance in millions or US dollars. 
= too small to compute. 
Source: UN, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. 
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Portugal and Greece have seen particularly rapid rises in 
imports and exports of these goods. Such products were 
highly significant in the export patterns of France, Italy, 
Portugal and Greece. However, the two latter countries 
tend to be locations in which products are assembled under 
labour-intensive conditions and for which trade mark owner-
ship largely resides elsewhere. This fact is seen from the low 
remaining export shares after clothing is removed from the 
sample. It is likely that over time firms in these countries 
will develop innovative clothing designs for which trade 
mark protection will be important. 
As expected, Italy and France displayed clear advantages in 
designing and producing status goods, such as cosmetics, 
luggage and clothing, under trade mark. Innovative design 
houses have clear interests in greater foreign protection 
for their products and fashions. Germany's largest export 
strength lay in automobile parts, an industry for which trade 
mark protection is crucial for profitability. France and Italy 
also were strong exporters of automobile parts in 1989. 
Denmark's most prominent advantage was in exporting fur-
niture under trade mark protection. The Netherlands, 
Belgium-Luxembourg and Ireland relied relatively little on 
exports of trade marked products. 
Outside the Community, Japan (in automobile parts) and 
Korea and India (in toys and clothing) demonstrated relative 
advantages as indicated by associated trade surpluses. The 
United States remained the largest single trader of these 
commodities, but imports far exceeded exports. Of course, 
much of these imports were of goods with US and foreign 
trade marks produced abroad under licence. Thus, despite 
the apparent comparative disadvantage at the production 
stage, American and European firms largely retain their 
design functions at home. Again, these sectors would benefit 
from stronger foreign IPRs to prevent unauthorized pro-
duction and export of knock-offs. 
Turning last to products with potential problems in copy-
right protection (printed materials and sound recordings and 
tapes), Community trade expanded relatively rapidly from 
1985 to 1989. Comparatively large export shares were rec-
orded by Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Ireland. 1 Ireland's strong export showing re-
flected large net exports in sound recordings in 1989. Spain 
demonstrated a relatively large share of copyright goods in 
its extra-EC exports. 
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Recall that the small export shares in these goods should not be inter-
preted to mean that copyrights are unimportant in EC international 
trade. Most transactions for which copyright protection is common, 
primarily in services, are excluded here. In general, the Community is a 
strong producer of copyrightable materials. 
Outside the EC, the United States, Japan and Korea have 
strong export shares in these goods. The situation in the 
latter two countries also arose due to substantial net exports 
of tapes and recordings. It should be noted that, while Korea 
has been the frequent subject of allegations about production 
and exports of counterfeit recordings, the data in Table 77, 
Panel D, reflect trade in products recognized as legitimate 
by Korean authorities. Thus, it appears that Korea has a 
growing interest in exporting copyrighted goods, perhaps 
under licence to foreign firms. 
While international trade data present, at best, only rough 
indications of trade in intellectual property, some broad 
conclusions are warranted from this review. It appears that 
global markets for IPI goods have expanded rapidly and 
dynamically in recent years, leading to significant potential 
for infringement. These goods are substantive components 
of trade in the industrial countries, wherein the interests of 
innovative firms lie in stronger foreign protection. Further, 
for many countries trade in IPI products is distinctive in 
terms of comparative advantage or disadvantage. Thus, 
there is a clear difference in the interests of the industrial 
countries and the poorer developing nations regarding IPRs. 
Finally, rapidly industrializing countries, such as Korea, 
should prefer to see improved domestic and global protec-
tion as their economies become more dynamic technologi-
cally and consumer preferences shift more toward higher-
quality products and services. 
In the light of these factors, growing concern among innova-
tive firms and trade policy authorities about global IPRs is 
readily understood. Firms are likely to experience substantial 
losses in sales, profits and employment due to domestic and 
foreign infringement of their intellectual assets, though it is 
difficult to assess how large these losses actually are. For 
example, respondents to a survey by the US International 
Trade Commission (1988) claimed a total ofUSD 9,3 billion 
in lost sales and exports in 1986. However, such claims 
surely overestimate actual damages, in part because stronger 
protection of their rights would call forth higher prices, 
diminishing overall sales. It is inappropriate to assume that 
new sales after the introduction of greater protection would 
just replace existing sales. Analysts would need information 
on market elasticities and market structure to predict future 
sales, a difficult prospect (Maskus, 1990). Further, firms that 
respond to such surveys may have an incentive to overstate 
their expected damages from deficient foreign IPRs. None 
the less, some innovative businesses and creative interests in 
the industrial countries surely would benefit from stronger 
international protection. 
From a policy standpoint, the greater concern should be 
with potential damage to the trading system from differing 
international levels of intellectual property protection. Un-
questionably, the form and enforcement of IPRs can distort 
trade and reduce the efficiency of global markets. The nature 
of these distortions may be subtle, however. On the one 
hand, border protections may be so stringent that they 
present an unwarranted barrier to trade and provide excess-
ive monopoly power to home-market firms. This is a con-
tinuing worry in the EC, as care is taken to ensure that 
national IPR regimes do not interfere with the free internal 
flow of goods as called for in the Treaty of Rome. The 
problem is more acute in some developing countries, where 
limited or discriminatory protection may act as a non-tariff 
barrier to imports by encouraging local firms to imitate a 
foreign product and exclude imports of the original good by 
procuring and exercising its own patent or trade mark. 1 
More generally, unauthorized production may displace im-
ports of the original good in home and third-country mar-
kets. On the other hand, lower levels of protection for 
intellectual property could expand trade by indirectly subsid-
izing exports of infringing products. It could also induce 
greater exports of legitimate goods from innovative firms if 
they find it strategically more advantageous to serve markets 
with exports, rather than licensing technology to local firms. 
The latter decision might more readily risk the unauthorized 
loss of proprietary information in a poorly protected 
country. 
Thus, in principle, different levels of IPRs could expand or 
reduce trade. The only systematic evidence on this question 
lies in a recent study by Maskus and Eby-Konan (1992), in 
which econometric models of equilibrium bilateral trade 
flows are estimated. The residuals from these equations are 
then related to variables that might explain the existence of 
disequilibria in international trade. One variable is an index 
of the strength of patent protection across countries at 
various levels of economic development. While the evidence 
is still rather preliminary, it suggests that bilateral trade is 
detectably diminished from its expected levels by weak pat-
ent regimes. In consequence, stronger levels of protection in 
developing nations would tend to shift global trade more 
toward those markets. 
2.2. Investment and technology transfer 
While trade in merchandise is an important means of ensur-
ing adequate returns to innovative activity, firms also earn 
This was one function of the Brazilian informatics policy, which is 
undergoing reform. 
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foreign income by establishing subsidiaries in which pro-
duction of IPI goods takes place. The parent corporation 
receives licence fees and investment income from its foreign 
affiliates. Additionally, intellectual property assets may be 
exploited through licensing of technologies, industrial 
secrets, and brand names to unaffiliated firms. This process 
involves selling or renting rights to produce and distribute 
goods under trade mark or copyright. The choice between 
FOi and licensing is complex and depends on a variety of 
strategic factors. 2 This subsection considers simple evidence 
on trends in both forms of trade. 
Note that neither type of exchange is readily measurable. 
Recorded intra-firm transactions are likely to be distorted 
to reduce global tax liabilities. Royalties and fees paid de-
pend on government restrictions on foreign remittances and 
other policies. Optimal pricing of information is itself a 
complex problem for firms to solve, so receipts of licence 
fees and investment income inherently may be inadequate 
measures of the economic value of intellectual property. 
Again, however, it is interesting to examine the limited data 
available. 3 Table 78 presents information on the levels of, 
and growth in, the foreign direct investment positions of EC 
Member States and other countries in recent years, along 
with the balances on direct investment income. Direct invest-
ment income is typically defined as reinvested earnings on 
direct investments plus dividends, interest, and remittances. 
For Community Member States the stocks of FOi listed 
include both investment within and outside the EC. The 
bulk of this investment is intra-EC. It is clear that the 
value of foreign-owned capital stocks in this set of nations 
increased markedly in the late 1980s.4 Most of the global 
expansion in investment has been within the industrial 
countries as part of the trend toward more interdependent 
competition. 
Horstmann and Markusen (1987) provide an example of this huge 
literature. 
See the paper by Professor Greenaway in this volume for additional 
data on trends in FDI concerning the Community. 
These figures are in billions of nominal US dollars, so part of the 
increase is associated with depreciation of the dollar over this period. 
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Table 78 
Foreign direct investment positions and balances on direct investment income and other property income, 1990; and growth in foreign direct 
investment positions, 1985-90 
FDI position 1 Balance on Balance on 
FDI incomc:2 other propcny 
Country 
Belgium-Luxembourg (1989) 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Greece 
Spain (1988) 
France (1988) 
Italy 
Netherlands (1989) 
Portugal 
UK 
USA 
Japan 
Korea 
Brazil 
India ( 1988) 
End-of-year (net), in billions of US dollars. 
Source 
15,8 
132,7 
n.a. 
6,1 
45,2 
60,0 
87,3 
0,1 
244,8 
598,1 
201,4 
2,1 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Growth(%) 
267,44 
211,5 
n.a. 
85,85 
n.a. 
233,3 
83,44 
400,0 
141,9 
57,6 
357,7 
320,0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Host Growth(%) income1 
21,9 163,94 n.a. -0,2 
53,5 134,6 -0,3 -1,9 
n.a. n.a. -O,J6 -0,02 
33,6 257,45 -1,96 -0,9 
n.a. n.a. n.a. -1,l 
60,0 200,0 n.a. -1,2 
55,0 121,84 2,7 -0,7 
2,1 600,0 -0,37 -0,1 
205,6 228,4 19,0 -0,1 
465,9 105,1 52,7 12,7 
9,9 110,6 2,66 -3,6 
4,8 220,0 -0,26 -0,1 
n.a. n.a. -2,46 -0,1 
n.a. n.a. n.a. -0,1 
Reinvested earnings on direct investments plus dividends, interest, and remittances, in billions of US dollars. 
J Net receipts minus net payments of royalties and fees for all propcny, in billions of US dollars. 
Growth from 1985-89. 
Growth from 1984-88. 
6 Direct investment income excludes reinvested earnings. 
7 Balance on direct investment income estimated by author. Data on Denmark and Ireland are unavailable. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 1990. 
Among EC members, the UK, Germany and the Nether-
lands stand out as net providers of foreign investment, 
though all three countries have seen rising inflows of foreign 
capital as well. In relation to the size of its economy, Germ-
any remained host to a small stock of foreign capital in 
1990. Italy had a balanced position in terms of its net 
ownership. Italy, Belgium-Luxembourg and Portugal have 
been the source of especially rapid increases in foreign capital 
stocks, albeit from a small base in the case of Portugal. 
Spain and Portugal enjoyed dramatic percentage increases 
in the value of foreign-owned capital in their economies, 
presumably in response to their accession to the EC. 
Firms have numerous reasons for expanding direct invest-
ments abroad. Though it is not possible to sort out these 
164 
factors with the limited data in Table 78, surely some portion 
of these investments represents attempts to expand returns 
to innovation and product development. Using the measures 
listed here, in 1990 the UK owned the world's second largest 
stock of direct foreign capital at USO 245 billion, and earned 
USO 19 billion in direct investment income on balance in 
1990. The Netherlands also earned positive net income on 
its foreign investments in 1989. Germany had a slightly 
negative balance on direct investment income, despite own-
ing a larger stock of foreign capital than was owned in that 
country. Though there is limited evidence on this question, 
other Member States tended also to have negative balances 
on FOi income. It should be noted that these net figures do 
not indicate well the importance of gross income from FOi 
across nations. Germany, for example, earned approxi-
mately USO 5 billion in private foreign direct investment 
income in 1989 while the UK received almost USO 28 
billion. The Netherlands earned over USO 4 billion and 
France nearly USO 1,5 billion exclusive of retained earn-
ings.1 Thus, this form of foreign income is significant in 
many EC States, suggesting the importance of taking active 
measures to safeguard the value of such investments, includ-
ing intellectual property protection and the avoidance of 
inefficient trade-related investment measures. 
The United States is both the largest source and largest host 
of foreign-owned capital stocks. In 1990 it remained a net 
source country, as was reflected in its net direct investment 
income of USO 52, 7 billion. Japan is unusual among indus-
trial countries in serving as recipient of so little FDI relative 
to what it provides. Korea, where incoming FDI from the 
industrial nations has increased rapidly, and Brazil make 
large net payments on direct investment income, as is to be 
expected for developing economies. Korea has also rapidly 
expanded its FDI abroad. 
The final column in Table 78 presents a more direct measure 
of trade in intellectual property. The balance on other prop-
erty income includes not only net receipts of royalties and 
licence fees for the use of trade marks, patents and copy-
rights, but also net receipts for tangible property, such as 
mineral rights. Thus, it is too inclusive as a measure of 
payments for intellectual property. It is the only direct 
measure available for the developing countries listed, how-
ever. The United States remained the only clear net recipient 
of such income in 1990, though the United Kingdom tra-
ditionally has been in that position. Other EC Member 
States make net payments for such properties, as does Japan. 
Clearly, the developing nations listed here are net importers 
of technology and the services of other properties. 
A better measure of trade in technological assets exists for 
the OECD nations. Table 79 presents receipts, payments, 
and the difference between them, or the so-called 'balance 
on technology trade' for the EC nations, the United States 
and Japan in 1988 and the percentage increase in receipts 
and payments from 1984 to 1988. These transactions include 
royalties and licence fees for the use of technological infor-
mation, such as patented processes and new products under 
patents and trade marks. 
This measure suggests also that the trade of many EC Mem-
ber States in intellectual property of a technological nature 
See International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Year-
book, 1990. These figures do not include income from foreign portfolio 
investments, which is substantially larger. 
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rose markedly in the late 1980s. Germany saw a greater than 
six-fold increase in its receipts, to some USO 3,9 billion. 
Despite this rise, Germany remained a net payer of such 
royalties and fees in 1988. Italy was in a similar situation, 
with its receipts rising considerably faster than its payments. 
These figures indicate that certain EC Member States are 
becoming more visible sources of new technologies and 
products of international interest. In US dollar terms, Portu-
gal's receipts actually declined, though they were small in 
any case. Portugal and Greece also saw only small rises in 
their payments of licences and fees for foreign intellectual 
property. 
Overall, EC countries typically had negative balances on 
technology trade in 1988, suggesting they remained net im-
porters of industrial property.2 For example, the UK had 
become a net payer by 1988, despite its traditional position 
as a net recipient. Spain stands out as a country to which 
technology has been transferred in this manner, with pay-
ments exceeding receipts by more than a factor of seven. 
Indeed, except for Denmark and Ireland, for which the 
available data are old and sketchy, EC Member States uni-
formly were in a deficit position on the technology balance 
of payments. Of course, this fact does not imply that Com-
munity members are worse off as a result of this trade. 
Rather, imports of foreign technology are a key means of 
expanding the technological base for competitive purposes. 
According to the data in Table 79, the United States re-
mained the major net global supplier of technology in 1988, 
though its payments have been rising faster than its receipts. 
Japan remained a large net payer for imported technology 
and trade marks. 
As a final indicator of the growth in technology trade, 
statistics on patent applications in EC countries, the United 
States and Japan and on applications by residents of those 
countries elsewhere are presented in Table 80.3 As may be 
expected, the countries of the Community found that the 
vast majority of applications were filed by foreign citizens 
in 1988, though much of this reflected patenting across EC 
nations. The share of foreign patent applications, as may be 
It is impossible to ascertain whether the Community as a whole had a 
positive or negative balance, since these data are not reported on an 
intra-EC basis. Many of these transactions represent licensing activity 
across Member States. 
At best, patent application statistics are only rough measures of tech-
nology development and trade. For example, most applications are for 
minor modifications of existing technologies and products rather than 
for significant new developments of wide application. Further, many of 
the applications are made in several countries. Finally, the statistics 
reflect differences across countries in patent procedures that may encour-
age or discourage filing without reference to the underlying infor-
mational content of the application. 
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Table 79 
Receipts, payments and balance of payments on technology trade, 1988; and growth in receipts and payments, 1984-88 
Country Receipts 1 Payments1 Balancc 1 Growth in Growth in 
Rca:ipts (%) Payments(%) 
Belgium I 300 I 862 -562 121,1 163,4 
Denmark (1985)2 217 190 27 102,8 167,6 
Federal Republic of Germany 3 924 4 687 -763 648,9 366,4 
Greece n.a. 12 n.a. n.a. 9,1 
Spain 187 1416 - 1229 55,8 189,6 
France I 522 I 914 -392 84,5 107,8 
Ireland ( 1983) 717 328 389 n.a. n.a. 
Italy 654 I 207 -553 336,0 136,2 
Netherlands 518 951 -433 156,4 142,0 
Portugal (1985)2 4 36 -32 -20,0 2,8 
UK I 896 2068 -172 114,0 144,7 
USA 10 858 2 054 8 804 106,1 184,1 
Japan I 956 2 480 -524 77,0 121,2 
I Millions or US dollars. 
2 Growth from 1981-85 in dollar terms. 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Basic Science and Technology Statistics. 1991. 
Table 80 
Patent applications and percentage of foreign patent applications, 1988; external patent applications and share in US applications, 1988; and 
growth in patent applications, 1984-88 
Country Patent applications in country External patent applications 
Total Growth % Foreign Total Growth % orus 
'lo 'lo 
Belgium 33 867 39,9 97,5 6 003 34,1 0,4 
Denmark 11 080 38,5 89,2 7 639 102,8 0,4 
Federal Republic of Germany 84 806 13,5 63,2 128 026 40,7 8,5 
Greece 13 764 294,4 97,3 212 34,2 0,0 
Spain 26 251 145,3 93,0 2 722 32,4 0,2 
France 66 095 24,1 81,2 53 150 45,6 3,3 
Ireland 3 901 15,7 81,4 939 78,5 0,1 
Italy 52 939 47,8 61,7 25 271 64,6 1,4 
Netherlands 40 115 55,0 93,6 20433 46,6 1,1 
Portugal 2464 33,0 97,8 105 I 212,5 0,0 
UK 79 916 21,2 75,2 54 926 54,2 4,0 
USA 146 904 28,4 48,8 200 842 35,9 51,2 
Japan 345 239 20,4 10,6 101192 60,0 20,2 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Basic Science and Technology Statistics. 1991. 
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expected, was related to country size and technological base, 
with Germany, the UK and Italy having had the lowest such 
shares. In contrast, only 49% of US applications and 11 % of 
Japanese applications were filed by foreigners. The Japanese 
result stemmed from an extraordinarily high propensity of 
Japanese firms to file for Japanese patents. 
Most EC Member States experienced faster growth in resi-
dents' filing activity in other countries than in total appli-
cations at home, suggesting a rising tendency to procure 
protection abroad for innovations in preparation for their 
foreign marketing. In total, EC countries filed 19,4% of all 
US applications in 1988, with Germany, the UK and France 
accounting for the bulk of this activity. This may be com-
pared with Japan's 20,2% share of US applications. At the 
same time, only German citizens filed more applications 
abroad than were filed at home. Greece presents the opposite 
situation, with far more foreign applications filed in Greece 
than Greek applications filed in foreign jurisdictions. In 
interpreting the results in Tables 78-80, the question of main 
interest regards the role that IPRs play in promoting foreign 
direct investment and technology transfer. A major argu-
ment on behalf of stronger protection in technology-im-
porting nations is that it would induce greater inward flows 
of capital and productive knowledge, thereby expanding 
employment, skills, and growth (Rapp and Rozek, 1990, 
and Sherwood, 1991 ). First, firms would be more willing to 
share technologies with local affiliates and licensees when 
there are legal guarantees that these technologies cannot be 
imitated by domestic competitors. Second, strong inter-
national protection should expand the global character of 
an innovative firm's production and marketing decisions, 
since it need not concern itself with forestalling or disciplin-
ing infringement in different markets. For example, since 
trade marks protect international reputations, which are 
'firm-specific assets', multinational enterprises are more 
likely to exploit their reputations through FOi than they 
would in the absence of strong IPRs (Horstmann and Mar-
kusen, 1987). Third, if they operate properly patents should 
directly increase international technology diffusion as details 
of applications are made public. Finally, FOi and tech-
nology flows could be indirectly encouraged if MNEs view 
the extension of new protection as a broader commitment 
by governments to establish private property rights and 
promote market mechanisms. 1 
There is surely substantial validity to these arguments, es-
pecially in the context of the European Community. A 
This signalling impact of IPRs is evidently behind recent moves by 
Mexico and certain Central European nations to strengthen their policy 
regimes. 
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unified internal market requires substantive harmony in IPR 
policies in order to promote efficient internationalization of 
business among Member States. 
However, given the complexities of FOi a~d technology 
trade, no unambiguous case can be made in general about 
the links between IPRs and such transactions. For example, 
it can be argued that MNEs may undertake greater FOi 
in countries with limited protection in order to maintain 
proprietary information within organizational control (Mas-
kus, 1990). The extension of protection by such countries 
could alter strategic decisions in favour of licensing, ex-
porting, or simply not 'working' the patent, with uncertain 
impacts on investment and technology transfer. Moreover, 
if a country's technological capabilities are insufficiently 
advanced to absorb and improve upon patented infor-
mation, patents may serve to stifle diffusion, rather than 
promote it. 
Thus, there again is a difficult empirical question on which 
there is little systematic evidence. Survey results (Mansfield, 
1984) note the rising importance of intra-firm technology 
transfers and the internationalization of R&O. While no 
effort was made to relate these trends to industrial property 
policies, the latter presumably play some role in encouraging 
such transactions. That role may be limited, however. As 
suggested by Teece (1977), these decisions may depend more 
readily on the capacity of recipient countries to absorb and 
exploit technologies. In tum, this capacity depends on local 
market size and structure, and the dynamism, skill levels 
and managerial abilities of subsidiaries and licensees. Also 
significant are the costs of transferring technology, which 
may be little related to policies covering IPRs. 
These factors help explain the fact that international trans-
actions in investment and technology are dominated by flows 
among the industrial countries. In general, these countries 
also have the strongest protection for intellectual property. 
Casual empiricism, then, could support a strong relation 
between IPRs and technology trade that may be weaker 
in reality. Additional evidence on this question would be 
valuable. 
2.3. International policy initiatives in 
intellectual property 
It is clear from this brief description that intellectual property 
protection is undergoing a significant evolution to meet the 
needs of a more competitive and technologically dynamic 
world economy. Much of this change is occurring in the 
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developing countries, many of which have responded to 
various external pressures to strengthen their intellectual 
property regimes. Legislative changes have been enacted 
since 1986 or are under consideration in Brazil, Mexico, 
Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Turkey and 
Poland, among other countries. These laws would establish 
considerably stronger protection for foreign owners of intel-
lectual property, though enforcement of the new procedures 
should remain difficult for some time. 
There appear to be two broad motivations for this shift in 
policy. First, some firms in developing countries seem to 
have developed a greater awareness of the possible benefits 
of stronger protection, including greater incentives for local 
innovation and more access to foreign technology. These 
business interests may be gaining political ascendancy in 
national debates over technology policies (Gadbaw and 
Richards, 1988). 
Second, more general pressures on commercial policy have 
been exerted on IPRs. For example, as noted earlier, it has 
been suggested that enhanced intellectual property protec-
tion would attract more foreign direct investment because 
multinational enterprises would interpret it as a greater 
commitment by host-country governments to establish and 
respect private property rights. 
Perhaps more important has been the role of foreign govern-
ments, most prominently that of the United States, in 
pressuring for policy changes. Since 1985 the United States 
has assigned high priority to defining as unfair trade prac-
tices the perceived deficiencies in IPR regimes in various 
nations. It has attempted to induce governments to modify 
or remove these deficiencies through application of its pro-
cedures under Section 301 as revised in the Omnibus Trade 
Act of 1988. 
While such unilateral actions have achieved some success in 
the sense of procuring legislative changes in key developing 
countries, there are inherent dangers that continued use of 
this approach could result in discriminatory commercial 
agreements and more fragmented or targeted flows of world 
trade and FOi. It would be preferable to rely on a multilat-
eral approach that might achieve a satisfactory balance of 
obligations and benefits in setting international standards 
for IPRs. 
In this context, the most fundamental policy initiative is the 
effort to conclude an agreement on intellectual property in 
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. This effort has 
been championed by firms in the European Community, 
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Japan and the United States that engage in significant prod-
uct and technology innovation and artistic creation. Such 
an agreement would establish strong and non-discriminatory 
minimum standards for protecting various forms of intellec-
tual property, transparent judicial mechanisms for enforcing 
them, and an avenue for dispute settlement within the 
GA TT. The negotiation process has produced a draft text 
informally agreed to in good faith. The prospects for intellec-
tual property in GA TT depend on the overall balance achiev-
able in the Uruguay Round. Such an agreement would 
bear some promise for enhancing global innovation and 
productivity and reducing bilateral tensions over IPR re-
gimes. The EC could benefit in a number of dimensions, 
including the gains from a prospective agreement on greater 
protection for geographic appellations. 
Finally, work continues within the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO), the umbrella organization over-
seeing the operation of the main multilateral intellectual 
property conventions, to redefine international standards 
and procedures for protection and to assist developing na-
tions in modernizing their regimes. The most prominent 
current WIPO initiative is an attempt to establish a treaty 
for the harmonization of patent law within the framework 
of the Paris Convention. That effort has so far proved 
unsuccessful due to US insistence on keeping its 'first-to-
invent' rule for awarding patents, in contrast to the 'first-
to-file' rule in other countries, and to disputes over the 
definition of a grace period between first disclosure of a new 
invention and the date of its patent protection (Bardehle, 
1991 ). 
2.4. The situation in the European Community 
The Community is actively defining appropriate legislation 
for intellectual property in the EC. 1 All Community Member 
States individually have legal protective regimes but there 
are important differences in relation to some IPRs which 
have a potential to hamper the free flow of goods and 
services. Thus, a harmonized EC legislation is highly needed. 
Such a regulation would provide benefits to Community 
and foreign businesses in terms of greater legal economic 
certainty, a wider scope for exploitation of trade marks, 
patents and other IPRs and the avoidance of costs associated 
For further details, see the chapter on intellectual property law in the 
Centre for European Policy Studies (1991 ). 
with making applications for protection in all Member States 
and sustaining that protection. In turn, firms should experi-
ence higher returns ori their R&D programmes, leading to 
greater technological dynamism in the Community. 
Significant in this context will be the establishment of a 
Community trade mark, requiring registration only at a 
Community Trade Mark Office. Distinctive marks or names 
for products and services that are recognized throughout the 
Community should provide competitive benefits as firms 
would have enhanced incentives to undertake product devel-
opment and sustain high quality. Elimination of national 
differences in trade mark regimes should result in freer 
movement of goods and services among Member States as 
businesses engage in EC-wide marketing. Potential threats 
to intra-EC competition associated with abuse of the trade 
mark registration system or anti-competitive trade mark 
exploitation could be disciplined by the vigorous use of EC 
competition law under Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome 
Treaty. 
Similar comments pertain to the potential usefulness of a 
Community patent system, whereby a single patent would 
provide uniform scope of protection throughout the EC. 1 
Again, this uniformity should increase business certainty, 
reduce administrative costs, contribute to EC-wide market-
ing programmes, and induce additional technology develop-
ment within the internal market. As an indication. of these 
possibilities, note that in the 12 EC Member States, 80% of 
the patent applications in 1990 were filed under either the 
European Patent Convention or the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty with patent grants to be made on the basis of these 
applications, while only 20% of the applications were filed 
directly with national patent offices.2 Thus, the establish-
ment of a Community trade mark and a Community patent 
may be viewed as a component of an EC strategy for compet-
ing in the global market as well. 
The EC aims also at matching new technologies with ad-
equate legislations. The most significant example is the modi-
fication to copyright practices, especially the protection that 
has been extended to computer programs. The EC has ad-
opted strong minimum standards specifying exclusive rights 
for the author to reproduce, alter, distribute and rent new 
original programs. Faced with concerns that such a policy 
could result in monopolization and slow diffusion of im-
portant information technologies, user decompilation of 
programs for purposes of establishing interoperability of 
systems will be allowed under strict limits. This compromise 
Adoption of this system, as specified originally in the Luxembourg 
Convention of 1975, has been delayed by ratification difficulties in two 
Member States. 
See World Intellectual Property Organization, Industrial Property Stat-
istics, 1990. 
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is expected to safeguard the interests of small, innovative 
software firms for which interoperability with major systems 
is crucial. 
The Community is also actively considering proposals for 
establishing and harmonizing copyrights or related rights 
covering databases, cable and satellite transmissions, home 
copying or sound and audiovisual recordings, and rental of 
recordings and cinematographic works. 
As suggested by this brief review, the EC has a system of 
IPRs that is evolving into one of the most comprehensive, 
sophisticated and protective regimes in the world. Overall, 
this system may be expected to meet the needs of creative 
and technologically innovative interests in the 1990s, both 
in the EC and elsewhere. None the less, strong IPRs cannot 
be considered unambiguously to be beneficial, either in the 
EC or globally. A host of complicated issues needs to be 
considered in assessing the potential impact of changes in 
intellectual property protection. The report turns next to 
this question. 
3. Economic arguments and evidence about IPRs 
Societies have an interest in promoting creative activity. If 
innovative firms and individuals are not adequately compen-
sated for the costs and risks of developing new products 
and artistic endeavours, such items would not be created. 
Societies would, therefore, forgo the considerable benefits 
of new technology development, product and quality differ-
entiation, and cultural advancement. In providing such com-
pensation, however, numerous difficulties could surface that 
should be considered in setting the IPR regime. 
3.1. The economics of intellectual property 
rights 
As noted earlier, private markets cannot, on their own, be 
expected to effect adequate payments in general for innova-
tive activity. The basic difficulty is that the public-good 
aspects of new information (technologies and artistic cre-
ations) invite its unauthorized use by free-riding imitators. 
Put another way, markets may not provide sufficient mech-
anisms for excluding those who would exploit the infor-
mation without providing compensation. Because this prob-
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lem may be expected to lovver the rate of innovation over 
time, markets suffer from the inherent dynamic inefficiency 
of allocating insufficient resources to creative activities. This 
situation may be corrected by providing legislative means of 
exclusion in the form of IPRs. 
At the same time, however, societies are interested in procur-
ing wide dissemination of new information. In economic 
terms, once a new technology is introduced it is socially 
optimal for the technology to be provided to users at the 
marginal cost of replicating it, which effectively may be 
zero. Thus, static efficiency requires that information be 
disseminated and used competitively, without regard for the 
sunk costs of developing it. 
This trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency in the 
provision and use of information may be stated more pre-
cisely. By providing an exclusive right in the form of a 
patent, trade mark or copyright, society allows an innovating 
firm to sell a new product or technology at a monopolistic, 
rather than a perfectly competitive, price. This solution 
promotes dynamic creative activity, procuring net social 
benefits of consumer surplus and monopoly profits less 
R&D costs on new innovations. However, it incurs static 
social costs of excluding some consumption due to the excess 
of monopoly price over true marginal cost. This static dead-
weight loss may be interpreted as society's investment in 
information creation. Optimality requires that the system 
induce the introduction of all innovations for which ex-post 
consumer surplus exceeds R&D costs. 
This description of the underlying intellectual basis for IPRs 
masks important complexities in markets for information. 
It is important to consider more fully the benefits and 
costs of promoting such markets and the role of intellectual 
property protection in doing so. For this purpose, discussion 
is organized initially by a major form of IPR. 
3.2. Patents 
Patents are issued by governments with two broad objectives 
in mind. The first objective is to encourage inventive activity 
and to stimulate the commercialization of new inventions, 
thereby offsetting the dynamic market distortion of underin-
vestment in technology. 1 The second goal is to promote the 
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Arrow (1962) notes also that the market will underinvest in creation if 
there is risk aversion among inventors and financiers. Patents may also 
diminish this problem, though insurance markets presumably offer a 
more efficient solution. 
diffusion of knowledge by requiring its detailed disclosure 
in patent applications. Diffusion can be important in widen-
ing the technological base and realizing beneficial spill-overs 
that may lower costs in other industrial sectors. 
The view that patents are important in promoting technology 
development has been criticized on several grounds. An 
obvious question is whether patents are really necessary to 
stimulate investment in R&D. Competitive rivalry in stra-
tegic markets may by itself be a sufficient incentive for 
invention that monopoly protection becomes unnecessary.2 
Further, market and technical barriers to imitation could 
allow inventive firms to charge a price above current pro-
duction costs for a sufficiently long period to recover invest-
ment costs and to compensate for risks. Scherer (l 980) 
notes conditions under which this outcome might prevail, 
including imitation lags due to secrecy, imperfect infor-
mation transfer, and the complexity of successful imitation. 
Further, there may be advantages in being first to market a 
new product in terms of product-differentiating quality, 
image, and the like. 
It is apparent that the private ability to appropriate the 
returns on innovation depends on a broad set of character-
istics, including the degree of market imperfection, the tech-
nical ease of imitation, the pace of information transfer and 
the firm's abilities to control it, and demand parameters. In 
cases where innovation and development would transpire 
endogenously without patent protection, providing such pro-
tection would be redundant and simply create a welfare-
reducing monopoly. In practice, however, it would be diffi-
cult to identify such cases since inventors generally do file 
for patents. It is hard to know whether the promise of a 
patent is the required stimulus to competition in R&D or 
simply a means of buttressing claims to the returns on 
invention. 
It is worth noting some suggestive empirical evidence on 
some of these issues. Information about new products and 
processes becomes available to a firm's competitors fairly 
rapidly, generally in a one-to-two year period (Mansfield, 
1985). The information is transferred through shifts of per-
sonnel, technical meetings and communications, communi-
cations with suppliers and customers, reverse engineering, 
On the relationships between market structure and innovation, see 
Kamien and Schwartz (1982). 
and the study of patent applications. For these reasons, the 
ability of a firm to retain its technological information in-
house is limited, diminishing the private returns to inno-
vation. 
However, the competitor's step from garnering the infor-
mation to imitating the new product or process may be more 
difficult. Imitation is a costly activity, with costs including 
R&D, marketing, investment in production facilities, start-
up costs, and, if necessary, the need to invent around a 
patent granted to the innovator. Indeed, these costs appear 
to be substantial. In a sample of firms in four American 
industries, average imitation costs totalled some 65% of 
innovation costs and imitation time equalled about 70% of 
innovation time (Mansfield et al., 1981 ). These costs de-
pended significantly on market structure. Further, except 
for the pharmaceutical industry, patents had small effects 
on imitation costs and patented innovations were rather 
easily imitated, generally within four years of their initial 
introduction. 
A further question is whether patents are viewed by firms as 
important in making their decisions to invest in innovation. 
Mansfield (1986) sampled 100 firms in 12 US manufacturing 
industries about their views on patent protection. From his 
results it appears that only in the pharmaceutical and chemi-
cal industries were patents considered essential, in the sense 
that more than 30% of their inventions would not have been 
developed in the absence of available protection. In three 
industries (petroleum, machinery and fabricated metal prod-
ucts) patents were seen as important in the development of 
between 10 and 20% of their inventions, while in the other 
seven industries patents were viewed as unimportant or only 
marginally significant in promoting R&D. 1 In summary, 
though there is substantial sectoral variation, the prospect 
of patent protection seems hardly to be the driving influence 
behind industrial inventive activity. Competitive pressures 
and strategies provide the bulk of the incentives for inno-
vation. 2 
This last result does not mean that firms which introduce 
new products or processes do not patent them. Mansfield 
(1986) also found that, in his sample, a high percentage of 
Taylor and Silbertson ( 1973) present similar evidence for UK industries. 
See also Levin et al. ( 1987) for more recent corroborative evidence in 
the United States. 
Note, however, that these mechanisms may be buttressed by IPRs other 
than patents, such as trade secrets and trade marks. Thus, a more 
general concern over IPRs may be warranted. See also Scherer ( 1980). 
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patentable inventions were, in fact, patented, ranging from 
50% in the primary metals industry to 86% in the petroleum 
and machinery industries. The remaining inventions were 
protected, to the extent possible, with trade secrets and 
private actions. Thus, although the promise of patent protec-
tion may not be critical for stimulating inventions, the ben-
efits of such protection, including monopoly pricing, licence 
fees and royalties, and the costs imposed on imitators, are 
viewed as worth pursuing. 
Taken at face value, the finding that patents are not critical 
in the decision to invent and are relatively ineffective at 
forestalling imitation, though welcomed for whatever ben-
efits they do provide to firms, leads to doubts about the 
utility of the system. Consumers suffer from the associated 
monopoly pricing or other exclusionary practices but there 
is little offsetting stimulus to invention. 
This view is somewhat nai"ve, however. Mansfield ( 1988) 
himself argues that the general weakness of the international 
patent system, exacerbated by the easy flow of technological 
information across borders, implies that the incentives for 
industrial innovation are limited and result in a suboptimal 
level of investment in new products. In other words, it is the 
ineffectiveness of the patent system that leads firms to view 
patents as unimportant; stronger patent protection would 
raise inventor activity and economic growth. 
Moreover, this evidence is outdated. It is likely that patents 
have taken on increasing importance as R&D-stimulative 
devices as technological competition has become stronger 
and more globalized. While there is no clear definition of 
globalization,3 it refers to growing trends toward commercial 
interdependence in high-technology products, involving both 
cooperative arrangements, such as joint R&D ventures, and 
competitive strategies, such as market interpenetration 
through foreign direct investment and marketing. In part, 
these tactics are an effort to control unauthorized inter-
firm and international flows of proprietary technological 
information, the dispersion of which has become easier due 
to improvements in communication and the emergence of 
significant technical skills in many countries. A stronger 
and more harmonized patent system should increase the 
appropriability of technological innovations in this environ-
ment. 
See Jacquemin (1991) for discussion of the structural characteristics of 
the new global competition. 
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In truth, there is little systematic evidence that natural mar-
ket mechanisms for appropriating returns on innovation 
have been eroded and that stronger patents would correct the 
situation. This is an unfortunate gap in our understanding of 
the situation and leaves unresolved the important empirical 
question of whether greater protection of IPRs would call 
forth substantially more inventive activity. This question lies 
at the heart of the debate over international protection of 
IPRs. 
A second criticism of patents relates to the terms under 
which they are provided. The issues concern the optimal 
length and breadth of a patent grant and the conditions for 
patentability. In industrial nations patents are granted for a 
period of 15 to 20 years with fairly narrow scope. Patent-
ability conditions require that the invention be new, non-
obvious, and commercially applicable. These terms represent 
a policy trade-off between the desirable invention-inducing 
incentives of patents and their information-diffusing proper-
ties on the one hand, and the reduction in consumer welfare 
from granting exclusive exploitation rights on the other 
hand. 
From a welfare standpoint, the optimal patent would allow 
inventors just to recover their investment costs but no sur-
plus. Thus, competition for patents should be allowed to 
continue until all private surplus is dissipated. Many analysts 
claim that this criterion calls for a short patent length and 
a narrow breadth. Others, however, note that the weakness 
of patent protection needs to be compensated by substantial 
length and breadth merely to recoup R&D costs. In fact, 
optimal policy would depend on market structure, including 
competition at the invention stage, and the need to dissemi-
nate information. At the least, one would expect the optimal 
patent grant to vary by industry or even by specific inven-
tions.1 However, because it is difficult to develop such a fine-
tuned policy regime, countries provide fixed-term patents to 
all patentable inventions. 
In the Community patents are typically granted for a fixed 
20-year period. Whether this approximates an optimal pat-
ent length is an issue for continuing debate and future 
empirical work. 
See McFetridge and Rafiquzzaman (1986) and Klemperer (1990). 
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Equally important is the scope of patent protection, defining 
what practices the patentee may exclude competitors from 
undertaking, including the development of imitation prod-
ucts and technologies. Industrial nations traditionally have 
assigned rights rather narrowly, because the large majority 
of patents have been awarded to minor modifications, em-
bodying little true inventiveness, of existing technology and 
products. The negative consumer-welfare implications of 
this policy are likely to be fairly minor since such modest 
inventions are easily imitated by inventing around the patent 
and the associated monopoly rents are likely to be small. In 
this context, fears of the monopoly powers conferred by 
patents are often exaggerated. It is a rare patented product 
that does not face significant legitimate market competition 
within a relatively short time-period. 
To be sure, there have been exceptions to this observation, 
in which a patent on a key technology or pharmaceutical 
drug has supported high prices, restrictive licensing contracts 
and spectacular monopoly profits. Thus, patent protection 
can be excessive in a static sense and may also be dynamically 
inefficient to the extent that it results in socially wasteful 
duplication of research effort devoted to its circumvention 
and in patent races in anticipation offuture profits. Different 
countries may take different approaches to this issue, leading 
to its inclusion on the negotiating agenda for international 
protection of IPRs. 
Consider next the objective of providing patents to encour-
age the dissemination of technical information. This goal is 
accomplished by insisting that detailed descriptions of the 
new technology embodied in a product or process be in-
cluded in the patent application. These applications are then 
published or made available for inspection by the public. 
Thus, while the specific idea in the patent is protected from 
duplication, the idea itself may be scrutinized by interested 
parties looking to improve the technology without duplicat-
ing existing effort. In turn, published patent applications 
serve, in principle, as an important conduit for technology 
diffusion and transfer. This is considered a principal benefit 
of the system, one that gives rise to subsidiary benefits 
(WIPO, 1988a). This author has found no systematic empiri-
cal evidence on this point. However, casual evidence suggests 
that foreign technical specialists make extensive use of pub-
lished US and European patent documents, indicating that 
the system may enhance technology transfer. 
Related to the question of technology diffusion is that of 
technology spillover. Scherer ( 1980) suggests that the main 
benefit of a patent system is that it may provide the necessary 
incentive for firms to undertake the risky, long-term research 
and development that leads to major technological break-
throughs, such as those underlying xerographic machines, 
computers and semiconductors. Around these innovations 
will grow whole industries that use their technologies, im-
prove on them, or develop residual applications. The social 
gains from major technological advances can far exceed 
private returns because their associated spillovers have a 
substantial positive impact on growth and welfare. On this 
point there is virtually no doubt. 1 In question here, however, 
is the empirical role of patents in this process. Once again, 
there is little evidence on this score due to the difficulty 
of constructing the appropriate counterfactual cases, but 
practitioners in this area suggest that protection plays an 
important role in spurring fundamental technological 
changes. 
An important question is whether patents are the most 
efficient public policy for stimulating innovative activity. A 
policy regime would be deemed efficient if it procures the 
greatest increase in socially beneficial inventions per dollar 
expended on research and development. Patents have numer-
ous disadvantages in this context. As noted, patents are 
usually awarded without differentiation among type of in-
dustry or invention. Thus, it is evident that the fixed-term 
patent structure is a crude design for effecting an optimal 
sectoral and dynamic resource allocation. Further, to the 
extent that patents are redundant in that a given flow of 
innovations would result in the market anyway, they result in 
a suboptimal income transfer from consumers to innovators. 
Finally, if a patent supports strategic licensing and marketing 
practices that retard the dissemination of technological in-
formation, society's growth is diminished. 
Several alternative policies could be envisioned for tech-
nology development. At one extreme, governments might 
choose a strictly laissez-faire approach, in which IPRs are 
not provided and the market is trusted to provide sufficient 
compensation for investing in R&D. Obviously, this option 
has long since been rejected by most nations as unworkable. 
There is strong evidence to support this rejection, in that 
social returns on R&D markedly exceed private returns in 
industrial countries, pointing to the need for active govern-
ment promotion (Mansfield, 1988; OECD, 1991 a). Further, 
a laissez-faire approach surely would fail to procure rapid 
technological advance in key sectors that are vulnerable to 
imitation, such as pharmaceutical and metal processes. 
Bresnahan (1986) provides strong evidence of these social gains from 
advances in computer technology and their adoption in financial ser-
vices. 
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Given that government involvement is required, three ad-
ditional possibilities exist. First, it is possible in principle to 
design lump-sum transfers from consumers to inventors that 
could stimulate the same investment in innovation without 
suffering the pricing distortions of patent grants (Cheung, 
1986). This argument is simply a variant of the well-known 
case for using tax-cum-subsidy schemes over tariffs and 
quotas to promote certain objectives in the economy. From 
a practical standpoint it suffers the same shortcomings, 
including the difficulty of effecting such transfers efficiently, 
the likelihood of excessive subsidization as research interests 
capture political power, and taxpayer resistance to explicit 
cash transfers. 
As an alternative policy, the government might consider 
replacing the patent system with a more thorough role for 
itself in sponsoring and subsidizing promising innovative 
activity (Scherer, 1980). It could do this first by mandating 
the transfer to itself of rights to use new technologies in 
return for compensating inventors. The technologies could 
then be provided to potential users at marginal cost, with 
taxpayer outlays limited to the compensation. Again, diffi-
cult incentive problems would emerge in such a scheme. 
Unless compensation is tied to the expected present value of 
the invention, which is likely to be unpredictable given 
the uncertain nature of research and product development, 
inventive firms would have little reason to pursue the risky 
major advances in technology with significant spillover po-
tential. It is more likely that public compensation schemes 
would be more rigidly established, imparting a bias for 
stimulating smaller inventions of limited value. 
Finally, public authorities could consider a policy of active 
technology development through subsidizing R&D by pri-
vate firms and establishing government research facilities. 
This is a key component of modern industrial policy, in 
which the essential goals are to nurture competitive strength 
in high-technology industries through promoting economies 
of scale and scope, and to develop associated spillover ben-
efits. A wide span of policy tools could be employed for 
these purposes, ranging from setting industrial standards or 
allowing precompetitive R&D joint ventures among indus-
trial rivals to public organization and ownership of research 
activities. Industrial nations are arrayed along this spectrum 
and the general trend is toward more active technology-
creation policies. 
It is beyond the scope of this report to evaluate the costs 
and benefits of high-technology industrial policies, which is 
a highly complex issue.2 Two general comments are in order, 
See Udis and Mask us (1991) for an example using the aerospace in-
dustry. 
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however. First, public promotion of new technology should 
be limited broadly to supporting basic research, which may 
be defined as research leading to discoveries of general 
scientific principles that may or may not have wide industrial 
applicability. Such research embodies strong publicness in 
the sense that exclusion is neither practicable nor desirable, 
leading to free-rider problems and the failure of markets to 
provide it. Applied research, or the development of new 
products and technologies of direct commercial interest, 
should be left to private firms in market competition. The 
role of the government should be to stay in the background 
but to set the rules of the game, including competition policy 
and IPRs. Of course, the distinction between basic and 
applied research is difficult to make at the margin. The 
second comment is simply that high-technology industrial 
policies face the same problems that more general industrial 
policies engender, including excessive entry, rent-seeking be-
haviour, sharp increases in costs for scarce R&D resources, 
and potential foreign retaliation. Thus, governments should 
be cautious in setting such policies. 
In this regard, a patent system provides distinct advantages 
over active industrial policy. 1 Rather than relying on govern-
ment officials to identify potentially successful technologies, 
a task for which they are poorly suited, it allows market 
competition for protected future profits to allocate R&D 
resources. A proper allocation of capital and labour into 
technologically dynamic uses is crucial for economic growth 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Because patents are typi-
cally provided without discrimination among applicants, this 
competition exists on an international rather than a domestic 
scale, which provides additional global benefits. In contrast, 
industrial policy is inherently discriminatory. For the same 
reason, patents might enhance the international diffusion of 
new technologies through published patent applications 
more readily than might be the case under government 
provision and control. 
As noted earlier, patent regimes are not socially optimal 
policies for numerous reasons. Whatever benefits they pro-
vide come at some costs to society. Patents are of limited 
scope and duration in order to cap welfare costs from mon-
opoly pricing or potential domination of important new 
fields of technology. Again, it is an open question as to how 
well this system, in combination with appropriate compe-
tition policy, secures an efficient resource allocation. None 
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Clearly, the patent system may be viewed as part of an industrial policy 
regime to the extent that it discriminates in favour of certain industries 
or in favour of domestic technology development. A fair characterization 
is that de facto domestic patent discrimination has been useful in promot-
ing technological development in a number of industrial countries, 
including Japan and the United States. 
the less, it provides the best compromise available for pro-
moting technological investments in industrial countries. 
Thus, a policy focus on greater harmonization, at least 
among that group of nations, bears some promise for raising 
global innovation, productivity, and growth.2 
3.3. Copyrights 
Copyrights protect the rights of creators of literary and 
artistic works to communicate, display or perform those 
works in some medium. In the classic definition, literary and 
artistic ideas are without industrial applicability or utility. 
Thus, granting monopoly protection on artistic ideas, such 
as the writing of a book about a particular historical event, 
would stifle creativity and intellectual debate with little social 
benefit in return. However, particular expressions of an idea 
deserve protection in order to avoid an underproduction of 
cultural and creative activity. These considerations underlie 
the structure of copyright protection. 
The fundamental economic problem necessitating copyrights 
is related to the need for protecting industrial property. 
Creative literary and artistic works provide social, cultural 
and economic benefits that society wishes to secure. These 
works involve investment costs, including training, time, 
materials, technology acquisition, and the like. If other mem-
bers of society were allowed to enjoy or exploit them without 
compensating their creators, the incentives to create would 
be severely dampened. Static economic efficiency might be 
enhanced at the sacrifice of growth in cultural identity. At 
the same time, however, providing exclusive control over the 
use of the works could result in their excessively narrow 
dissemination. Copyright systems reflect a compromise be-
tween these difficuliies. 
In comparison with patents, there is no hard evidence regard-
ing the efficiency with which copyrights promote their social 
objectives. Again, protection could be excessive or insuf-
ficient compared to some socially optimal criterion for trans-
ferring consumer surplus to creators. Such a criterion would 
be practically impossible to implement, however, since the 
associated copyright policy would depend on the character-
istics of particular cases. For example, there may be private 
mechanisms that secure remuneration to the creators, the 
strength of which would depend on such market parameters 
An important example of potential harmonization lies in resolving the 
difference between the American system of awarding patents to the first 
to demonstrate invention and the system of the rest of the world, which 
awards the first to file for a patent. This is an important distinction 
because the US system provides an effective grace period in which an 
inventor can publish his results without losing the right to have the 
invention patented, while the other system encourages early {and per-
haps excessively broad) filing and disclosure through applications. To 
date, this difference has not been overcome in international negotiations. 
as the accessibility of the subject-matter, the advantages of 
being first in differentiating the creative product, and elas-
ticity of demand. However, the existence of low-cost dupli-
cation and distribution activities suggests that private mech-
anisms fail to protect literary and artistic property. 
Governments might attempt to design other policies that 
achieve artistic creativity at lower cost than copyrights. A 
system of direct taxes and subsidies could be justified for this 
purpose, as could most government support programmes for 
the arts. For political reasons, however, thorough govern-
ment provision of cultural activities may be expected to result 
in inefficient bureaucracy that is unresponsive to consumer 
preferences in the arts. Overall, a system of copyrights with 
uniform protective standards that allows market demand 
largely to reward creators provides an appropriate solution. 
While these questions are interesting, traditional copyright 
concerns are not the main issues in the current debate over 
artistic intellectual property rights. There are two reasons 
why copyrights have taken on greater urgency in recent 
years. First, improved technologies for duplicating copy-
righted media have lowered the costs of infringement, en-
couraging piracy and reducing the returns on creative ac-
tivity. I Second, the emergence of new products and technol-
ogies in computer programs, semiconductor devices, and 
electronic transmission of data and broadcast signals has 
blurred the basic distinctions between patentability and eligi-
bility for copyright. Such changes are forcing a re-evaluation 
of basic copyright policies (Peyton, 1986; N ovos and Wald-
man, 1987; Liebowitz, 1986). 
That copying technologies have improved and become more 
accessible to consumers and infringers of intellectual prpp-
erty is evident. High-quality photocopying of books and 
journals is available at reasonable cost while audio and video 
recordings are easily and faithfully duplicated onto blank 
recording media. These reductions in copying costs have 
encouraged greater legal and illegal duplication of author-
ized copies, for private use or resale. Members of the EC 
have attempted to correct this problem within their markets 
by levying a tax on the sale of blank recording devices, with 
the proceeds distributed to artists, performers and broad-
casters through centralized copyright associations. The 
Community is also considering extending this protection by 
establishing rights to control rental of creative property. 
The growing complexity of the copyright problem has spur-
red the development of market responses by firms. One 
The welfare implications of restricting unauthorized copying are more 
subtle than simple tradeoffs between creators' rents and consumer 
surplus. For example, broadcasters may have an interest in allowing 
unrestricted home copying if raising copying costs through additional 
copyrights lowers overall viewership and advertising revenues. See John-
son (1985), Novos and Waldman (1984), and Liebowitz (1985). 
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strategy has been to tie the sale of a copyable good, such as 
a computer program, to that of a complementary good that 
is not copyable, such as the computer itself. Characteristics 
of demand for the latter good may allow greater appropri-
ation of rents to the development of the program than would 
a traditional untied marketing strategy. Another approach 
has been to make copying costly through, for example, copy 
protection on programs. Such responses thus far have been 
insufficient broadly to eliminate copyright infringement, but 
have raised concerns over potential monopolization of cer-
tain computer software markets. 
Copyright has been an area of policy concern because of 
the need to develop appropriate protection for evolving 
technologies in computer programs, semiconductors and 
electronic transmission of signals and data. Regarding com-
puter programs, most industrial countries have moved to 
provide standard copyright protection since programs are 
expressed in a literary medium and do not have direct 
industrial utility. This is the approach in the Community, 
where the regulation allows program purchasers to make 
back-up copies and to attempt decompilation of a computer 
code under limited circumstances. From an economic stand-
point, allowing such decompilation (or 'reverse engineering') 
is a sensible policy for it is a key factor in ensuring the 
mutual compatibility of programs across different operating 
systems. Without this possibility, program markets could 
become excessively fragmented, damaging the introduction 
and dissemination of computer technologies through the 
economy. 
At the same time, US courts have found in some circum-
stances that copyrights provide insufficient protection for 
programs. Such protection would cover the specific pro-
gramming code developed by a firm or software writer rather 
than the idea to write a program devoted to a specific task. 
Thus, the copyright may be easily circumvented by imitators 
who need only rewrite the code sufficiently to convince the 
courts that the imitating program did not result from 'slavish 
copying'. It follows that copyrights provide weak protection 
for software and may not address well the appropriability 
problem. In the United States, for example, numerous 
spreadsheet programs are now marketed despite copyrights 
awarded to the Lotus Corporation. Further, private copying 
of microcomputer software is so widespread that relatively 
few firms make an effort to impede it significantly. 
Given this difficulty, some observers have advocated provid-
ing patents to some software on the theory that certain 
programs constitute an industrial process with commercial 
utility, such as accounting programs or those running indus-
trial controls. Most countries have avoided this interpret-
ation on the view that a set of computer instructions or 
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symbols cannot constitute an invention. However, recent 
practice in the United States has been to grant growing 
numbers of patents to software developers (Bulkeley, 1989). 
Because of the far greater degree of control over the scope 
of imitation provided by a patent than a copyright, this 
trend has occasioned growing concern over its potential 
impacts on small software developers, software users, and, 
ultimately, the growth and vitality of the programming in-
dustry. 
With respect to semiconductors, the question is whether to 
protect the design of integrated circuits. When costly new 
topographies are introduced in the market, it is fairly simple 
for competitors to copy them or improve on them slightly 
through reverse engineering. Industrial countries, including 
the Community, have recognized the need for a unique 
protective mechanism for chip topographies. These designs 
are not easily 'copyrightable' since they are not communi-
cable expressions of an idea. Neither are they readily patent-
able because a circuit design does not contain an inventive 
step. Thus, the protection provided is somewhere between 
patent and copyright: upon registration and certification of 
newness the design is protected from unauthorized copying 
and distribution of products incorporating it for 10 years, 
subject to limited exceptions. 
Finally, there is the area of electronic signal transmission. 
For example, the required technologies for receiving a satel-
lite broadcast have evolved and become sufficiently inexpen-
sive that it is difficult and costly for the broadcaster to 
practise exclusion in reception. Some who receive the broad-
cast without authorization may then benefit commercially 
from it by displaying it to paying patrons or by retransmit-
ting it via local cable systems. Such actions reduce the value 
of the copyright owned by the programme's producer and 
the neighbouring right owned by its broadcaster. 
The private solution, whereby broadcasters scramble their 
signals and make them unintelligible to all but authorized 
receivers, may be socially inefficient. It achieves exclusion, 
thereby sacrificing consumer benefits, but incurs a cost to 
the broadcaster that may approximate the original loss in 
copyright value, leaving a net potential loss in welfare. The 
Community is attempting to establish a harmonized policy 
in member countries that would transfer greater payments to 
broadcasters, through collective agencies, based on potential 
viewership in different regions. It remains to be seen how 
effectively this new regime will discipline the free-rider 
problem. 
One alternative might be the US compromise, in which 
broadcasters get limited copyright protection plus remuner-
ation from cable operators at a price set by the government. 
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Cable operators effectively receive a compulsory licence to 
carry the broadcast in question. This solution may also be 
suboptimal because compulsory licences constitute involun-
tary transactions by the broadcaster that may stifle further 
programme development. 
Related questions surface with respect to telephone trans-
mission of databases and other proprietary information 
among computers. Again, exclusion is feasible but costly, 
particularly when transmission is over telecommunications 
networks with multiple users. Databases may be copyrighted 
in some countries to encourage their development and sale. 
Laws covering trade secrets may also help protect their 
proprietary information. But when such information is 
transmitted the difficulty of exclusion raises policy concerns 
like those discussed above for broadcasts. Copyright policies 
are evolving over this point. There is a substantive inter-
national component to this issue since such transmissions 
are often trans-border and countries assert the right to 
regulate the amount and type of information flows crossing 
their borders. 
3.4. Trade marks 
A variety of devices exist to identify and protect the unique-
ness of specific goods and services of firms, including trade 
marks, service marks, brand names, and marks of origin. 
Though there is some variance in how these mechanisms 
operate (WIPO, 1988a) and their impacts on economic incen-
tives, they all have the same basic purposes. Therefore, it is 
sufficient to consider the economic issues by discussing only 
the most prevalent form of such protection, trade marks. 
Trade marks carry legal authority to enforce the exclusive 
use of a symbol or other identifier that conveys information 
to the customer about the product being purchased. If con-
sumers view the mark as a reliable indicator of high quality, 
they will be willing to pay a premium price for the good. 
This premium price compensates the firm for the cost of 
developing and advertising the trade mark. If competitors 
were allowed to duplicate the mark or use a confusingly 
similar mark these costs could not be recovered. Society 
would suffer from deficient investment in product develop-
ment and quality. At the same time, trade marks serve in 
part to augment the ability to differentiate products and to 
sustain associated monopoly profits. Critics contend that 
this makes trade mark protection less desirable than other 
forms of IPRs. 
A balanced view of the need for trade marks lies between 
these extremes (Landes and Posner, 1987). Assuming a pro-
posed mark is sufficiently distinctive to be accorded protec-
tion, 1 the resulting trade mark provides certain benefits to 
society. Over time the trade mark will become an indicator 
of the inherent quality of the product it identifies. If the 
firm sustains a relatively constant degree of quality, then 
consumers know what to expect when buying strictly on the 
basis of trade marks. This signal Jowers consumers' costs 
of searching for preferred quality attributes. Trade mark 
protection gives firms an incentive to maintain or improve 
quality over time because to do otherwise would diminish 
their reputations and erode the value of their marks. Thus, 
trade marks may be expected to increase the average quality 
of products on the market. 
A secondary, though highly visible, function of trade marks 
is to accommodate tastes for exclusivity in consumption. 
The ability to buy such products as Louis Vuitton luggage 
at exclusively high prices provides utility to consumers who 
wish to achieve a distinctive lifestyle (Higgins and Rubin, 
1986). The need for protection is evident. Competitors would 
otherwise free-ride on these products by duplicating their 
trade marks and attaching them to lower-quality goods. 
Trade mark protection can be socially costly, however. Trade 
marks may promote inefficient forms of product differen-
tiation by inducing firms to advertise and claim a dubious 
image of high quality. Such claims could procure monopoly 
profits by misleading consumers into purchasing higher-
priced goods with no offsetting increases in quality. Com-
petitive advertising by firms could also lead to socially waste-
ful resource misallocation. The result of these factors could 
be net deadweight losses associated with trade marks. 
Most economists view these potential costs as limited, 
though there is little systematic evidence on the subject. 
First, the monopoly power associated with a particular trade 
mark is likely to be small because the potential supply of 
competing trade marks is virtually unlimited. Second, legal 
structures generally prevent false and misleading advertising. 
Third, consumers are capable of assigning quality valuations 
to goods. If firms provide low quality, consumers will dis-
count the trade marks. Since firms have an incentive to 
safeguard their reputations and trade marks, misleading 
activity is expected to be minimal in well-functioning mar-
kets. 
A trade mark grants exclusive authority to a firm to distrib-
ute its products with the assistance of a particular and 
distinctive identifying mark. Distinctiveness is important 
See WIPO (1988a) for conditions under which protection may be 
granted. 
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because protecting non-distinctive marks could impose costs 
on society without generating the requisite information to 
lower consumer search costs. In EC Member States, trade 
marks are awarded to the first person to register them 
with the government. This registration system ·provides legal 
certainty about ownership and helps avoid inadvertent dupli-
cation of trade marks, but may encourage excessive invest-
ment in trade mark development as firms attempt to register 
all potentially interesting or descriptive names and symbols 
in a prospective product line. Moving to a system of award-
ing Community trade marks through a single centralized 
registration should diminish this problem in Member States. 
The greater advantage of a Community trade mark should 
be to improve the efficiency of advertising and distribution 
efforts for firms in the unified market. 
4. Policy issues for IPRs in the international 
economy 
The discussion to this point has analysed the inherent trade-
offs with which each economy must contend in setting its 
IPRs policies. Additional issues arise in considering relation-
ships among nations with varying levels of protection. As 
mentioned earlier, these issues have become the basis for 
international debate and negotiations over greater harmoni-
zation in intellectual property regimes. 
4.1. Economic aspects of international 
harmonization 
It must be stressed that, in principle, international agree-
ments to establish reasonably homogeneous systems for 
IPRs could raise or lower international trade in goods, 
investment and technology. Further, either outcome could 
be economically inefficient and reduce global welfare as it 
internationally redistributes benefits from protection. The 
reason for this problem was indicated earlier. Protecting 
intellectual property imposes a static distortion (potential 
monopoly practices) in the economy in order to overcome 
a dynamic distortion (insufficient investment in innovation). 
Therefore, IPRs are supposed to be practical solutions to an 
inherently second-best problem. In principle, any solutions 
may raise or lower welfare and must be assessed on a case-
by-case basis. 
The widespread support of IPRs in the industrial countries 
is consistent with the presumption that their dynamic ben-
efits have significantly outweighed any static monopolization 
problems. It is likely that both economic growth and the 
satisfaction of consumer tastes for variety and quality in 
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these nations have been advanced materially through the use 
of patents, trade marks and copyrights. Continued redefi-
nition and harmonization of IPRs should strengthen these 
influences in the future. One advantage of greater standard-
ization among the industrial countries would be that R&D 
and marketing resources would be devoted to projects with 
the highest expected payoffs across all participants rather 
than to those in countries with the strongest protection. It 
could also raise the efficiency of financing R&D programmes 
by allowing monopolistic firms to price-discriminate across 
markets, extracting the greatest surplus from countries with 
the highest demand for new products. The application of 
these principles to the EC internal market is clear. 
Other areas may potentially be faced with higher costs of 
acquiring some new products and technologies, but offset-
ting welfare benefits would exist also, however. The ad-
ditional profit potential may induce foreign firms to under-
take more invention of new products designed for these 
markets, thereby expanding consumer choice (Diwan and 
Rodrik, 1991). It may also encourage greater innovation by 
domestic firms, enhancing local technology. And, as noted 
above, stronger protection could stimulate further inward 
FOi and technology transfer. However, it remains an open 
question as to how significant these responses would be. 
Whether a particular country would experience net costs or 
benefits from providing stronger protection depends on its 
circumstances. Stated in different terms, proposals to change 
global IPR policies have both efficiency and equity aspects. 
Overall, standardization could advance world dynamic ef-
ficiency inducing greater innovative efforts. In the multilat-
eral context, a balance of advantages for movements towards 
global harmonization of IPRs could appropriately come 
from a comprehensive agreement in the Uruguay Round 
that guarantees greater access to markets in the developed 
countries for products in which developing nations have a 
clear export advantage. 
4.2. IPRs in a broader policy context 
It must be recognized that IPRs are one component in a 
broad array of economic policies for promoting growth 
and welfare. While it is important to establish a thorough, 
transparent and effective system for protecting intellectual 
assets, the system chosen is secondary to maintaining sound 
macroeconomic and commercial policies. Innovation and 
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technology diffusion are hampered in economies with slow 
growth and erratic or inflationary monetary and fiscal poli-
cies. Arbitrary business regulations and uncertainty about 
future tax policies are also restraining factors. In short, 
countries must pursue sound and stable aggregate policies 
before expecting IPRs to function effectively. 
This situation is evident in countries with significant trade 
restrictions and regulated capital markets. These barriers 
unilaterally prevent access to key inputs and technologies 
and inefficiently limit potential market size. For a country 
in which such restrictions are common, strengthening its 
IPR policies alone would be likely to generate little rise in 
domestic innovation or inward FOi and technology transfer. 
It could be costly, however, both in static terms through 
higher prices and in a dynamic sense by pulling scarce R&D 
resources into protected and inefficient industries (Nogues, 
1990). Thus, general liberalization of commercial policies is 
the sensible prerequisite for successful changes in IPRs. In 
this context, emphasis on establishing reasonable common-
alities across the broad scope of economic policies in the EC 
internal market is appropriate. Given the clear links between 
intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment 
as discussed earlier, progress on implementing measures 
concerning investment incentives and disincentives would 
also assist in the economic rationalization of creative ac-
tivity.1 
In allowing intellectual property to be exploited, authorities 
must remember that the chief danger of strong IPRs is the 
potential for establishing abusive positions of market power. 
Again, there is a delicate balance between society's need to 
promote innovation and its interest in ensuring effective 
market competition (OECD, 1989). 
The link between competition policy and IPRs is compli-
cated, requiring officials to assess in particular cases whether 
the grant of a patent, trade mark or copyright results in 
pricing behaviour or licensing agreements that excessively 
damage market competition. In most cases, the potential for 
cartelization or predatory behaviour is likely to be slight as 
alternative products and technologies limit market power 
(Maskus and Eby-Konan, 1992). This suggests that a regu-
latory presumption that IPRs should be allowed to operate 
typically without interference is desirable. 
Nevertheless, as technological rivalry intensifies and firms 
turn more frequently toward joint ventures, patent-pooling 
arrangements and cross-licensing agreements, the potential 
See the paper by Professor Greenaway in this volume for an analysis of 
investment measures. 
for abuse of IPRs may be growing. For example, providing 
a patent on a key computer program or biotechnological 
invention may risk allowing one firm to dominate an im-
portant area of technology, diminishing potential for its 
diffusion and subsequent economic growth. Competition 
authorities must have the ability to ensure effective compe-
tition through appropriate judicial procedures, safeguarding 
the interests of the innovative firm to the extent possible. 
The report by Professor Vosgerau on competition policy in 
this volume provides a detailed analysis of such issues. 
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That these issues are complicated should not deter policy-
makers from working toward efficient and acceptable sys-
tems of IP Rs. Within the EC, the preponderance of economic 
interests would be advanced by a regime of strong protection 
with greater policy harmony across Member States. It is 
certain that the Community will need to take a leading role 
in finding common international ground for policies in the 
'new areas' of services, investment and intellectual property. 
Expanding business internationalization in the 1990s will 
demand nothing less. 
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Annex 1: Definitions and functions of intellectual 
property rights 
Intellectual property is the asset generated by creative action, 
such as invention or authorship. As with more tangible 
forms of private property, the owners of intellectual property 
are, in most countries, allowed to garner its returns through 
commercial exploitation. 
Unlike tangible property, however, intellectual property de-
rives from the creation of new information, which is essen-
tially a public good. Accordingly, the problem arises that 
market participants have little incentive to compensate the 
inventor once the information underlying the invention be-
comes known. Information is non-rivalrous in consumption. 
Its use by the inventor does not diminish any imitator's 
ability to use it as well. 
This problem necessitates the establishment of a set of pro-
tective devices that go beyond forms of protection for ordi-
nary property. These devices assign and preserve the rights 
to exploit intellectual property. In general, IPRs refer to the 
legal authority of a creator to control the means by which 
the new information or idea is disseminated and commer-
cialized and to the enforcement mechanisms to which the 
creator may appeal to prevent unauthorized use. 
There are two general forms of intellectual property and 
each has evolved rights-preserving protective schemes 
(World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 1988a). 
The first form is industrial property, relating to creations of 
value to industry and commerce. Typically, these creations 
include inventions that provide new solutions to technical 
problems and industrial designs and marks that distinguish a 
product or clarify its characteristics. Protection of industrial 
property comes in various forms, including patents, regis-
tered industrial designs, trade marks, service marks, trade 
names and indications of source. Further, industrial property 
is protected by laws disciplining unfair competition that 
infringes the legal right to exploit new products or processes. 
The second form is artistic property, relating to literary and 
artistic creations, such as books, music, pieces of art and 
filmed works. Such creations are protected by copyrights, 
which provide at a minimum that the creator has the right 
to exercise control over the copying of the work, though this 
right is generally assigned by the creator to his publisher or 
agent. Copyrights may extend further to 'author's rights' or 
'moral rights', which extend to the creator the right to 
prevent subsequent distortions to, and distorted repro-
ductions of, his creation after it has been sold. 
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An increasing number of countries also provide 'neighbour-
ing rights', which protect performers and broadcasters from 
unauthorized public communications and reproductions of 
their performances and music producers from unauthorized 
duplication and sale of their records, tapes, and so on. 
Turning to definitions and terms of specific IPRs, protection 
of industrial property takes several forms. The first device 
is the patent, which confers an exclusive right to exploit (that 
is, to make, use, sell, and import an invented product or to 
use an invented process and to control production and use 
of products made from a new process) an invention or to 
authorize others to exploit it. The patent recipient is pro-
tected from unauthorized exploitation for a fixed term, gen-
erally between 15 and 20 years. 
For an invention to be patentable it must typically meet 
three criteria: it must be new (that is, previously unknown), 
it must contain a non-obvious or creative step, and it must 
have industrial applicability (that is, it must have practical 
'utility'). The last criterion exists to prevent, under most 
laws, the patenting of fundamental scientific discoveries 
flowing from the basic physical laws of nature. Two general 
exceptions to the exclusive-rights provisions exist (WIPO, 
1988a). First, a government may elect to exploit an invention 
itself on public-interest grounds. Second, the government 
may issue a compulsory licence mandating that the patent 
recipient allow exploitation by another entity that may have 
failed in attaining authorization otherwise. Compulsory li-
cences usually provide fixed payments to the patent owner. 
These basic patent terms reflect a compromise between an 
inventor's need for compensation and society's need for 
technological advance and information diffusion. 
An important variation on the basic patent exists in many 
countries. 'Utility models' are mechanical inventions with 
much less stringent requirements for non-obviousness. Since 
these inventions embody less technological progress and are 
easier to develop than regularly patentable inventions, they 
receive patent protection of shorter duration. 
A second protective device for industrial property is the 
registration of an industrial design. An industrial design is 
the aesthetic or ornamental aspect, involving shape, pattern, 
and/or colour, of a useful commercial article. The design 
must be associated with the industrial article itself or else 
the design would be considered a potentially copyrightable 
artistic work. Industrial designs are protected from unauth-
orized copying or imitation, generally for a period of 5 to 
15 years. As distinctive packaging and product form have 
become increasingly important elements of competitive strat-
egy, industrial interests in design protection to compensate 
for the costs of design development have increased markedly. 
The next form of protection consists of distinctive registered 
marks, including trade marks, service marks and trade 
names. The primary function of these devices is to safeguard 
the reputation for high quality of firms and specific goods 
and services they sell. At the same time such marks act as a 
signal of quality to consumers, thereby lowering their search 
costs and insulating them from confusion, fraud and other 
undesirable business practices. Simply put, a trade mark 
(service mark) is a distinctive symbol that identifies the 
provider of a good (service). Such marks may be pictorial 
devices, a single letter or numeral, an entire phrase or sen-
tence, or any combination. Trade names identify an entire 
enterprise rather than specific goods and services but other-
wise serve similar purposes. 
Generally, registration of industrial marks is required to 
receive protection from infringement (duplication of marks 
or the use of confusingly similar marks) but a few countries, 
including the United States, recognize also simply the com-
mercial use of a new and distinctive mark as sufficient 
to procure protection. Trade mark protection is granted 
indefinitely though periodic re-registration is typically re-
quired. 
Indications of source or, equivalently, appellations of origin 
receive protection under most national laws also. These 
indications signify a geographical area from which a product 
originates and serve to identify product characteristics that 
derive specifically from that location. They are most often 
used to indicate geographical origins of a particular form of 
spirits and are intended to provide a further signal of quality 
to consumers. 
Finally, countries provide different levels of protection for 
industrial property in their domestic legal structures against 
unfair business competition. What constitutes unfair compe-
tition varies widely across nations and, in principle, covers 
a broad set of business practices (WIPO, 1986, 1988a). 
Examples would include industrial espionage, bribery, 
dumping, and unauthorized disclosure of a competitor's 
technical information. From the standpoint of industrial 
intellectual property, perhaps the most significant protection 
is that provided by trade secrets, which refer to unpatented 
proprietary technical information, such as a production pro-
cess or chemical formula. Trade secrets are an important 
competitive strategy for many firms; and legal recourse 
against employees who divulge such information and com-
petitors that acquire it is available in the judicial systems of 
some countries. 
With respect to copyrights, protection is provided to the 
expression, such as a publication or film, of an idea rather 
than, as with patents, the idea itself. Thus, with limited 
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exceptions, books, music, and the like cannot be duplicated 
without authorization by the creator or his designated agent. 
However, the ideas contained therein may be used by others 
without compensation or authorization, so long as other 
expressions of the ideas are not generated by 1slavish copy-
ing' of the originals. Generally it is up to the courts to decide 
if a copyright has been infringed. 
To be copyrighted, the expression of an idea must be an 
original creation of the author or artist, though the idea 
need not be novel. Protection is provided regardless of the 
apparent quality of the work or the use for which it is 
intended. Finally, in most countries the expression of the 
idea must be established in some tangible form, such as a 
book or a recording, before it is accorded protection. Copy-
right is generally provided to the creator for his lifetime and 
to his heirs for at least 50 years after his death. 
In recent years questions have surfaced about the ability of 
these mechanisms to provide appropriate levels of protection 
for certain forms of technological innovation. Computer 
programs, for example, might be insufficiently protected by 
a standard copyright in that their operation could be imi-
tated by the rearrangement of lines in the programming code 
without necessarily violating the 'slavish copying' standard. 
Thus, while copyright remains the typical device in countries 
that protect programs, judicial and legislative practice in 
the United States and the Community have moved toward 
providing stronger protection de facto. 
Similarly, the designs of semiconductor devices (or 'chip 
topographies') are easily copied; and most industrialized 
nations have chosen to establish a unique, or sui generis, 
form of protection that is a hybrid of copyright and patent. 
A further issue concerns the eligibility for copyright of infor-
mation databases, which are typically compilations into use-
ful forms of data prepared by others. The question arises as 
to whether simply the literal expression (that is, the order) 
of the data may be protected or whether the copyright should 
be broader. 
Finally, intriguing issues surface with respect to the patent-
ability of biotechnological innovations, or new microbiologi-
cal plants and animals with commercial utility. Some have 
argued that it is unethical to provide exclusive economic 
rights to the exploitation of living organisms, even if the 
development of those organisms requires intellectual creativ-
ity on the part of inventors. At least among industrialized 
countries, a consensus has emerged that such organisms 
should be patentable. 
For additional details see WIPO (I 986, 1988a, 1988b). 
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Annex 2: Industry classifications for patent, 
trade mark and copyright goods 
Following is a list of the goods classified into patent, trade 
mark and copyright goods for the figures in Table 77 of the 
text: 
Patent goods 
SITC 512 
SITC 541 
SITC 583 
SITC 728 
SITC 736 
SITC 751 
SITC 752 
SITC 774 
SITC 7764 
SITC 87413 
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Alcohols, phenols, etc. 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 
Polymerization products, etc. 
Other machinery for special industries 
Metalworking machine tools 
Office machines 
Automatic data-processing equipment 
Electro-medical and X-ray equipment 
Electronic microcircuits 
Surveying, measurement, drawing and 
gas control instruments 
Trade mark goods 
SITC 112 
SITC 553 
SITC 665 
SITC 784 
SITC 821 
SITC 831 
SITC 84 
SITC 8851 
SITC 8942 
Alcoholic beverages 
Perfumery, cosmetics, etc. 
Glassware 
Motor vehicle parts and accessories 
Furniture and parts thereof 
Travel goods, handbags 
Clothing 
Watches, movements, and cases 
Toys, indoor games, etc. 
Copyright goods 
SITC 89212 Printed books, globes, newspapers, per-
iodicals 
SITC 8983 Sound recording tape, discs 
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Annex I - A concise overview of the EC trade policy I 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a concise overview 
of the main elements characterizing the Community trade 
policy. The first section contains a brief summary of the 
general process of decision-making in the Community and 
the way it affects the nature of Community trade decisions, 
with reference made to recent internal developments affect-
ing the Community's trade policy. The second part is a 
description of the main instruments that characterize the 
Community's trade regime, while the last section recalls the 
main preferential trade arrangements with a number of trade 
partners. 
1. Trade policy decision-making 
in the Community 
I. I. Main features of the institutional process 
The Rome Treaty provides that all decisions that are general 
in scope or considered very important in policy terms are 
taken by the Council of Ministers. Apart from some limited 
cases, however, the Council can only decide on the basis of 
a Commission proposal. The Commission is thus the engine 
of Community policy as well as being the custodian of the 
Treaty and the executive arm of the Community whereas 
the Council is the legislative arm. 
In general, Commission proposals pass through a decision-
making process with Member States, coordinated by ·the 
Coreper (Committee of Permanent Representatives), and 
simultaneously the Council consults the European Parlia-
ment and where appropriate the Economic and Social Com-
mittee. Their opinions may lead the Commission to modify 
its first proposal. 
Council decisions are taken by a simple or a qualified ma-
jority vote except for certain cases where unanimity is laid 
down. This is also necessary where the Council decision is 
different from the Commission's proposal, although the 
Commission may itself modify its initial proposal in order 
to obtain support of the majority. 
When the Council has defined the general policy orientation 
and the basic regulation has been agreed upon, the Com-
mission is responsible for working out its implementation, 
This chapter draws heavily from the reports prepared by the European 
Community and the GATT Secretariat in the context of the 1991 Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism. 
for its day-to-day management and for surveillance of Com-
munity rules. In this legislative task the Commission acts in 
close cooperation with the Member States through advisory 
committees of government experts who give opinions on 
the Commission's proposals. The precise de'cision-making 
process tends to vary from case to case; in general, the 
Commission is not bound to follow the advice it is given 
and has the power to take decisions, but in some cases the 
matter may be referred to the Council. 
Furthermore, the Commission has established a network of 
its own advisory committees to receive more generally the 
views of professional organizations, from traders to pro-
ducers and from consumer bodies to environmentalists. In 
specific policy areas, e.g. product sectors in agriculture, 
there are formal meetings with representatives of producers, 
processors, traders and consumers. 
As regards trade policy, particular provisions were laid down 
in the Treaty, of which a main feature was the express use 
of majority voting.2 This has no doubt contributed to a 
more rapid and effective decision-making process in this 
field, a factor that has been recognized by the extension of 
this practice to other policy areas in the Single European 
Act. In addition, the consultations with the Parliament are 
not usually obligatory (except for certain issues in agri-
culture). Nevertheless, a regular reporting and information 
process has in recent years been initiated by the Com-
mission.3 
In the case of negotiations with third countries, a Council 
decision is required to enter into such a negotiation, usually 
on the basis of a negotiating directive (which may be more 
or less specific in nature). Coordination during the nego-
tiation is assured by the Article 113 Committee which gives 
advice to the Commission as negotiator. This ensures that 
the necessary decisions or legislation required for implemen-
tation of agreements reached with third countries are likely 
to be approved by the Council once the negotiation is com-
pleted. The Parliament is informed of the progress of nego-
tiations. 
In the Council votes are weighted according to the size of the Member 
States, ranging from 2 for Luxembourg to 10 for larger Member States 
(Article 148 of the EEC Treaty). For their adoption, acts of the Council 
require at least 54 votes (out of the 76 available) in favour on a proposal 
from the Commission; or 54 votes in favour, cast by at least 8 Member 
States, in other cases. Thus, for example, a minority of two large plus 
one small Member State would be sufficient to block any proposal. 
The European Court of Justice has also an impact on trade policy-
making through its rulings: examples include the extension of steel crisis 
measures to import quotas, the conclusion of commodity agreements 
and its rejection of national tariff quotas (under the GSP system) in 
favour of a progressively Community-wide system. 
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1.2. Recent developments and future prospects 
1.2.1. The 1992 single market 
During the first half of the 1980s the EC economy was 
characterized by economic stagnation, increasing unemploy-
ment, and loss of competitiveness. A fragmented Community 
market was identified as one of the main reasons for this 
disappointing performance. This fragmentation of the Com-
munity market was caused by the remaining physical and 
technical barriers between Community countries, restrictive 
public procurement practices, fiscal differences particularly 
in indirect taxation (excise duties, VAT) and regulated trade 
in services (notably financial services). 
In 1985, a comprehensive and ambitious approach was laun-
ched to revitalize the integration process. Following a Com-
mission initiative, the European Council of 29-30 March 
1985 identified as a first priority 'action to achieve a single 
large market by 1992' and asked the Commission to submit 
a detailed programme. In response, the Commission pre-
sented, on 15 July 1985, its White Paper on completing the 
internal market. The paper represents a signpost on the way 
to 1992. It defined the direction and pace of the future 
development of the internal market. A wide range of physi-
cal, technical and fiscal barriers are addressed which are 
impinging on the free flow of goods, services, persons and 
capital. 
In the absence of common legislation, the principle of mutual 
recognition comes into play. In this respect, several rulings 
of the European Court of Justice have paved the way since 
the late 1970s. Referring to national protection measures 
and regional quotas, the Commission took the view that 
their abolition by 1992 was 'not an unreasonable aim'. If 
so-called Article 115 measures were no longer applicable, 
any import restrictions would then have to be applied on an 
EC-wide basis.' 
While the White Paper did not establish concrete insti-
tutional reforms, these were brought about by the Single 
European Act (SEA) which came into effect on I July 1987. 
The Act lays down the legal basis for the internal market 
programme. Its creation is evidence of a new momentum in 
the integration process stemming from the presentation of 
the White Paper. The Act introduced in the Treaty the 'aim 
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In a recent communication, the Commission has reiterated that 'after 
the completion of the internal market it will no longer be possible to 
use border controls at internal frontiers' to protect national markets. 
See EC Commission (1990), Industrial policy in an open and competitive 
environment. 
of progressively establishing the internal market' by the end 
of 1992 (Article 13 of the SEA) and provided for new 
procedures and practices in the pursuit of issues outlined in 
the White Paper. 
The range of common EC policies and objectives was ex-
tended, and institutional changes were made so as 'to ensure 
smoother functioning of the Communities' (preamble). 
Thus, for instance, through Article 18 of the SEA, a new 
Article 100a was inserted in the EEC Treaty which estab-
lished qualified majority voting for Council decisions on the 
internal market. 
The European Community has made clear that one of the 
central objectives of the single market programme is that of 
trade liberalization and the Council has noted that one of 
the aims of the progress of work to achieve the single market 
coincides with those of the Uruguay Round, namely to 
strengthen and maintain the multilateral trading system. 
This parallel objective of trade liberalization between the 
Uruguay Round and the single market has placed the Euro-
pean Community's approach to the trade policy aspects of 
the single market firmly within its long-standing trade policy 
of open multilateral trade based on the GA TT. Community 
Heads of State or Government have reaffirmed this ap-
proach at successive European Councils in declaring that 
the Europe of 1992 will be an open and partner Europe. The 
completion of the single European market by the end of 
1992 will result in an economic area comparable in size to 
the economy of the United States of America, creating new 
trade and investment opportunities both for the Community 
and its trade partners. 
The specific measures required for the removal of physical 
barriers at the Community's internal borders (e.g. elimin-
ation of customs controls on goods) and technical barriers 
(e.g. harmonization of standards, establishment of a com-
mon public procurement market) will have a trade liberaliza-
tion effect. 
The internal market means an area without internal frontiers 
(Article 8A). Its completion therefore implies the removal 
of the remaining controls on goods at the internal borders 
of the Community which impose burdensome and costly 
restrictions on the flow of goods within the Community. 
These arise in two principal areas - customs procedures 
(e.g. import documentation and veterinary controls) and 
disparities in the Community common commercial policy 
(e.g. national quantitative restrictions). 
The elimination of internal customs procedures will liberalize 
trade both for Community goods and third country imports 
into the Community. For example it will mean that third 
country imports will only be subject to one customs import 
procedure to enter the Community and thereafter can circu-
late freely within the single Community market without 
further customs control. The current Single Administrative 
Document required for intra-Community trade will be abol-
ished. Other customs procedures will be made uniform and 
simplified within the Community to ensure the free flow of 
goods throughout the Community. 
The necessary completion of the Community's common 
commercial policy and the elimination of the remaining 
national quantitative restrictions will also bring a significant 
liberalization for third country imports. This will eliminate 
disparities between commercial policy measures applied by 
Member States and thereby make the conditions prevailing 
on the markets of individual Member States more uniform. 
Residual national restrictions, whether or not they have been 
enforced by the use of Article 115, have to be adapted or 
eliminated in order to complete the Community's common 
commercial policy. Already surveillance measures author-
ized under Article 115 have been reduced from I 300 in 1987 
to 185 in 1991. 
The different national industrial standards, legal regulations 
and testing and certification requirements constitute perhaps 
the most substantial technical barrier to trade within the 
Community. The removal of such barriers is therefore crucial 
both to the completion of the single market and to the 
realization of its full economic benefits. 
The Community approach to removing these technical bar-
riers and creating common European standards rests on 
two principles: (i) mutual recognition of national rules; and 
(ii) where appropriate, harmonization of national legislation 
in cases where these create different levels of protection for 
the essential requirements of public health/safety, environ-
mental and consumer safety. 
This harmonization leads to a significant advantage for 
producers in that products manufactured in conformity with 
the resulting harmonized European standard are presumed 
to conform to the essential requirements. European stan-
dards are therefore not being made obligatory, but offer a 
'fast track' to the Community market in the regulated sec-
tors. The creation of a common body of rules for regulated 
product sectors rather than a plethora of different national 
rules will bring considerable savings and improved access 
for third countries. 
Moreover, where possible, these European standards are 
based on international standards drawn up by the ISO or 
IEC. There is, in addition, close cooperation between the 
European standard-setting bodies, CEN/Cenelec and the 
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international standards bodies of the ISO/IEC. For example 
draft European standards are made available to the ISO/ 
IEC and, under a recent decision, these European and inter-
national standards bodies have agreed to work even more 
closely together; this includes the adoption 'of accelerated 
procedures for the application of international standards 
as European standards and improved procedures to avoid 
duplication of work on individual standards. 
The total value of government procurement including con-
tracts awarded by firms in the public sector was estimated 
to represent about 15% of the Community's GDP in 1988, 
but only 2% of public procurement contracts in the Com-
munity were awarded to firms from a Member State other 
than the Member State advertising the tender. This clearly 
demonstrates the economic importance of the public pro-
curement market in the Community and the need to create 
common rules for the establishment of a single public pro-
curement market. The Community has already made sub-
stantial progress towards the opening-up of its public pro-
curement market with the adoption of measures on supply 
contracts, works contracts and 'legal remedies' and the ex-
cluded sectors of water, energy, transport and telecommuni-
cations. The creation of the Community's public procure-
ment market provides for major trade opportunities for 
producers inside as well as outside the Community. In ad-
dition, the Community is pursuing similar liberalization ef-
forts at the international level in the context of the current 
negotiations in the GA TT government procurement code. 
Last but not least, the creation of a single Community 
market for services, including banking, insurance, securities, 
transport, telecommunications and capital movements, will 
generate substantial new trade opportunities. However, the 
liberalization and deregulation of these services markets will 
equally provide much improved access to the Community 
for third countries. As an illustration of the importance of 
these developments, the new Community banking market 
will be the largest single banking market in the world. 
1.2.2. The Treaty on European Union 
The sections of the EEC Treaty concerning the common 
commercial policy (Articles 110 to 116) underwent only 
minor modifications under the Treaty on European Union 
signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992. Three Articles 
were dropped (Articles 111 and 114 on transition period, 
and Article 116 on common action in international economic 
organizations), while Articles 110 (purposes) and 112 (aid 
for exports) remained unchanged. Only Articles 113 (content 
and instruments of commercial policy) and 115 ( deflection 
of trade) were partly redrafted without changing, however, 
their substance. 
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The provisions for the establishment of an economic and 
monetary union in the Treaty on European Union have 
largely narrowed the possibility for Member States to restrict 
intra-EC trade in the event of balance-of-payments difficult-
ies. The amended Article 108 no longer makes reference to 
such a prospect, while under the new Article 109h:2b the 
Council, acting by qualified majority, may decide upon 
measures needed to avoid trade deflection where a Member 
State in balance-of-payments difficulties maintains or re-
introduces restrictions against third countries. The pro-
visions of Article 109h:2b, however, concern only the tran-
sitional period (stage two), and will cease to apply from the 
beginning of the third stage of the economic and monetary 
umon. 
1.3. Effects of the decision-making process 
on trade policies 
The Community system of taking decisions in the trade 
policy area is one in which a complex set of checks and 
balances exists and, in the most usual cases, the result is a 
network of countervailing forces which can cancel each other 
out. Thus, in any given situation - such as a decision to 
apply a safeguard measure, or to put in place the threat of 
retaliation against a trade partner - there are likely to be 
opposing views. Some will be in favour of action which is 
felt to be justified (e.g. by injury to specific interests) and 
which is desirable to achieve a limited objective, while others 
will consider that this would be contrary to a more global 
set of Community interests, would risk escalation of the 
situation thus affecting Community exports, or is not ad-
equately justified. Decisions are therefore very often the 
result of hard-fought internal negotiation and ultimately of 
compromise. 
Thus, in a typical case, the Commission is first responsible 
for analysing the facts, for example as regards injury, and 
for proposing the measure that is appropriate. Even at this 
stage there can be difficult internal arguments and disagree-
ments on both the analysis and the solution; but this can 
also occur within the governmental machinery of any coun-
try. The intensity of this argument in the Community case 
depends on the particular regulation in force since this may 
impose particular delays for decision-making or other statu-
tory obligations on the Commission services. 
At the next stage the pattern often repeats itself, as some 
form of consultation or other advisory process takes place 
with the Member States. As indicated above, this can and 
does lead to divided situations in which those countries with 
less direct trade interest in the case give more weight to the 
global interest; those with a wider range of export interests 
tend to consider more carefully the potential reaction of the 
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third country concerned; those with traditionally a more 
liberal trade philosophy tend to require a higher standard 
of impact before resorting to action. 
What makes the Community process more complex than 
that of the ordinary unitary State is that I 2 views at govern-
mental level have to be taken into account in addition to 
the normally opposing views of different sectors of industry 
and of consumers that might be affected as well as of differ-
ent government agencies. 
Divergences of opinion can continue into yet a third stage. 
Where the Commission has powers to decide (e.g. in anti-
dumping cases or on safeguard action) the rules often pro-
vide for the possibility of further review by the Council 
which must then confirm, reject or modify the Commission 
decision. In an anti-dumping case, for example, the Com-
mission is able to impose a provisional duty but this decision, 
after further review of the facts, is later transformed into a 
definitive duty decision by the Council. In safeguard cases 
a Commission decision can be (but this is optional) referred 
for Council review within 90 days. 
Where delegated powers do not exist, e.g. for retaliation 
decisions, the Commission must make a proposal in the 
normal way to the Council which is then discussed and 
decided by majority vote according to Article I I 3. This also 
can become a protracted process where the spread of views 
results in two broad camps and where there is no clear 
majority to proceed or where the minority has a blocking 
power against decision. 
The consequence of these decision-making structures is that, 
once the basic factual and economic analysis is made, the 
type of solution to be chosen has to reflect what is acceptable 
to the qualified majority. The Commission itself will some-
times insist on the proposal which fully applies the basic 
principles in the Community legislation; but perhaps more 
often it will look to how this principle can be defended while 
at the same time seeking the widest support for its proposal. 
In summary, Community decisions tend to be the product 
of several internal processes of reconciling divergent views, 
and to reflect the middle ground of compromise. 
The same tendencies and consequences can also be observed 
in the negotiating positions that the Commission proposes 
and that the Council adopts; with the additional compli-
cation that, since tactical considerations require that the 
whole negotiating position should not be revealed in public, 
the Community negotiating directives are very often bland 
and general. Here another factor enters into play: much of 
the internal consultation and advisory process in the de-
cision-making is transparent or becomes public very rapidly 
and is consequently known to other trade partners at an 
early stage. 
There is also a high degree of transparency as regards the 
final decision, all regulations and decisions being published 
as a matter of course. This may have led to perceptions 
that the Community trade policy is more restrictive than is 
actually the case. In reality the same degree of transparency 
does not always exist as regards the measures taken by other 
countries. 
2. The European Community's trade regime 
The EEC Treaty enumerates the elements considered necess-
ary for establishing the common commercial policy. Accord-
ing to Article 113, this policy shall be based on uniform 
principles throughout the Community, notably a common 
tariff regime, common trade agreements with third countries, 
and the uniform application of trade policy instruments on 
both the import and the export sides. Moreover, the Treaty 
contains the procedural framework for the design of com-
mon policies. It thus defines the playing field and sets the 
general rules of the game. However, the Treaty provides no 
rules for the conduct of policies, including implementation 
procedures, in individual trade policy areas. This has been 
left to subsequent Council legislation. 
2.1. Major features of EC trade legislation 
The main EC import regulations of a general nature include 
the Common Customs Tariff (Council Regulation No 2886/ 
89), the Common Rules for Imports (No 288/82), several 
import arrangements for products from State-trading 
countries (e.g. No 1765/82 and No 3420/83), the Common 
Procedures for the Administration of Quantitative Restric-
tions (No 1023/70), and the so-called New Commercial Pol-
icy Instrument (Regulation No 2641/84). Common rules for 
exports are established by Regulath:m No 2603/69. 
Council Regulation No 288/82 on common rules for imports 
applies to all products, except agricultural products under a 
common market organization (including processed prod-
ucts), textiles (MFA products) and ECSC (European Coal 
and Steel Community) products. Within the product range 
of its application, it regulates imports from all sources, 
except imports from State-trading countries. The Regulation 
starts from the general premise of unrestricted market access. 
Specific exceptions are enumerated in an annex, allowing for 
the maintenance of surveillance measures or of quantitative 
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restrictions - the so-called residual restrictions - on the 
part of Member States. In 1989, the list of products subject 
to residual restrictions was reduced in scope by three amend-
ments. 
The Regulation also provides the legal basis for introducing 
surveillance measures or imposing quantitative restraints 
(safeguards) in specified circumstances. In this context, an 
advisory committee is set up for consultations between Mem-
ber States and the Commission on possible actions. 
The Commission is the competent body for initiating investi-
gations on safeguard measures, when considered justified on 
the basis of available information. Thus far, it has generally 
been the Commission's practice to open investigations only 
at the request of Member States. The decision to engage in 
an investigation is published in the Official Journal. Affected 
parties are then entitled to present their views. 1 
The investigation may lead to the introduction of surveil-
lance measures if imports threaten to cause injury to EC 
producers and if the Community's interests so require.2 
Surveillance can be retrospective. The measures must be of 
limited duration; Regulation No 288/82 stipulates that they 
lapse at the end of the second half calendar year after their 
introduction, unless provided otherwise. Any surveillance 
action is based on the issuance of an import document.3 In 
specific cases, Member States may implement, after having 
informed the Commission, surveillance measures at the na-
tional level. 
In cases of urgency, the Commission can immediately impose 
quantitative restrictions in order to prevent substantial in-
jury or the threat thereof. The provisions of Regulation 
No 288/82 (Articles 15 and 16) closely follow the wording 
In many cases, the Commission organizes hearings to which EC and 
third country producers, importers and exporters are invited. 
Article 9 of Regulation No 288/82 specifies the information which has 
to be gathered and examined in this context. In practice, the Community 
interest is interpreted in terms of the effects of increased imports on 
production and employment in the affected industries. 
Surveillance measures under Regulation No 288/82 which are currently 
in force include video-tape recorders (Republic of Korea), textiles and 
clothing products (Mediterranean countries), shoes (all third countries; 
imports from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan are under prior 
surveillance), and a range of engineering machinery and consumer 
electronics from Japan. Some of the measures on Japanese imports date 
back to the early 1980s; they have been prolonged on an annual basis. 
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of Article 19:l(a) of the GATI. 1 The Community may then 
either issue import documents of limited periods of validity 
or change the import rules· by instituting prior import auth-
orization. 2 The measure may be confined to imports for 
certain regions of the EC. 3 
Alternatively, following Article 16 of Regulation No 288/82, 
the Commission can propose that the Council introduce, on 
the basis of a qualified majority, safeguard measures. In this 
case, possible action may take the form of any 'appropriate 
measures'. This includes the negotiation of restraint arrange-
ments with the exporting country. 
On average, the Commission has taken one or two protective 
measures per year under Regulation No 288/82 since its 
inception in 1982. The Regulation stipulates no time-limits 
for the duration of such measures. Furthermore, interim 
safeguard actions could be taken at the national level if so 
provided in bilateral agreements between Member States 
and third countries. Since 1982, this has occurred once. 
Imports from most State-trading countries are governed 
by Regulations No 1765/82 and No 3420/83 (since 1989, 
however, trade relations with Central and East European 
countries are regulated by new cooperation or association 
agreements; see Section 3 below). The former refers to prod-
ucts which, being enumerated in a 'common liberalization 
list', are not subject to quantitative restrictions. The Regu-
lation specifies, largely in parallel with Regulation No 288/ 
82, surveillance procedures and protective measures to be 
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There are, however, some differences. Under Article XIX:l of the 
GA TT, a contracting party is only entitled to suspend obligations if a 
product is being imported 'in such increased quantities and under such 
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause injury'. Article 15: I of 
Regulation No 288/82 refers to imports 'in such greatly increased quan-
tities and/or on such terms or conditions as to cause or threaten substan-
tial injury to Community producers .. .'. 
Any Member State is entitled to refer the matter to the Council which 
can confirm, amend or revoke the Commission's decision by qualified 
majority. In the absence of a Council decision within three months, the 
measures in question are deemed to be revoked. 
Commission Regulation No 561/88 may serve as.an example of protec-
tive measures in favour of certain regions (Member States) and, in this 
case, against certain trading partners. The Regulations established an 
import authorization system to protect the Italian and the French 
markets from footwear originating in the Republic of Korea and Tai-
wan. The matter was referred to the Council which confirmed these 
actions. They lapsed on 30 June 1990 and were replaced with an EC-wide 
export restraint arrangement by both suppliers (Commission Regulation 
No 1735/90, as amended by Council Regulation No 3050/90). In the 
case of regional application of protective measures, the Commission, 
under Article 115 of the EEC Treaty, may authorize the respective 
Member States to limit transiting imports via other Member States 
(Section 11:5). 
applied in the event of a surge in imports. Regulation 
No 3420/83 deals with products which are not liberalized at 
Community level. It establishes the procedures for adminis-
tering the import arrangements and for the eventual amend-
ment of these arrangements. A list of import quotas, by 
originating country and Member State, is annexed.4 
Council Regulation No 1023/70 lays down procedures for 
the establishment and the administration of import and 
export quotas.5 In principle, quota volumes and criteria for 
their distribution among Member States are decided by the 
Council, acting by qualified majority. However, in 1988, the 
Court of Justice found that the national allocation of quotas 
is not compatible with the principle of free competition in 
the common market.6 At present, Regulation No 1023/70 is 
not applied. 
In 1984, the Community launched its New Commercial 
Policy Instrument (Regulation No 2641/84). The objectives 
are to 'defend vigorously the legitimate interests of the Com-
munity in the appropriate bodies, in particular GA TI, and 
to make sure that the Community, in managing trade poli-
cies, acts with as much speed and efficiency as its trading 
partners'. The Regulation establishes a procedural mechan-
ism which may be applied (i) to respond to any illicit com-
mercial practices and to remove the injury or (ii) to exercise 
the Community's rights with regard to third countries' com-
mercial practices. Proceedings may be initiated either by an 
industry which considers itself injured as a result of illicit 
commercial practices abroad, or upon request from a Mem-
ber State. After consulting an advisory committee, the Com-
mission decides on the opening of an examination. The 
decision is published in the Official Journal. 
Regulation No 2641/84 allows for the imposition of any 
commercial policy measure which is compatible with the 
Community's international obligations and procedures if, as 
a result of the examination, such action is considered to 
be in the interest of the Community. Where international 
obligations provide for consultations or for dispute settle-
Before I December of each year, the Council has to decide on the quotas 
for the following year in accordance with Article 113 of the EEC Treaty 
(by Member State and exporting country). In the absence of a decision, 
existing quotas will continue to apply. 
Agricultural products under a common market organization are not 
covered by this Regulation. 
The ruling dates as of27 September 1988 (Case 51/87). While it specifi-
cally refers to the regional allocation of GSP (generalized system of 
preferences) imports, the ruling has general implications. Accordingly, 
a complete overhaul of Regulation No 1023/70 is currently being con-
sidered. 
ment procedures, these must have been terminated and their 
results taken into account before measures are decided upon 
(Article I 0(2)).1 
Regulation No 2603/69 establishes common rules for ex-
ports. It can be seen as the counterpart to the common rules 
for imports (Regulation No 288/82). Once again, the starting 
point is the principle of unrestricted trade.2 In the event 
of shortages of essential products, the Commission could 
introduce an export authorization scheme. Such action may 
be taken on the Commission's own initiative or at the request 
of a Member State. Any action is subject to consultation in 
an advisory committee and has to be approved by the 
Council, acting by qualified majority. As compared with the · 
common rules for imports, Regulation No 2603/69 is less 
stringent in defining procedures and information require-
ments. 
Without enumerating specific criteria, the regulation stipu-
lates that measures can be limited to exports to certain 
destinations and from certain regions of the Community. 
Other provisions provide for export restrictions designed 
to comply with international obligations, particularly with 
respect to trade in primary commodities. A general exception 
clause allows for the application of export restrictions for 
reasons of public morals and national security, the protec-
tion of life and health, the preservation of national treasures 
and the protection of industrial and commercial property. 
Apart from the above regulations of a more general charac-
ter, there exists a wide range of Council Regulations provid-
To date, the instrument has been used twice, in the so-called Akzo-
Dupont case concerning Section 337 of the United States Tariff Act of 
1930 and in a case concerning sound recordings in Indonesia. Section 
337 of the United States Tariff Act has been subject to a GA TT 
Panel. The report of the Panel was adopted by the GA TT Council on 
7 November 1989. As for sound recordings (Indonesia), the Commission 
decided to terminate the investigation after a solution was found between 
the authorities involved. There have been two other cases involving 
Regulation No 2641/84, where the complaints of EC companies were 
rejected by the Commission. The issues were soybean oilcake (Argentina) 
and new polymorph (deprivation of patent protection; Jordan). Re-
cently, Italian tomato canners who have been affected by the United 
States countermeasures against the EC hormone ban submitted a formal 
complaint. The EC is currently examining whether action under the 
New Commercial Policy Instrument, in particular a request for a GA TT 
Panel, is called for. 
By a later amendment (Regulation No 1934/82), a list of product-specific 
exceptions from the common rules at the EC-level was replaced by 
individual lists of exceptions on the part of some Member States. The 
only EC-wide exceptions from the basic freedom to export principle 
which are still in force apply to petroleum oils and gases. The Council, 
by qualified majority on a Commission proposal, can include any of 
these products under the common rules. In practice, most of the excep-
tions provided for by Regulation No 1934/82 are actually not being 
applied. Their partial or complete elimination is currently under con-
sideration. 
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ing, for example, for remedial action in specific trade situ-
ations (dumping, subsidization, etc.) or laying the basis for 
trade-related policies in areas such as public procurement 
and standardization. These Regulations are often related to 
EC obligations under the Tokyo Round Agreements.3 
2.2. Tariff measures 
The Common Customs Tariff (provided for by Article 9 of 
the EEC Treaty) was among the first tangible signs of the 
European Economic Community. The establishment of the 
Common Customs Tariff (CCT) demanded harmonization 
of the sometimes widely differing tariff levels of the individ-
ual countries establishing the Community. New Member 
States acceding at a later stage have harmonized their own 
tariff to the CCT over a transitional period. 
Article 113 of the EEC Treaty transfers the competence to 
enter into tariff and general trade policy negotiations with 
third countries from national to Community level. It is thus 
the European Commission which represents the Community 
in bilateral as well as multilateral trade negotiations. 
The conventional duties applied are those customs duties 
applicable to goods or imported products originating in 
countries who are GA TT contracting parties or with whom 
the EEC has concluded agreements granting them the most 
favoured nation (MFN) clause with regard to tariff matters. 
However, the Community applies conventional duties to 
goods imported from any third country. Autonomous duties 
are applicable in (those relatively few) cases where they are 
less than the conventional duties or where no conventional 
duty exists (as for a wide range of agricultural products). 
The Council may authorize total or partial suspension of 
autonomous duties over a determined period in cases where 
the production of goods in the Community is insufficient 
or non-existent. The system of tariff suspensions may be 
associated with a system of quotas; the fixing of quotas is 
shared between Member States (to be revised according to 
the 1992 rules). 
All imports into the Community are subject to duty or duty-
free entry in accordance with their classification in the EC 
Harmonized Tariff schedule comprising some 9 500 tariff 
lines. Nearly all duties are ad valorem. The weighted average 
of tariffs on all EC imports was 5,7% at the outset of the 
The European Community has signed all Tokyo Round Agreements. 
Three Member States have not yet assumed obligations under the GA TT 
Code on Government Procurement. 
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Uruguay Round and the unweighted average came to 6,5% . 
Tariffs for industrial products are lower and more evenly 
spread across tariff items than tariffs for agricultural prod-
ucts. Nearly all EC imports (99% of imports from MFN 
sources) enter under 'bound' or partially bound tariffs. Tar-
iffs on 92% of all items are fully or partially bound. 
Developing countries benefit from the Community's gen-
eralized system of preferences (GSP) or from one of the 
even more favourable preference arrangements (the Lome 
Convention or bilateral agreements and arrangements). Im-
ports of industrial products and of certain agricultural prod-
ucts from the EFT A countries enter duty-free into the Com-
munity in accordance with the Free Trade Agreement be-
tween the individual EFTA countries and the Community 
(see Section 3.1 below). 
Exports from the Community are essentially unrestricted. 
However, as mentioned above, some product-related excep-
tions can be applied to prevent supply shortages of essential 
products, for reasons of national security, for protection 
of life, health and the environment or to protect national 
treasuries. Export promotion activities take place mainly at 
national level, but the Community has in recent years be-
come increasingly involved in this area. 
2.3. Other trade-related measures 
2.3.1. Barriers to intra-EC trade and quantitative 
restrictions 
The common commercial policy is a centrepiece of the EEC 
Treaty. Basically, it refers to policies which are decided upon 
and implemented at the EC level (e.g. tariffs, anti-dumping 
and countervailing measures, most quantitative restrictions). 
In addition, there is a number of trade-related policies which 
lie, more or less, within the competence of Member States. 
In many cases, this competence is limited by the EEC Treaty 
and the Commission exerts supervisory powers. Examples 
include State aid and public procurement activities. 
Individual Member States have been applying certain quan-
titative restrictions against imports from third countries. 
Most of these measures, the so-called residual restrictions, 
pre-date EC membership; they arc largely confined to certain 
sensitive sectors. In principle, any national restriction (in-
cluding quotas under the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA)) 
is liable to circumvention by intra-EC transits. To fend 
off such indirect imports, Member States can request the 
GRAPH 35: Distribution of EC imports from MFN sources by range of tariff rates 
(All products, 1988) 
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Commission's authorization to temporarily intervene at in-
ternal frontiers and to suspend certain products from Com-
munity treatment (Article 115 of the EEC Treaty). The rec-
ord of individual Member States and sectors under 
Article 115 is suggestive of gaps in the common trade policy 
regime and indicates some of the problem areas in the 
integration process. 
The Commission determines the conditions and details of 
measures under Article 115. In 1979 and 1987, it issued 
decisions with a view to tightening the general criteria for 
authorizations. Referring to the establishment of a common 
commercial policy and to the single market objectives, the 
Commission stressed that these measures should be applied 
'only for a limited period and where the gravity of the 
situation so warrants' (Commission Decision 87 /433).' 
The duration of individual applications is decided on a case-
by-case basis, ranging from two months up to one year.2 For 
textiles, authorizations are only granted if national quotas of 
Member States are exceeded by at least 50% and, in general, 
the amount in free circulation exceeds the quota by more 
than 100%. Reflecting the focus of the external trade 
measures which it is intended to support, Article 115 has 
never been applied on an erga omnes basis. 
In order to achieve uniformity of its trade regime; the Com-
munity has followed a policy based on the progressive elimin-
ation of those quantitative restrictions that had been tra-
ditionally applied by its Member States (in many cases prior 
to their accession to the Community). This principle of 
liberalization is indeed reflected in the two instruments of 
Decision No 87 /433 establishes a two-tier approach: (i) On the basis of 
Article 2 the Commission can authorize the issuance of an import 
document for surveillance purposes 'where there is a danger that imports 
into a Member State ... will give rise to economic difficulties'. As a 
general rule, such action should be limited to cases where 'significant 
imports' via other Member States have been made in the preceding year 
and/or the Communities' imports of the product in question from the 
originating country exceeded I% of its total third country imports. 
(ii) In case of actual difficulties, Member States may apply for protective 
measures (Article 3). They are then required to provide, inter alia, the 
following information: direct imports and detouring imports from the 
third country concerned; imports from other third countries with which 
similar arrangements are being maintained; total third country imports; 
imports originating in the Community. Other Member States are infor-
med of the request. 
However, by way of subsequent authorizations these measures may be 
prolonged over several years. For example, Article 115 measures have 
been in place for TV sets and radios since 1974 (France, Italy), for cars 
since 1981 (Italy) or 1986 (Spain) and for motorcycles since 1986 (Italy 
and Portugal). In the case of requests for the prolongation of measures 
under Article 115, the same procedures and criteria are applied as with 
any original authorization. 
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commercial policy dealing with quantitative restnctions 
(Regulation 288/82 and Regulation 3420/83; see Section 2.1 ). 
Restrictions maintained by the Member States are listed 
as exceptions to such principles and these lists have been 
progressively reduced over time. 
The accession of Portugal and Spain to the European Com-
munity illustrates the effects of membership on the elimin-
ation of quantitative restrictions. As an example, in the case 
of Spain, out of a total of 430 quantitative restrictions, the 
Treaty of Accession envisaged the elimination of 328 either 
immediately or at the end of a transitional period. 
By July 1992, the number of surveillance measures author-
ized by the Commission under Article 115 had dropped to 
three. This compares with 800 surveillance measures author-
ized in 1988. Likewise, the number of intra-EC trade restric-
tions in force dropped from 128 in 1988 to only three in 
mid-1992. Most of the restrictions used to be concentrated 
in four Member States, namely France, Spain, Italy and 
Ireland. By contrast, Germany has not taken any action 
under Article 115 since 1984. From a sectoral perspective, 
the huge majority of restrictions has been imposed on im-
ports of textiles. 
The transition of Central and East European countries 
towards market economies has resulted in the near total 
elimination or suspension of the quantitative restrictions 
affecting their exports to the EC market. The recently signed 
Association Agreements have further improved access to the 
Community market (see Section 3.2). 
Since 1989 the question of specific quantitative restrictions 
applied to products originating in Japan has been the subject 
of bilateral consultations. Two liberalization packages were 
implemented in July 1989 (Regulation 2429/89) and Nov-
ember 1990 (Regulation 3156/90). The recent arrangement 
on automobiles has allowed the progressive relaxation of the 
restrictive measures on the Italian, Spanish and Portuguese 
markets. 
The completion of the internal market will have major impli-
cations for the maintenance of national quantitative restric-
tions. Disparities in national import regimes, which have in 
the past been enforced by means of measures applied under 
Article 115 of the Treaty of Rome, are incompatible with 
the objective of eliminating all barriers to the free circulation 
of goods within a large unified market. With the abolition 
of internal frontiers national measures will not be im-
plementable as from 1 January 1993. It is in this context, 
that the Commission has acted to bring the number of 
authorized measures down to a virtual disappearance. 
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2.3.2. Safeguard actions 
Article XI of the GATT bans the use of quantitative restric-
tions as a trade policy instrument. However, this obligation 
is subject to a few precisely-defined exceptions under Article 
XIX. Safeguard measures can be imposed when an industry 
is seriously injured or threatened with injury by foreign 
imports. The requirements needed to impose a quantitative 
restriction are an increase in the import volume, the extent 
of the price-undercutting and the consequent impact on EC 
producers. The threshold of injury for safeguard measures 
is usually higher than in anti-dumping cases. There must be 
a casual link between the volume and conditions of imports 
and the serious injury. Protection must be limited to the 
duration and extent necessary to prevent or remedy the 
injury. The EC must give written notice which is followed 
by consultations with the affected export country. With 
the exception of agricultural products covered by market 
regimes, safeguard measures taken by the Community are 
usually based on Council Regulation No 288/82 relating to 
common rules for imports or under Regulations 1766/82 
and 3420/83 relating to the common rules for imports from 
State-trading countries. In addition, safeguard measures are 
provided for in a Regulation dealing with trade with China 
and in each preferential agreement implemented by separate 
Regulations. 
Proceedings under Council Regulation No 288/82 may lead 
to export restraint arrangements, although the latter are not 
expressly foreseen in the Regulation itself. Upon termination 
of an investigation, and before taking safeguard measures, 
the Commission holds a disclosure session. The exporting 
country is informed about the findings of the investigation 
and given the opportunity to offer an appropriate restraint 
arrangement. Member States are then asked to approve the 
envisaged solution. 
Restraints are usually agreed for a three-year period, with 
degressive application over time. Main product areas con-
cerned include textiles, steel, machinery, consumer elec-
tronics, and motor vehicles. Protective actions under Regu-
lation 288/82 tend to be confined to a limited number of 
Member States, but in 1990 EC-wide measures were intro-
duced for the first time. 
2.3.3. Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy actions 
The Community's anti-dumping rules were adopted in ac-
cordance with existing international obligations, in particu-
lar those arising from Article VI of the GA TT and the 1979 
Anti-Dumping Code. In applying these rules the Community 
seeks to maintain the balance of rights and obligations laid 
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down in Article VI and the Code. It also takes account of 
the interpretation of these rules by its major trading partners. 
The EC basic legislation is Council Regulation No 2423/88 
and, as far as coal, iron and steel products are concerned, 
Commission Decision No 2424/88. Complaints about dum-
ped ( or subsidized) imports can be lodged either directly with 
the Commission or via Member States. 1 After consultations 
within an advisory committee, including representatives of 
Member States under the chairmanship of the Commission, 
the latter decides upon the initiation of proceedings which 
are then carried out under its own responsibility. The in-
itiation is announced in the Official Journal. Interested par-
ties have a right to be heard and to express their views at 
different stages of the proceedings, after the initiation of the 
procedure and the introduction of provisional measures. 
The CouncilRegulation stipulates that an investigation shall 
normally be concluded within one year; it shall normally 
cover a period of not less than six months immediately prior 
to its initiation. In accordance with the GA TT provisions, 
both the imposition of provisional duties and of definitive 
duties are contingent upon the establishment of dumping 
(either by a preliminary examination or a final finding) 
and of injury caused thereby. In addition, EC legislation 
stipulates that measures may only be taken when the interests 
of the Community call for intervention. 2 
The Commission is empowered to impose provisional duties 
during the proceedings, to accept price undertakings, or to 
terminate proceedings when no evidence of dumping or 
injury could be established. If a Member State disagrees with 
the decision by the Commission the matter is referred to the 
Council; if the latter does not decide to the contrary within 
one month, the Commission's proposal will take effect. The 
introduction of definitive duties is decided by the Council 
(qualified majority) on the basis of a Commission proposal. 
As a rule, the Commission imposes provisional duties only 
after the preliminary finding of dumping and injury, pro-
vided that no price undertakings are agreed upon. The 
validity of provisional duties is limited to a period of four 
months which may be extended by an additional two months 
in certain circumstances. 
The initiative may be taken by any natural or legal person or any 
association acting on behalf of an EC industry, which considers itself 
injured or threatened with injury. In the absence of such complaints, 
Member States may directly communicate to the Commission any evi-
dence of dumping or subsidization. 
2 This applies both to the imposition of provisional duties (Regulation 
No 2433/88, Article 11:1) and of definitive duties (Article 12:1). 
Dumping margins are defined as the difference by which the 
normal value of the product concerned (e.g. in the exporter's 
domestic market) exceeds the export price. To obtain rep-
resentative results, normal values are usually established on 
the basis of weighted averages for a certain time-period. 
When no like products are sold domestically in the ordinary 
course of trade or when such sales do not permit a proper 
comparison, a constructed value is taken in most cases. The 
constructed value includes all production costs, 'a reasonable 
amount' for selling, administrative and other general ex-
penses, plus the average profit realized by the producer or 
exporter on the profitable sales of like products on the 
domestic market. 
As regards export prices, Council Regulation No 2423/88 
provides either for the use of actual prices or of constructed 
prices. The latter may be established when no export prices 
exist, when exporters and importers are associated, or when 
actual prices are considered unreliable for other reasons. In 
general, prices are constructed on the basis at which the 
products are first re-sold to an independent buyer. Allow-
ances are then made for all costs incurred between import-
ation and resale and for a reasonable profit margin. These 
components are excluded from the export price used in the 
determination of dumping margins. A dumping margin is 
calculated for each transaction. In establishing the average 
margin, transactions where export prices were above the 
normal value (involving 'negative dumping margins') are 
treated as if the price difference was zero. 
To prevent the circumvention of definitive duties by as-
sembly operations, the EC anti-dumping instrument _also 
relates to operations on the basis of imported parts and 
components (the so-called 'screwdriver plant legislation'). 
Under certain conditions, anti-dumping duties can be ex-
tended to products which were produced or assembled within 
the Community on the basis of imported inputs. 1 
As a general rule, EC anti-dumping and countervailing du-
ties lapse after five years (sunset clause). The date of expiry is 
published in the Official Journal in advance and, in addition, 
made directly known to the EC industry concerned. The 
latter has the opportunity to show that the expiry of the 
duties would lead again to injury or threat thereof. After 
consultation with Member States, the Commission can re-
open an anti-dumping or countervailing duty investigation. 
The party must be related to or associated with a manufacturer whose 
imports are subject to a definitive duty; the operation must have been 
started or substantially increased after the opening of the investigation; 
and the value of inputs used from the country of exportation must 
exceed 60%. 
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Between 1980 and 1990, 400 cases were initiated in the 
Community and 900 decisions were taken.2 Over such a 
period, the number of cases resulting in definitive duties or 
price undertakings has been on average about 14 per year, 
with some fluctuation from year to year. In 1991, of the 79 
investigations in progress, 21 ended with the imposition of 
definitive duties or price undertakings (see Table 81). A large 
number of complaints lodged by Community industry do 
not lead to the initiating of a procedure. It is estimated that 
nearly half of all complaints fall within this category. 
When looking at the impact of anti-dumping measures a 
number of qualifications need to be taken into account. 
First, the amount of the anti-dumping duties imposed is not 
automatically the same as the amount of the dumping mar-
gin established; when the injury caused by the dumped 
imports is less than the dumping margin, the amount of the 
measure will be limited to what is adequate to remove the 
injury. In the period from 1985 to 1990 the amount of the 
anti-dumping duty was, in nearly 50% of the cases, limited 
to the 'injury threshold'. Secondly, a large number of anti-
dumping investigations in the Community are terminated 
with the acceptance of price undertakings.3 This is consistent 
with the remedies permitted by the GA TT Code, even if the 
Community has made more use of price undertakings than 
other signatories. During the period 1985 to 1990 nearly 
50% of the investigations were terminated by this type of 
measure. 
As for anti-subsidy actions, the number of proceedings in-
itiated has been relatively small, and only seven measures 
have been taken between 1980 and 1991. They concerned 
imports of shoes from Brazil, steel from Spain (before be-
coming a member of the Community) and Brazil and, more 
recently, ball bearings from Thailand and polyester fibres 
and yarns from Turkey. 
The number of decisions is greater than the number of cases initiated 
because any case may concern several countries or exporters for each 
of which a decision is required. 
A price undertaking is a binding commitment from an exporter to raise 
export prices so that either the dumping or the injury suffered from 
the dumped imports by the domestic industry is eliminated. A price 
undertaking will be accepted only after a full investigation, after the 
exporter has had the opportunity to fully exercise his rights of defence 
and after a determination of dumping and material injury has been 
made. A price undertaking is often the outcome of an anti-dumping 
procedure preferred by the exporter, because it enables him to maintain 
his commercial relationship with his importer and a share of the market. 
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Table 81 
EC anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations (1 Jan. 1987-31 Dec. 1991) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Investigations in progress at the beginning of the period 21 39 53 60 59 
Investigations initiated during the period 39 40 27 43 20 
Investigations in progress during the period 60 79 80 103 79 
Investigations terminated by: 
imposition of definitive duty 9 18 10 18 19 
acceptance of price undertaking 8 5 9 3 
determination of no dumping l 
determination of no subsidization 
determination of no injury 4 5 5 13 6 
Terminated for other reasons 3 4 4 
Total investigations concluded during the period 21 26 20 44 33 
Investigations in progress at the end of the period 39 53 60 59 46 
Provisional duties imposed during the period 31 28 10 23 19 
Source: Tenth annual report from the Commission to the European Parliament on the Community's anti-dumping and anti-subsidy activities, SEq92) 716, 27.5.1992. 
2.4. Trade policies in selected sectors 
2.4.1. Agriculture 
Agricultural policy is included in Part Two of the EEC 
Treaty ('Foundations of the Community') and has often 
been regarded as one of the institutional cornerstones of 
the Community. The objectives of the common agricultural 
policy (CAP) are set out in Article 39 of the Treaty: (a) 
increasing agricultural productivity; (b) ensuring a fair stan-
dard of living for the agricultural community; (c) stabilizing 
markets; (d) assuring the availability of supplies; an~ (e) 
ensuring that supplies reach consumers at reasonable pnces. 
Since the early 1960s three main stages can be distinguished 
in the Community's agriculture. The initial decline in pro-
duction deficits; secondly, in the 1970s, a transition to self-
sufficiency and to a net exporting position for a number of 
major commodities; and finally, in the 1980s, the emergence 
of disequilibria between supply and effective demand. 
The change in the net trade position was accompanied by the 
progressive declining share of agriculture in total production 
and employment: the former fell to 4,6% in 1988 from 8,4% 
in 1960, while in terms of employment the corresponding 
drop was to 7,4% from 21,1 %. Rapid increase in agricultural 
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productivity linked to structural and technical improvement 
in the sector, the labour flow from agriculture to expanding 
industries, and low growth of demand for agricultural prod-
ucts have been major factors behind the contraction in the 
relative size of the Community agriculture. 
The EC agricultural policy is generally formulated by the 
Agricultural Council, attended by Ministers for Agriculture. 
The Council sets the broad thrust of policies on the basis of 
Commission proposals, while the fine tuning is to a large 
extent left to the Commission. The management of the 
markets is carried out in close cooperation with agricultural 
specialists from Member States within the framework of so-
called management committees. 1 
More than 80% of EC agricultural production is subject to 
common market organization. The bulk of production is 
covered by intervention mechanisms based on internal price 
support underpinned by ad valorem customs duties, variable 
levies (specific duties), and a system of minimum prices, 
In addition, regular consultations are held at the national and EC levels 
with organizations representing farmers and farm work_ers, processoi:5 
and workers in the processing industries, traders, agncultural credit 
organizations and forest owners. Twenty advisory committ~, four 
special sections and four joint working parties meet regularly dunng the 
year to discuss matters of interest at Community level. The consumers' 
organizations also take part in these meetings. 
compensatory taxes, and export subsidies. These measures 
are designed to support farm incomes, by making them less 
dependent on world market trends. Supply controls have 
also been added to the system over time. 
Tariff quotas are also used, and preferential access is granted 
for products originating from EFT A, ACP and Mediter-
ranean countries, and in the framework of the GSP scheme. 
For products for which there is no or insufficient production 
in the Community, total suspension of tariff may also be 
authorized by the Council. Certain agricultural products 
may also benefit from a favourable import tariff regime 
depending on their specific destination (Regulation No 4142/ 
87). 
Agricultural levies are established on the basis of weighted 
average values calculated for the relevant agricultural prod-
ucts. In general, the levy for a particular agricultural product 
is equal to the difference between a predetermined entry 
price and the value on the world market for the correspond-
ing product. Agricultural levies are, therefore, specific duties, 
which can be applied individually, or in combination with 
ad valorem duties, to which certain categories of agricultural 
products and their derived processed products are subjected. 
For agricultural imports from third countries offered at 
prices considerably lower than those at which Community 
production can be sold, tariffs are established through the 
fixing of minimum import prices and compensatory taxes, 
calculated on the basis of the prices applied by the supplying 
countries. 
As a result of the various import arrangements, about 55% 
of the Community's agricultural imports come in duty .free; 
almost 34% are subject to customs duties or to a combi-
nation of customs duties and levies or countervailing 
charges; and 11 % of total Community imports are subject 
to a levy. The Community remains the world's largest im-
porter of agricultural produce and foodstuffs, well ahead of 
the United States of America and Japan in terms of share 
of world trade. 
Export refunds are meant to cover, as far as possible and in 
such a way as to allow export on the basis of the prices in 
international trade, the difference between these prices and 
the (higher) Community prices. Export refunds move in line 
with changes in the world market price. The refunds system 
applies to cereals, fruit and vegetables, rice, sugar, isoglu-
cose, tobacco, beef and veal, pigmeat, poultrymeat and wine. 
It also applies to cereals, rice, milk and milk products, eggs 
and sugar exported in the form of certain processed goods 
not covered by Annex II to the EEC Treaty (as set out in 
Annex B to Regulations Nos 2727/75 and 2418/76 on cereals 
and rice, and in the Annex to Regulations Nos 2771/75, 
3330/74 and 804/68 on eggs, sugar and milk respectively). 
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In general, refunds are fixed at regular intervals by the 
Commission, in accordance with the management com-
mittees procedure. If the need arises, the Commission may, 
at a Member State's request or on its own initiative, change 
the refunds in the intervening period in order 'to react quickly 
to changes in the data which formed the basis for its calcu-
lation. In certain sectors, and subject to certain conditions, 
the refund is fixed by tendering procedure. In view of the 
mobility of refund rates and the need for operators to know 
in advance the relevant price levels, particularly in the case 
of long-term contracts, the refund can be fixed in advance 
for certain products. The rate of the refund may be differen-
tiated on the basis of the kind and quality of the product 
and its destination (to take account of the transport costs 
or the conditions in import markets). 
The rules for applying the refund system have been the 
subject of provisions common to all the sectors under Regu-
lation No 3665/87. Furthermore, arrangements for the ad-
vance financing of refunds, also common to all sectors, 
were introduced (payment of the refund in the event of 
warehousing for export and in the event of processing under 
temporary import procedure). 1 
In recent years, for major agricultural products such as 
cereals, dairy products and beef, subsidized exports have 
replaced intervention storage as the main tool for regulating 
the EC markets. These three groups of agricultural products 
account for the bulk of export refund expenditure in the 
Community, with cereals and dairy products each account-
ing for some 30%. 
Import and export licences and certificates were introduced 
under each common market organization. They are subject 
to common arrangements (Regulation No 3719/88) but the 
sectoral regulations may lay down specific rules for applying 
these arrangements, concerning in particular the period of 
validity of the licences and certificates and the level of any 
security deposit. Import and export licences have a triple 
aim: they are documents which forecast trade, instruments 
for administering the protective measures, and, where appro-
priate, instruments for the advance fixing of levies and 
refunds. Advance-fixing certificates perform only this third 
function. 
The import and export of certain products is subject to the 
presentation of import and export licences. For some other 
products, it is either import or export which is subject to 
presentation of a licence. Production of an advance-fixing 
Regulation No 3665/87 describes certain procedures to be observed by 
all exporters wishing lo receive an export refund, and also the methods 
of paying the refund. 
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certificate is always optional; it is compulsory only in cases 
where the operator wishes to benefit from the provisions 
relating to the advance fixing of levies or refunds. The period 
of validity of the licences and certificates varies from one 
product to another. Licences and certificates are valid 
throughout the Community, irrespective of the Member 
State of issue. 
Import and export licences confer the right to import and 
export respectively on the basis of the licence, under certain 
conditions, where appropriate with advance fixing of the 
levy or refund. The only effect of advance-fixing certificates 
is to enable the operator to benefit from the fixing in advance 
of the amounts indicated. The rights arising from the certifi-
cates are transferable by the holder of the certificate, for the 
period of validity of the certificate. 
The licences impose the obligation to import or export the 
net quantity of the product indicated during the period of 
validity of the licence, failing which the security lodged is 
forfeited. Regulation No 3719/88 describes, inter a/ia, the 
conditions and procedures for issue of licences, the use made 
of them, the verification of licences and release of securities. 
In the early 1980s the Community made extensive changes 
to the common agricultural policy, including a restrictive 
price policy, producer co-responsibility, easing of the role of 
intervention, the diversification and strengthening of socio-
structural measures. This reform was carried out mainly 
in response to the Community's own preoccupations. The 
objective sought was largely to restore a better balance to 
the agricultural markets, to promote the development of 
Community agriculture on a sound economic footing, and 
at the same time to ensure rational use of the available 
budget resources. 
Under this reform, the Community implemented a relatively 
wide range of instruments aimed directly or indirectly at 
limiting agricultural supply or preventing it from increasing 
too fast. These measures fell into two main categories: (i) 
measures affecting the support price, as a determining factor 
in farmers' choice of production; and (ii) measures affecting 
the quantities produced, either by limiting the quantities or 
by limiting one of the factors of production used (e.g. the 
land). As support prices were reduced, the mechanisms for 
intervention buying-in by public bodies were made more 
flexible in order to ensure that the market played a larger 
role. The second type of measures involved production quo-
tas and the set-aside ofland. From the inception of the CAP, 
production quotas were applied to sugar, production of 
which has remained relatively stable during the second half 
of the 1980s. 
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The introduction in 1984 of a system of production quotas 
for milk, followed by the reduction of the reference quantit-
ies, led to a major restructuring of the Community milk 
market. In 1988, the Community also introduced a voluntary 
system for the set-aside of arable land, under which pro-
ducers taking part received compensation for loss of earn-
ings. 
Despite the partial results obtained through this reform, 
certain markets were still suffering an imbalance or looked 
likely to do so. The problem of surpluses had not been 
solved on a lasting basis, and only fairly small-scale use had 
been made of back-up measures such as set-aside, extensi-
fication, and the system of income support. That is why 
the Community underwent a lengthy internal discussion to 
provide a new direction to the CAP. 
In May 1992, the guidelines for a major reform of the CAP 
were approved by the Council of Ministers. The reform was 
the response to the uncertainties arising from several years 
of increasing production surpluses and budgetary con-
straints. It aimed at a better orientation of agricultural 
production in the Community, while taking into account 
other objectives, in particular those related to the environ-
ment, the farmers' revenue and the local rural economies. 
The first Regulations for the implementation of the reform 
were adopted on 30 June 1992. The full implementation 
of the Council decision will take place over the period 
1993-96. 
The CAP reform still relies on the existence of a common 
price mechanism, a common external protection (variable, 
with floor or reference prices), and intervention buying-in 
by public bodies. But the policy mix has been substantially 
modified. The reform is based on three main orientations, 
as originally proposed by the Commission: (i) a substantial 
price reduction, to make prices more competitive on the 
internal and external markets; (ii) a full and lasting compen-
sation of the negative effects of such price reduction, with 
direct income support, decoupled from production, to farm-
ers; and (iii) measures limiting the use of certain factors of 
production (as in the case of set-aside schemes), together 
with stricter rules in terms of production quotas for certain 
products. At the same time, action will be taken to protect 
the environment, and to favour the early retirement of aged 
farmers and non-agricultural uses of land. 
With the reform, price support will no longer be the only 
instrument to sustain Community agriculture, and direct 
income support will play a major role. The growth of pro-
duction will depend more closely on actual market perspec-
tives. Furthermore, by modifying at the root its internal 
rules, the Community has shown its willingness to contribute 
to the effort to liberalize international agricultural trade. 
2.4.2. Textiles and clothing 
The Community maintains a number of bilateral agreements, 
and in other cases has agreed administrative cooperation 
concerning textiles, with signatory countries of the Multi-
fibre Arrangement (MF A), as well as with Mediterranean, 
Central and East European countries in the framework of 
economic cooperation or association agreements. At the 
same time, the Community maintains some autonomous 
restrictions vis-a-vis non-GA TT contracting parties and 
State-trading countries. 
The internal legal basis for the application of the present 
textile import regimes are Council Regulations on common 
rules for imports of certain textile products originating in 
third countries. Agreements with third countries are nego-
tiated on the basis of a Council negotiating directive, assisted 
by Member States within the Article 113 Committee. 
The Commission administers the bilateral textiles agree-
ments and arrangements, assisted in this task by a Textile 
Committee composed of representatives of the Member 
States and chaired by a Commission representative. 
The Community is a signatory of the Arrangement regarding 
international trade in textiles (MF A) and has accepted the 
1986 Protocol extending the Arrangement to July 1991, 
and its further extension to 31 December 1992. Within the 
framework of MF A IV, the Community negotiated, in 1986, 
19 bilateral agreements with restraints on the imports of 
textile products. These agreements are aimed at providing 
for an orderly and equitable development of trade in textile 
products on the basis of bilateral cooperation, with a view 
to eliminating the situations of market disruptions or real 
risk thereof. These agreements provide for quantitative limits 
and for a basket exit mechanism applicable to supplier 
countries' exports under specified circumstances. The Com-
munity has undertaken the commitment to refrain, in respect 
of products covered, from introducing quantitative restric-
tions under Article XIX of GAIT or Article III of MFA. 
These bilateral agreements expired on 31 December 1991 
and have been extended for the year 1992, pending the 
outcome of the Uruguay Round. 
There are substantial differences among the agreements as 
to the number of restrained categories. In the case of large 
suppliers, there are up to 40 restrictions. In the case of 
smaller suppliers, there can be only one or two restrictions. 
The Community quantitative limits are allocated among 
the Member States. There are also cases where individual 
quantitative limits for single Member States are applied 
without a Community limit. With six other countries there 
are agreements, or exchange of letters on textiles, with no 
restraints. 
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In the framework of the preferential economic cooperation 
or association agreements with Mediterranean countries, a 
system of arrangements for administrative cooperation has 
been set up by which the exports of certain categories of 
textiles and apparel products to the Community are closely 
monitored. The aim is to avoid export increases of certain 
sensitive products causing disruptions in the Community 
market. Should this occur, safeguard measures provided 
for in the preferential economic cooperation or association 
agreements would have to be invoked. Administrative ar-
rangements for trade in textiles exist with Turkey, Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Malta. They generally have a duration 
of 2 or 3 years. 
The recent association agreements concluded with certain 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe contain textile 
protocols setting the treatment accorded to their export to 
the Community. The previous bilateral agreement with the 
ex-Yugoslavia has been replaced by an autonomous regime 
pending the clarification of the political situation. 
The Community distinguishes 161 categories of textile and 
clothing products, based since 1988 on the Combined No-
menclature, of which categories I to 123 are the object of 
the EC textile policy. In total, by the end of 1990, the 
Community had 26 bilateral MF A-type agreements with 
Bulgaria and the USSR, and five administrative cooperation 
arrangements with Mediterranean countries. Four of the 
agreements are in the form of an exchange of letters: they 
do not provide for either restraint levels or for the possibility 
of introducing them. Two agreements do not provide for 
restraint levels, but provide for the possibility of introducing 
some restraints in the case of real risk of market disruption. 
On the basis of Regulation No 3420/83 ('autonomous re-
gime') certain textiles and clothing imports from State-trad-
ing countries are subject to quantitative restrictions at Mem-
ber State level. Quotas relating to these restrictions are 
authorized through Community procedures on a yearly 
basis. In some cases of countries having concluded an MF A, 
or MFA-type, textile agreement with the Community, this 
'autonomous' regime applies only to categories not covered 
by the bilateral agreements and to outward processing trade. 
Following negotiations with Central European countries 
(Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania) 
OPT quotas have been incorporated into the bilateral agree-
ments. 
In 1988, two-thirds of imports from countries with MFA 
agreements were imported under bilateral quotas, while the 
remaining third came in free of any restrictions. For prefer-
ential countries, 79% of imports were in categories under 
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surveillance and one-fifth with no monitoring. Combining 
the cases of bilateral and autonomous restrictions with sur-
veillance in preferential arrangements (although the differ-
ence between the two is substantial) the global picture at the 
beginning of this decade was the following: 
(i) only about half of all imports entered the Community 
under some sort of quantitative limitation ( or preferen-
tial surveillance); 
(ii) about one-quarter are subject to the basket exit mechan-
ism, but are not restricted; 
(iii) about one-quarter of the Community's total imports 
of MF A products are not covered by any form of 
arrangement. They come from industrialized countries 
and other unrestricted sources like ACP countries, Gulf 
countries and other smaller supplier countries not 
covered by any form of arrangement. 
As compared to the previous agreements concluded in the 
framework of MF A III, the agreements concluded under 
Article 4 of the MF A since 1986 reflect a more liberal 
stance of the Community trade in textiles. One-quarter of all 
previous quantitative restrictions were removed. All margins 
for either category transfers, carry-overs and cumulative 
application of flexibilities were greatly enhanced and new 
facilities for inter-regional transfers and optional conversion 
of quotas for children's garments were introduced. All new 
limitations were the result of negotiations with the supplier 
countries and no unilateral actions were taken. 1 
The Community is the largest importer of textiles and cloth-
ing in the world. Both imports from MF A countries and 
from other countries have increased considerably, as a 
whole, since 1976. Notwithstanding the decreasing average 
value of imported goods in latter years, the gap between EC 
exports and imports reached almost ECU 8 200 million in 
1990 and ECU 12 600 million in 1991. As a consequence of 
the very fast increase of shipments from MF A countries, the 
share of the latter reached almost 60% of total EC imports 
in volume. 
202 
Categories which are not restrained are subject to the so-called 'basket 
exit mechanism'. When imports from a given country reach a specified 
share of total imports, consultations may be held with a view to introdu-
cing mutually agreed limitations. The 'trigger levels' vary across five 
groups of countries and three product groups. Community action re-
quires the prior assent of Member States to a Commission proposal in 
the context of the EC Textile Committee. 
3. Trade agreements and preferential 
trade schemes 
3.1. The European Economic Area (EEA) 
The institutional links between the Community and EFT A 
countries have been largely determined by institutional 
changes in the Community itself. When Denmark and the 
United Kingdom (former members of EFT A) joined the 
Community in the early 1970s, the Community concluded 
Free Trade Agreements with the individual EFT A countries. 
The elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions in 
industrial goods envisaged by such agreements averted the 
imposition of tariffs by Denmark and the United Kingdom 
vis-a-vis the remaining EFT A members. 
The move towards the completion of the internal market 
coincided with new efforts to intensify the cooperation be-
tween the Community and EFT A, and led to the creation 
of the European Economic Area (EEA). Negotiations were 
concluded on 14 February 1992 and the Agreement was 
signed on 2 May 1992. After ratification by national parlia-
ments of the Community's Member States and of the EFT A 
States, and by the European Parliament, the Agreement is 
expected to come into force on I January 1993. Main objec-
tives of the Agreement, as stated in the EC Council's nego-
tiation directives for the Commission, are (i) free movement 
of goods, services, capital and persons throughout the EEA 
on the basis of the relevant EC acquis communautaire, by 1 
January 1993; (ii) strengthened cooperation in the frame-
. work of Community actions in other areas; (iii) reduction 
of regional and social disparities; and (iv) a surveillance 
procedure including a mechanism for dispute settlement. 
The free movement of industrial goods and processed food 
products in the strengthened Free Trade Area is subject to 
simplified rules of origin, 2 as well as mutual recognition and 
harmonization of technical standards. The Community and 
the EFT A countries are committed not to impose anti-
dumping actions vis-a-vis each other, while maintaining 
autonomous policies in this field. In addition to the rules on 
State aids and antitrust policy, the Agreement establishes 
the criteria for the cooperation between the two parties in 
the area of competition policy. 
Fewer and simpler documents will be needed to prove the origin of 
goods; the principle of cumulation will apply; alternative percentage 
rules will present an easier way of calculating the origin of goods; and 
a general tolerance rule will reduce formalities by allowing for a certain 
margin of error in the calculation of a product's origin. 
3.2. EC trade regimes towards Central 
and Eastern Europe 
Until the late 1980s, the Community rules on State-trading 
countries placed the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
at the bottom of the EC's hierarchy of trade preferences. 
Only Romania and Yugoslavia benefited from the EC's 
generalized system of preferences (GSP), while exports from 
Central and Eastern Europe have generally faced significant 
trade obstacles, often in the form of quantitative restrictions 
(QRs), set at EC and/or national level. 
Since 1989, however, the Community has been engaged in 
promoting the process of political and economic reforms in 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Developments 
in the latter countries induced the Community to reconsider 
its relations in order to support the changes under way. To 
supplement the network of Agreements with the countries 
concerned, actions were taken to ensure that Trade and 
Cooperation Agreements were concluded with those 
countries not yet covered by such agreements, while at the 
same time redefining their objectives and content. 
A number of import quotas were removed by the EC Mem-
ber States already in 1990, as part of the Community's trade 
concessions. Originally, EC-wide quantitative restrictions 
were to be gradually phased out in the case of Hungary and 
Poland. Subsequently, the extension of Operation Phare to 
other countries resulted in the elimination or suspension of 
QRs vis-a-vis Central and Eastern Europe. QRs specifically 
aimed at these countries and operated nationally by Member 
States were eliminated, whereas non-specific QRs (covering 
glass, shoes, toys, leather, some machinery, some non-MF A 
products and some non-ECSC steel products) were sus-
pended until .the end of 1991. The generalized system of 
preferences was granted to all five Central and East Euro-
pean countries. The Trade and Cooperation Agreements 
envisaged specific provisions for certain sensitive sectors, 
which accounted for a substantial portion of exports from 
Central and Eastern Europe. For textiles, the CSFR, Hun-
gary and Poland accepted an interim (not-renewable) ar-
rangement aimed at replacing for a year the existing bilateral 
arrangements, with a view to putting the three countries on 
a par with other MF A participants. 
Negotiations for the Association Agreements with the 
CSFR, Hungary and Poland started in December 1990 and 
were signed on 16 December 1991. The Agreements aim 
at the establishment of a free trade area and freedom of 
movement, as well as at economic and financial cooperation, 
with a view to ever-closer relations with the countries con-
cerned. The free trade area is to be established at the end of 
a transitional period, of a maximum duration of ten years, 
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divided into two successive stages of five years each, starting 
from the entry into force of the agreement (March 1992). 
Pending the ratification of the agreement by the national 
Parliaments, an interim agreement is currently in place to 
implement the provisions of the European Agreements on 
trade and trade-related matters. 1 Negotiations with a view 
to an association agreement with Bulgaria and Romania 
started in mid-May 1992. The trade component of these 
agreements is virtually the same as in the case of the CSFR, 
Hungary and Poland. 
On the Community side, the Association Agreements con-
solidate all the previous unilateral trade concessions, while 
laying the ground for the complete removal of all trade 
obstacles by the end of the transitional period. The trade 
provisions involve the immediate removal. of all quotas, 
while import tariffs will be progressively eliminated over a 
period ranging between 2 and 5 years. The Central European 
countries will reciprocate more slowly by phasing out tariffs 
and quotas over 4 to 9 years. As in the previous trade and 
cooperation agreements, the Association Agreements also 
contain specific provisions for certain sensitive sectors (tex-
tiles, agriculture, steel and coal). 
3.3. Other agreements and arrangements 
The European Community subscribes to the fundamental 
GA TT principle of most-favoured nation treatment whereby 
GATT contracting parties should, in their trade policies, 
offer the same treatment to imports from all third countries 
without discrimination. Yet, by virtue of other GA TT-
accepted principles such as the 'enabling clause' which covers 
the generalized system of preferences (GSP) schemes and 
Article XXIV, the Community does grant preferential tariff 
treatment both to groupings of industrialized countries with 
whom it has free trade area agreements (namely EFT A) and 
to most developing countries as well. 
The preferential treatment granted to LDC's reflects the 
Community's policy objective of giving support to the indus-
trialization efforts in the poorer parts of the world. Yet, the 
preferential treatment towards LDCs is not uniform. On the 
contrary, depending on historical and geo-strategic factors 
the treatment is 'more preferential' in some cases than in 
others. More precisely, a hierarchy of regimes, a sort of 
'pyramid of privileges', can be distinguished. 
Council Decision of25 February 1992, OJ L 115/1, 30.4.1992. 
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(i) ACP countries 
The Community relationship with this group of 
countries which includes a large number of least de-
veloped countries is the most extensive and privileged 
in the hierarchy. The Lome Agreement between the 
Community and most of the countries of Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific (a total of 69 since Lome IV) 
grants to those countries tariff preferences that virtually 
allow for duty-free entry of industrial exports without 
any quantitative limitations. Imports of agricultural 
products are virtually duty free as well and, within 
some quantitative limits and calendar restrictions, they 
benefit from reductions and suspensions in their vari-
able levies; furthermore, sugar and beef have a secured 
market access at favourable EC prices. Beyond the tariff 
and access benefits the Lome Convention also provides 
extensive financial support (inter alia, to support ACP 
export earnings), and substantial technical assistance 
(through aid projects). 
(ii) Mediterranean countries 
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Within a global framework common to all the countries 
of Southern Europe (Cyprus, Malta, Turkey and Yu-
goslavia) and the Southern (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, 
Tunisia) and Eastern Mediterranean (Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria) the Community has economic and 
commercial bilateral agreements of various kinds (co-
operation, association, customs unions, etc.) with each 
of those countries providing for financial and technical 
aid and granting important trade preferences for their 
exports to the Community. 
The extent of the trade preferences varies with the 
countries: they tend to be less than those granted to 
ACP countries for agricultural products but, for most 
industrial products, they allow for duty-free entry sub-
ject to tariff quotas in certain cases and to agreed 
bilateral arrangements, e.g. for textiles. 
(iii) The GSP beneficiary countries 
By virtue of its GSP scheme, the EC grants unilaterally, 
i.e. without any formal agreement and without involv-
ing reciprocity, a series of generalized1 duty reductions 
for imports originating from LDCs. The granting of 
these reductions is made on a year-to-year basis but 
within a scheme whose structure has been established 
until now for JO-year periods. 
To the extent that GSP concessions are, as a rule, granted 
to all developing countries, all LDCs are in a sense 'GSP 
countries'. However, because the preferential treatment 
within the GSP involves concessions that are less than those 
granted by the Lome Convention and the Mediterranean 
agreements, the only countries that effectively make use of 
the GSP scheme are the non-Mediterranean Asian countries 
and the Latin American countries. 
Outside the Lome and Mediterranean agreements, the Com-
munity also has various trade and cooperation bilateral 
agreements of a non-preferential character with other LDCs. 
While these agreements do not involve specific import con-
cessions, they normally include measures to facilitate and 
promote exports from those countries to the Community. 
Most of these agreements are with individual countries but 
some of them are with groups of countries instead. More 
precisely, the Community has commercial and cooperation 
agreements with the Asean, the Andean Group, the Central 
America Common Market and some Latin American 
(Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, etc.) and Asian (Bangladesh, 
China, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Yemen, etc.) countries. 
However, there are two significant exceptions to this principle: Korea 
and Taiwan. Korea, although formally a GSP beneficiary, has been 
explicitly, and on a temporary basis, suspended since 1988 from enjoying 
the preferences of the system. On the other hand, Taiwan, because it 
does not belong to the UN organizations, has never been granted GSP 
treatment. 
II - Statistical information 
Table 82 
Community trade by major groups of countries1 
Imports 
(%) 
Year Industrialized countries Developing countries Eastern STEs7 Total 
Europe6 extra-EC 
USA Japan EFfA Other Total Latin 0Ds2 Mediter- Asian ACP OPEC' Total (billion 
America ranean3 NIEs4 ECU) 
1970 21,7 3,4 17,4 12,l 54,6 7,9 0,7 9,4 1,5 8,9 16,3 38,0 6,4 0,8 61,8 
1975 17,6 4,2 15,6 8,3 45,7 5,7 0,7 7,5 2,4 7,4 27,9 45,7 6,9 0,9 132,9 
1980 16,9 4,9 17,0 7,3 46,1 5,8 0,4 8,3 2,2 7,3 27,2 45,7 7,3 0,9 282,5 
1981 17,2 5,4 16,8 7,1 46,4 6,4 0,5 8,9 3,3 6,0 27,0 45,4 7,3 0,9 318,3 
1982 17,7 5,7 17,2 7,1 47,8 6,5 0,5 10,0 3,2 6,0 24,6 43,2 8,2 0,9 335,4 
1983 17,2 6,4 19,2 7,1 49,8 7,2 0,4 10,3 3,7 6,5 21,0 40,6 8,6 1,0 341,7 
1984 17,2 6,6 19,4 7,8 51,0 7,1 0,4 10,2 3,6 7,2 18,5 38,9 9,2 1,0 390,6 
1985 17,0 7,0 20,2 8,0 52,1 7,3 0,4 10,9 3,5 7,5 17,8 38,4 8,4 1,1 406,6 
1986 16,9 9,9 23,5 8,6 59,0 6,0 0,4 8,5 4,9 5,9 11,5 32,2 7,4 1,4 334,6 
1987 16,5 10,2 24,3 8,2 59,2 5,7 0,5 8,6 6,0 4,9 10,3 31,9 7,2 1,7 340,1 
1988 17,6 10,7 23,4 9,9 61,6 5,9 0,5 7,8 6,3 4,5 8,2 30,1 6,4 1,9 387,9 
1989 18,7 10,4 23,0 8,6 60,6 5,8 0,5 8,3 6,0 4,4 9,1 30,7 6,5 2,2 446,7 
1990 18,4 10,0 23,5 7,9 59,7 5,5 0,5 9,1 5,7 4,3 9,7 31,1 6,8 2,4 462,7 
Exports 
(%) 
Year Industrialized countries Developing countries Eastern STEs7 Total 
Europe6 extra-EC 
USA Japan EFfA Other Total Latin 0Ds2 Mediter- Asian ACP OPEC' Total (billion 
America ranean3 N1Es4 ECU) 
1970 18,0 2,6 25,1 13,6 59,3 6,7 1,7 10,3 2,1 7,6 7,5 31,0 7,3 1,5 54,2 
1975 11,9 2,0 22,4 11,9 48,l 6,6 J,2 14,1 2,0 7,5 16,4 38,5 10,3 1,6 118,5 
1980 12,8 1,0 25,5 10,3 49,6 6,1 l, 1 13,4 2,7 7,9 18,1 41,2 8,0 1,2 216,7 
1981 14,5 2,2 21,5 9,2 47,5 6,2 1,2 14,4 2,7 7,8 21,2 44,6 6,8 1,0 265,3 
1982 15,7 2,3 22,1 8,9 48,9 5,2 1,2 12,9 3,0 7,2 20,7 43,8 6,3 1,0 284,1 
1983 17,4 2,6 22,0 8,7 50,7 4,1 1,2 13,2 3,1 5,9 18,4 41,1 7,0 1,2 300,6 
1984 21,0 2,7 21,8 9,5 55,0 4,1 1,2 12,3 3,3 5,2 15,6 37,4 6,3 1,3 350,9 
1985 22,6 2,8 22,4 9,8 57,6 3,9 1,1 11,7 3,5 5,2 12,8 34,0 6,2 2,2 378,7 
1986 22,0 3,3 25,5 9,6 60,5 4,0 1,3 11,2 3,7 4,8 10,3 31,5 5,9 2,2 341,9 
1987 21,2 4,0 26,6 9,9 61,7 4,0 2,4 10,1 4,4 4,2 8,7 30,8 5,7 1,8 339,3 
1988 19,8 4,7 26,6 10,l 61,2 3,6 2,4 9,8 5,4 4,3 8,6 31,3 5,7 1,8 362,9 
1989 18,9 5,1 26,1 10,1 60,2 3,7 2,4 9,9 5,5 4,0 8,5 31,8 6,3 1,7 413,0 
1990 18,2 5,4 26,5 9,6 59,8 3,6 2,4 10,9 5,5 4,0 8,4 32,0 6,7 1,5 419,8 
I The country groupings are not mutually exclusive, thereby giving rise to some double counting as well as exclusions of trade flows. OPEC includes Nigeria and Gabon whose trade flows are 
also recorded under the ACP. Turkey. the former Yugoslavia and Malta appear under the industrialized countries as well as under the Mediterranean countries. The excluded countries concern 
in panicular some South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, etc.), as well as some South-East Asian countries (Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, etc.). These countries are, however. 
included in the developing countries total. 
2 Overseas depanments and territories of the Member States of the European Community. 
J Ceuta and Melilla, Gibraltar, Malta, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Albania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Jordan. 
Newly industrializing economies of Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. 
Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Gabon, Venezuela, Ecuador, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Indonesia. 
6 Fonner USSR and GDR, CSFR, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Poland. 
7 State-trading economies of America and Asia: Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia, China and Nonh Korea. 
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Table 83 
Top 40 trading partners of the Community: Imports 
Countries Million ECU Share in total imports Cumulaled 
(current prices) 'Y, 'lo growth 
'lo 
1980 1990 1980 1990 1980-90 
United States of America 47 735 85 182 16,9 18,4 78,4 
Japan 13 968 46224 4,9 10,0 230,9 
Switzerland 15 746 34 338 5,6 7,4 118,1 
Austria 7 136 20 989 2,5 4,5 194,1 
Sweden 11 918 19 296 4,2 4,2 61,9 
Fonner Soviet Union 11 382 16 749 4,0 3,6 47,2 
Norway 8 301 16465 2,9 3,6 98,3 
China 1974 10 603 0,7 2,3 437,1 
Finland 4629 10438 1,6 2,3 125,5 
Canada 6 393 9 409 2,3 2,0 47,2 
Brazil 4 778 9 203 1,7 2,0 92,6 
Taiwan 2 241 9 159 0,8 2,0 308,7 
Saudi Arabia 27 619 8 224 9,8 1,8 -70,2 
Libya 7 488 7 888 2,7 1,7 5,3 
Fonner Yugoslavia 2 184 7 684 0,8 1,7 251,8 
South Africa 6 779 7 653 2,4 1,7 12,9 
Algeria 4435 6 940 1,6 1,5 56,5 
South Korea 2079 6 557 0,7 1,4 215,4 
Turkey 1 053 5 943 0,4 1,3 464,4 
Hong Kong 3 674 5 916 1,3 1,3 61,0 
Iran 3 601 5 798 1,3 1,3 61,0 
Poland 2 805 5 278 1,0 1,1 88,2 
Australia 2 587 4 822 0,9 1,0 86,4 
Singapore 1 886 4694 0,7 1,0 148,9 
India 1 841 4 553 0,7 1,0 147,3 
Nigeria 8 185 4 386 2,9 0,9 -46,4 
Thailand 1 263 4 105 0,4 0,9 225,0 
Israel 1660 3 467 0,6 0,7 108,9 
Morocco 1356 3 043 0,5 0,7 124,4 
Hungary 1430 3 004 0,5 0,6 110,1 
Mexico 2000 2 947 0,7 0,6 47,4 
Indonesia 1 278 2 863 0,5 0,6 124,0 
Czechoslovakia 1 544 2 786 0,5 0,6 80,4 
Egypt 2 385 2 299 0,8 0,5 -3,6 
Tunisia 1 380 2 250 0,5 0,5 63,0 
Iraq 9 640 2 214 3,4 0,5 -77,0 
Kuwait 4228 1 851 1,5 0,4 - -56,2 
Venezµela 2254 1 784 0,8 0,4 -20,9 
United Arab Emirates 5 286 1 509 1,9 0,3 -71,5 
Pakistan 467 1 461 0,2 0,3 212,8 
Total of the above 248 588 409 974 88,0 88,6 64,9 
Total extra-EC trade 282 532 462 720 100,0 100,0 63,8 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Table 84 
Shares of merchandise exports and imports by broad product group: EC, USA and Japan, 1980-90 
(current prices) 
EC 12 USA Japan 
Exports(%) Imports(%) Exports(%) Imports(%) Exports(%) Imports(%) 
1980 Agriculture 2,6 9,3 15,5 4,6 0,3 14,1 
Energy 6,7 36,7 4,3 33,4 0,4 50,6 
Manufactures 90,7 54,0 80,2 62,0 99,3 35,3 
1981 Agriculture 2,9 8,7 14,7 4,2 0,3 13,4 
Energy 7,6 38,6 4,9 31,3 0,3 51,1 
Manufactures 89,5 52,7 80,5 64,5 99,4 35,5 
1982 Agriculture 2,6 8,8 13,8 4,4 0,3 13,3 
Energy 7,9 37,8 6,4 26,9 0,3 50,5 
Manufactures 89,5 53,4 79,7 68,7 99,5 36,2 
1983 Agriculture 2,7 8,7 14,3 4,5 0,3 13,9 
Energy 7,2 33,9 5,2 22,7 0,3 47,6 
Manufactures 90,1 57,4 80,4 72,9 99,5 38,6 
1984 Agriculture 2,8 8,8 14,0 4,1 0,3 14,1 
Energy 6,5 32,6 4,8 18,9 0,3 45,3 
Manufactures 90,7 58,6 81,3 77,0 99,5 40,6 
1985 Agriculture 2,8 8,4 11,0 4,0 0,2 13,7 
Energy 6,3 31,3 5,3 15,9 0,3 44,0 
Manufactures 90,9 60,3 83,7 80,1 99,5 42,3 
1986 Agriculture 2,6 · 8,6 9,1 4,2 0,3 15,4 
Energy 4,0 20,2 4,4 10,7 0,2 30,1 
Manufactures 93,5 71,2 86,6 85,1 99,5 54,6 
1987 Agriculture 2,5 7,8 8,6 3,7 0,2 15,4 
Energy 3,8 17,7 3,4 11,5 0,3 27,l 
Manufactures 93,8 74,5 88,0 84,8 99,5 57,6 
1988 Agriculture 2,5 7,3 9,1 3,4 0,3 14,6 
Energy 3,1 13,2 2,9 10,0 0,2 21,4 
Manufactures 94,4 79,5 88,1 86,6 99,5 64,0 
1989 Agriculture 2,6 6,4 8,4 3,2 0,2 13,4 
Energy 3,1 15,0 3,2 11,7 0,3 21,3 
Manufactures 94,2 78,7 88,5 85,1 99,4 65,3 
1990 Agriculture 2,4 5,9 7,6 3,0 0,2 11,6 
Energy 3,6 16,0 3,5 13,6 0,4 25,3 
Manufactures 94,0 78,2 88,9 83,3 99,4 63,2 
The classification of goods is derived from the NACE·CLIO R44 nomenclature of products and branches: agriculture includes code I; energy products are defined as the sum of codes 3 + 5 + 7 +9 + 11, 
while manufactures comprise codes 13 to 51. 
Source: Eurostat, Volimex. 
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Table 85 
Community trade by product groupl 
Mineral fuels and lubricants 
Non-fuel crude materials 
Miscellaneous manufact. articles 
Food products and tobacco 
Other basic manufactures 
Chemicals and related products 
Industrial machinery 
Office machinery 
Electrical machinery and apparatus 
Road vehicles 
Clothing 
Telecoms and sound equipment 
Non-ferrous metals 
Other transport equipment 
Power-generating machinery 
Textiles 
Iron and steel 
Footwear 
Total 
Total imports (SITC 0-8) 
I Regroupings of SlTC 2-digit product categories. 
Source: Eurostat. Cumext. 
Table 86 
Share in total 
merchandise impons 
1980-81 1989-90 
% % 
35,5 15,3 
10,5 8,9 
5,4 8,8 
10,8 8,7 
6,3 8,1 
4,6 6,9 
3,7 5,9 
2,1 5,4 
2,4 4,7 
3,0 4,5 
3,0 4,5 
2,0 3,6 
3,2 3,3 
1,3 3,1 
1,4 2,6 
2,4 2,6 
1,8 2,2 
0,5 0,8 
100,0 100,0 
Billion ECU, cif 
265,9 430,4 
Leading products in Community (EC-12) external trade, 1981-90 
Impons 
SITC 2-digit product categories 1990 Share in Cumulated 
(million total growth 
ECU) impons 
(%) 1982-86 1986-90 
(%) (%) 
Petroleum and derivatives 59 699 13,6 -48,5 21,3 
Office machines 23 277 5,3 93,9 56,5 
Clothing 20 551 4,7 36,1 71,3 
Electrical machinery and apparatus 20 528 4,7 63,7 59,8 
Road vehicles 20 274 4,6 42,8 52,7 
Miscellaneous manufact. products, 
n.e.s. 18 063 4,1 39,0 78,6 
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Industrial machinery 
Chemicals and related products 
Miscellaneous manufact. articles 
Other basic manufactures 
Road vehicles 
Food products and tobacco 
Electrical machinery and apparatus 
Iron and steel 
Power-generating machinery 
Other transport equipment 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Mineral fuels and lubricants 
Office machinery 
Non-fuel crude materials 
Telecoms and sound equipment 
Non-ferrous metals 
Footwear 
Total 
Total exports (SITC 0-8) 
Expons 
Share in total 
merchandise cxpons 
1980-81 1989-90 
% •;. 
16,0 
10,8 
8,1 
10.5 
10,1 
9,1 
4,7 
6,0 
3,7 
2,5 
3,1 
1,6 
5,6 
1,5 
2,1 
1,9 
2,1 
0,7 
100,0 
15,3 
12,3 
10,8 
9,9 
9,6 
8,2 
5,4 
4,0 
3,6 
3,5 
3,2 
2,7 
2,6 
2,5 
2,0 
1,8 
1,6 
1,0 
100,0 
Billion ECU, fob 
228,7 392,4 
SITC 2-digit product categories 1990 Share in Cumulated 
(million total growth 
ECU) cxpons 
(%) 1982-86 1986-90 
(%) (%) 
Road vehicles 38 034 9,6 23,4 10,6 
Specialized industrial machinery 27 108 6,9 24,l 23,4 
General ind. machinery equip. and 
parts 25 987 6,6 17,7 24,7 
Electrical machinery and apparatus 21 635 5,5 26,4 34,1 
Miscellaneous manufact. products, 
n.e.s. 20 624 5,2 46,3 36,7 
Power-generating machinery 15 089 3,8 9,0 33,2 
Annex II - Statistical information 
Imports Exports 
SITC 2-digit product categories 1990 Share in Cumulated SITC 2-digit product categories 1990 Share in Cumulated 
(million total growth (million total growth 
ECU) imports ECU) exports 
(%) 1982-86 1986-90 (%) 1982-86 1986-90 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
Telecoms and sound equipment 16 009 3,7 57,8 70,8 Non-metallic mineral manufac-
Other transport equipment 13 884 3,2 44,6 174,5 tures 14 831 3,8 11,3 28,0 
Non-ferrous metals 13 410 3,1 9,9 61,0 Iron and steel 14 247 3,6 -1,1 -5,0 
Paper, paperboard and related Other transport equipment 14 086 3,6 -7,7 98,2 
materials 13 033 3,0 49,9 55,8 Textile yam and fabrics 12 823 3,2 35,8 19,2 
General ind. machinery equip. and Manufactures of metals 11 550 2,9 -0,9 15,2 
parts 12 329 2,8 33,2 61,0 Clothing 10 774 2,7 81,5 30,8 
Power-generating machinery 11 522 2,6 32,7 60,5 Organic chemicals 10 256 2,6 30,3 38,3 
Textile yam and fabrics 11 425 2,6 26,6 34,7 Petroleum and derivatives 10 081 2,6 -41,4 6,3 
Vegetables and fruit 10 248 2,3 -0,7 35,5 Professional and scientific instru-
Specialized industrial machinery 10 024 2,3 51,7 63,4 ments 9 900 2,5 52,7 19,0 
Iron and steel 9 090 2,1 16,4 36,8 Office machines 9 894 2,5 91,5 18,4 
Professional and scientific instru- Medical and pharmaceutical prod-
ments 8 923 2,0 53,9 44,1 ucts 8 746 2,2 41,8 28,4 
Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 8 750 2,0 12,9 17,7 Telecoms and sound equipment 7 174 1,8 23,2 15,0 
Organic chemicals 8 365 1,9 48,1 46,4 Chemical materials and products, 
Cork and wood 7 950 1,8 12,9 38,3 n.e.s. 6 991 1,8 34,0 28,9 
Non-metallic mineral manufac- Beverages 6 517 1,6 23,5 29,8 
tures 7 910 1,8 32,6 27,2 Metal-working machinery 6 219 1,6 21,8 16,0 
Manufactures of metals 7 210 1,6 26,9 54,5 Plastics in primary form 6 123 1,5 36,3 7 268,4 
Photographic and optical goods 6 616 1,5 42,3 35,3 Non-ferrous metals 5 971 1,5 11,8 21,1 
Fish, crustaceans, molluscs 6 396 1,5 67,6 58,7 Paper, paperboard and related 
Pulp and waste paper 5 454 1,2 6,4 40,2 materials 4 970 1,3 57,1 37,7 
Medical and pharmaceutical prod- Cereals and cereal preparations 4 921 1,2 -4,5 25,3 
ucts 4 959 1,1 65,7 59,6 Furniture 4 911 1,2 52,9 18,9 
Coke, coal and briquettes 4 914 1,1 5,5 6,3 Essential oils and perfume 
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices 4 877 1,1 55,1 -49,8 materials 4 820 1,2 40,7 43,7 
Gas, natural and manufactured 4 710 1,1 -10,4 -4,3 Photographic and optical products 4 562 1,2 27,4 19,0 
Textile fibres and their waste 4 528 1,0 26,4 10,8 Dyeing, tanning and colouring 
Plastics in primary form 4491 1,0 47,6 6 114,4 materials 4 363 1,1 38,6 34,5 
Feedingstuffs for animals 4 326 1,0 -0,6 ·-4,8 Footwear 4 214 1,1 73,4 19,4 
Metal-working machinery 4019 0,9 69,6 63,6 Dairy product and birds' eggs 3 546 0,9 -24,5 18,9 
Footwear 3425 0,8 15,3 102,5 Rubber manufactures 3 321 0,8 30,9 10,9 
Oilseeds and oleaginous fruits 3 336 0,8 -7,8 -6,2 Inorganic chemicals 3 272 0,8 20,2 23,9 
Chemical materials and products, Vegetables and fruit 3 138 0,8 57,3 17,7 
n.e.s. 3 278 0,7 54,9 44,4 Plastics in non-primary form 2 984 0,8 31,2 -61,5 
Cork and wood products (excl. fur- Meat and meat preparations 2 924 0,7 47,4 12,5 
niture) 3 240 0,7 11,3 60,0 Sugars, sugar preparations and 
Inorganic chemicals 2 815 0,6 15,0 -10,7 honey 2 147 0,5 -25,4 52,2 
Meat and meat preparations 2 738 0,6 -10,1 22,0 Machinery applicable to industrial 
Furniture 2 657 0,6 31,7 61,l plant 2 048 0,5 -6,4 9,7 
Leather products and dressed fur-
skins I 892 0,5 60,9 14,3 
Miscellaneous edible products I 823 0,5 16,8 64,9 
Total of the above 406 595 93,4 5,2 43,1 Total of the above 374 518 94,8 19,5 23,5 
Total imports 437 939 100,0 5,6 40,l Total exports 395 189 100,0 19,5 23,3 
Source: Eurostat, Comext. 
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Table 87 
Growth of Community trade volumes, 1980-91 
(% a .. ragt annual growth) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1986-91 1980-91 1990 
share 
Imports 
Total goods' 
Extra-EC -8,4 -2,5 -0,7 4,7 2,4 6,2 6,8 9,6 6,2 5,7 6,8 7,0 3,2 40,4 
Total 
Manufactures2 -4,6 -0,2 1.0 5,4 4,1 4,3 6,4 7,5 7,4 5,5 5,0 6,4 3,7 100,0 
Extra-EC -2,8 -0,9 3,0 9,0 2,8 8,2 9,1 13,3 8,3 7,9 7,1 9,1 5,8 36,2 
Total -2,2 1,0 1,9 7,1 4,0 5,4 7,7 9,4 9,2 6,5 4,6 7,5 4,9 100,0 
Exports 
Total goods1 
Extra-EC 7,7 -2,1 -1,2 7,5 4,3 -5,8 -2,1 0,7 5,0 -0,3 -0,1 0,6 1,1 38,3 
Total 
Manufactures2 2,7 -0,1 0,8 6,9 4,6 0,0 2,6 3,7 7,2 2,3 2,0 3,5 2,9 100,0 
Extra-EC 6,7 -2,4 -1,8 8,1 4,5 -7,0 -2,8 0,6 5,5 -0,2 -0,5 0,5 0,9 40,2 
Total 2,2 -0,2 -0,3 7,4 4,5 -0,9 2,6 4,1 8,1 2,5 1,4 3,7 2,8 100,0 
1 SJTC0-8. 
2 SJTC 5-8. 
EC = EUR 10 until 1985. 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Table 88 
Top 40 trading partners of the Community: Exports 
Countries Million ECU Share in total exports Cumulated 
(current prices) % % growth % 
1980 1990 1980 1990 1980-90 
United States of America 27 760 76 561 12,8 18,2 175,8 
Switzerland 22 702 41 340 10,5 9,8 82,1 
Austria 11 389 26 981 5,3 6,4 136,9 
Sweden 11 980 23 941 5,5 5,7 99,8 
Japan 4 810 22 721 2,2 5,4 372,4 
Former Soviet Union 7 808 13 614 3,6 3,2 74,4 
Norway 5 273 9 306 2,4 2,2 76,5 
Canada 3 542 9 298 1,6 2,2 162,5 
Finland 3 573 9 165 1,6 2,2 156,5 
Former Yugoslavia 4 276 8 521 2,0 2,0 99,3 
Saudi Arabia 7 833 7 756 3,6 1,8 -1,0 
Turkey I 917 7 722 0,9 1,8 302,8 
Australia 3 150 6 817 1,5 1,6 116,4 
Hong Kong 2 166 6 602 1,0 1,6 204,8 
South Korea 967 6061 0,4 1,4 526,8 
India 2 371 6 019 1,1 1,4 153,9 
South Africa 5 134 5 758 2,4 1,4 12,2 
Singapore I 756 5 689 0,8 1,4 224,0 
China I 784 5 318 0,8 1,3 198,1 
Israel I 719 5 240 0,8 1,2 204,8 
Iran 3 524 5 021 1,6 1,2 42,5 
Algeria 5 093 4 976 2,4 1,2 -2,3 
Poland 2 892 4 934 1,3 1,2 70,6 
Taiwan 886 4 917 0,4 1,2 455,0 
Egypt 3 397 4 153 1,6 1,0 22,3 
Mexico 2 491 3 881 1,1 0,9 55,8 
Brazil 2 704 3 653 1,2 0,9 35,1 
United Arab Emirates 2 125 3 567 1,0 0,8 67,9 
Morocco I 764 3 562 0,8 0,8 101,9 
Thailand I 619 3 429 0,7 0,8 111,8 
Hungary I 619 3 220 0,7 0,8 98,9 
Tunisia I 684 2 971 0,8 0,7 76,4 
Czechoslovakia I 405 2 909 0,6 0,7 107,0 
Indonesia I 288 2 841 0,6 0,7 120,6 
Libya 4 530 2 660 2,1 0,6 -41,3 
Nigeria 6 250 2 501 2,9 0,6 -60,0 
Iraq 4 029 2 076 1,9 0,5 -48,5 
Venezuela I 833 I 692 0,8 0,4 -7,7 
Pakistan 939 1428 0,4 0,3 52,1 
Total of the above 181 982 368 821 84,0 87,9 102,7 
Total extra-EC trade 216 670 419 814 100,0 100,0 93,8 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Table 89 
Import penetration of the EC market (extra-EC imports as a percentage of apparent consumption1) 
NACE code 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
22 Metals 21,3 19,5 20,4 22,1 21,6 21,8 21,4 21,5 25,5 23,8 23,3 24,8 
24 Non-metallic minerals 3,5 3,8 3,7 3,9 4,4 4,6 4,7 4,8 5,1 5,4 5,5 6,1 
25 + 26 ChemicaJs2 105,8 115,5 99,6 109,6 123,3 127,4 106,9 104,9 97,4 95,7 85,0 87,5 
31 Manufacturing of metal articles 4,0 4,3 4,4 4,4 4,7 4,7 4,7 4,9 5,3 5,6 5,6 6,2 
32 Mechanical engineering 12,6 14,3 14,3 13,9 14,8 16,5 16,l 16,8 17,2 17,8 18,l 19,0 
33 Office mach. & data proc. 
equip. 30,3 33,4 30,7 32,0 36,8 35,5 33,7 36,2 36,4 38,2 36,8 37,8 
34 Electrical engineering 13,6 15,9 15,9 16,4 18,4 18,7 17,6 18,0 19,2 20,2 19,9 20,9 
35 Motor vehicles & parts 7,5 8,1 8,3 9,4 10,9 11,2 11,4 11,0 11, I 11,3 11,6 13,l 
36 Other transport equipment 23,4 27,2 27,5 27,8 31,2 24,0 19,3 20,5 31,5 33,3 33,8 38,4 
37 Instrument engineering 30,9 35,0 35,6 38,2 42,0 40,7 39,5 38,7 39,4 42,4 41,7 42,7 
41/42 Food, drink & tobacco 6,7 7,0 6,9 6,9 7,3 7,0 6,1 5,9 6,2 6,1 5,8 5,7 
43 Textiles 8,9 9,9 9,8 9,6 9,5 9,4 10,3 12,0 12,5 12,8 14,0 16,8 
44 Leather goods 26,7 27,I 27,6 25,8 27,7 31,4 30,7 32,9 36,4 42,l 43,7 45,2 
45 Footwear & clothing 21,3 24,0 24,0 22,7 24,8 25,3 26,6 28,8 29,7 32,7 34,1 37,8 
46 Timber & wooden furniture 18,2 18,l 18,3 19,3 19,6 18,7 18,2 18,5 18,4 19,0 18,6 17,5 
47 Paper, printing & publishing 12,2 13,4 13,1 12,9 14,2 13,5 13,0 13,3 13,6 14,2 13,2 12,5 
48 Rubber & plastics 6,1 6,8 7,3 7,3 7,7 8,0 7,7 8,0 8,7 9,0 9,1 9,6 
Total 14,2 15,1 15,2 15,5 16,9 16,9 16,2 16,4 17,7 18,3 18,1 18,9 
Gross output plus total imports minus total exports. The Community is defined as EUR 9 during the entire period. 
Includes man-made fibres. 
Source: VISA databank. Eurostat. 
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Table 90 
High-tech products as a share of EC trade in manufactures with selected trade partners 
Partner 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Imports 
Extra-EC million ECU 19 309,7 30 345,4 40 284,2 56 678,l 61 572,4 65 446,1 78 705,3 92 875,0 95 794,2 
% of manufactures 27,1 30,9 29,4 31,7 30,6 29,7 30,8 30,9 31,4 
USA million ECU 8 320,5 11 884,7 16 575,3 23 106,9 22 814,9 22 039,5 26 152,5 33 332,2 33 532,3 
% of manufactures 44,9 43,3 47,4 52,0 54,2 52,5 51,6 52,5 52,l 
Japan million ECU 3 171,2 4 660,5 6 959,8 10 771,1 14 127,9 15 255,4 18 440,9 20 657,1 20 124,7 
% of manufactures 34,7 36,3 38,2 41,7 41,7 42,6 44,2 44,1 42,9 
EFfA million ECU 3 880,6 4 636,7 5 897,0 8 114,3 10 418,2 11 430,7 12 339,5 13 851,8 14 812,4 
% of manufactures 17,1 16,3 16,J 17,4 18,7 19,2 18,5 18,4 18,6 
Exports 
Extra-EC million ECU 26 590,0 35 413,9 45 451,7 59 009,9 62 149,8 59 230,2 62 952,2 71 221,7 72 509,9 
% of manufactures 20,5 22,5 20,0 20,6 21,l 20,J 20,3 20,3 20,7 
USA million ECU 3 431,6 4 450,8 6 801,6 II 486,7 13 494,6 12 884,2 14 113,9 16 122,9 16 449,0 
% of manufactures 19,J 21,9 21,2 19,9 21,5 21,4 23,2 24,3 25,6 
Japan million ECU 590,3 798,5 I 080,3 I 224,8 1 623,6 I 719,0 2 140,7 2 261,5 2 362,9 
% of manufactures 19,4 21,5 20,4 16,9 17,8 15,4 15,2 12,8 12,2 
EFfA million ECU 4 773,9 6 284,0 7 057,5 9 701,3 12 545,7 12 979,4 13 996,5 15 471,8 15 596,1 
% of manufactures 16,5 16,3 15,0 16,3 17,3 17,0 17,0 16,8 16,6 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Table 91 
Annual average growth rates of Community exports and imports of high-tech products by selected trade partners, 1982-90, in value terms 
(%) 
Extra-EC USA Japan EFTA MCIS 1 
Exports 
1982-86 8,1 18,7 10,7 15,5 6,5 
1986-90 3,9 5,1 9,8 5,6 7,2 
1982-90 6,0 11,7 10,3 10,4 6,8 
Imports 
1982-86 11,2 8,3 19,4 15,3 20,3 
1986-90 11,7 10,1 9,2 9,2 21,0 
1982-90 11,4 9,2 14,2 12,2 20,6 
1 MCl5 = most competitive developing countries. The group includes Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong. India, Indonesia, Israel, Macau, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand and the former Yugoslavia. 
Source: Eurostat and Comtrade database. 
Table 92 
Community trade in high-tech products: export/import ratio by selected trade partners, 1982-90 
Panner 1982 1984 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Extra-EC l, 1 1,0 1,0 0,9 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 
USA 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 
Japan 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 O,l 0,1 
EFTA 1,2 1,2 1,2 1, 1 l, 1 1,1 1,1 0,9 
MC151 2,0 1,2 1,2 0,9 0,7 0,8 0,8 0,7 
1 Sec Table 91 for definition. 
Source: Eurostat and Comtrade database. 
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Table 93 
Breakdown of trade in high-tech products by reporter and partner, 1978-90 
/%) 
Partner/reporter 1978 1986 A vcrage 1989-90 
EUR 12 USA Japan EFTA MCl5 1 EUR 12 USA Japan EFTA MC15 1 EUR 12 USA Japan EFTA MC15 1 
Exports 
EUR 12 * 12,9 2,2 18,0 14,3 * 21,7 2,6 20,2 14,3 * 22,7 3,2 21,6 16,0 
USA 33,6 * 6,7 4,9 21,2 34,1 * 10,3 4,1 21,6 34,3 * 11,0 3,9 25,3 
Japan 18,8 29,0 * 2,6 25,2 20,3 40,4 * 2,8 20,7 23,5 36,2 * 2,4 27,1 
EFTA 39,7 8,2 2,5 * 10,3 45,1 10,8 2,2 * 10,1 52,1 8,9 2,9 * 10,0 
Imports 
EUR 12 * 43,1 16,4 20,1 8,2 * 37,1 22,9 16,9 11,7 * 35,4 21,6 15,2 15,9 
USA 20,6 * 32,9 4,2 28,0 18,5 * 39,3 2,8 29,0 17,5 * 33,7 2,3 34,2 
Japan 20,6 57,4 * 6,5 14,0 15,2 64,0 * 4,8 14,4 13,2 57,1 * 5,2 21,3 
EFTA 55,5 17,4 7,9 * 1,9 53,3 17,1 12,l * 3,7 52,4 18,2 11,4 * 6,4 
Percentages add up horizontally. Thus, for example, in 1989-90 the USA, Japan, EFTA and MCl5 accounted for 63,5% ortotal EC exports. 
I Sec Table 91 for definition. 
Source: Eurostat. 
215 
216 
List of contents of European Economy Nos 1 to 51 
1, November 1978 
2, March 1979 
3, July 1979 
4, November 1979 
Special issue 1979 
5, March 1980 
6, July 1980 
7, November 1980 
8, March 1981 
9, July 1981 
10, November 1981 
11, March 1982 
12, July 1982 
13, September 1982 
14, November 1982 
15, March 1983 
16, July 1983 
- Annual Economic Report 1978-79 
- Annual Economic Review 1978-79 
- European Monetary System 
Texts of the European Council of 4 and 
5 December 1978 
- Short-term economic trends and prospects 
The European Monetary System 
Commentary 
Documents 
- Annual Economic Report 1979-80 
- Annual Economic Review 1979-80 
- Changes in industrial structure in the European 
economies since the oil crisis 1973-78 
- Europe - its capacity to change in question! 
- Short-term economic trends and prospects 
- Adaptation of working time 
- Short-term economic trends and prospects 
- Borrowing and lending instruments looked at in the 
context of the Community's financial instruments 
- Annual Economic Report 1980-81 
- Annual Economic Review 1980-81 
- Economic trends and prospects 
- The Community's borrowing and lending operations 
- recent developments 
- Fifth medium-term economic policy programme 
- The main medium-term issues: an analysis 
- Annual Economic Report 1981-82 
- Annual Economic Review 1981-82 
- Economic trends and prospects 
- Unit labour costs in manufacturing industry and in the 
whole economy 
- Documents relating to the European Monetary 
System 
- The borrowing and lending activities of the 
Community in 1981 
- Annual Economic Report 1982-83 
- Annual Economic Review 1982-83 
- Economic trends and prospects 
- Budgetary systems and procedures 
- Industrial labour costs 
- Greek capital markets 
- Business investment and the tax and financial 
environment 
- Energy and the economy: a study of the main 
relationships in the countries of the European 
Community 
17, September 1983 
18, November 1983 
19, March 1984 
20, July 1984 
21, September 1984 
22, November 1984 
23, March 1985 
24, July 1985 
25, September 1985 
26, November 1985 
27, March 1986 
28, May 1986 
29, July 1986 
30, November 1986 
31, March 1987 
32, May 1987 
- The foreign trade of the Community, the United 
States and Japan 
- The borrowing and lending activities of the 
Community in 1982 
- Annual Economic Report 1983-84 
- Annual Economic Review 1983-84 
- Economic trends and prospects 
- Industrial labour costs 
- Medium-term budget balance and the 
public debt 
- The issue of protectionism 
- Some aspects of industrial productive performance in the 
European Community: an appraisal 
- Profitability, relative factor prices and capital/labour 
substitution in the Community, the United States and 
Japan, 1960-83 
- Convergence and coordination of macroeconomic policies: 
some basic issues 
- Commission report to the Council and to Parliament 
on the borrowing and lending activities of 
the Community in 1983 
- Annual Economic Report 1984-85 
- Annual Economic Review 1984-85 
- Economic trends and prospects 1984-85 
- The borrowing and lending activities 
of the Community in 1984 
- Competitiveness of European industry: 
situation to date 
- The determinants of supply in industry 
in the Community 
- The development of market services 
in the European Community, 
the United States and Japan 
- Technical progress, structural change and employment 
- Annual Economic Report 1985-86 
- Annual Economic Review 1985-86 
- Employment problems: views of businessmen and the 
workforce 
- Compact - A prototype macroeconomic 
model of the European Community 
in the world economy 
- Commission report to the Council and to Parliament 
on the borrowing and lending activities of 
the Community in 1985 
- Annual Economic Review 1986-87 
- Annual Economic Report 1986-87 
- The determinants of investment 
- Estimation and simulation of international trade linkages 
in the Quest model 
Commission report to the Council and to Parliament on 
the borrowing and lending activities of the Community in 
1986 
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33, July 1987 
34, November 1987 
35, March 1988 
36, May 1988 
37, July 1988 
38, November 1988 
39, March 1989 
40, May 1989 
41, July 1989 
42, November 1989 
43, March 1990 
44, October 1990 
Special edition 1990 
45, December 1990 
46, December 1990 
47, March 1991 
Special edition No 1/91 
Special edition No 2/91 
48, September 1991 
49, 1993 
50, December 1991 
Special edition No 1/92 
51, May 1992 
- The economic outlook for 1988 and budgetary policy in 
the Member States 
- Economic trends in the Community and Member States 
- Annual Economic Report 1987-88 
- The economics of 1992 
- Creation of a European financial area 
- Commission report to the Council and to Parliament on 
the borrowing and lending activities of the Community in 
1987 
- Annual Economic Report 1988-89 
- International trade of the European Community 
- Horizontal mergers and competition policy in the Euro-
pean Community 
- The borrowing and lending activities of the Community 
in 1988 
- Economic convergence in the Community: a greater effort 
is needed 
- Annual Economic Report 1989-90 
- Economic transformation in Hungary and Poland 
- One market, one money 
- The impact of the internal market by industrial sector: 
the challenge for the Member States 
- Stabilization, liberalization and devolution 
- Annual Economic Report 1990-9 I 
- Developments on the labour market in the Community 
- Quest - A macroeconomic model for the countries of the 
European Community as part of the world economy 
- The economics of EMU 
- The path of reform in Central and Eastern Europe 
- Fair competition in the internal market: Community State 
aid policy 
- The ecu and its role in the process towards monetary 
union 
(In preparation) 
- Annual Economic Report 1991-92 
- The economics of limiting CO 2 emissions 
- The climate challenge: Economic aspects of the Com-
munity's strategy for limiting C02 emissions 
Eastern Europe and the USSR 
THE CHALLENGE OF FREEDOM 
GILES MERRITT 
E.ASTIEIRN 
EUIRC>IPE · 
AND 
THE USSIR 
The sparks of unrest 
that leapt from Berlin in 
November 1989 to 
Moscow's Red Square 
in August 1991 are 
firing an explosion of 
political and economic 
change. Out of the 
ashes of Communism is 
emerging the shape of 
a vast new European 
market-place stretching 
from the Atlantic to the Pacific. 
In his fascinating account of 
Europe's fast-changing East-West 
relationships, Giles Merritt argues 
that a massive rescue operation must 
be mounted to ensure the success of 
these changes. The upheaval of Com-
munism's collapse is 'The challenge 
of freedom'. 
Written with the cooperation and 
support of the European Commis-
sion, this book sets out to identify the 
key policy areas where a new part-
nership is being forged between the 
countries of Eastern and Western 
Europe. It offers a privileged insight 
into the current thinking of European 
256 pp. - Price: ECU 14.30 (excluding VAT) 
CM-71-91-655-EN-C 
Community officials, poli-
ticians and industrial 
leaders, and analyses 
the factors that will 
determine whether the 
emerging market econ-
omies of Eastern Europe 
can truly be absorbed 
into a single European 
economy. 
Immensely readable and 
often disturbing, this important book 
contains much up-to-date and hith-
erto unpublished information on 
such major East-West problem areas 
as energy, environmental control, 
immigration, trade relations, agricul-
ture and investment. It also examines 
the arguments surrounding a 'Mar-
shall Plan' for Eastern Europe that 
would emulate the famous US aid 
programme that helped relaunch the 
economies of Western Europe in the 
aftermath of World War II. 
For anyone concerned about the 
future of Eastern Europe and the 
USSR, whether from a political, 
social or economic standpoint, this 
book is essential reading. 
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Bulletin 
of the European 
Communities 
The Bulletin of the European Communities, which is issued 10 times a 
year (monthly, except for the January/February and July/August 
double issues), is an official reference publication covering all spheres 
of Community activity. 
It is compact, easy to consult (with an index and copious references to 
the Official Journal and to previous issues), logically structured (to 
reflect the main fields of Community policy) and wholly reliable. The 
Bulletin is an essential reference tool, describing the passage of Com-
munity legislation through all its stages from presentation of a pro-
posal by the Commission to final enactment by the Council. 
Thanks to its topical commentaries on the month's major events, it 
provides the student of European integration and other interested 
readers with up-to-date and accurate information about the most re-
cent developments in Community policy - the creation of a single 
market, economic and social integration, the Community's role in 
international affairs, etc. 
Supplements to the Bulletin are published from time to time, contain-
ing important background material on significant issues of the day. 
Recent Supplements have covered German unification, the Commis-
sion's programme for 1992 and European industrial policy for the 
1990s. 
The Bulletin and its Supplements are produced by the Secretariat-
General of the Commission, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Brussels, in the 
nine official languages of the Community, and can be ordered from the 
Community sales agents. 
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INF092 
~2 COMMOSS,ON OF THE EURO<'<AN COM•'-"mES 
National 
Implementing 
Measures 
to give effect to the White Peper 
of the Commission on the Completion 
of the Internal Market 
Sltuaflon at 30 April 1991 
The Community database focusing on the obiectives and the 
social dimension of the single market 
As a practical guide to the single market, INF092 contains vital infor-
mation for all those determined to be ready for 1992. 
INF092 is really a simple market scoreboard, recording the state of play 
on the stage-by-stage progress of Commission proposals up to their 
adoption by the Council, summarizing each notable development and 
placing it in context, and keeping track of the transposition of directives 
into Member States' national legislation. 
Using INF092 is simplicity itself. It can be consulted on-screen by means 
of a wide range of everyday equipment connected to specialized data-relay 
networks. Fast transmission, the virtually instant updating facility (several 
times a day, if necessary) and dialogue procedures requiring no prior 
training make INF092 ideal for the general public as well as for business 
circles and the professions. 
The system offers easy access to information thanks to the choice of 
menus available and to the logical presentation modelled on the structure 
of the White Paper, the Social Charter and the decision-making process 
within the institutions. 
Enquiries may also be made to the Commission Offices in the Member 
States or - for small businesses - the Euro-Info Centres now open in all 
regions of the Community. 
Eurobases Helpdesk { Tel. : (32·2) 295 oo 03 
Fax: (32-2) 296 06 24 
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Official Journal of the European Communities 
DIRECTORY 
OF COMMUNITY LEGISLATION IN FORCE 
and other acts of the Community institutions 
The Community's legal system is of direct concern to the 
individual citizen as much as to the Member States themselves. 
Both lawyers and non-lawyers, then, need to be familiar not just 
with national law, but also with Community legislation, which 
is implemented, applied or interpreted by national law and in 
some cases takes precedence over it. 
To make Community legislation more accessible to the public, 
the Commission of the European Communities 
publi~hes a Directory, updated twice a year, 
covermg: 
- binding instruments of secondary legislation 
arising out of the Treaties establishing the three 
Communities (regulations, decisions, directives, 
etc.); 
other legislation (internal agreements, etc.); 
agreements between the Communities and non-
member countries. 
Each entry in the Directory gives the number and 
title of the instrument, together with a reference to 
the Official Journal in which it is to be found. Any 
amending instruments are also indicated, with the 
appropriate references in each case. 
The legislation is classified by subject matter. 
Instruments classifiable in more than one subject 
area appear under each of the headings concerned. 
The Directory proper (Vol. I) is accompanied by 
1 064 pp. - ECU 83 
ISBN 92-77-77093-7 (Volume I) 
ISBN 92-77-77094-5 (Volume II) 
ISBN 92-77-77095-3 (Volume I and II) 
FX-86-91-001-EN-C 
FX-86-91-002-EN-C 
two indexes (Vol. 11), one chronological by 
document number and the other alphabetical by keyword. 
The Directory is available in the nine official languages of the 
Community. 
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EUROPEAN 
ECONOMY 
European Economy appears four times a 
year, in March, May, July and November. 
It contains important reports and com-
munications from the Commission to the 
Council and to Parliament on the 
economic situation and developments, as 
well as on the borrowing and lending 
activities of the Community. In addition, 
European Economy presents reports and 
studies on problems concerning economic 
policy. 
Two supplements accompany the main 
periodical: 
Series A - 'Economic trends' appears 
monthly except in August and describes 
with the aid of tables and graphs the 
most recent trends of industrial pro-
duction, consumer prices, unemploy-
ment, the balance of trade, exchange 
rates, and other indicators. This supple-
ment also presents the Commission 
staffs macroeconomic forecasts and 
Commission communications to the 
Council on economic policy. 
- Series B - 'Busintss and consumer 
survey results' gives the main results of 
opinion surveys of industrial chief 
executives ( orders, stocks, production 
outlook, etc.) and of consumers (econ-
omic and financial situation and 
outlook, etc.) in the Community, and 
other business cycle indicators. It also 
appears monthly, with the exception of 
August. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the texts are 
published under the responsibility of the 
Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs of the Commission of the 
European Communities, 200 rue de la Loi, 
B-1049 Brussels, to which enquiries other 
than those related to sales and sub-
scriptions should be addressed. 
Subscription terms are shown on the back 
cover and the addresses of the sales offices 
are shown on the third page of the cover. 
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Success in business 
depends on the decisions you make ... 
which depend on the information you receive 
Make sure that your decisions are based on information that is 
accurate and complete! 
In a period of rapid adjustment, with national economies merging 
into a single European economy under the impetus of 1992, reliable 
information on the performance of specialized industry sectors is 
essential to suppliers, customers, bankers and policymakers. 
Small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular, need easy access 
to information. 
The market must be defined, measured and recorded. Information 
is needed on production capacities, bottlenecks, future develop-
ments, etc. 
Panorama of EC industry 1991-1992 
Current situation and outlook for 180 sectors 
of manufacturing and service industries 
in the European Community 
1 400 pp.• ECU 110 • ISBN 92-826-3103-6 • C0-60-90-321-EN-C 
15/02/93 
OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
2, rue Mercier- L-2985 Luxembourg [Tel. (352) 499 28-1] 
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ENERGY 
A CHALLENGE FOR EUROPE AND THE WORLD 
Since it first appeared in 1985 Energy in Europe has become recognized as an 
invaluable source of information on both the policy-making and the operational 
aspects of European Community energy policy. Subscribers include leaders of 
energy-consuming and energy-producing industries and other decision-makers in 
the private and public sectors, as well as major consultancies and research institutes 
in and outside the Community. 
In the present situation within the Community, itself at the eve of the single market, 
and vis-a-vis the huge energy problems, as well as the potential, of our neighbours 
in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
the energy sector is of the greatest strategic importance. An understanding of it is 
indispensable in many areas of economic activity. It also constitutes a crucial factor 
within a debate of truly global importance, namely the protection of the environ-
ment, including the global warming issue. 
Energy in Europe continues to keep its readers abreast of the ongoing situation as 
regards overall policy, markets, energy planning, and the constant quest for cleaner 
and more efficient energy technology. 
Market trends and perspectives are covered in two regular issues each year, and also 
in a Short-term energy outlook appearing in the first half of the year and an Annual 
energy review at the end of the year which includes the world energy situation by 
region including EC Member States, the short-term energy outlook for the 
Community, and a review of trends in main indicators over 10 years. Further 
Special Issues are also produced in connection with major developments or events, 
including international conferences on or relevant to the energy sector. 
Energy in Europe appears in English but each issue also contains translations into 
French, German or Spanish of articles from the preceding issue. 
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Also available: 
·,-, 
reaty on European Union 
253 pp.• ECU 9 • ISBN 92-824-0959-7 • RX-73-92-796-EN-C - 1992 
Conradh ar an Aontas Eorpach 
253 pp.• ECU 9 • ISBN 92-824-0964-3 • RX-73-92-796-GA-C - 1992 
National implementing measures to give effect to the White Paper· 
of the Commission on the completion of the internal market 
Situation at 31 October 1992 
448 pp.• ECU 47 • ISBN 92-826-4973-3 • CM-76-92-875-EN-C - 1992 
Reports of Commission Decisions relating to competition - 1989/1990 
247 pp. • ECU 12 • ISBN 92-826-3868-5 • CV-73-92-772-EN-C - 1992 
Harmonization of company law in the European Community -
Measures adopted and proposed - Situation as at 1 March 1992 
518 pp. • ECU 54 • ISBN 92-826-4314-X • Cl-74-92-831-EN-C - 1992 
Green Paper on the development of the single market for postal 
prvices (Communication from the Commission) - COM(91) 476 fmalj 
371 pp.• ISBN 92-77-45007-X • CB,-C0-92-263-EN-C - 1992 
Farm take-over and farm entrance within the EEC 
148 pp. • ECU 15 • ISBN 92-826-3667-4 • CM-73-91-3.76-EN-C - 1992 
Copyright and information limits to the protection of literary and 
pseudo-literary works in the Member States of the EC 
lt2 pp.• ECU 27 • ISBN 92-826-3666-6 • CM-75-92-049-EN-C - 1992 
Social security for persons moving within the Community -
Social Europe 3/92 
154 pp. • ECU 19 • ISSN 0255-0776 • CE-AA-92-003-EN-C - 1992 
1:Jrban social development - Social Europe - Supplement 1/92 
125 pp.• ECU 9 • ISBN 92-826-4013-2 • CE-NC-92-001-EN-C - 1992 
Enterprise and people aspects in the information technology sector 
to the year 2000 - Social Europe - Supplement 2/92 
111 pp.• ECU 9 • ISBN 92-826-4537-1 • CE-NC-92-002-EN-C - 1992 
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Towards a Europe of solidarity: housing- Social Europe - Supplement 3 /9~ 
142 pp. • ECU 9 • ISBN 92-826-4567-3 • CE-NC-92-003-EN-C - 1992 
:fhe regulation of working conditions in the Member States of the 
European Community - Volume 1 - Social Europe - Supplement 4/92 
114 pp.• ECU 9 • ISBN 92-826-4996-2 * CE-NC-92-004-EN-C - 1992 
' 
EUR 14197 - Evaluation of economic effects: relevance and impacts· 
of EC programmes promoting industrial R&D with special emphasis 
on small and medium-sized enterprises (pilot methodological study) 
K. HORNSCHILD, F. MEYER-KRAHMER 
129 pp. • ECU 13.50 * ISBN 92-826-3817-0 • CD-NA-14197-EN-C - 1992 
EUR 14198 - Evaluation of the impact of European Community 
research programmes upon the competitiveness of European industry -
concepts and approaches · 
J. S. METCALFE, L. GEORGHIOU, P. CUNNINGHAM, H. M. CAMERON 
44 pp. • ECU 6.00 • ISBN 92-826-3818-9 • CD-NA-14198-EN-C - 1992 
Employment in Europe - 1992 
206 pp.* ECU 11.25 * ISBN 92-826-4559-2 • CE-75-92-106-EN-C - 1992 
Focus on the East - Energy in Europe 
157 pp. • ECU 19 • ISSN 1017-6705 • CS-BI-92-001-4H-C - 1992 
A view to the future - Energy in Europe 
176 pp. • ECU 19 • ISBN 92-826-3665-8 • CS-75-92-841-EN-C - 1992 
The finances of Europe, Daniel STRASSER 
439 pp. • ECU 18.50 • ISBN 92-826-2306-8 • CM-60-90-280-EN-C - 1992 
XXIst Report on Competition Policy - 1991 
446 pp. • ECU 29 • ISBN 92-826-3850-2 • CM-73-92-247-EN-C - 1992 
Europe in figures - Third edition 
256 pp. * ECU 16.50 • ISBN 92-826-3371-1 • CA-70-91-895-EN-C - 1992 
Inventory of taxes levied in the Member States of the European 
Communities - 14th edition . 
726 pp. * ECU 80 • ISBN 92-826-0417~9 • CM-59-90-855-EN-C - 1992 
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A common market for services - Banking • Insurance • Transactions in 
securities • Transport services • New technologies and services • Capital 
movements • Free movement of labour and the professions 
(Completing the internal market - Volume 1) 
}~9 pp. • ECU 17 • ISBN 92-826-3566-X • C0-62-91-001-EN-C - 1992 
iii 
R{:, 
The elimination of frontier controls - Control of goods • Control 
,I individuals • Value-added tax • Excise duties 
{Completing the internal market - Volume 2) 
88 pp. • ECU 17 • ISBN 92-826-3573-2 • C0-62-91-002-EN-C - 1992 
Conditions for business cooperation - Company law • Intellectual 
'froperty • Company taxation - Public procurement 
fCompleting the internal market - Volume 3) 
l(i pp. • ECU 17 • ISBN 92-826-3583-X • C0-62-91-003-EN-C - 1992 
~;:: 
Community social policy - Labour market • Employment and pay • 
Improved living and working conditions • Free movement of workers • Social 
Jrotection • Freedom of association and collective bargaining• Information, 
~onsultation and participation of employees • Equal treatment for men and 
women • Vocational training • Health and safety at work • Rights and. 
protection of children and adolescents • The elderly • The disabled 
(Completing the internal market - Volume 6) 
308 pp. • ECU 34 • ISBN 92-826-3609-7 • C0-62-91-006-EN-C - 1992 
;pie current situation, evolution and future prospects 
for agriculture in Yugoslavia 
,1;: 
Z::,, 
128 pp. • ECU 12 • ISBN 92-826-3485-X • CM-72-91-899-EN-C - 1992 
ti practical guide to cross-border cooperation 
112 pp. • ECU 10 • ISBN 92-826-3143-5 • CT-70-91-992-EN-C - 1992 
f! 
f992: a pivotal year ( address by Jacques Del ors, President of the 
tommission, to the European Parliament) - From the Single Act to 
Maastricht and beyond: the means to match our ambitions - The 
tommission's programme for 1992 - Supplement 1/92 - Bull. EC 
;,;;, 
~5 pp. • ECU 5 • ISBN 92-826-3841-3 • CM-NF-92-001-EN-C - 1992 
~V-
Research after Maastricht: an assessment, · a strategy -
Supplement 2/92 - Bull. EC 
f' 
~~pp.• ECU 5 • ISBN 92-826-4307-7 • CM-NF-92-002-EN-C - 1992 
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Europe and the challenge of enlargement - Supplement 3/92 - Bull. EC1 
24 pp. • ECU 5 • ISBN 92-826-4524-X • CM-NF-92-003-EN-C - 1992 
'.The creation of the internal market in insurance, Bill POOL 
~26 pp. • ECU 10.50 • ISBN 92-826-0246-X • CB-58-90-336-EN-C - 1992 
European Economy - No 44 - One market, one money -
An evaluation of the potential benefits and costs of forming an 
~conomic and monetary union 
351 pp. • ECU 18 • ISSN 0379-0991 • CB-AR-90-044-EN-C - 1992 
European Economy - The economics of EMU - Background studies 
for European Economy No 44 'One market, one money' 
Special edition No 1 - 1991 
248 pp. • ECU 18 • ISBN 92-826-1996-6 * CM-60-90-208-EN-C - 1992 
European Economy - No 51 - The climate challenge - Economic 
aspects of the Community's strategy for limiting C02 emissions 
f53 pp. * ECU 23.50 • ISSN 0379-0991 • CM-AR-92-051-EN-C - 1992 
Practical guide to legal aspects of industrial subcontracting within the 
~uropean Community - Volume I - The subcontract 
;118 pp. * ECU 11.25 • ISBN 92-825-9593-5 • CB-27-89-001-EN-C - 1992 
Practical guide to legal aspects of industrial subcontracting in ~ 
:European Community - Volume II - The legal framework of ,,_ 
$ubcontracting in the twelve Member States 
70 pp. • ECU 9 • ISBN 92-826-4651-3 • CB-27-89-002-EN-C - 1992 
r'l 
The rules governing medicinal products in the European Community -
Volume I - The rules governing medicinal products for human use in 
the European Community - Revised edition / September 1991 
t28 pp. • ECU 20 * ISBN 92-826-3166-4 • C0-71-91-631-EN-C - 1992 
[fhe rules governing medicinal products in the European Community -
y olume II - Notice to applicants for marketing authorizations for 
~edicinal products for human use in the Member States of the 
:European Community 
186 pp. • ECU 16.50 * ISBN 92-825-9503-X • CB-55-89-293-EN-C - 1992 
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[(be rules governing medicinal products in the European Community ;; 
[Yolume III - Addendum No 2 - May 1992 - Guidelines on the quality,,
1 
,arety and efficacy of medicinal products for human use 'ij 
~06 pp. * ECU 23 • ISBN 92-826-4550-9 • C0-75-92-558-EN-C - 1992 
f 
Jhe rules governing medicinal products in the European Community ~ 
;V" olume IV - Good manufacturing practice for medicinal products 
r 
d77 pp. • ECU 19.50 • ISBN 92-826-3180-X • C0-71-91-760-EN-C - 1992 
{., 1 
Jhe rules governing medicinal products in the European Community ~~ 
o/ olume V - Veterinary medicinal products 11 
,j 
158 pp. • ECU 14.25 • ISBN 92-825-9643-5 • CB-55-89-972-EN-C - 1992 
A 
.~ 
3 
,, 
rI'he rules governing medicinal products in the European Coinmunity ~ 
Yolume YI - Establishment by the European Community of maximmg 
residue limits (MRLs) for residues of veterinary medicinal products b:j 
foodstuffs of animal origin i 
1127 pp. • ECU 13.50 • ISBN 92-826-3173-7 • C0-71-91-768-EN-C - 1992 
Credit Institutions - Community measures adopted or proposed j 
~ituation as at August 1992 ;,j 
t: :(1 
41 
.,,; 
~56 pp. • ECU 37 • ISBN 92-826-4842-7 • Cl-76-92-293-EN-C - 1992 
New information technology in education - France 
110 pp.• ECU 13 • ISBN 92-826-4771-4 • CY-03-92-007-EN-C - 1992 
New information technology in education - Germany 
124 pp. • ECU 13 • ISBN 92-826-4683-1 • CY-03-92-004-EN-C - 1992 
, 
New information technology in education - Denmark 
138 pp. • ECU 14 • ISBN 92-826-4681-5 • CY-03-92-003-EN-C - 1992 
New information technology in education - The Netherlands 
108 pp.• ECU 12 • ISBN 92-826-4779-X • CY-03-92-011-EN-C - 1992 
New information technology in education - Luxembourg 
122 pp.• ECU 13 • ISBN 92-826-4777-3 • CY-03-92-010-EN-C - 1992 
,,,/ 
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Removal of tax obstacles to the cross-frontier activities of companies - Supplement 4/91 - Bull. EC 
67 pp. • ECU 4.25 • ISBN 92-826-3025-0 • CM-NF-91-004-EN-C - 1992 
Agriculture in Europe 
97 pp. • ECU 7 • ISBN 92-826-0476-4 • CM-60-90-418-EN-C - 1992 
Telecommunications in Europe, Herbert UNGERER with the collaboration of Nicholas P. COSTELLO 
Revised edition, 1990 
257 pp. • ECU 10 • ISBN 92-826-1640-1 • CM-59-90-346-EN-C - 1992 
European Economy - No 35 - The economics of 1992 
222 pp. • ECU 16 • ISSN 0379-0991 • CB-AR-88-035-EN-C - 1992 
European Economy - No 40 - Horizontal mergers and competition policy in the European Community 
98 pp. • ECU 16 • ISSN 0379-0991 • CB-AR-89-040-EN-C - 1992 
European Economy - No 45 - Stabilization, liberalization and devolution - Assessment of tbe economic situation and 
reform process in the Soviet U Dion 
191 pp. • ECU 18 • ISSN 0379-0991 • CB-AR-90-045-EN-C - 1992 
European Economy - No 50 - Annual Economic Report 1991-92 - Strengthening growth and improving convergence 
285 pp. • ECU 20 • ISSN 0379-0991 • CM-AR-91-050-EN-C - 1992 
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